Rebuilding the Iron Cage: Post-Failure Organizing in Newspapers and Investment Banks by Burg, Ryan S
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
Spring 5-16-2011
Rebuilding the Iron Cage: Post-Failure Organizing
in Newspapers and Investment Banks
Ryan S. Burg
University of Pennsylvania, ryanburg@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Journalism Studies Commons, Legal Ethics and
Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Work, Economy and Organizations Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/991
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Burg, Ryan S., "Rebuilding the Iron Cage: Post-Failure Organizing in Newspapers and Investment Banks" (2011). Publicly Accessible
Penn Dissertations. 991.
http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/991
Rebuilding the Iron Cage: Post-Failure Organizing in Newspapers and
Investment Banks
Abstract
Organizational failure is an incomplete process because routines and norms persist through employee careers.
Qualitative interviews with former employees from four newspapers and two investment banks, all of which
are bankrupt or disbanded, demonstrate ongoing utilization of routines and ongoing compliance to norms
despite severed connections to the failed firm. Routines are most likely to persist when they relate to low-
volatility processes that do not require maintenance to ensure ongoing accessibility. Characteristics that make
norms transferable are also identified. Adherence to aesthetic and pragmatic norms depends on how well they
fit into new occupational contexts: uptake varies in proportion to the similarity between the failed firm and
the new occupational setting of a failure survivor. Justice-oriented norms are not context-dependent; they
persist regardless of post-failure employment outcomes. In fact, justice-oriented norms are found to drive the
selection of new occupations as journalists seek normative consistency in their careers and some investment
bankers change careers to reclaim a sense of purpose lost in banking. These observations hold whether
survivors find employment in incumbent firms, entrepreneurial projects, or as freelancers. As survivors adapt
work practices, their efforts constitute a form of inter-organizational innovation that generates organizational
heterogeneity within unstable industries. Post-failure continuity provides an important and largely
undocumented mechanism for the preservation of organizational attributes and the diversification of
organizational form amidst crisis, an adaptive process that reconsiders the normative environment of a
business and selectively discards assumptions about how firms ought to be. Survivors of failure often face a
dilemma in deciding whether to attempt to re-create an occupational setting similar to the firm that failed or to
go a different direction. This work takes up this dilemma, asking what insight business ethics research can
provide for those who might wonder about the purpose of their firms. A theory of property is used to
articulate a normative argument: firms should fail when they are unable to cover their debts and externalities,
and firms should survive when they generate surplus value. The dissertation contributes to organizational
theories of evolution, to the study of career trajectories, and to a life-cycle approach to business ethics.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Legal Studies & Business Ethics
First Advisor
Diana C. Robertson
Keywords
organizational failure, clawbacks, business ethics, routines, norms, property theory
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/991
Subject Categories
Banking and Finance Law | Journalism Studies | Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility | Work,
Economy and Organizations
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/991
REBUILDING THE IRON CAGE:  POST-FAILURE ORGANIZING IN 
NEWSPAPERS AND INVESTMENT BANKS 
 
Ryan S. Burg 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
in 
 
Legal Studies and Business Ethics 
 
For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics 
 
and in Sociology 
 
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania 
 
in 
 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
2011 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor of Dissertation 
Signature_________________________ 
Diana C. Robertson, Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics 
 
Graduate Group Chairpersons 
Signature_________________________ 
Eric T. Bradlow, Professor of Marketing, Statistics and Education,   
Chair, Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics 
Signature__________________________ 
Emily C. Hannum, Associate Professor of Sociology and Education,  
Chair, Graduated Group in Sociology 
Dissertation Committee,  
William S. Laufer, Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, Sociology, and Criminology 
Charles L. Bosk, Professor of Sociology 
Marshall W. Meyer, Professor of Management and Sociology 
Valery Yakubovich,, Associate Professor of Management 
 ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to acknowledge the supportive faculty, family, and friends whose 
influences are too numerous to fully explain. I hope that the reader will forgive my taking 
some time to tell the twisted tale of this work. Though acknowledgements are often 
characterized by florid prose and subtle angst, I hope that this one invokes the sense of 
adventure that I’ve felt in learning, researching, and writing. Like so many of the 
journalists who I interviewed, I find tremendous amusement in the curious community of 
my occupation and in the work itself. 
I met Bill Laufer as an undergraduate member of the Student Alliance to Reform 
Corporations. We were interested in corporate accountability and in the responsible 
investment of Penn’s endowment. Bill was a helpful critic and supportive advocate. And, 
as any good teacher would, he encouraged us to reformulate our social concerns into a set 
of research questions and then to answer them. The question that captivates the latter half 
of this dissertation, “which firms should fail?”, arose first in those conversations with Bill 
over ten years ago, and Bill has been a supportive teacher, advisor, and mentor ever 
since. We share the belief that formal and informal social controls are the cornerstone of 
corporate responsibility. Bill has a special talent for turning problems into comedy, even 
a dissertation about corporate death and destruction.  
Diana Robertson has been a strong dissertation advisor and mentor throughout the 
development of this project. When I first asked her to join my committee, she said that 
she’d learn a lot working with me and the other committee members. It is hard for me to 
imagine that she learned as much as I did from her. Diana’s attitude, humility, and 
openness are remarkable and inspiring. She kept me focused on business ethics 
 iii 
throughout, and I learned some valuable lessons along the way. She was particularly 
insightful on the relationship between empirical and normative research methods, and on 
the larger implications of the project. 
Charles Bosk has provided invaluable input for me as a scholar and a sociologist. 
In a science that is always pushing for generalities, Chuck emphasizes the particularities, 
and my work is better for it. Conversations with Chuck helped me to realize how 
important it would be to provide the reader with a sense of place for newspapers and 
investment banks. This is sometimes difficult to do while sorting out theoretical debates, 
but if the reader learns something about these industries in reading this document, I will 
be greatly satisfied. 
I owe Marshall Meyer a great intellectual debt for his guidance at every stage of 
this project and for his work on organizational failure and performance. Without him, this 
project would not have been possible. Though Wharton’s faculty spend more time 
seeking performance than worrying about failure, Marshall, Rafi Amit, and Sid Winter all 
sought to account for failure processes in their teaching, and each of them was an 
important influence in developing an empirical account of post-failure organizing. 
Among the arresting insights I learned in Marshall’s class was a simple fact of academic 
life: “you have to learn to read more than you could ever possibly read.” 
Valery Yakubovich has been a supporter and constructive critic. I have learned 
from him as a student, co-author, and friend. In the complex mixture of organizational 
theory, business ethics, and sociology that come together in this project, I have come to 
greatly respect Valery’s analytical approach to inference and his insistence on thinking 
sociologically. 
 iv 
This dissertation is dedicated to C. Edwin Baker, whose research and teaching 
contributed to it significantly. In 2002 I took Ed’s constitutional jurisprudence seminar 
with three other students. Despite my being an undergraduate student among second and 
third-year law students, I felt welcomed as a scholar and collaborator. Ed was a 
wonderful teacher and planted a number of important ideas that have been growing in my 
consciousness ever since. My first assignment was to write a ten-page critique of Ed’s 
unpublished article disaggregating the normative aspects of property theory in 
constitutional jurisprudence (developing on a 1986 piece he published on the same 
subject). Ed’s work on the media, journalism, property theory, and normative pluralism 
are each palpable in different portions of this project. I was very sad to learn of Ed’s 
passing, and I am proud to contribute, in a small way, to his legacy. 
Three other intellectual contributions are worth mentioning. In a graduate seminar 
with Anne Norton I learned about Ibn Khaldun’s theory of Bedouin regime change. 
Khaldun thought that the city made the desert people soft and the desert made them 
strong. In contrast to Schumpeter, who thought that incumbents were destroyed by 
external forces of new innovators, Khaldun counted the forces of destruction as 
originating from within the excesses of the city. Once the regimes of the Bedouins 
collapsed in the city, the Bedouins would return to the desert where they would renew 
their strength and reduce their appetites for luxury. Post-organizational life is like 
Khaldun’s desert; teaching its lessons harshly, it strengthens the resolves of its occupants.  
Sidney Winter provided a number of important insights in his class and his 
personal correspondence, insights about limited liability and risk, Schumpeterian 
innovation, and strategic disbanding. Sid argued once in a memorable seminar that Kodak 
 v 
would have done well to recognize its path dependence in photochemistry and to 
strategically exit rather than attempting to enter the digital photography market. We do 
not often conceive of failure as a choice, but according to Sid, we should. This is a view 
that I have taken from Sid and used throughout my work.  
I also benefited in no small measure from Paul DiMaggio’s teaching and writing. 
Though this dissertation has only begun to scratch the surface of the evolving institutions 
of online journalism, I became interested that subject in Paul’s seminar on new media as 
an evolving organizational form. It was the last class that I took as a graduate student, and 
none could have been a better inspiration for my work since. 
Feedback has come from a long list of helpful colleagues and friends. This 
dissertation benefitted directly from conversations with Dan Forbes, Nien-hê Hsieh, Ted 
Baker, Jay Barney, Eric Orts, Danielle Warren, Katherina Glac, Rosemarie Monge, Tae 
Wan Kim, Gaston de los Reyes, Livia Levine, Tom Dunfee, Rob Phillips, and David 
Ashkenazi. Each of these people discussed parts of this project with me, and all have 
helped me to better understanding. Many other intellectual titans are acknowledged in the 
references. Kafka is not, but a number of people have helped to make my time at Penn 
less Kafkaesque: Lauretta Tomasco, Lowell Lysinger, Tamara English, Cherly Vaughn-
Curry, Carolanne Saunders, Audra Rodgers, and Aline Rowens have been incredibly 
helpful. The department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics and the Zicklin Center 
have generously supported my work throughout this project, including indispensible 
funding for transcription. Alix Howard, Kate Reese, Tracey Abner, and Maia Wilkes 
helped with interview transcription, for which I owe each of them a great debt.  
 vi 
I would also like to acknowledge Robin Leidner, Randy Collins, Rachel Margolis, 
Jerry Porter, Phil Nichols, Chris Bradie, Ellen Kennedy, Mike Housman, Cristina 
Biccieri, Andy Lamas, Sam Freeman, Grace Kao, Alan Strudler, Tom Donaldson, KC 
Tan, Andrew Norris, and Galit Sarfaty. Each has been supportive of me during an 
important part of my time at Penn. 
I thank my family and friends for their patience, encouragement, and support. I 
am very grateful to my parents, sister, and grandparents for their generosity and curiosity. 
I am also grateful to Vione, who has taught me more than she knows. Cheyenna, Annie, 
Hafid, Kyren, Manuel, ML, Alisa, Zeev, Emily, Rose, Paul, Drew, and so many others 
have supported me in every way that I could ask. No one person has spent more time 
listening, reading, and commenting on this dissertation than Imanni Wilkes. One could 
not ask for a better partner, proofreader, friend, and ally. Her efforts are silently lurking 
in every paragraph of this dissertation: shoring   up   gaps, Correcting Random 
Capitalizations, and banishing fragments of. I only hope that I can be as useful to her as 
she is to me. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the participants who took the time to talk to 
me about their lives and work. I am grateful to the newspaper journalists and investment 
bank employees who were willing to talk to me about their personal and occupational 
experiences in such detail.  
Dissertations are acts of social production in many respects, and several of the 
insights that this dissertation explores were realized through dialogue and discovery. I am 
very grateful for all of the support that I’ve received. I hope that my career provides me 
with opportunities to pay it back and forward.   
 vii 
ABSTRACT 
 
REBUILDING THE IRON CAGE: 
POST-FAILURE ORGANIZING IN NEWSPAPERS AND INVESTMENT BANKS 
Ryan S. Burg 
Diana C. Robertson 
Organizational failure is an incomplete process because routines and norms persist 
through employee careers. Qualitative interviews with former employees from four 
newspapers and two investment banks, all of which are bankrupt or disbanded, 
demonstrate ongoing utilization of routines and ongoing compliance to norms despite 
severed connections to the failed firm. Routines are most likely to persist when they 
relate to low-volatility processes that do not require maintenance to ensure ongoing 
accessibility. Characteristics that make norms transferable are also identified. Adherence 
to aesthetic and pragmatic norms depends on how well they fit into new occupational 
contexts: uptake varies in proportion to the similarity between the failed firm and the new 
occupational setting of a failure survivor. Justice-oriented norms are not context-
dependent; they persist regardless of post-failure employment outcomes. In fact, justice-
oriented norms are found to drive the selection of new occupations as journalists seek 
normative consistency in their careers and some investment bankers change careers to 
reclaim a sense of purpose lost in banking. These observations hold whether survivors 
find employment in incumbent firms, entrepreneurial projects, or as freelancers. As 
survivors adapt work practices, their efforts constitute a form of inter-organizational 
innovation that generates organizational heterogeneity within unstable industries. Post-
failure continuity provides an important and largely undocumented mechanism for the 
preservation of organizational attributes and the diversification of organizational form 
amidst crisis, an adaptive process that reconsiders the normative environment of a 
business and selectively discards assumptions about how firms ought to be. Survivors of 
failure often face a dilemma in deciding whether to attempt to re-create an occupational 
setting similar to the firm that failed or to go a different direction.  This work takes up 
this dilemma, asking what insight business ethics research can provide for those who 
might wonder about the purpose of their firms. A theory of property is used to articulate a 
normative argument: firms should fail when they are unable to cover their debts and 
externalities, and firms should survive when they generate surplus value. The dissertation 
contributes to organizational theories of evolution, to the study of career trajectories, and 
to a life-cycle approach to business ethics.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
ORGANIZATIONAL FAILURE AND 
THE PERSISTENCE OF NORMS AND ROUTINES 
Introduction 
This dissertation focuses on the post-failure persistence of organizational norms 
and routines in newspapers and investment banks. Both industries were experiencing 
tumultuous reorganization throughout the study period from 2008 to 2011, and both 
demonstrate strong continuities linking failed firms to other organizations through 
employee careers. From failed firms, journalists carry their aesthetic for what makes a 
good story and their justice orientations for whom news ought to serve. These are norms 
that newspapers instill, and they persist even after organizational failure. Investment 
banks also persist beyond failure in the way that employees conceive of financial models 
and the way that they put together computer presentations, among other continuities 
discussed in detail below. 
The finding that firms survive failure is surprising; the finding that people seek 
consistency in their careers is not. In order to develop this account, I had to forge a 
linkage between organizational level phenomena such as norms and routines and 
individual level phenomena such as careers and job mobility. I claim that this is a 
strength rather than a weakness in my argument insofar as it forges a new path for the 
recognition of complex organizational processes in industries where firms fail and new 
organizations emerge. Dynamic industries present a moving target that is extremely 
difficult to characterize at any level of analysis. When Whyte wrote The Organization 
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Man (1956), an organization could be characterized without much messiness in levels of 
analysis. Employees remained within their firms long-term, so that they were the firm 
and the firm was them. What was essentially organizational was the fact that these 
entities endured with relative stability despite the eventual replacement of their human 
substance. The organization was a fixed point through which people moved. Self-
selection and socialization processes imposed dominant organizational norms, routines, 
and behaviors onto Whyte’s organization, fixing these processes within a single entity.  
In contrast, newspapers and investment banks, like many modern firms, cannot be 
characterized in this way. Journalist careers traverse numerous newspapers as they work 
from small-town papers with limited circulations into mainstream papers with a wider 
readership. A large portion of the labor supply is constantly shuffling, working toward a 
coveted post at a large metropolitan daily newspaper. Similarly, many investment bank 
employees never intended to stay put within their firms; most are counseled against this 
career strategy. Instead, they hope to be “poached” by another firm, often shortly after 
annual bonuses have been distributed. 
Though these bankers and journalists are not organization men (and women) in 
Whyte’s sense, they are organized by their firm associations. Within firms they learn 
policies, strategies, expectations, skills, and a sense of purpose. They learn routines and 
norms that they continue to invoke throughout their careers regardless of the persistence 
of the firm where the learning took place. For example, many universities have hired 
journalists who were laid off by failing papers to write about their students, faculty, and 
alumni. We cannot understand the organizations in which these people work without 
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reference to the newspapers that trained and normed their employees. Likewise, we 
cannot understand hedge funds without reference to the investment banks at which their 
employees learned their trade.  
The changed nature of careers has been the subject of considerable discussion and 
debate in management research and the sociology of work (Arthur and Rousseau 1996; 
Cappelli 1999; Hall 2002). Observations of the likelihood of career transitions are hardly 
new (Abbott 1989). What is changing is the way that these career transitions are coming 
to serve as a central component of traditionally organizational phenomena. For instance, 
prior occupational experience is now being recognized as a central factor in job 
performance (Dokko, Wilk, and Rothbard 2009).  
Is this a study of organizations or a study of careers? Clearly, it is both. For those 
who are interested in layoffs and job mobility, the reshuffling of labor during 
organizational failure offers an interesting research setting for outcomes of interest like 
human capital investment, retraining, innovation, and job satisfaction. For the 
organizational theorist who is interested in organizational failure, and in routines and 
norms as organization-level phenomena, the results of the study apply even more directly 
to these conversations.   
Before reviewing related literature, a word should be said about the concept of 
failure used in this study. My sample is comprised of firms that had declared bankruptcy 
and conducted significant layoffs; some of these firms disbanded completely. Under this 
multi-stakeholder conception, “failure” is conceived as an organizational event that 
displaces people from work. Some leave on their own accord, and others are forced out. 
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Academics invoke the concept of “failure” in many different ways. Medical devices fail 
when they cease to function within specified parameters: a heart valve has failed when it 
no longer regulates the flow of blood. Power grids fail when they are unable to regulate 
current. The grid persists, but its failure is a recognizable incident of aberrant behavior. 
We talk about failure at multiple levels in some settings, for instance, we describe failing 
students within failing classrooms within failing schools, a nesting of failure that goes all 
the way up to a federal government and might drill down to a failing grade on a single 
assignment. I use “failure” in keeping with the tradition of organizational analysis and 
population ecology, indicating underperformance in key outcomes for multiple 
stakeholders. Failure, thus conceived, is associated with organizations disbanding, but 
some failing organizations persist despite underperformance (Meyer and Zucker 1989).  
The remainder of this chapter surveys organizational theories of failure and 
employee transition. The first section documents the gap in research that would connect 
failed firms to other organizational outcomes. The second section surveys research 
suggesting the likelihood of a connection, but given the disparate and underdeveloped 
linkage, a grounded theory approach is undertaken. The third and final section documents 
some of the contributions that this study makes to the literature. 
Oversights of Theory and Practice 
Organizational research addresses every part of the organizational life cycle 
(Kimberly and Miles 1980; Quinn and Cameron 1983) except the part that cycles: that is, 
the part that connects the end to the beginning. Until the late 1970s, there was very little 
research on failure, and entrepreneurship research was limited to backward-looking 
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studies of firms that had survived. Since then, research has filled out on both ends of the 
life course. Due to the emergence of ecological approaches to organizational analysis 
(Hannan and Freeman 1989; Singh and Lumsden 1990), organizational death has taken 
its rightful place as an important subject for managerial study (Levinthal 1991). Failure is 
studied as a byproduct of decline (Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987; Weitzel and 
Jonsson 1989; Whetten 1987) and a more general occurrence that befalls even newly 
minted firms (Bruderl and Schussler 1990; Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan 1983; 
Swaminathan 1996). Industry-level studies are complemented by process studies of 
organizational death at the firm level (Harris and Sutton 1986; Sutton 1983). Ideas that 
were once fundamentally distinct, like death and growth, are now recognized as related 
phenomena (Barron, West, and Hannan 1994; Walsh and Bartunek In Press).  
Meanwhile, entrepreneurship theory provides an increasingly detailed portrait of 
firm emergence. The many studies based upon Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 
and Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) datasets provide insight into the 
fates of entrepreneurs (Reynolds and Curtin 2008). Entrepreneurship scholars and 
organizational theorists are starting to look back even further in an effort to understand 
the origins of firms. The necessary theoretical groundwork to begin forging the 
connection between organizational failure, established firms, and new venture formation 
exists in studies that take personal histories seriously. These include research on the 
enduring importance of founders (Beckman and Burton 2008), the career histories 
grounding venture formation (Burton, Sørensen, and Beckman 2002), backgrounds that 
predate entrepreneurship (Dobrev and Barnett 2005; Sørensen and Phillips 2008), the 
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inter-organizational transferability of gender inequality (Phillips 2005), and the broader 
genealogical origins of organizations (Phillips 2002). The post-failure connection is 
increasingly focal to understanding a subset of organizational processes that motivate 
strong organizational identities, as observed in Walsh and Bartunek’s forthcoming study, 
but the specific boundaries of what transfers and what does not have yet to be tested. 
Through an exploration of post-failure transfers, we may have reason to revise 
some of the basic assumptions of how organizations work to account for the history that 
they derive from their employees. For instance, “new” organizations founded from the 
shells of failed firms may not lack legitimacy as many new firms do (Singh, Tucker, and 
House 1986). Similarly, evolutionary perspectives that view organizational failure as a 
selection event (Aldrich and Ruef 2006; Nelson and Winter 1982) might be updated to 
recognize the selective uptake of organizational norms and routines among displaced 
workers. There is room for an understanding of organizational death as incomplete 
(Hoetker and Agarwal 2007), adaptive (McKinley 1993), and educational to the 
population (Miner et al. 1999), but the broader framework is only emerging recently. 
A small literature on organizational genealogies and the organizational afterlife 
has finally bridged the gap between failures and post-failure projects, but a deeper rift 
continues to divide the underlying disciplines and methodologies that support post-failure 
research. What is the level of analysis at which post-failure transformations occur? Are 
these individual, organizational, or relational processes? As an individual-level 
phenomenon, it is clear that occupational identities persist despite the collapse of the 
organizations in which identities were established and through the mechanism of 
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entrepreneurship (Walsh and Bartunek in press). As an organization-level phenomenon, it 
seems similarly probable that organizational routines also survive failure (Hoetker and 
Agarwal 2007).  
It is surprising to no one that people are creatures of habit and firms are path-
dependent. But mixing these two observations to understand the process of post-failure 
organizing yields a very different understanding of both firms and the people who inhabit 
them. Failed routines and norms become proto-organizational substance that can be 
reconfigured within emergent firms. Individual identities become motivating forces that 
help organizational logics to endure. 
Small discontinuities in the use of norms and routines do not indicate their 
destruction. Instead, these processes should be presumed dormant. I use the prefix 
“proto” to indicate this dormancy. That prefix is most often used to indicate the primitive 
state of noun, as in “prototype.” The use is appropriate for proto-routines (Hsu and 
Marino 2010) and proto-norms, which are both dormant remnants of a failed firm, and 
potential components of a new organization. Proto-norms and proto-routines provide 
survivors of organizational failure with a toolkit for their subsequent projects. These tools 
shape some of the decisions that survivors make, and the tools are also reshaped through 
a deliberate process of adaptation. Though many of the routines and norms that persist 
are tacit and assumed, survivors deliberately select others. A survivor’s decision to utilize 
a routine or norm cannot be justified by the mere fact of its having existed in another 
organization, particularly not an organization that failed. Unlike established firms, 
emergent organizations cannot discard an alternative based upon a “not invented here” 
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mentality because, in a very real sense, there is no “here.” When survivors blame a given 
firm’s failure on a dysfunctional routine, it is discarded. If, however, they believe the 
routine to have been functional despite the firm’s failure, its resurrection becomes more 
likely. The implications have immediate bearing on some of the central topics of 
managerial research, particularly innovation and organizational evolution. 
Proto-organizational processes find differential expression depending upon the 
career trajectories of the individual employees who carry them, on the characteristics of 
the failed firm, and on the characteristics of the environment and organization in which 
displaced workers organize. The phenomenon can only be understood at the interface of 
three levels of analysis: persons, networks, and organizations. Yet the context provides 
some clues for disentangling these factors in an unusual way. Amidst failure, one can 
observe the informal organization outside of the established hierarchy through which it 
emerged.  
Project Overview 
The key empirical question pursued within this study concerns the post-failure 
fates of organizational processes: are the workplace routines of a firm lost when that firm 
fails? Does adherence to the norms of a firm cease when that firm fails? Are norms and 
routines transferred to incumbent firms? How do the resultant structures of work and 
organization change through the process of post-failure organizing?  
The key normative question concerns these same fates. It seeks in business ethics 
answers to the dilemma faced by many survivors of failure: the question of which firms 
should fail. Though the question of survival and failure is most pronounced for the 
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managers, creditors, bankruptcy courts, and shareholders who are often involved in the 
discussion leading up to an organization being disbanded, the post-failure context 
provides a survivor of failure with a related question of whether the norms and routines 
of a failed firm ought to survive, and unlike the formal organization of the firm, every 
employee has opportunities to re-create aspects of the failed firm. 
The remainder of this chapter links the post-failure process with organizational 
and economic theory, laying out the conceptual landscape. The second chapter focuses on 
methodological strategies for post-failure analysis. The third chapter reports results from 
a qualitative study of 40 interviews with newspaper journalists whose firms have failed or 
are failing. The analysis documents their trajectories and their utilization of proto-
organizational norms and routines in subsequent work. The fourth chapter explores 
similar processes through 16 interviews with former investment bankers, examining post-
failure organizing in a very different setting.  
Throughout this work, the reader will be struck by an overarching question that 
survivors must answer: which firms ought to survive? The question is not about owners 
or entities, but about the underlying norms, and routines that are the essence of the firm. 
The fifth chapter explains just how challenging it is to answer this question. It draws on 
normative theory within business ethics to examine the different ways in which 
organizational fates can be decided, and finds helpful but flawed responses. Business 
ethics provides important but incomplete insights to determine which firms should fail. 
The sixth chapter seeks to construct a theory of responsible profit that can provide 
guidance where the other theories cannot. The argument is conceived as a byproduct of 
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the suggestion that, if firms are meant to serve the interests of owners, they should wish 
to provide owners with a substantive entitlement to profit as a basis for a claim upon 
property. The final chapter returns to the empirical analysis, and to the settings of 
newspapers and investment banks. It considers the survival of firms within these two 
industries, and the challenge of integrating the ethnographic practice of understanding 
people and their lives with the ethical lens that asks how people ought to live. 
Philosophers in business ethics have tended to focus on the irrelevance of empirical 
observation for the determination of right and wrong, but this conclusion reaches the 
opposite view: that empiricism enriches normative analysis. The final judgment affirms 
the importance of news media: news organizations should survive because the positive 
externalities of their work exceed the costs of firm persistence. The section also describes 
a set of open questions regarding the moral entitlements to profit generated by banks. The 
chapter concludes by returning to Weber’s metaphor of the “iron cage” and asking how 
rationality and performance-orientations are changing through organizational failure in 
these two industries. It concludes by highlighting the importance of biography and social 
cohesion to the continuity of organizational norms, an iron cage that is inscribed on 
individuals through their idiosyncratic occupational histories. 
The first four chapters of this dissertation develop an empirical account of the 
transfers of norms and routines through post-failure career transitions. These processes 
are empirically observable. Using this empirical account as a backdrop, the next two 
chapters launch a normative inquiry into the nature of failure. The analysis works through 
the question of which firms ought to fail and which should survive using established 
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business ethics frameworks, and then presents an alternative concept of business ethics 
that is better suited to the question of organizational failure. The final chapter merges 
these two efforts together to examine the question of whether newspapers and investment 
banks should survive, thus completing the transition from empirical to normative and into 
a final, hybrid form that uses normative concepts to explain an empirical phenomenon 
and uses empirical observations to recognize the implications of normative theory. The 
tension and interdependence of normative and empirical research is a persistent subject 
within business ethics and within this dissertation as well, but rather than stake a set of 
claims regarding that relation, this work provides an example of how the approaches do 
relate and reflects upon the limits of integration only after its analysis runs up against 
them. It is worth noting that this dissertation was written to satisfy the requirements of 
two different Ph.D. programs within two distinct research traditions. The transition 
between Chapters Four and Five demonstrates the striking contrast between these 
subjects and disciplines. Though key themes carry through the entire project, the halves 
are divided by disciplines with distinctive methods, goals, and aesthetics. The reader 
should expect only a partial integration of these divided intellectual pursuits. 
Post-Failure Trajectories 
Among the victims of the experience of post-failure unemployment (described 
here as “survivors”), a minority attempt the complete resurrection of the failed 
organization, and many hurry in different directions. But most do something, in their own 
way, to preserve the normative and productive substance of the failed firm. The diversity 
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of these attempts is an important pathway for the preservation of organizational capacity 
that is otherwise spoiled by failure.  
This project focuses on corporate failures in the print journalism and financial 
services industries, on newspapers and investment banks in particular. During the 
observational period, the futures of these two industries were substantially uncertain. 
Some of the most established firms had dissolved or filed for bankruptcy, and others 
teetered on the brink of failure. There was little doubt that capital and news would be 
provided, but the future of this provision was substantially uncertain. The newspaper, as a 
dominant player in the dissemination of information, seemed to be as outdated as its 
paper-wasting means of distribution. Investment banks were in flux as well. Widespread 
exposure to mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps had debilitated the 
major banks and led to a spate of distressed acquisitions and failures. By the end of 2008, 
some insiders were declaring Wall Street dead and the investment bank defunct as a form 
of organization (Hester and Cook 2008). Meanwhile, preservation-oriented state 
interventions sought to sustain failing firms in several industrial contexts. The two 
industries in this study differ in the extent to which they received public subsidy, but both 
have been the subjects of profound public concern in this transitional period. 
Newspapers and investment banks offer an interesting platform for the study of 
individual career trajectories and organizational isomorphism. The standardization of 
investment practices among investment banks was as destructive to their population as 
the dependence on commercial and classified advertising revenue has been to 
newspapers. Standard accounts of organizational change would look for innovation 
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among new entrants to the industry and incumbent firms willing to invest in R&D. 
Meeting these expectations, fledgling online news outlets are redefining news even as 
massive incumbent firms experiment with alternative revenue models at scale. Similarly, 
large banks remain indomitable, but their services are brokered increasingly often by 
hedge funds and “family offices” that seek to stimulate oligopolistic competition between 
the banks, or to prey upon the risks that they take. Largely forgotten in this tale of 
organizational change are the established firms that fail. Evolutionary perspectives 
suggest that these firms have been “selected” out of the industry by economic pressure 
(Nelson and Winter 1982). But if we look more closely at the firms that are shedding 
employees amidst failure or liquidating entirely, we find that there are many 
opportunities for organizational capabilities to be disbursed rather than destroyed. As 
Hoetker & Agarwal (2007) express it, “Death hurts, but it isn’t fatal.”  
The routines and norms that survive firm failure are products of individual 
initiative and personal agency in organizational life. Every day, employees make choices 
that influence the behavior of the firms that employ them, but they are rarely afforded the 
opportunity to start from scratch, choosing with whom to work and whether the business 
should exist at all. A layoff is thus both loss and liberation. Because people are defined 
by their organizational roles (Whyte 1956) and organizational objectives are defined by 
external resource dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), organizational failure 
presents a special opportunity for individuals to choose their colleagues, their work roles, 
and their organizational environments. Failure also encourages survivors to refine or 
redefine their strategies in recognition of prior failures. Neo-institutionalism, which tends 
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to emphasize the static and constraining nature of organizational environments, should be 
very interested in the heterogeneity and change that failure initiates within an 
organizational field.  
Failure is also of special importance for the field of business ethics. Amidst 
sweeping change and redefinition, the decisions that employees make are morally 
complex, and the moral issues are salient for many who face them. In the post-failure 
transition, former employees decide which firms, norms, and routines ought to exist, and 
which ought not to exist. The promise of ethics, the unique possibility, is that people can 
and should make moral choices to do the right thing. Sociologically, we know that people 
face constrained choices. Regardless of the metaphysical possibility of free will, 
constrained choice is empirically probable. Organizational constraints are an enduring 
topic for both sociology and business ethics (McGregor 1960; Whyte 1956). The study of 
choice under collapsed constraint allows a researcher to observe the impetus of 
conformity, and the individual process of self-redefinition in its wake. Durkheim’s 
(1997b) analysis of anomic suicide is also a study of choice under collapsed constraint. 
He argues that one of the chief consequences of sharp economic change is the removal of 
a person from the norms of a society: 
It is not true, then, that human activity can be released from all restraint…. Man’s 
characteristic privilege is that the bond he accepts is not physical but moral; that 
is, social. He is governed not by a material environment brutally imposed on him, 
but by a conscience superior to his own, the superiority of which he feels. 
Because the greater, better part of his existence transcends the body, he escapes 
the body’s yoke, but is subject to that of society. But when society is disturbed by 
some painful crisis or by beneficial but abrupt transitions, it is momentarily 
incapable of exercising this influence; thence come the sudden rises in the curve 
of suicides…. In the case of economic disasters, indeed, something like a 
declassification occurs which suddenly casts certain individuals into a lower 
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state…. All the advantages of social influence are lost so far as they are 
concerned. Their moral education has to be recommenced (1997b: 252).  
In this transcendental passage, Durkheim lifts the person above the materialism of 
physicality, only to return her to the clutches of social control. Durkheim’s case is 
extreme. In fact, most people do not escape the normative restraints of their field. But 
Durkheim’s argument poses the question of how norms fare in post-failure transitions, a 
question that is entirely unaddressed within business ethics. 
Many business ethics scholars aspire to improve the moral conduct of business 
and/or to hold business accountable for mistreatment of people and the environment. 
Whether approached from a Kantian (Bowie 1999), Aristotelian (Hartman 1996; 
Solomon 1993), or social contractarian (Dunfee and Donaldson 1999) perspective, the 
ethical orientation would suggest that there are important moral concerns that should be 
recognized by managers. But what should managers do when they have no more work? 
What should they do before work begins? These moments of unconstrained liberation are 
almost beyond the incremental, dilemma-oriented tools of the business ethics discipline. 
Stakeholder theorists might suggest that the unemployed focus upon value creation 
(Harmeling, Sarasvathy, and Freeman 2009). Kantians might suggest that they consider 
meaningful work (Bowie 1991). But their choice is, in some sense, radical beyond the 
scope of the current business ethics paradigm.  
To what extent do firms survive failure? Is it possible that aspects of informal 
organization survive a failed formal organization? Organizations are formalized through 
legal relationships, official policies, reporting hierarchies, and documented procedures. 
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Informal organization relies on the norms and routines of everyday work practice1. The 
embedded routines and norms that lack formality are difficult to manage, replicate, and 
control. Yet, insofar as informal organization is separate from the imposed social 
arrangements and authority structures of a firm, it may survive organizational failure.  
A Typology of Organizational Failure and Routine Cessation 
In order to locate the connections between failed firms and other organizations, 
four possible fates are worth considering. A firm may stay the same, change within the 
bounds of its formal organizational structure, fail as an organization but live on through 
the continued use of its organizational routines and norms, or fail so completely that it 
might as well never have existed. These four outcomes are categorized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Failure and Cessation 
  Formal Organization 
  Fails Survives 
Routines 
and Norms 
Persist Post-Failure Continuity Business as Usual 
Cease Pristine Failure Organizational Transformation 
 
If the informal organization is lost alongside the formal organization, then failure 
is pristine. Pristine failure results in the complete destruction of the firm and its 
component routines. Research in population ecology and evolutionary economics 
theorizes organizational failure as “selecting” a firm’s operational routines from an 
organizational population (Nelson and Winter 1982), as pristine failure implies. But 
                                                
1 It is difficult to distinguish between formal and informal organization in most organizational 
studies, but this project provides an exception. If we take formal organization to be codified and 
backed by the legal and contractual apparatus of the firm, it is clear that most of this structure is 
destroyed through liquidation, altered through reorganization, and ripped apart by layoffs. The 
leftover instances of informal organization do not represent the entire spectrum of informal 
organization, but only those aspects that can survive failure. 
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sometimes routines and norms survive organizational failure, and the same people 
continue to do the same work in a very similar way through post-failure continuity, where 
key parts of failed firms are transferred to new or surviving firms2. In an extreme case, 
the organization may be indistinguishable to outside observers like customers and 
suppliers, but more often, pieces of an organization survive failure through the care and 
attention of former employees, some of whom work together to achieve common ends.  
Routines can also change or be lost within the bounds of solvent firms. A 
substantial literature covers the topic of business as usual, where routines persist in 
ongoing organizations. A smaller but well-established literature on change and 
organizational transformation addresses the process through which organizations 
establish new routines. The established literatures on business as usual, organizational 
transformation, and pristine failure leave an open question of how routines survive 
organizational failure. Little has been done to study post-failure continuity.  
Next I will describe each of the four categories in detail, and document their 
placement within the field of business ethics.  
                                                
2 Aldrich and Ruef explain the connection at the population level as follows: “Prior numbers of 
disbandings have been hypothesized to affect founding and disbanding rates by their effects on 
resource availability and on entrepreneurial knowledge and intentions…. [S]ome resources are 
tied up within the boundaries of existing organizations, and entrepreneurs only have access to 
them when those organizations disband. Many foundings replace defunct organizations, as 
disbanding create openings in niches that then become available to new organizations (e.g. 
physical plant locations). Prior disbandings also free resources for use by existing organizations, 
thus lowering the current organizations' likelihood of disbanding” (2006: 221). But population 
ecologists who attempt to measure these effects do not have the data to specify the actual 
mechanisms. Rather, each specified mechanism should be treated as an untested hypothesis. 
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Business as Usual 
Most business scholarship focuses on the everyday maintenance of organizational 
operations and routines. Academic researchers provide answers to real challenges of 
business life. If a manager faced a decision about who to hire, where to locate, how much 
to invest, to whom marketing should be directed, how employees should be motivated, 
how tasks should be broken up into jobs, or how to encourage creativity in project teams, 
that manager could consult a broad base of research. Most of what is taught in business 
school is centered on business as usual.  
The category also includes the majority of research in business ethics. Research 
topics as diverse as corporate social performance, codes of conduct, moral awareness, 
stakeholder theory, the treatment of employees, supply chain responsibility, the moral 
permissibility of insider trading, and professional responsibility all fit into this category. 
Even business scholars who question the relationship between corporate social and 
financial performance (e.g. Margolis and Walsh 2003) tend not to discuss the relationship 
between social performance and survival, much less failure. 
It is appropriate that most business research be applied to everyday practices, and 
so with business pedagogy. Many firms, small and large, survive for years. During these 
years of survival, they make decisions that are economically and morally relevant, and 
worth the applied attention of business academics. 
Organizational Transformation 
 Organizational transformation occurs when a firm departs from its routine 
practice to adopt an alternative approach. Though there are a number of books that 
 19 
purport to instruct managers on organizational transformation, true transformation is 
extremely difficult to achieve, and the business literature often overstates the power of 
the available tools to achieve it (Davenport and Stoddard 1994). Indeed, there are 
unintended consequences to many changes, including the possibility of what Carroll and 
Teo (1996) describe as “creative self-destruction.”  
Organizations tend to have a path-dependent quality. Like people, they are 
habituated in certain circumstances, and their operational capacity is limited by what they 
are used to doing. Profound reorganization is unlikely within the confines of the firm. 
There are several reasons classically given for this path dependency in organizational 
process. Hannan and Freeman (1977) give four internal and four external reasons for 
organizational inertia: 
1. Specialized assets and personnel are not applicable to all activities. 
2. Limited organizational information is available to managers. 
3. Internal politics are destabilized by change. 
4. Extant norms define the right way activities should be done. 
5. Legal barriers to entry and exit preclude some options. 
6. Managers have limited external information. 
7. Change may be perceived as illegitimate. 
8. Collective rationality for organizations is uncertain. 
Of these, asset specificity, bounded organizational rationality, political and normative 
inertia, and external legitimacy have each developed into expansive research topics. 
Organizations develop a specialized way of doing things that is sometimes too deeply 
 20 
embedded within the organization to be consciously managed. One example of this is the 
organization of a firm around the functional components of a larger assembly. The 
organization of the assembly is written onto the social and bureaucratic structure of the 
firm to such a degree that the firm cannot simply be reassigned to a new assembly.  
Though the aspiration of organizational transformation remains, the leading 
advice for firms facing disruptive technological innovations is not organizational 
transformation at all. Instead, scholars like Clayton Christensen (1997) suggest that firms 
create functionally discrete organizations to deal with emerging technological 
opportunities. From the perspective of organizational transformation, this is cheating. If a 
manager sets out to save a firm that would otherwise fail, and she ends up instead 
creating a new firm with different employees as an incubator for an alternative approach, 
there is a sense in which that manager has failed to do as she hoped. What she has done is 
create a lifeboat organization that may eventually grow into a fallback setting for many of 
the core business employees and managers. In so doing, she has left the realm of 
transformation management and entered an increasingly important subfield of business as 
usual: corporate entrepreneurship. While corporate entrepreneurship may maintain 
market dominance amidst otherwise catastrophic change, it is not actually a strategy 
designed to change or increase flexibility within a given organization.  
A second approach views change as an organizational technique, as absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), organizational learning (Fiol and Lyles 1985), and 
dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). 
These literatures document the development of routines for change, either through the 
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collection of external information or through internal innovation procedures. In either 
case, organizations are meant to routinely change by becoming responsive to their 
environments. Using the information that they find, organizations can adjust to changing 
circumstances. Once again, there is a sense in which this is cheating. What absorptive 
capacity is intended to do is to subsume the change process into the core functions of the 
firm’s routine. Christensen and other advocates for corporate entrepreneurship would 
argue that this internalization of change is hindered by structural features of the firm, 
irrespective of intent. The argument is moot from the perspective of organizational 
transformation. Whether the incumbent firm is to fail while founding its successor or to 
routinize change, either path departs from the conceptual category of organizational 
transformation. 
The third option, which is probably the brightest hope as an account of 
organizational transformation, focuses on the individual persons who are themselves 
subjected to, and agents in change. Kanter stakes this claim in the introductory passages 
of The Change Masters: 
People seem to matter in direct proportion to an awareness of corporate crisis…. 
Not long ago, when American companies seemed to control the world in which 
they operated, it was easier to ask the people within them to just fit into the 
“system” and to assume that the “system,” not the people, was responsible for 
success. But when events disturb the smooth workings of corporate machines and 
threaten to overwhelm us… and change requirements go up… individuals actually 
need to count for more, because it is people within the organization who come up 
with the new ideas, who develop creative responses, and who push for change 
before opportunities or minor irritants turn into catastrophes. Innovations… are 
designed not by machines but by people (1983: 17). 
Though Kanter locates innovation within the people of the firm, her argument focuses on 
the organizational structures that permit change. She sustains a critique of 
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“segmentalism,” which she defines as a “style of thought [that is] anti-change-oriented 
and prevents innovation… because it is concerned with compartmentalizing actions, 
events, and problems and keeping each piece isolated from the others. Segmentalist 
approaches see problems as narrowly as possible, independently of their context, 
independently of their connections to any other problems.” (: 28). What Kanter suggests 
instead is “integrative action,” which allows individuals to approach problems holistically 
and to work across boundaries to solve them.  
Kanter is not proposing that the firm should be understood as ultimately 
individual in nature. In fact, she explicitly rejects this view (1983: 59). However, she is 
arguing that organizations must make room for individuals to solve problems rather than 
treating individual variation as the problem to be solved. She makes her argument based 
upon cases where organizations “master change” by allowing employees to solve 
problems, and contrasts these firms with organizations that fail to do so. Insofar as 
employees are able to do as Kanter suggests, to reconfigure basic aspects of their 
employer by working across organizational boundaries, this would seem to achieve 
organizational transformation. The crucial point in Kanter’s argument is that the people 
must change the system, rather than the reverse. There are ways in which organizations 
have become more receptive to their employees and constituencies, but the glimmers of 
workplace participation and “product quality circles” that Kanter noted affirmatively in 
the early 1980s have not taken root as universal practices. Even so, the firms that have 
been transformed have done so through the efforts of their employees and managers.  
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Ethical innovation is not as central to business ethics as managerial innovation is 
to management. If anything, the field is more concerned with avoiding change; that is, 
protecting personal values from the pressures of business life. This may be interpreted, in 
turn, as a strategy for improving organizational values, but if that is the intended effect it 
is only sometimes stated as such. Efforts to legitimize organizations by changing their 
reputations amidst a crisis of legitimacy (e.g. Pfarrer et al. 2008) may or may not be 
transformational, depending on whether the efforts result in surface or substantive 
change.  
Moral awareness as a basis for organizational change (e.g. Trevino 1986) requires 
that people have already developed a sensitivity, often from before they arrived at work, 
though standard managerial strategies to impose policies through “tone at the top” and 
codified rules are also subject to considerable discussion. But when insensitivity is 
ingrained in the fabric of organizational logics, it becomes even less likely that 
organizations will realize the errors of their ways (Gioia 1992).  
Yet, the importance of individuals as change agents has recently come to 
represent a significant consideration in business ethics pedagogy. The Giving Voice to 
Values curriculum uses scenario-based cases to encourage students to work through how 
they would do the right thing, rather than making the determination of what is right 
(Gentile 2010). In so doing, the explicit pedagogical emphasis is placed on developing 
scripts that students can carry into the dilemmas that they face. Thus, the field may be 
showing an increased interest in the dynamics of organizational change. 
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Pristine Failure 
Pristine failure occurs when all norms and routines are lost in the course of an 
organizational collapse. Every year, approximately 600,000 firms fail in the United 
States. Of these, 95% have fewer than 20 employees (Small Business Administration 
Office of Advocacy 2010). Though failure is common, there is no study or established 
methodology for determining how many firms survive through post-failure continuity. 
Instead, it is generally assumed that failure is final.  
For the purpose of categorizing research, almost every study of organizational 
failure, exit, or death can be said to presume pristine failure. As far as the data and 
method are concerned, the story ends when the firm collapses. There are two key 
literatures to consider, organizational death and population ecology. In studies of 
organizational death, the focus is on the closure and parting processes. Some of these 
studies reference the job prospects of individual employees (Sutton 1987), or the process 
of learning through failure (Shepherd 2003), but other studies of organizational death 
make no reference to post-failure outcomes at all (Hager and Galaskiewicz 2002; Harris 
and Sutton 1986). Though there is little research on post-failure outcomes (Walsh and 
Bartunek In Press), there is a substantial body of work on the prolonged process of 
decline, which makes no mention of post-failure outcomes (Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 
1987; D'Aveni and Macmillan 1990; Whetten 1980).  
In population ecology, the data tend to be far too general to permit the 
examination of post-failure outcomes. There is, however, some consideration of the 
aggregate effects of failure at the population level, asking the question of whether prior 
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failures anticipate subsequent failures and foundings (Barnett and Amburgey 1990; Baum 
and Oliver 1991; Delacroix and Carroll 1983; Land, Davis, and Blau 1994). At the 
industry level, there is no opportunity to link failed firms with post-failure outcomes, and 
the data limitations alone condition the conceptual orientation towards pristine failure.  
Pristine failure is not just the de facto product of a blind spot in empirical 
analysis. It also constitutes a fundamental building block in evolutionary theories of the 
firm. In particular, pristine failure is a necessary ingredient of selection at the firm level. 
The multi-level nature of economic processes has been under consideration in population 
ecology since early in the development of that literature (Hannan and Freeman 1977). 
More recent updates on evolutionary approaches to organizations (Aldrich and Ruef 
2006) make reference to the different levels at which organizations can evolve, but most 
scholarship is committed to evolutionary selection as an organizational phenomenon3. In 
fact, individual-level literatures that discuss selection often ignore the conceptual link to 
evolutionary thinking (Schneider 1987).  
In biological systems, both survival and reproduction play key roles in the 
dominance of traits within a species population, which we call evolution. Because 
organizational failure is the nearest match to one of these mechanisms, it has received a 
good measure of the attention. However, at the same time, organizational theorists have 
                                                
3 Hannan and Freeman’s initial approach to population ecology specifies five levels of analysis, 
“(1) members, (2) subunits, (3) individual organizations, (4) populations of organizations, and (5) 
communities of (populations of) organizations” (1977: 933). Levels 3, 4, and 5 are argued to be 
the appropriate levels at which organizations interact with their environments. These levels are 
mapped onto the biological ecological levels of organisms, populations (of a species), and 
communities. The problem is, as Hannan and Freeman acknowledge, “The added complexity 
arises because organizations are more nearly decomposable into constituent parts than are 
organisms” (: 934). But despite this early acknowledgement, there is very little subsequent 
treatment of the decomposition of organizations, a process that occurs forcibly upon failure. 
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observed other mechanisms through which traits become dominant in an organizational 
population. In so doing, the biological metaphor is replaced by institutional mechanisms 
like mimicry and coercion (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). With the introduction of these 
sources of adaptation, selection is relegated to a secondary status, cleaning up those 
organizations that fail to adapt to institutional pressures. There are still factors in 
organizational heterogeneity that are non-adaptive, like differing starting conditions 
(Stinchcombe 1965; Swaminathan 1996), and these will only change if they are selected 
from the organizational population, provided that the organizational attributes are not 
carried into other firms post-failure. 
The possibility of incomplete failure is an addendum to the firm evolution 
paradigm. Post-failure continuity is an important lacuna in organizational theory, and 
finding ways to understand organizations through the people who pass through them is a 
key development in a more dynamic view of the modern firm. If the addendum is 
accepted, the category of failure is split into two. Once pristine failures are distinguished 
from continuity outcomes, selection may still apply, but it will do so through a two-step 
process whereby organizational attributes are decomposed with some probability of post-
failure recomposition. 
Though failure plays a very important role in organizational theory and 
management research, failure is not a particularly well-researched subfield in business 
ethics. There is a sparse literature on bankruptcy that focuses on strategic (optional) 
bankruptcies (Johnson 1986). The most common references to organizational failure 
concern what is pragmatically feasible for businesses. It is generally asserted that 
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businesses should not be morally obliged to do more than they can afford to do (Dunfee 
2006). Chapters Five and Six reconceive the relationship between obligations and failure. 
Rather than viewing the possibility of failure as a limitation on what a firm might be 
obliged to do, failure is understood as a choice, sometimes the best available choice. 
Post-Failure Continuity 
Most organizational research assumes pristine failure. Yet, this runs counter to the 
ecological intuition that death makes resources available for the living and newly born. 
This “life-cycle” intuition is expressed in organizational terms as post-failure continuity. 
It is a firm-specific outcome indicated by the survival of organizational norms and 
routines outside of the failed firm. Though continuity could also occur through 
transferred physical capital, real estate, or intellectual property (Hoetker and Agarwal 
2007), these vectors are not the focus of the present analysis. Instead, I focus on the 
employees. Because employees are capable of adapting and reclaiming proto-routines 
and proto-norms from their prior experience, their careers provide a non-specific 
mechanism for post-failure continuity. Many employees have a keen sense of the 
organizational processes that make their work possible, and they make choices that result 
in the persistence of organizational routines. 
As job tasks become increasingly specialized within highly specialized 
organizations, the process of post-failure continuity becomes more important. In a 
relatively un-specialized social order, individuals could move their labor into other 
entities with little costly retraining. Specialization locks employees into long-term 
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relationships with the firms through firm-specific human capital investments, and inter-
organizational continuity allows individuals to recover some of their investment.  
There is little research on post-failure organizational outcomes. Hoetker and 
Agarwal (2007) show that the patents of failed tech companies are still cited after firms 
fail.  While these citations occur less often than citations of surviving firms, they continue 
nonetheless. Failure research asked the question of how these connections are built, and 
whether organizational failure could stimulate new venture formation (Whetten 1987), 
but these questions are only recently being answered. Walsh and Bartunek (In Press) 
provide one of the first general statements on how failure connects with founding. They 
argue that failure inspires founding, driving the creation process among entrepreneurs 
through an affective impulse to preserve what might otherwise be lost through firm 
failure. Using a sample of six “ex-morte organizations,” they suggest that post-failure 
firms gather around shared nostalgia and prized resources that are won from the failing 
firms. The post-failure identities that they examine are stronger than any recorded here, 
which is a likely byproduct of their focused sampling technique. Whereas the present 
study begins with failed firms and attempts to describe the diverse fates of former 
employees, Walsh and Bartunek identified organizations that descended from failed 
firms, focusing exclusively on failed firms with more than 1,000 employees at failure and 
post-failure organizations that were incorporated entities. Their study samples backward 
through post-failure entities, whereas this study samples forward through entities that 
have failed. Theirs provides rich detail on the entrepreneurial process, and is a unique 
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study of the post-failure context. There is no comparable research on the fates of norms 
and routines in organizational research or in business ethics.  
The remainder of this chapter considers the applicability of extant theories to the 
post-failure context and the project objectives through the formulation of research 
questions. The chapter concludes with a section on the contributions that the project 
makes to academic research. 
Discovering or Developing a Theory of Post-Failure Continuity 
Perhaps there is a reason that the domain of post-failure research is so empty. It 
may be that routines are decimated by organizational failure and that the rare cases of 
survival are insignificant twitches in the already dead corporate body. There are reasons 
to be skeptical of the opportunities for routine transfer from failed firms. Because 
routines are the established sub-organizational processes that are believed to be selected 
from an organizational population by organizational failure, the very possibility of post-
failure continuity counters the working assumptions of a dominant approach to 
organizational research. Moreover, from what we know of job outcomes after layoffs, the 
post-failure prospects are bleak. Layoffs are often devastating for individuals, careers, 
and families, sometimes precipitating a fall in social class described as “downward 
mobility” (Newman 1999). Finally, routines are not just socially embedded; they are also 
technologically and physically embedded in the property of the firm. Many of the 
productive systems of the firm are no longer accessible to employees in the post-failure 
context, and this should limit the persistence of routines that connect with lost resources.  
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Yet there are equally important developments that suggest the post-failure 
survival of routines. For example, network theory, regional development, entrepreneurial 
bricolage, and genealogical approaches to organizational research all indicate that 
routines and norms may survive organizational failure. I will briefly illustrate some of 
these connections here. 
From the perspective of network theory, interpersonal social networks exist 
within an organization and are not wholly explained by it. Economic activity is 
“embedded” in social life (Granovetter 1985). People use their personal networks to 
make major decisions (Kilduff 1990), and these relationships are important for the firm as 
well. Without interpersonal ties, organizations can suffer from a “liability of 
unconnectedness” (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996). However, the failing 
organizations included in this study are at no risk of disconnection. Most of them 
encapsulated dense networks prior to failure, and ties may have become even stronger 
thereafter (Harris and Sutton 1986). As the classic Simmelian (1964) argument runs, 
conflict can help to generate and strengthen social ties.  
Among network theorists, considerable attention has gone to network forms of 
organization, defined as “any collection of actors (N> 2) that pursue repeated, enduring 
exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate 
organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the 
exchange” (Podolny and Page 1998: 59). It would seem that the network form would be 
the most likely candidate for the post-failure entrepreneurs and freelancers. The trust 
relations and status orders are already established informally, and most people share an 
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informal understanding of the work product. Not only does the literature on network 
forms of organization provide ready-made description of the organizational form 
assumed in the post-failure environment, but it also provides some interesting research 
questions regarding the interplay between networks, markets, and hierarchies. Some of 
the post-failure projects examined in this dissertation are organized within a network 
form, and others are not. But whether the eventual organizational form is a network 
structure or not, the network form is at least an intermediate organizational form that 
demonstrates the potential viability for post-failure reorganization. Some network 
organizations are transitional stages prior to organization formalization. 
Closely related to the concept of network organization (and cited widely in that 
literature) is the geography-based account of Regional Advantage (Saxenian 1994). For a 
variety of reasons, some industries have come to be organized regionally rather than 
through enduring ties between employees and firms. As one of Saxenian’s managers 
observed, there is “far greater loyalty to one’s craft than to one’s company…. A company 
is just a vehicle which allows you to work” (1994: 97). Geographic proximity aids the 
transfer of information and staff between firms and reduces the cost of failure. 
Organizations can be created without total commitment from their staff. It is enough for 
employees to believe in the possibility of the organization’s goals. There are regional and 
geographic considerations at play in both samples of this dissertation. People seek local 
work in order to avoid a costly move that would be difficult for family ties. If jobs are not 
available, it becomes all the more likely that the employees will seek to create them. The 
prospects of entrepreneurship are powerfully motivated by a ready supply of specifically-
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skilled labor. Saxenian’s book compares tech firms in Massachusetts and California, and 
the different norms of company loyalty and employment transferability in the two areas. 
Silicon Valley’s loose association between worker and firm provides a dynamic model of 
labor force participation. As long as new firms continue to emerge and failure remains 
unstigmatized, the precarious position of laid-off employees is partially rectified. When 
failure is not anticipated and not normalized, the experience can be devastating, 
particularly for those whose career strategies were entirely dependent upon a single firm. 
Regional processes nonetheless suggest that individual employees can undertake failure 
and reorganization, and that the firm itself is only one of numerous possible containers in 
which economic activities are organized. Regional processes are fundamental in the 
process of post-failure continuity. The failed firm is a testament to the regional 
availability of labor, but without a new project to gather this labor, smaller labor markets 
cannot absorb the unemployed, and geographic relocation becomes much more likely. 
However, the mechanism runs in the opposite direction as well, driving laid-off 
employees into entrepreneurship in order to avoid relocation. 
A third key support for the theory of post-failure continuity is entrepreneurial 
bricolage. Entrepreneurial bricolage is “making do by applying combinations of the 
resources at hand to new problems and opportunities” (Baker and Nelson 2005: 333). The 
term bricolage originates in the work of Levi-Strauss (1967), but a more proximate and 
domain-specific argument can be found in Penrose (1959), who argues that firms derive 
their value not just from the resources that are available to them, but from their skill at 
combining and reconfiguring the available resources. The emphasis on recombination as 
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a source of innovation goes further back as well. Schumpeter (1934) proposed that most 
innovation takes place with existing assets. Baker and Nelson distinguish their theory, 
arguing that “because bricolage often draws on degraded, fallow, or otherwise 
undeveloped resources to construct new combinations, it represents a form of value 
creation that does not depend on the Schumpeterian assumption that assets are withdrawn 
from one activity for application in another” (2005: 362). The socially embedded routines 
of a failed organization would seem to be a perfect example of the fallow resources that 
bricolage is meant to characterize, combined with other more Schumpeterian resources, 
like the human capital transferred from the failing firm to other enterprises. Entrepreneurs 
sometimes reach deep into the career histories of their friends and colleagues in order to 
gain access to information and support for their budding enterprises. Many of these 
capacities are unused until the entrepreneur asks that they be applied to a project. 
Organizational failure provides a supply of capacities for bricolage and a demand for 
their uptake as laid-off employees seek to redefine their work and careers. Bricolage is 
promoted by narrow training that people receive in large firms. Entrepreneurship does not 
permit specialists to avoid a diversity of work tasks, and some of these tasks require 
outside support for learning and establishing new routines. 
The fourth theory tradition that would affirm the possibility of post-failure 
transfers is the genealogical or biographical approach to organizational structure. Though 
sociological approaches to organizational research continue to emphasis structure and to 
focus on levels of analysis that are above the individual, one such level involves the 
transitions of the individual through her career. The neo-institutionalist paradigm has 
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settled on the organizational field as the most relevant level of analysis. Entities are 
habituated into the norms of the field through institutional forces at the entity level, and 
individuals are habituated through the firms that they inhabit. However, as Khurana, 
Kimura, and Fourcade (unpublished manuscript) explain, Bourdieu’s original concept of 
habitus was specific to an individual history “where neo-institutional studies looked at 
habitus in terms of cross-sectional habituation, Bourdieuian methodology emphasizes 
longitudinal habituation…. [T]he development of neo-institutional theory over the last 
twenty five years overlooks the power of biography in shaping the habitus of individual 
actors” (2). Their argument is closely related to an organizational research paradigm that 
Phillips describes as genealogical (2002; 2005). Several studies focus on the pedigrees of 
entrepreneurial firms through the backgrounds of their employees (Beckman and Burton 
2008; Burton, Sørensen, and Beckman 2002; Dobrev and Barnett 2005; Shane and 
Khurana 2003). Shared history paves the way for future collaboration, both through the 
specific bonds that form and through the more abstract “generic subjectivity” (Wiley 
1988) of common experiences that are globally rare, but occupationally frequent.  
In keeping with these studies, the process of post-failure continuity operates 
through the individual habits and history of the persons who were laid off. However, it 
places special emphasis on the enduring social context of this history. It is not merely 
habituation that occurs within a person’s history: it is their participation in a community 
that they may never leave. Indeed, many of the participants in this study go to 
considerable lengths to preserve what they can of their communities. 
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These are important reasons to suspect that routines and norms may be transferred 
from failed firms, and they provide some insight into how we might expect the process to 
unfold, but it should also be acknowledged that they were developed in contexts that 
differ markedly from the post-failure experience. Thus, while we can deduce a few 
possible outcomes from these theories, most of the theory development will be 
undertaken inductively in Chapters Three and Four using observations from the post-
failure experiences of laid-off workers. As a matter of process, the aforementioned 
theories were the guiding frameworks that I took into the field. While some of the 
observations from the data collection refer to other explanations and illustrate 
alternatives, the interaction between observation and theory is more properly documented 
within the empirical chapters themselves and in the conclusion. Here I argue for a 
grounded theory approach to this project (Glaser 1967). 
As an example of how the process has unfolded thus far, consider the increased 
diversity of organizations found in the wake of organizational failure. The observation of 
increased organizational heterogeneity among the former employees of a failed firm is 
intuitively plausible, and may be substantiated by some theory, but the theoretical 
development began with an observation rather than the reverse.  
This chapter began with a summary of the project and went on to map out the 
relationship between organizational change and organizational survival, recognizing post-
failure continuity as an underexplored phenomenon. Different theoretical traditions that 
are suggestive of post-failure continuity were then surveyed. Because these literatures 
were not tightly connected with the research question of interest, a grounded theory 
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approach is deemed most appropriate. The chapter concludes with the next section, which 
explains the research contribution of the project. 
Research Contribution 
Despite the likelihood of organizational failure, important consequences of failure 
are poorly understood. Chief among these are the prospects and process of post-failure 
organizing. There are few post-failure studies, and none that concern the survival of 
norms and routines. For those who are concerned with failure, crisis, unemployment, and 
economic change, this dissertation explores topics of direct interest. 
Beyond telling an interesting story, the objective of this project is to provide a 
framework that helps us to understand many other processes and narratives. The 
contributions of this study are aimed at “theories of the middle range,” (Merton 1957) a 
scope of inquiry below the grand attempts at a general statement of social processes as 
scientific law, but above the “workaday hypotheses” of scientific practice. There are four 
ways in which I believe that this study contributes to theory. 
The first contribution is to re-categorize some entrepreneurial firms by their post-
failure associations and to note the important role that such firms sometimes play in 
stimulating organizational change. The contribution builds on recent work in 
entrepreneurship (Walsh and Bartunek In Press) by explaining the implications of post-
failure entrepreneurship for institutional theory, especially the diversity of organizational 
forms and norms within a given field. Post-failure projects may seek some of the more 
radical or innovative changes by experimenting with alternative organizational strategies. 
The established theory of industrial change pits the internal developments of incumbent 
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firms (Kanter 1983) against new entrants (Schumpeter 1934) as the agents of change and 
growth. My research proposes a third, hybrid alternative. Displaced workers of failed 
firms are, in the first sense, liberated from the iron cage of organizational life. Yet, they 
remain tied to its social, economic, and technological apparatus. These agents have 
worked for established firms, and seen them flounder. Thus, while failure is a part of their 
pedigree, so are its lessons. Though the theory has not been elaborated before, the 
observation is not so different from Saxenian’s (1994) example of employees leaving the 
falling star Digital Equipment Corporation to start new firms in Silicon Valley. Many of 
these departures were voluntary, but they exemplify the spirit of individual transitions 
from firms that are failing. 
As a second contribution, the research adds to emergent discussions of career 
pedigrees and organizational histories. Though there is little research on how industries 
learn from failure (Miner et al. 1999), recent developments in entrepreneurial research lay 
a helpful methodological groundwork for considering failure as an antecedent to the 
formation of new enterprise. As Sørensen and Phillips explain: 
The structural characteristics of existing organizations are transmitted to new 
organizations in part through individual career histories, as work experiences in 
established firms shape the attitudes and abilities that individuals bring to new 
organizations (Sørensen and Phillips 2008: 2).  
Many work history studies focus on senior managers whose experience is crucial to the 
strategic orientations of the firms that they inhabit (Beckman and Burton 2008; Boeker 
1997; Sørensen 1999). Studies also focus more directly on the pedigrees of 
entrepreneurial firms (Beckman and Burton 2008; Burton, Sørensen, and Beckman 2002; 
Dobrev and Barnett 2005; Shane and Khurana 2003). Work history studies lay an 
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important conceptual framework for thinking about inter-organizational transfers through 
the most obvious vector: a human host.  
The genealogical metaphor may be helpful in thinking about organizations, but 
the lineage of an organization has the potential to be more complicated and dynamic than 
a biological lineage. Moreover, career history studies tend to rely upon the transitions of 
individuals who move between firms. In most cases, these studies cannot distinguish 
between the circumstances that led to the inter-firm mobility. Thus, post-failure mobility 
is represented as an unidentified component of other mobility studies. The special 
character of post-failure mobility derives from the simultaneity of discharge within a 
community and the solidarity that catastrophic change precipitates. These factors allow 
individuals to choose to work together without violating the trust and expectations of 
former peers. Phillips (2005) shows that the genealogies of law firms are associated with 
the involvement of women in positions of authority: firms that subordinate women beget 
firms that subordinate women. Work like this is inspirational to the formulation of the 
present research question and study design, and the present study moves that research 
forward by recognizing personal agency in organizational inheritance. Thus, while it 
remains likely that individuals will carry with them proto-norms of practice that are 
uncritically sustained, the research makes room for choice in the norms that groups 
establish, conceived as choices between norms that will be to leave behind and norms 
that will be re-established. The fact that these observations include some organizations 
where multiple contributors worked together on a nascent project increases the 
opportunities for transmission and critical engagement. 
 39 
The third contribution occurs in the development of a new approach to the 
analysis of firm failure. By collecting post-failure measures of important productive 
capacities, a new baseline for the loss-rate of organizational churn can be imagined. 
Organizational routines are at the center of the productive capacity of a modern economy 
(Nelson and Winter 1982), but as of yet there is no good way to measure the utilization 
and survival of these important economic assets. As firms are founded, grown, merged 
together, and dismantled, an alternative baseline for the costs and benefits of 
organizational churn can be conceptualized through the growth, persistence and 
destruction of routines. People who have lost organizations can explain better than 
anyone else the value that these organizations provide.  
Finally, the study contributes building blocks to the theory of the firm. It responds 
to established evolutionary thinking on organizations and firms by calling for a symbiotic 
evolutionary theory of organizations and economics. By refocusing on the routine as a 
fundamental productive unit, this study suggests that the important essence of an 
organization may sometimes be preserved across organizational generations. In biological 
systems, important complex proteins, nutrients, and forms of energy are passed from one 
organism to another through mutually beneficial symbiotic relationships. Many 
evolutionary biologists assert that symbiosis is a more important factor in survival than 
competition. The study of economic organization is steeped in economists’ fixation on 
competition amidst scarcity, an orientation that might seem incompatible with the 
symbiotic perspective. But the major shift in evolutionary biology to an interest in 
symbiosis occurred amidst a re-conceptualization and integration of different insights 
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from different levels of analysis. By recognizing porous boundaries of individual 
organisms and the importance of other organisms to the processes within an individual, 
biologists began to realize that the “compete and survive” conception was insufficient to 
explain many evolutionary outcomes.  
Population ecology and the sociology of organizations have not been blind to the 
importance of mutualism (Barnett and Carroll 1987). However, without a conceptual 
apparatus that conceives of production within and across firm boundaries, important 
symbiotic processes have been unobservable. Thus, the fourth contribution of this study 
is to begin integrating levels of analysis to illustrate interdependencies that are otherwise 
obscured by incompatible forms of measurement. A similar feat is already accomplished 
by Saxenian’s arguments for “protean places” that sustain innovation through risk taking 
and porous firm boundaries. Indeed, geography will appear regularly in the analysis as 
respondents pit their social contexts against their career objectives. But when firms close, 
the effect is not merely regional. Sometimes they cast employees on job searches that 
lead them thousands of miles away, often in the quest to make something out of the 
routines that they already possess. 
There is reason to hope that this project will be of interest to academics, 
particularly those academics who work in the fields of business ethics, organizational 
theory, and strategy. When Davis (1971) sought to define what makes a theoretical 
contribution interesting, the most salient feature that he identified was the denial of the 
assumptions of an audience, and on this feature I hope that my work does not disappoint. 
It does, in many respects, deny assumptions about the finality of failure, the 
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organizational nature of routines, and the selection-based nature of organizational 
evolution through failure. But I hope that the project also does justice to the meaningful 
and challenging experiences that the study’s participants have faced in the wake of 
organizational failures. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
A METHOD FOR POST-FAILURE ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Ignorance of post-failure processes follows directly from data limitations. Most archival 
data sources are unable to demonstrate linkages between failed firms and other 
organizations because they lack the observational detail to demonstrate (1) that new and 
incumbent firms are connected to failing firms via employment histories and other 
resource transfers, and (2) what organizational resources are recoverable from the failed 
firm. Direct observation and surveys conducted among or within organizations suffer 
from the same limitations because gaining access to an organization is costly and 
generally concerned with ongoing activities. Failed firms, laid-off employees, and 
departures from an industry are all hidden within a black box of unobserved 
organizational heterogeneity.  
This dissertation examines post-failure continuity in two industries using 
qualitative, semi-structured interviews. These interviews document the routines and 
norms of the failed organization and the survival of routines and norms in the current 
productive context of the interviewee. The first chapter on theories of post-failure 
organization justifies an inductive, grounded theory approach rather than a deductive 
approach that proposes hypotheses and tests them, but the theory contribution of the 
research product depends upon many of the same factors as a deductive project. Both 
should aspire to generalizability, clarity, and usefulness. This requires care in specifying 
the scope of the phenomenon under observation, in the present case, failure. It requires 
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attention to the structure of the sample and the selection of the industries from which that 
sample is to be drawn. And it requires a procedure for identifying organizational 
characteristics within the narratives of individuals.  
Failure as Job Death 
The complex and multifaceted nature of failure is discussed above (p. 3), and the 
conception of failure within organizational analysis is shown to be the obverse of 
organizational performance and distinct from organizational disbanding. Because diverse 
stakeholders have distinctive performance expectations of the organizations with which 
they are involved, organizational failure can mean several different things. This is the 
case regardless of the position that one takes in the stakeholder vs. shareholder debate 
(Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld 1999; Donaldson and Preston 1995; Jones 1995). 
Whether a firm is meant to serve its shareholders first, or some other balance of interests, 
the failure of a firm to meet the expectations of multiple stakeholder groups is a negative 
organizational outcome. A firm can fail its shareholders through financial 
underperformance, fail to meet its contractual obligations to customers, fail to provide 
safe ongoing employment, or fail to repay its debts. For each of a firm’s stakeholder 
relationships, there is a possibility of failure. Many failures concern multiple stakeholders 
simultaneously; for instance, when Enron collapsed, it simultaneously failed its 
shareholders, creditors, and employees.  
This study focuses on forms of organizational failure that result in significant 
layoffs, a category that includes organizational “death” (disbanding), liquidation, decline, 
and strategic layoffs. Most often, the category overlaps with underperformance in other 
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stakeholder relationships as well. However, it is possible that strategic layoffs lead to 
increased profit, creating a success for shareholders and a failure for employees. To 
exclude these cases, all of the firms in this sample were also under bankruptcy protection. 
Regardless of whether firms are failing financially, layoffs are a good place to 
start in an effort to understand the transfer of organizational attributes. Employees are the 
most flexible mechanism through which routines and norms have an opportunity to 
transfer. There are other ways that routines can transfer. For example, a failing 
organization might close a factory and make its physical plant, capital equipment, and 
former customers available to competitors. However, these transfer mechanisms are 
industry-specific, whereas employee job displacement generalizes to all firms. Ongoing 
employment is also an important indicator of organizational health. We would not 
generally say that companies should maximize the number of people that they employ, 
but it is certainly the case that companies are meant to fulfill their employment contracts, 
and it is commonly argued within business ethics that employees who have made firm-
specific human capital investments have special rights within the firm as key stakeholders 
who should be treated fairly. But the rationale need not be viewed as a zero-sum game. 
The notion that employees, as individual persons, have rights that should be respected by 
company policy (Radin and Werhane 2003) is entirely compatible with the empirical 
claim that companies find success by respecting their employees (Pfeffer 1994). As 
joblessness becomes a larger concern in public policy, it is likely that the organizational 
imperative to provide employment will continue to be a key aspect of the social 
responsibility of business and the conception of organizational performance. For all of 
 45 
these reasons, it seems wholly appropriate to center a study of organizational failure on 
layoffs and lapses in the provision of employment. Thus, while I do rely upon a multi-
stakeholder conception of failure in my approach to the study and my sampling strategy, I 
take employees to be the focal stakeholder in the failure reconfiguration process. 
Some of the organizations in this study are appropriately characterized as 
“organizational deaths,” but it is the death of jobs that unifies the experiences of the 
participants in this study. Many were laid off from organizations that collapsed entirely. 
Some anticipated a collapse and found alternative employment before their jobs were 
eliminated. Others were laid off because of their seniority and thus their burden on the 
payroll. Still others were laid off because of their junior positions within an organization 
that valued tenure. Finally, some employees retained their jobs during acquisitions, 
moving into a different organization in the process. The destruction of occupational 
opportunity therefore unites a diverse set of career transitions that arise amidst 
organizational failure. These faces of failure do not wholly explain the phenomenon, but 
they offer a reasonably comprehensive account of careers amidst failure, the key 
mechanism for post-failure continuity.  
In Chapter Seven there will be reason to consider the burden of failure and its 
distribution based upon the consequences of failure. In that case, I will focus on three 
considerations: “job death” as described above; the availability of the products and 
services provided by an industry or of reasonably good substitutes for these products and 
services; and the collapse of specific obligations that occur within the firm between 
stakeholders. More need not be said at this point other than to acknowledge that the costs 
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and consequences of failure are much more general than the loss of work, and that these 
consequences are also important considerations. 
Industry Selection 
In this study, two industries were selected for comparative analysis. The three 
necessary conditions for inclusion were occurrence of organizational failure, use of 
specialized labor, and a long-term demand for the services provided by the industry. 
Thus, rather than developing a sample for the study of change amidst technological 
obsolescence (Tripas 1997), this study focuses on industries undergoing a process of 
redefinition with total collapse being an unlikely outcome. The argument hinges on an 
ongoing need for the services provided within these industries, particularly the routines of 
the study participants. 
The industries were also selected for their differences. Because the study 
questions relate to norms of practice, career motivations, tenure, and productive routines, 
it is useful that the selected industries should differ on these characteristics. Newspapers 
and investment banks met all of the necessary criteria. These are two important, enduring, 
and dynamic industries, and they differ in other interesting ways. One virtue that justified 
the chosen industries was the multiple levels of complexity within newspapers and 
investment banks. Investment banks and newspapers have failed at multiple levels: whole 
news organizations and large banks have gone bankrupt, subsidiaries have closed, and 
sections of newspapers and individual business units (“funds”) have been shuttered. This 
complexity introduces otherwise unaccounted-for variation of failure within a business 
hierarchy. 
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Table 2: Key Characteristics of Newspapers and Investment Banks 
Industry Newspapers Investment Banks 
Involuntary 
Displacement Very frequent Frequent 
Opportunity 
Low perceived employment 
opportunity: jobs are rare and 
undercompensated 
Medium perceived employment 
opportunity: jobs are rare but well 
compensated 
Careers 
Out and up or stay stagnant: career 
advancement involves moves 
between papers 
Up or out: bank experience is 
highly valued, and those who don’t 
advance within a firm or don’t want 
to stay find other opportunities 
Networks 
Dense and reaching: journalists 
know their peers well because of 
the collaborative, public nature of 
the work; movement between 
papers makes journalist networks 
far-reaching 
Cohorts and hierarchies, reaching: 
junior bankers know their peers 
with whom they suffer certain 
abuses, and they know the chain of 
command above them; senior 
bankers develop external 
relationships as well. 
Motivation Normative Economic 
Routines and 
Norms 
Routines: use of visuals, 
perspective in photography, 
authorial license in writing (voice), 
editorial process and oversight 
 
Norms: “what is news?” Is a paper 
a mission or a business? Do 
marketing and publishing 
executives have a say on editorial 
policy?  
Routines: valuation process and 
acceptable forms of “quantitative” 
evidence, emphasis on internal 
service audiences (CSR initiatives 
are employee-driven, efficiency 
improvements are employee driven, 
research products are designed for 
specific internal use) 
 
Norms: emphasis on compensation, 
buyer beware, trust and 
insider/outsider distinctions, intense 
competition 
 
There are a few other dimensions upon which these industries differ that will 
receive additional attention in Chapters Three and Four: 
Social structure: Newspapers are more socially organized during and after failure 
than investment banks are. In newspapers, email listserves are often created to share job 
posts and news about former employees. These alumni networks create social ties that 
cross departments and tenure. The alumni organizing among investment bankers has been 
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comparatively modest, but there are also alumni groups organized through websites like 
Facebook and LinkedIn, some of which coordinate face-to-face meetings as well. 
Investment banks produce age-stratified social networks with ties running horizontally 
between colleagues and vertically within a chain of command. Analysts are hired as a 
cohort and trained as a group. They form social bonds with their “classmates” that 
persevere despite mobility within the industry. Other investment banking ties come from 
business school and project collaboration. 
Norms of work: Both newspapers and investment banks have relatively strong 
normative environments, particularly regarding work product. Performance in news 
production and finance depends upon the quality and timing of information. “Getting the 
story right” is a relevant process in both industries, but the normative similarities end 
there. Interviews focus on a subset of norms within each of these environments. In 
newspapers, it is the questions “What is news?” and “How should news be presented?” 
that motivate many of the shared understandings and conflicts within papers. In 
investment banks, it is quantification in the use of financial models, receptiveness to 
internal feedback, and the emphasis on external perceptions.  
Compensation and career motivations: Though both newspapers and investment 
banks employ members of a skilled and educated elite, the relative and absolute 
differences in compensation are profound. Newspaper journalists are poorly compensated 
relative to most other skilled careers, whereas investment bankers are highly 
compensated relative to most other careers. The compensation orientations interact with 
the organizations in interesting ways: investment bankers are much quicker to move if 
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they perceive a better economic opportunity elsewhere, whereas journalists may depart 
based upon other motivations, like the perceived threats to journalistic integrity. 
Employee age: Newspapers and investment banks differ substantially in the age 
of the workforces that they employ. Investment banks operate with a pyramid-based 
demographic model, where a few older people manage a larger and younger population. 
Newspapers, on the other hand, tend to be less age-stratified, so that reporters may 
continue as journalists throughout their careers without a move to management. Editors 
tend to be seasoned journalists, but not all senior journalists are editors. There are long 
tenured positions in banks for analysts and other specialists, but even these positions 
involve advancement in titles and reporting relationships so that the nature of the work 
also changes. 
Sampling Strategy 
The sample in this dissertation identifies laid-off employees within failing firms 
within failing industries. Thus, the sampling occurs at two different levels within two 
different industries. After surveying the diversity of newspaper failures, four papers were 
selected: one well-regarded paper that closed entirely, one prestigious paper that 
conducted layoffs, a paper that managed to maintain a good reputation despite a gradual 
decline and eventual failure, and a paper that is known widely for a precipitous decline in 
quality along with massive layoffs. The investment banks were selected for two 
variations in bank failure. One was acquired as a severely weakened party in a distressed 
acquisition. The other entered into bankruptcy and was broken into businesses that were 
maintained, closed, or acquired.  
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Having selected organizations from within these industries, the next stage of the 
study required the identification of individual employees from failed firms. Sampling 
employees involved a two-stage process in both newspapers and investment banks: 
identification of initial contacts, and expansion through snowball sampling techniques. In 
the news organizations, journalists were contacted through public contact information. 
Journalists proved to be extremely generous as study participants. Nearly all of the 
journalists I contacted agreed to participate, and most suggested several others to contact. 
Newspapers are also relatively porous organizations in the sense that information is 
widely publicized. Both disbanded organizations published the names of all of their 
employees in their final issue of the paper, and complete lists of all laid-off employees in 
the surviving papers were available through online sources along with a commentary on 
the layoff decisions.  
Relative to newspapers, investment banks are much more opaque. Investment 
bankers and analysts were initially contacted through an outdated alumni database that 
continues to list potential respondents as employees of now-defunct organizations. Many 
of these individuals have since moved on, and many of their email addresses are out of 
date, but the initial sampling procedure was sufficient to initiate the study. Another 
strategy involves identifying firms that acquired portions of a failed bank within a 
specific region, and then searching for that bank’s employees within the same alumni 
database. A quick search of publicly available work histories on Linkedin.com narrowed 
the sample to confirm that bankers had in fact worked in the firm of interest.  
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The biggest contrast in interviewee accrual concerns snowball sampling. 
Journalists provided as many as 300 emails addresses of alumni from their organizations, 
and almost every interviewee suggested five or more former colleagues as potential 
participants. Several journalists sent emails to introduce the research project to their 
friends and former colleagues. In one case, a journalist generously arranged a lunch with 
four survivors of the same organizational failure. In contrast, snowball sampling among 
investment bankers proved almost completely ineffective: only one interview arose from 
the suggestion of a peer, and in that case it was agreed that the contact be made in 
confidence without the recommended person knowing the identity of recommender. The 
journalists whom I interviewed are more often known to one another than the investment 
bankers whom I interviewed. In order to minimize the bias associated with interviewing a 
single clique of individuals, I approached several individuals from each paper. Most were 
nonetheless acquainted, but these relationships are not an artifact of the sampling 
strategy. In either case, one might expect some response bias among the sample which 
would make it more likely for agitated or aggrieved former employees to respond than 
those who would protect their company and industry’s reputation. I sought to minimize 
these effects by focusing recruitment materials on individual careers rather than salient 
characteristics of failed firms. Though it is difficult to determine what sample selection 
bias resulted from the ineffective snowball sampling strategy, I found little coherent 
evidence of a unifying perspective among respondents. A few respondents did admit to 
wishing ill upon their former employers, but the dominant narrative of regret for 
unfortunate outcomes and recognition of complex causes offset these views. 
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The backward-looking approach of this research strategy opens the way for a 
wide variety of post-failure analyses. Because the social networks of failed firms are 
largely intact, it is possible to sample into these firms through snowball or network-based 
techniques with relatively comprehensive coverage. The least connected participants of 
the firm are likely to be excluded from the analysis. It may be presumed that these 
isolated persons have little access to the routines and norms of the failed organization.  
The post-failure context provides a natural experiment for researchers who are 
interested in understanding informal organization and its relationship to formal 
organization. Organizational failure strips informal organizations from their formal 
setting, and the resultant painful process provides a repeated opportunity for researchers 
to unravel the complex entanglement of how economic relations are embedded within 
social relations, even as survivors redefine themselves and their productive contexts. 
Prioritizing and Observing Norms and Routines 
In order to link failed firms to new and established organizations, one must first 
define the medium through which these organizations are connected. Such a medium 
could take many forms. Some things are obviously lost to displaced workers: letterhead, 
business cards, and job titles are no longer useful once a person loses her job. However, 
other things survive. For example, occupational status, knowledge of organizational 
process, and social capital all have the opportunity to survive the failure of a firm 
depending upon the process of post-failure organizing. In order for the connection 
between the firms to be non-trivial, the linkages must concern aspects of the firm that are 
important or highly valued. If we found that survivors wear the same shoes in failed and 
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newly founded organizations, we would have little evidence that the organizations are 
materially connected. We need to document the connection through resources or 
processes that are directly connected to the very essence of the firm. 
Though organizations can be understood in many ways, an organization’s norms 
and routines are certainly essential aspects of what makes a firm operate in the way that it 
does. In this section I will explain why norms and routines are so important to the 
substance of an organization and how they are recognized through qualitative analysis. 
These concepts will be further refined in the third and fourth chapters.  
Routines 
 Organizational routines are socially and technologically embedded work 
processes. In the language of strategy research, the “routine” is an expansive metaphor 
for the many patterns, policies, practices, interactions, techniques, and procedures of an 
organization. Within organizations, patterned actions result from predictable responses to 
“triggers” (Becker 2004). The predictability helps to maintain the basic interpersonal 
expectations between competing interests within the firm. This “truce” (Nelson and 
Winter 1982: 107) in the way that things are done provides one of the important overlaps 
between routines and norms. Though many routines are negotiable, some routines are 
reinforced by social norms that provide motivations for individual behavior. For example, 
newspapers promote short meetings because of deadlines. Short meetings are the routine, 
and they are also enforced as norms: if a meeting were to run too long, complaint would 
be a likely result. If a norm is followed with sufficient regularity, it is also a routine. 
Importantly, many organizational processes are sufficiently routinized to avoid conflict 
 54 
all together. So long as the routine is followed according to the established truce, no 
conflict is warranted. Chester Barnard described this area of agreement as a “zone of 
indifference” (Barnard 1968 [1938]: 167). 
Organizational routines are among a constellation of managerial concepts that are 
neither easy to define, nor easy to distinguish. “Routine” describes a subset of activities 
within most organizational contexts. Nelson and Winter define them broadly:  
Our general term for all regular and predictable behavioral patterns of firms is 
“routine.” We use this term to include characteristics of firms that range from 
well-specified technical routines for producing things, through procedures for 
hiring and firing, ordering new inventory, or stepping up production of items in 
high demand, to policies regarding investment, research and development (R&D) 
or advertising, and business strategies about product diversification and overseas 
investment (1982: 14). 
Later their definition moves closer to the individual level:  
“We use ‘routine’ in a highly flexible way…. It may refer to a repetitive pattern of 
activity in an entire organization, to an individual skill, or, as an adjective, to the 
smooth uneventful effectiveness of such an organizational or individual 
performance.” (1982: 97).  
Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett (1993) note the overlapping conceptions of organizational 
routines and organizational knowledge:  
Routines refer to the repetitive patterns of activity by organizational members, 
both individuals and groups. Beyond defining what an organization can do, 
routines define what the organization knows, and writings in this area tend not to 
distinguish knowledge and action. (1993: 92) 
Indeed, Nelson and Winter have an entire section on “routine as organizational memory,” 
(1982: 99). The vagueness is useful for some approaches to organizational research. 
Population ecologists, for example, have studied newspapers in several contexts 
(Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett 1993; Carroll and Huo 1986; Delacroix and Carroll 
1983). These industry-level datasets tend to provide lists of firms and their locations, and 
 55 
the years during which their papers were printed. In most cases, researchers do not have 
access to very basic information like firm size, paper circulation, or price, but they 
nonetheless speculate about the path dependency associated with an underlying basis of 
routines embedded within organizations (e.g. Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett 1993). This 
should not detract from the very interesting findings of population ecology, but it does 
illustrate the gap between industry-level analysis and any specific operationalization of 
the concept of an organizational routine. 
While there is a general acceptance of routines as embedded organizational 
activity and knowledge, there is considerable discussion regarding exactly where these 
organizational processes are embedded. Teece (1982) distinguishes “separable” routines 
by arguing that for some routines, the transfer of a key individual may be sufficient for 
knowledge to be transferred between organizations. However, Teece claims that 
organizational knowledge (as distinguished from separable routines) is required in the 
majority of cases to facilitate the transfer of productive expertise. “Taken out of context, 
an individual's knowledge of a routine may be quite useless” (1982: 45). Simultaneous 
layoffs like those studied here may permit the transfer of otherwise inseparable routines 
because multiple knowledge carriers are displaced from work together. 
Argote and Ingram (2000) suggest that organizational knowledge and routines 
should be understood as adhering to “knowledge reservoirs.” These reservoirs exist 
within and between organizational members, their tasks, and their tools. For example, 
they suggest that a transfer of a technological resource may be facilitated by the 
simultaneous transfer of an organizational member who may be useful in adapting the 
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resource. The enduring question among strategists is how organizations can develop and 
maintain the knowledge and routines that they require without releasing (or “spilling 
over”) the routines to other firms.  
Though Nelson and Winter (1982) establish routines as a cornerstone of 
evolutionary economics, routines have a different connotation for many sociologists of 
work. For them, routines arise from a deliberate managerial practice of imposed order or 
“routinization.” Various organizational research settings, including industrial (Blauner 
1964; Burawoy 1979), clerical (Mills 1951), and service work (Leidner 1993), reveal the 
intensity of imposed routines in workplace social organization. As work roles are 
prescribed more narrowly, workers lose autonomy and become deskilled and replaceable 
(Braverman 1998 [1974]). The central concern has been the balance of power between 
workers and managers. There are also more subtle considerations that relate to the 
experience of the work itself, Leidner explains: 
I do not take the position that the routinization of service work and the 
standardization of human personality… are in fact benign, benefiting workers, 
customers, and companies in a happy congruence of interests. Often, these 
manipulations are invasive, infantilizing, exasperating, [and] demeaning. But if 
we are to understand how routinization works in service jobs and what outcomes 
it produces, we need an account of the relations among routinization, skill, 
control, interaction, and self that is both more precise and more subtle than we 
have yet been given. These outcomes of routinization are felt throughout society 
as participants adjust their assumptions about the norms guiding social 
interaction. (Leidner 1993: 23). 
The admittedly adverse consequences of highly organized work, which depress 
individual autonomy, make skills superfluous, and threaten the worker’s command over a 
fair wage give the term “routine” a negative connotation that stands in stark contrast with 
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its use in management research, but in either case routines play an important role in 
organizational life. 
 The two views are not mutually exclusive. One can acknowledge the universal 
character of routines within economic organizations and also grant the consequences of 
using routines as an inflexible system of social control. Business ethics contributes one 
version of this distinction. Bowie (1998) argues that many jobs can be meaningful, 
provided that the worker’s autonomy is respected and that she is given the opportunity to 
fully exercise her moral powers. Provided that workers are involved in the specification 
of their work and its improvement over time, there is no reason to think that established 
practices are a violation of individual autonomy. Religion provides a helpful analogue: 
we describe religious participation as an exercise of individual choice, yet the practices of 
religion are carefully specified by the rituals of the religious order. Autonomy does not 
require the absence of patterned social behavior, only the presence of meaningful choice 
between such patterns. This is the view that I develop in the present study. I look for 
practical regularities that coordinate work products. I view routines as indispensible 
components of any complex organization. Patterned behavior creates outputs that are 
sufficiently standard that they can consistently serve as inputs for other processes and 
organizations, and avoids regular interpersonal conflict. 
Some routines are actually liberating, reducing the effort involved for multiple 
parties to coordinate their work even as the collaboration increases the opportunity for 
meaningful expression. For example, one paper that will be discussed in Chapter Three, 
the “Local Blotter,” collects story ideas at the end of every weekend. Anyone in the paper 
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is invited to pass ideas along, so that the entire organization serves as one social antenna. 
All reporters are expected to submit ideas by first thing Monday morning. Many papers 
involve their staff in defining what stories should be written, but journalists from the 
Blotter note the organization’s receptiveness to their ideas and make special reference to 
this routine. The routine establishes the active expectation of participation, and since the 
reporters who regularly supply story ideas are the same individuals who write the stories, 
the routine may be said to increase the scope of their autonomy.  
There are a number of conceivable research strategies for identifying 
organizational routines. It is not difficult to identify regularities of process, either through 
participant observation, qualitative interviews, or open survey responses that elicit 
process descriptions. The difficulty occurs in deciding which routines matter. Of all 
possible process regularities, which should be considered? Situations provide their own 
narratives about which processes matter, but these subjective perceptions can be 
persistently uninformed. For example, for many years medical practitioners moved 
directly from autopsy to obstetrics, generally without washing their hands. Their routine 
resulted in the loss of countless lives, but it took decades for germ theory to catch up with 
the germs (Nuland 2003). It would be a tall order to hope for an internal or external 
evaluation of workplace routines to establish which routines are productive and which are 
unproductive or counterproductive. This is unlikely where the objective is clear, like the 
survival rate of mothers after childbirth, but it is even less likely where multiple and 
competing objectives vie for consideration. Most organizations serve complex interests 
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and objectives, and no study can assess the totality of all causes and effects within a 
complex system of shared and divergent priorities.  
One solution is to take seriously the subjective perceptions of the relative 
importance of routines and norms. I take the perceptions of the workplace and the 
workplace routines of all workplace participants as good indicators of the importance of 
these observed processes. Therefore, when a study participant explains that one routine is 
an important part of the way that an organization works, or is something that they miss 
about an organization, or when the participant uses a given routine to explain the larger 
context, I take that routine to have been lifted out of the nearly infinite set of assumed 
practices as something that is distinctive and at a minimum related to the interests of the 
study participant, if not the wider organization. Memorable routines are sufficiently 
salient that they are likely to matter to the people who rely upon them. 
A second issue involves the selection of routines that are specific to a given failed 
firm in order to understand the process of routine transfer. The challenge is to specify 
what is idiosyncratic about the routines of a given firm such that the employees of the 
firm would carry a given routine elsewhere and that it would matter. Take, for example, 
two firms that will be discussed in Chapter Four: “Global Investment,” a failed 
investment bank, and “Walls Investment,” a former subsidiary of Global that was 
acquired by its fund managers after Global collapsed. Stock analysts from both firms 
discussed the templates that they use to communicate with other parts of their banks. 
These templates provide a basic structure for what facts are displayed in the emails that 
go out to their research audience. The research audiences differ. In the case of “Walls 
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Investment,” the primary audience is comprised of portfolio managers who will use the 
information to choose stocks to buy or sell. In the case of “Global Investment,” the 
primary audience was a sales force of brokers who would then use the information to 
encourage their clients to buy or sell. In both cases, the immediate audience is internal to 
the firm.  
What is interesting about these research notes is that the communication is 
technologically routinized through a structured template, and these templates are taken 
seriously as an important form of professionalism for what is essentially internal email 
being sent between people who already know each other. However, several interviewees 
stressed the importance of these templates within the culture at Global Investment as a 
way to maintain the expectation of professionalism, which one referred to as “the gloss.” 
The templates are a routine; their use is reinforced by policy, which is also a routine. In 
the background, Global Investment’s gloss is sustained by a norm that defines 
professionalism as an important contributor to success and an important part of the way 
that work is done. 
Without diverse industry knowledge, it is difficult for an outsider to identify 
idiosyncratic organizational routines. However, thanks to their recent career transitions, 
study participants can easily observe the distinctiveness of a work environment and its 
norms and routines. The first example is from the “Regional Post,” a paper that was 
closed outright. The Regional Post was known for its photography, and its tabloid format 
allowed the display of a large photograph prominent on the first page. A very personal 
approach to the news was a part of everything that they did. Rachel explains: 
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We focused a lot on faces, and people in general. When we decided what photos 
to use for 9/11 or when the Virginia Tech shooting happened, I mean these were 
not events that happened in our backyard, but when we went to the wire photos to 
choose, we always sort of focused in on faces and moments and what emotions 
we could gather from the picture, rather than, 'Here's a picture of a building that 
isn't there anymore, or a picture of a building on fire,” and there was a place for 
those pictures in the paper, too, but they weren't the main focus. What our editor 
was really interested in was digging behind the event and finding out how people 
felt, and what they were going to do now, and how this affected our readers, and 
why our readers should care. 
In the wake of the failure of the Regional Post, two different entrepreneurial post-failure 
projects sprung up as online outlets, and both tried to preserve this approach to news. 
Both websites placed an image at the center of the page in a way that was explicitly 
photography-centered and unlike the prevailing aesthetic for online news layouts at the 
time. According to Rachel and her colleague Sarah, both of these organizations aimed to 
continue producing news content in a way that connects emotionally with the same 
working-class or lower middle-class audience.  
 This project seeks to identify process regularities from retrospective accounts of 
failed firms, and then to use the comparative perspective of former employees of these 
firms to determine whether these routines were important, whether they were 
idiosyncratic, and whether the employee was able to transfer the routine to a new firm. 
Norms 
Norms are in many ways the most important variable in this study. Social norms 
form a bridge between sociology and business ethics, the two key audiences of this 
project. Interestingly, the sociological study of business ethics began very early in the 
development of sociology as a discipline through a focus on social norms. Durkheim 
wrote his dissertation on The Division of Labor in Society (1997a), examining the 
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relationship between the formation of social bonds (“social solidarity”) and the 
emergence of industrial capitalism. One of Weber’s most famous works, The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1958), is about the transfer of religious norms into 
economic life, and about the sustained place of such norms even after the original 
religious inspiration has been removed.  
Homans defines a norm as “a statement made by a number of members of a 
group, not necessarily by all of them, that the members ought to behave in a certain way 
in certain circumstances’’ (1961: 46). It turns out that norms are more easily defined than 
identified empirically. It is difficult to identify norms as an outsider to a normative 
context (Burg 2010), and the qualitative interview approach to newspapers and 
investment banks is no exception. One strategy to bridge the gap is immersion, which 
provides the researcher with the opportunity to learn the norms and observe how 
infractions are addressed. This strategy is not an option in the post-failure context, 
because the context under examination is at least partially destroyed at the time that the 
analysis begins. The advantage of the retrospective interview design is that it tends to 
focus the respondent on comparative differences across their own careers, but its chief 
disadvantage is that the researcher is not able to observe norms directly, and must instead 
seek corroboration from consistent responses between interviews with individuals who 
were displaced from the same firm. 
Social norms, like organizational routines, are processes that regulate individual 
action through interpersonal expectations. Social norms can be formal and codified or 
informal and tacit. If norms are followed with regularity, they are also routines, but the 
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concepts remain distinct. Laws against jaywalking are an example of codified norms that 
are not routinely followed; they are norms but not routines. Drinking coffee at morning 
meetings is an example of a routine without normative repercussions. Should a journalist 
drink tea or water, none of her peers would care.  
Social norms are rules reinforced by others, but norms need not be “social.” Many 
social norms also include a self-imposed component of personal values. When a social 
norm becomes a personal value, we say that it has been internalized. The distinction is 
particularly important in the post-failure context. Many journalists move from 
newspapers into workplaces where they are unimpressed by the way that their colleagues 
gather and present information:  
Helen (editorial journalist at the National, then left voluntarily to take a job as a 
nonprofit leader): I have wanted [our nonprofit to provide] informal, accessible, 
good writing [that can be] fused into our whole mission… There is just such crap 
in the field and impenetrable information. People go into nonprofits and (a) they 
don’t know how to write, and (b) they start writing with language that the 
government uses because that’s where all their attentions are focused, so they’re 
sounding like the Federal Register. I mean it’s just impenetrable. I would get so 
bored and fall over on my face just trying to get through this stuff.  
The colleagues do not establish or enforce the social norms of a newspaper; yet the 
journalist often continues to self-impose certain norms. These norms would seem to have 
been internalized into personal values. What is most important, though, is not that Helen 
had internalized an aesthetic for how information should be communicated, but that in a 
new workplace she would seek to impose that aesthetic upon her peers and employees. 
So, while norms may be internalized for a variety of reasons, the most interesting 
transition process involves the re-externalization of norms, a process through which 
norms are once again established as a component of a social context. 
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 Here I will briefly outline some of the sociological and social psychological 
thinking on norms that suggests that such an oscillation may be possible. The 
internalization of norms constitutes a final stage in some of the most grandiose 
sociological theories, and I believe that theories of social control provide a background 
for a similar process in the opposite direction.  
Weber concludes The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1958) by 
asserting that once religious asceticism had imposed its strictures of self-restraint on 
capitalism and the logic had spread, its religious origins became unnecessary and 
irrelevant. Durkheim (1995) argues similarly that social interaction through religion and 
shared symbols was crucial in the development of language, cognition, and science. The 
development of rationality and its norms of verification could not have happened without 
shared superstitions, but once rationality took hold, the superstitions were no longer 
necessary to maintain the norms.  
 At a smaller scale of social reality, the process of internalization is the 
overarching assumption of many interventions into business and professional ethics. 
Business ethics curricula are often subjected to “tests” of the norms that they instill in 
their students (Bloodgood, Turnley, and Mudrack 2010; Cagle and Baucus 2006; Luthar 
and Karri 2005; Schlaefli, Rest, and Thoma 1985). Similarly, one objective of medical 
internships and training programs is the “norming” process through which doctors pass. 
Such programs are expected to succeed, even though it is understood that most students 
will go on to practice in a setting that lacks the oversight and accountability mechanisms 
that are in place in a teaching hospital.  
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 I do not provide an account of the moral psychology present within individual 
persons that generates and establishes persistent systems of value, but I take it that such 
an account is readily available within social psychology. The sociological strain of 
accounting for social structure within an individual is illustrated by Coleman: 
It is useful to begin with the extreme case, a person who has so strongly 
internalized the goals or interests of others that the “actors” inside that person are 
simply reflections of actors outside; the system of action here is a kind of internal 
world mirroring the external world. The phrase is reminiscent of Cooley’s (1902) 
term, “the looking-glass self,” which is ordinarily interpreted in a narrow sense, 
that is, as seeing oneself through the eyes of others. But Cooley seems to have 
intended the term to be more encompassing, that is, the self as constituting an 
internal reflection of the system of action that exists outside the person. In this 
view the self contains within it a reflection of all the actors in the system outside, 
along with their interests. The person’s action toward that outside system is an 
outcome of the balance of interests among the actors internalized from that 
system. (Coleman 1990: 525-26) 
One way to explain the process of internalization and the structural component of 
personal values in the post-failure context is as a lag or ghosted effect. In the same way 
that images become burnt into old computer monitors, the looking-glass self may provide 
a cumulative sense of external expectations and motivations. Adding an affective 
component to the understanding of moral psychology (Haidt 2001) introduces the 
possibility that intuitions established through prior experience could perpetuate the 
satisfaction that a person finds in meeting the expectations of a disbanded reference 
group even when the person is cognitively aware of the irrelevance of the prior peer 
group’s perceptions. 
The actual process through which occupational norms are retained, altered, 
discarded, and re-introduced remains somewhat mysterious, and while this dissertation 
provides some basic components of a larger theory, much more study is required. 
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Research on occupational norms tends to focus within an organization or an industry in a 
way that gathers little information on prior work contexts.  
The methodology for identifying occupational norms is similar to the 
methodology for identifying routines. Study participants are asked to characterize the 
norms of the failing paper and then to compare and contrast these norms with the norms 
found within a current workplace. The advantage of this procedure is that it highlights 
salient features that matter to journalists and bankers. Assuming that conflict is part of 
what makes norms memorable, the interview-based process is slightly biased against 
norms that are routine and persistent from the failing firm to the post-failure work 
context. These normative routines are unlikely to create conflict and therefore less 
memorable than the norms that involve strife or disconnection between work contexts. 
Like routines, norms can be difficult for an outsider to identify. And, as with 
routines, we aim to identify idiosyncratic and valued norms, not irrelevant norms that are 
typical of the industry and irrelevant to performance or personal experience. Fortunately, 
a very similar process can be used to untangle norms. By asking journalist and bankers to 
explain how they do the work that they do, one can elicit dense process descriptions that 
invoke the collaborative efforts of colleagues. When participants contrast these process 
descriptions with their work in other firms, they begin to identify divergent practices, 
some of which relate directly to different expectations. Having described this process, the 
normative conflict experienced in new firms is sometimes so obvious that very generic 
questions yield relevant details about norms and normative contrasts. For example, 
Nathan gives the example of the difference between managerial practice at Global 
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Investment, and Adant, the firm that acquired his division of Global. Though Adant 
merged some divisions of Global into its own operations, Nathan’s division had no local 
equivalent, so it served as more of a targeted acquisition. Thus, from his perspective, “At 
least initially, what we were doing hadn't changed a whole lot. Who we were doing it 
with didn't change a whole lot, and the only thing[s] that really changed were our 
business cards and email addresses.” But in the longer run, Nathan ran into the different 
norms of how to motivate employees between Global and Adant. Nathan worked in 
technology, and one of the perks that Global provided to technologists was giving 
employees time to experiment with the latest technology and to work on side projects. 
Nathan: The morale of the teams is a topic of continuous conversation. The 
question of how to retain people despite flat markets, how to give people the 
promotions, the hot projects, how to motivate and retain them is definitely a topic 
of continuous discussion. There had been some discussions [of allowing 
employees to pursue side projects], but it seemed like a lot of that evaporated 
pretty quickly as it went up the chain. And not only was it a discussion of things 
like side projects, but even simple things, like the systems that we use to 
administer and record the performance appraisals. Some of these things were just 
so backwards, with forced curves and the language that they wanted to put in 
these things that those were demotivating factors for the teams, and often when 
we made some minor suggestions on how to evolve that process, even that didn't 
go over so well. Back in the Global days it was a five point scale, you know, one 
to five, and the majority of the performers got threes, three being, “meeting 
expectations,” that was fine. I guess that people weren't thrilled about it, but they 
were OK with it. At Adant, they had it on a four point scale, “A” through “D,” 
and the majority of the resources fell into the “C” camp by design with a forced 
distribution. And maybe they came up with the scale [somewhere else] because 
“A” through “D” and getting a “C” everybody equated with academia, and getting 
a “C” is not something that we're all very happy with. So, just putting it back on a 
five-point scale, or one to four, could have changed a lot of perceptions. 
Adant’s ongoing problems with employee retention are only partially explained by the 
cultural dissimilarities between Global and Adant, but Nathan’s examples demonstrate 
that the priorities were not easily imposed within that organization. Yet the expectations, 
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motivations, and local norms within the project teams were stable throughout. So, while 
Adant did not absorb the norms of the employees that it acquired, it is also clear that 
these norms persisted throughout the acquisition and were eventually motivations for 
many team members to move to other organizations that would be more consistent with 
their expectations. 
 Most norms and routines are never described by participants in those terms. As 
such, it is important to note the distinguishing features that indicate each. Routines are 
most often described as the way that things are done, in the consistent and repetitive 
processes of the organization. Norms are distinguished by the existence of commonalities 
of behavior and preferences for these commonalities. Here I suggest three indicators 
ordered by certainty. The most certain indicator is conflict. When people fight, complain, 
or contest in order to maintain a behavioral expectation, this is a strong indication of a 
norm. When the former Global employees fought against the Adant evaluation system, 
they were policing a norm and seeking to impose it on a new organization. It is clear that 
the evaluation system at Global was routinized around a five-point scale, but if this 
routine were viewed as substitutable or arbitrary it would not have led to rancor. The 
conflict itself demonstrates the norm. The second best indicator of a norm is an assertion 
of universal preference. It is very common for employees to ascribe desires to groups or 
entities.  For example, when journalists say, “We want to speak truth to power,” they are 
at once expressing a motivation and defining a group norm that corresponds to a sense of 
purpose. Of course, statements of group intention may not necessarily be enforced as 
norms, but they often are social expectations with consequences. The third indicator 
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overlaps entirely with the notion of a routine. At the most basic level, a norm is simply a 
behavioral regularity. However, if the behavioral regularity is sufficiently recurrent, and 
highly valued enough, then it is most likely that there is also a norm, either aspirational or 
obligatory, related to the behavior in question. 
 This section has identified norms and routines as key organizational concepts. 
Routines define the way that a firm works, and norms maintain firm behavior and 
encourage its adaptations by focusing participants on their wider social role. Though it is 
clear that a firm cannot be understood without reference to the specific individuals who 
inhabit it (Schneider 1987), a firm’s norms and routines are at the very core of how those 
individuals behave and why they continue to do so. So, even if organizational failure 
spreads the individual inhabitants of an organization throughout an industry, it is 
appropriate to look to a firm’s norms and routines as indicators of the continuity of its 
organizational life. 
Qualitative Approach 
A qualitative methodology like this one is not sufficient to demonstrate industry 
change over time, certainly not with the multi-decade timescale of some ecological 
studies. But it can provide cross-sectional evidence at one important moment in an 
industry’s development. What the research design loses in quantitative proof, it gains in 
descriptive depth. Moreover, the transitions that lead individuals from one job to the next 
are surprisingly complex, and armchair theorizing was not likely to define appropriate 
categories for a quantitative study without first observing the diversity of experience 
through open response.  
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Because this study aims to develop a situated understanding of how individuals 
shape and form the firms and industries that they inhabit, direct descriptions provided by 
participants in their own words get as close as possible to the actual process and 
experience. Qualitative interviews permit direct documentation of perceived repetition or 
strategic re-engagement of organizational practices and capabilities in post-failure 
contexts. These observations are made at the individual level by individuals whose 
economic well-being depends upon their decisions to maintain or discard key 
organizational routines and norms. Just as travelers have a keen sense of difference while 
visiting other cultures, so do survivors of organizational failure have an immediate sense 
of what they have left behind and what they have brought along. This is one of the 
methodological contributions of the study to organizational research. Researchers have 
struggled to identify routines and prove them to be significant. The transition between 
firms makes it possible for the respondent to better observe the importance of routines 
that are different in each context, at least with respect to the respondent’s own perceived 
effectiveness. 
At the individual level, study participants can be distinguished based their post-
failure engagement in work. Transition outcomes include jobs with similar work tasks, 
jobs with different work tasks, entrepreneurship, retirement, and unemployment. The 
primary outcome of interest is the extent to which displaced workers carry organizational 
routines and norms into new work contexts. Semi-structured interviews were selected as 
the data collection method because the heterogeneity of work tasks within different 
organizations does not permit question standardization and because the study is intended 
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to inductively learn what individuals carry out of failed firms, and what they lose in the 
course of failure. Interviews lasted between one and three hours, either in person or over 
the phone. The interviewee was asked to provide a career history. This most often elicited 
an uninterrupted narrative from college to present. Next, interviewees were asked to 
describe the work that they did at the failing firm, and their transition through the course 
of the failure. Participants were asked to compare their current work with the work that 
they did in the failing firm, with probes on expectations within the firm (norms) and on 
how others and the organization helped them to get their work done (routines).  
Interviews were transcribed, or when recording was not allowed, notes were 
expanded. The raw interview data were imported into the qualitative research software 
Atlas.ti. The program was used to sort, track, code, and link interview responses.  
All organization names have been changed, and all participants have been given 
pseudonyms. The reader may note the conflict inherent to such anonymization given the 
search for idiosyncratic norms and routines. Having set out to define what is most 
distinctive about a few firms in two relatively small industries, it is likely that my very 
success will undermine the anonymity provided by organizational pseudonyms. Where 
direct quotes may result in repercussions for individual study participants, these quotes 
have not been attributed to a pseudonym in order to offer further protection to 
participants. Appendix A provides a summary of all organizations identified in the study 
and their pseudonyms. Appendix B provides a summary of the work histories of all study 
participants and their organizational affiliations. 
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This chapter began by discussing the understanding of failure that is used within 
this research project. It is the death of a job that holds the study together. The chapter 
then documents the industry and sample selection strategies, and discusses some of the 
challenges and opportunities of researching these industries. Most of the chapter is 
dedicated to norms and routines as materially important and researchable concepts. The 
final section documented the interview process and qualitative research methodology 
relied upon in the third and fourth chapters, which begins with newspapers. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
POST-FAILURE CONTINUITY IN NEWSPAPERS 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the process of post-failure organizational continuity in 
newspapers. It explores patterns in the norms that are more and less likely to transfer, and 
in the relationship between these norms and the career decisions that individuals make. I 
distinguish between three types of norms: aesthetic, pragmatic, and justice norms. 
Aesthetic norms relate to matters of taste. Some of these norms are strongly felt, but most 
are flexible and will yield to the preferences of new stakeholders within a new 
organizational context. Pragmatic norms are norms that relate directly to performance of 
organizational goals. Survivors leave failed organizations with strong convictions about 
what works and what does not, and these convictions are imposed and shared as 
pragmatic norms. Pragmatic norms are both more and less flexible than aesthetic norms. 
These norms yield quickly when evidence is presented that the receiving context differs 
from the originating context and that the same norms are not appropriate or necessary, 
but they may also be firmly entrenched without such evidence. Justice norms are 
characteristically different in that they tend to be extremely inflexible. Justice norms 
relate to fundamental values and individual identities that, while formed throughout a 
career, are not immediately adaptable to a new organizational context. Regardless of the 
context, many journalists would have a very difficult time writing deceptive or untrue 
prose, or even writing something without the resources necessary to get the facts right. 
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Routines are distinguished based upon their volatility. In computer memory, the 
volatility relates to the amount of time that it takes for information to be lost. Like high-
volatility memory, high-volatility routines are difficult to transfer from an organization 
because as soon as they are unplugged from the organizational structure they lose their 
structure and retention of process. In contrast, low-volatility routines are more 
“separable” (Teece, 1982), and they’re more easily transferred to other contexts. The 
introduction of the new concept is intended to focus explicitly on the importance of 
complexity, change, and dynamism in determining which routines are too fragile to 
transfer. Low-volatility routines are the organizational equivalent of riding a bike. Even 
long after long periods of disuse, low-volatility routines continue to be preserved as 
proto-routines for eventual re-deployment. 
The final section outlines processes that facilitate or inhibit the transfers of 
routines and norms. The selection process occurs at two different levels. The first two 
sections define how norms and routines are selected from survivor backgrounds. The 
third section recognizes the antecedents to the organizational position necessary for 
survivors to make such a choice. Age discrimination, for instance, proves to be a major 
challenge for long-tenured employees whose work experience is viewed as a cost and 
liability rather than an asset. These barriers reduce the likelihood of transfer and 
demonstrate some of the most significant costs of organizational failure within 
newspapers. 
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The Failing News 
In early 2008, the Afternoon Dispatch (named here with a pseudonym) published 
its final issue, ending a journalistic legacy that spanned more than eight decades. Forty-
eight people were laid off and a city of more than 500,000 residents lost an important 
news source. At the time, the closure seemed to be an isolated incident, but papers would 
soon close across the United States and many more journalists would experience the 
death of their jobs.  
We speak of dying industries and organizations, but we say that jobs are “lost,” as 
if they have been misplaced. It sounds strange to describe a job as “dead,” but for the 
dozens of people who worked at the Dispatch, it was a job that died: a geographically 
proximate source of income, an organizational role, a place within a community, and a 
stable normative environment. Though the Dispatch had limited resources, its employees 
praise the quality and priorities of the newsroom. They are proud of the paper that they 
produced together, and most have yet to find equally satisfactory employment.  
Unfortunately, job satisfaction alone is not enough to keep a business alive. 
Businesses die for a variety of reasons. A business might starkly disappoint a key 
constituency or gradually cease to provide value to the customers, employees, and 
investors that once gave them cause to gather together. Practically speaking, most 
organizations die through the initiative of the owners, managers, or creditors. However, 
underperformance in other key relationships may also hasten a firm’s demise. In the case 
of the Dispatch, the firm’s failure was a strategic decision to cut costs made by a parent 
firm. In the process, the parent company lost a proven training ground for editors. 
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Dispatch employees had little agency over the survival of their paper, but 
considerable agency of their career decisions subsequent to the firm’s failure. Journalists, 
like other members of the educated elite, tend to do work that is portable and adaptable to 
different organizational contexts. If they choose to search, journalists, photographers, and 
editors often find ways to continue doing similar work in a similar way after being laid 
off. Therefore, the fates of their news organizations are eventually decided through the 
careers of former employees, a determination that occurs long after the point at which the 
firm disbands. Organizational death disrupts the economic relations coordinated by the 
disbanded organization, but that disruption need not be permanent or complete. The 
firm’s spirit may live on through its former employees’ ongoing adherence to its norms 
and ongoing utilization of its routines.  
The genealogical approach to organizational analysis (Phillips 2002) provides the 
most coherent theoretical perspective for the examination of post-failure continuity. 
Without an employee-centered conception of an organization’s pedigree, we are left with 
a disconnected life cycle: firms emerge, grow, decline, and die without drawing resources 
from other entities or releasing resources back into the ecosystem once disbanded. In 
contrast, the genealogical perspective conceives of a firm as sharing in its employees’ 
accumulated history and experience.  
This chapter considers post-failure continuities in organizational norms and 
routines among newspaper journalists. It is appropriate that a close analysis of post-
failure processes be undertaken within a sample of newspapers, a contemporary site of 
cataclysmic organizational failure and an industry that has provided data for some of the 
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classic studies of population ecology (Carroll and Huo 1986; Carroll and Hannan 1989; 
Delacroix and Carroll 1983). 
Evolutionary economics posits that routines are destroyed by organizational 
death, but the interviews quoted below show four newspapers in which job deaths were 
incomplete. Routines and norms were transferred to new or established firms, sometimes 
into very different organizational contexts. The chapter considers individual agency and 
structural opportunity in the preservation of failed firms.  
Method 
Retrospective Interviews: Continuity in Careers and Firms 
The analysis of norms and routines in newspapers is based on 40 qualitative semi-
structured interviews with former employees from four newspapers. Table 1 describes the 
organizational sample. 
Table 3: Newspapers Included in Analysis 
Pseudonym Disbanded Bankrupt Size Non-financial performance 
Regional Post Yes No Medium Stable, well-regarded 
Afternoon Dispatch Yes No Small Gradual decline in resources 
City National No Yes Large Senior layoffs, sharp decline 
Local Blotter No Yes Large Stable, junior layoffs 
 
Employees with various job functions, including assigning editors, copy editors, writers, 
photo editors, and photographers, were interviewed from each of these organizations. The 
papers differ in size, solvency, and relative decline. Two organizations were in 
bankruptcy at the time of their layoffs and have since recovered. Two had been disbanded 
altogether. All four firms are blighted by job death, and employees have been laid off and 
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bought out4 in waves. To learn whether norms and routines survive when jobs die, I 
located individuals who had left or been laid off from disbanded and bankrupted firms. 
Sampling began with organizational insiders identified through bylines in papers and 
stories on layoffs. Snowball sampling provided additional respondents, and final editions 
of newspapers and lists of people who had been laid off together provided relatively 
complete sampling frames. 
I conducted semi-structured interviews between one and two years after layoffs 
occurred. Interviews focused on career histories beginning with entry into journalism, 
which often starts in high school or earlier, up through the present. I asked respondents to 
compare work tasks and experiences at the focal (failed or failing) organization with the 
work that they are currently doing. I asked what parts of the failed firm they had been 
able to preserve and what they had lost. Qualitative interviews were transcribed, and the 
names of all participants and their related papers were changed, though references to 
other periodicals cited by interviewees in the industry were left intact. Interviews were 
coded throughout the process so that new theories and ideas could be discussed in later 
interviews (Eisenhardt 1989). This stage of the research is meant to generate theory from 
cases, with the eventual goal of a survey-based instrument for further confirmation of 
findings. 
The transfer phenomenon may generalize to other workforce reductions. Not all 
participants were laid off. Some employees left voluntarily and a few took buyouts. The 
lucky few whose timely departures avoided layoffs generally enjoyed a much smoother 
                                                
4 A “buyout” is a strategy used by some organizations to reduce their payrolls. Buyouts are generally 
offered to senior employees to speed their way to retirement. Employees who “take a buyout” receive some 
extra compensation and reduced penalties for early retirement. 
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transition into subsequent employment, but other aspects of their narratives are broadly 
similar, including the tendency to preserve desirable aspects of the failing firm. 
Newspapers as Structure and Process 
This section provides a background introduction to newspapers and the 
organization of production within them. Three features are examined in detail. First, the 
public nature of the news product, which allows shared accountability and scrutiny 
beyond what is possible in most other production processes. Second, the publication 
process permits a relatively clear hierarchy so that superordinates can exercise significant 
control over the work products of their subordinates. Third, the news production process 
is recurrent. Though not all content is produced on a daily basis, the repetition in the 
news production process affords recurrent opportunities for feedback and learning. These 
three features are discussed in detail below. All observations, unless cited with external 
literature, draw upon the process descriptions of newspapers provided within qualitative 
interviews. 
Journalism is often described as a calling, a trade with a higher purpose to which 
people are drawn as a form of service. This public-minded conception of journalism is 
famously expressed in the Hutchins report (Commission on Freedom of the Press 1947), 
which describes the “social responsibility” of the media5. Discussions of the ethics of 
journalism tend to focus on the wider social purpose, and that purpose is motivational to 
many of the actors who inhabit the modern newsroom. Their shared norms of what it 
means to be a good journalist are widely discussed and frequently codified. Most major 
                                                
5 Though many believe that these values are universal, some have argued that a given theory of 
journalistic integrity depends significantly on the kind of democracy at which it aims (Baker 
2002). 
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news organizations have ethics codes. Industry-wide codes, like the one promulgated by 
the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ), are similarly common. The SPJ code has 
four key tenets, “Seek truth and report it[,] minimize harm[,] act independently[, and] be 
accountable” (Society of Professional Journalists 1996). These issues are subject to 
considerable discussion in newsrooms, as are subtler issues like covering the issues that 
matter and doing so in a way that deserves the interest of the reader. The norms of good 
journalism may also include the importance of balanced representations of politically 
charged issues, but the question of how such a norm is to be enacted is subject to 
considerable debate (Baker 2002). As one respondent explains: 
Carl (laid off as a reporter for the National, hired by a school to write copy for its 
website): A lot of us came into the profession because we had a love or a passion 
for writing and seeking news and the truth. Nobody gets into this job to get rich, 
because it doesn’t pay well. You’re getting people who are working hard long 
hours, selflessly, not to make money. There’s some kind of ideal we have in our 
mind. Investigative reporters are working because they want to expose things and 
help out and make our world a better place to live. 
News production is public, hierarchical, and recurrent. Newspapers produce relatively 
strong normative environments that arise from specific aspects of production.  
The first important characteristic of the newspaper as a normative environment is 
the public nature of its production. The published product creates a transparency for the 
output of the organization that is unique to news production. No other industry puts the 
entire organization’s capacity on display on a daily basis in the way that the newspaper 
does. This creates numerous opportunities for social norms to be imposed between 
journalists and across desks. Positive and negative reinforcement passes through informal 
and formal social channels within the paper in real time. One might think that reader 
opinions would also matter, but newsrooms are remarkably insulated from their 
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readership and the newspaper business as a whole. Comments and page view counts for 
online publication are changing this insulation, but traditionally newspapers have had 
somewhat limited feedback from readers.  
Mark (business reporter who left the Local Blotter voluntarily to protect someone 
else’s job, wrote for another outlet, and came back after 2 years): This is a little 
bit of a strange industry… It is kind of like health care in that you have a 
disconnect between the people who are buying the product, the people who are 
selling the product, and the people who are producing the product. An engineer 
knows if his process works or it doesn’t. A salesman knows if he’s moving 
product or he isn’t. But the reporter is really isolated most of the time from the 
business. You’ve got some people who sell advertising and some people who sell 
subscriptions, then you’ve got these other folks laboring away writing for a public 
that they may or may not hear from. And, there is really no scientific way, in most 
cases, to know who you’re reaching and whether they like your product or not. 
So, if you can just imagine all of the steps between the users and the producers of 
the product it is really a great deal of stuffing and insulation. 
A newspaper’s staff is often in a better position to judge the quality of its news than the 
newspaper’s readers. The news that did not make the paper may be known only to 
employees, since only the finished product is observable by readers. The process through 
which the organization selects news, develops the news as a narrative and visual product, 
aggregates stories, lays them out, and presents them for sale is as focused on deciding 
what should not be published as it is focused on what should be published. 
 The second characteristic of newspapers that arises from the production process is 
a relatively strict hierarchy. The printed word permits a clear chain of command that 
determines who is permitted to revise whom. The hierarchy is not exactly linear. Copy 
editors, for instance, are not simply superordinate to assigning editors; their role specifies 
the sorts of changes that are appropriately made and those that would require the editor to 
“report” the story. However, from the perspective of the reporter, the hierarchy is sharply 
defined. It is the editors who decide which stories the reporters will be permitted to 
 82 
pursue and it is the editors who decide how those stories will be presented and in what 
voice. The editors can change a story or withhold it entirely as they choose. The editors 
can also remove pieces of the narrative that are, from the journalist’s perspective, 
absolutely necessary for the reader to understand the rest of the story. 
The third relevant characteristic of newspapers as a normative environment is the 
recurrence of publication. Recurrence provides regular opportunity for learning and 
growth. Because newspapers do the same things day after day, their routines and norms 
have a regularity that exceeds many other production processes6. Recurrence also 
increases the importance of deadlines. Deadlines are deeply ingrained in the production 
process of the printed paper. Consider the many necessary steps involved in a paper 
arriving at the newsstand: 
1. Story ideas are selected from the many possible topics. News begins with a 
filtration and curation process that prioritizes some projects, stories, and issues 
over others. Even before this occurs, a list of ideas is gathered from staff 
reporters, freelancers, editors, and others. Many news organizations welcome 
ideas from everyone. The question of what news “is” is a vibrant source of 
contention, not just in the abstract, but also an enacted reality. 
2. Once the priorities are set, the editors assign stories to writers. Depending on the 
assigning editor’s expertise on the topic, the writer’s relationship with the editor, 
the writer’s experience, and the editor’s approach, a story idea may be relatively 
                                                
6 Though news production is recurrent, it is not necessarily repetitive. On any given day a journalist may be 
learning about something that is completely different from what she covered the day before. But the way in 
which she pursues this learning is likely to be consistent as she recurrently utilizes the same strategy to 
quickly learn, document, summarize, and explain. 
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vague and open ended or extremely specific and circumscribed. Story ideas are 
particularly specific when papers are managing coverage by multiple writers on 
different parts of a larger story. 
3. Next the reporters do their work: collecting information, asking questions, getting 
quotes, and eventually writing a story. Different people have different levels of 
expertise on this process. There is a particularly important contrast between 
“writers” and “reporters,” though the same person almost always plays both roles. 
Great reporters have the background knowledge, skills, and relationships 
necessary to quickly find information. Great writers can distill a story from the 
information that requires little editing, reads well, presents the facts in a 
straightforward manner, and develops a narrative that draws the reader in and 
keeps his or her attention.  
4. Stories enter into the organization through assigning editors, who are the first to 
revise them. Assigning editors may ask a writer to get more information, to cut 
out a part of the story, or to alter a part of the presentation. Assigning editors have 
some responsibility for the factual accuracy of the story, and they might check 
with the reporter if they doubt something. Depending on the story, the possibility 
for controversy, and other factors, it may cycle between steps 3 and 4 multiple 
times before moving on in the process. 
5. In most papers, the story moves next to the copy editors. Copy editors are most 
often experienced journalists who are responsible for checking the story for 
grammatical, factual, and stylistic errors. Depending on the paper, a copy desk 
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may check facts, or at least quotes, but some of this happens with the assigning 
editor as well. Sometimes multiple copy editors will edit the same story, and the 
slot editor (the person who assigns stories to copy editors) may edit it as well. 
6. From here, the process varies between organizations. In heavily edited papers, a 
story might be edited and reviewed further or might already have been reviewed 
by others. As a rule, better papers involve more layers of editing, but there is a 
point of diminishing returns, and many journalists believe their newspapers to be 
“over-edited.” 
7. Most papers have automated page-flow, but design editors continue to play an 
important role in laying out the headlines, stories, graphics, and images on a page. 
This is a technologically dependent process, and papers make tradeoffs between 
getting the layout perfect and getting the layout done quickly and cheaply.  
8. Once the page design is finished, the page moves to the production side. For most 
journalists, the remaining production process is entirely opaque to them: it occurs 
in factories that are located far from newsrooms, sometimes in facilities that are 
shared with competitor papers. 
9. The printed papers are delivered to newsstands, to boxes, and to subscribers. 
The entire process from story idea to publications runs on a clock. For daily 
newspapers, steps 1 and 2 occur in the morning, steps 3 and 4 in the early 
afternoon, steps 5, 6 and 7 run late into the evening, and steps 8 and 9 starts in the 
very early morning before most people are awake and headed to work.  
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Some weekly sections involve more planning for longer cycles, and some investigative 
reporting pieces take months to develop, but a sizeable portion of the copy that an 
organization generates is provided as needed with a quick turn-around. Not all content in 
a paper comes from journalists employed by the organization or is produced fresh on a 
daily basis. Pictures may come from organizational photographers or from stock photo 
services, advertisements are sold in advance and printed alongside news content, 
freelancers contribute content to augment news staff, and news wire services may provide 
coverage on stories that are beyond the paper’s news collection capacity. There are 
numerous variants on this basic structure. For instance, some news organizations treat 
photographers as journalists and involve them actively in the process of story generation 
and coverage selection, while others treat photography as a final task that derives its 
value from the reporting already done by the “word people.” 
There are always pages to fill. The linear process relates to a similarly linear and 
hierarchical authority structure, a structure that is often sharply defined. In a newspaper 
the hierarchy establishes whose revisions rule, and the process and timing reinforces it. 
Copy editors, whose shifts may run from 3 PM until 11 PM, are in a natural position to 
make final decisions on published content. However, their revisions are bounded by what 
they can justify given the story that they are provided. They have neither the time nor the 
resources to report stories, and are therefore limited in the scope of the revisions that they 
can make. So, while copy editors do have opportunities to make changes late in the 
process, the scope of such changes is limited due to practical considerations. Assigning 
editors, however, have the power to redeploy the journalist and to change the way the 
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story gets reported. So, while assigning editors may not be the most powerful people in 
the organization, they have tremendous power over the reporters, their writing, and their 
stories. But with this power comes the assigning editors’ responsibility and accountability 
for the stories that their writers contribute. 
A chain of command is not unique to the newspaper, but the established process 
of contestation does make this chain distinctive. Writers fight to get their words into the 
paper in the way that they choose and editors second-guess the work that writers have 
done. If the authority structure allows it, some editors will also challenge the work of 
other editors. Though editing involves stylistic considerations and value judgments, the 
strong norms of newspapers make certain claims more dominant than others. The 
normative errors (Bosk 1979) of the newsroom concern factual inaccuracy and 
fabrication of quotes. Though perhaps not normative, one possible addition to the list is 
the production of boring content. A story that is not worth reading is a mistake regardless 
of the facts that it presents. Likewise, a failure to publish the important news of the day in 
favor of reporting “fluff pieces” that do not provide worthwhile information is a serious 
complaint, but all journalists know to expect this sort of news in the article mix. 
Newspapers are experience-sensitive organizations. The identification of expertise 
is one of the special skills of journalists, and they demonstrate a remarkable awareness 
for the occupational histories of their peers. Journalists rely on their peers’ backgrounds 
as an accessible source of expertise, and functional news organizations promote the social 
connections and interpersonal norms necessary to make this knowledge available7. 
                                                
7 For example, one sports writer inquired about my high school, guessed my age, and listed some 
of the athletes who graduated with me over ten years earlier, almost without pause. Interestingly, 
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 The process described thus far is broadly representative of daily papers published 
in the United States. There have been tremendous changes in the printing process, in the 
photographic process, and in the use of computers across news organizations, but some of 
the most profound changes in news production are currently underway. The analysis 
concerns the newspaper as it has been, rather than as it will be. The regularity of 
newspaper deadlines is under threat from instant online publication. Online news brings 
together a mixture of traditional media organizations (radio, television, and print), web-
only outlets, and citizen journalists. The medium places little emphasis on page layout 
other than the initial process of page design. It forgoes a daily deadline for an instant 
push to be the first online and thus the first gaining status in web search indexes. The 
editorial function that seeks to sell papers with stories and draw interest with headlines is 
threatened by a new set of norms that counts readers on every story with page views and 
seeks search result optimization in the selection of headlines. The new regime makes 
interaction with readers, at least the most vociferous of among them, a likely possibility, 
and some writers become increasingly comfortable with reader comments providing input 
and fact-checking support.  
These changes in process have profound implications for the organization of news 
and news production. However, what is clear from the interviews described here is that 
news organizations have yet to establish stable norms regarding an alternative process. 
This includes work-limiting rules to regulate the required output through online 
publications and boundaries between economic and editorial influences, key institutions 
                                                                                                                                            
one of his colleagues had acknowledged his encyclopedic knowledge of preps in an earlier 
interview, demonstrating the peer recognition of knowledge embedded in colleague expertise. 
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in the traditional media organization. The changing organization and normative 
environment of news presents a particularly vibrant setting for the study of news, 
particularly newspapers. It seems clear that some individuals will be paid to report and 
write news content, others to record photojournalistic images to display alongside this 
content, and still others to curate the content provided by both groups. However, it is 
anyone’s guess as to how this news will be provided and presented, and how the 
organizations that produce and distribute it will be constituted. The argument of this 
chapter is that whatever happens, the norms of traditional journalism will continue to 
reassert themselves through those who have worked in papers, even if those papers have 
been destroyed in the transition. 
The Norms That Persist: Aesthetic, Pragmatic, and Justice-Oriented 
 Persistent norms fall into three categories: aesthetic, pragmatic, and justice-
oriented. These categories relate to the relative intensity of the motivations for the 
preservations of the norms. Aesthetic norms originate in relatively idiosyncratic 
preferences that are understood to differ between people, organizations, and audiences. 
Pragmatic norms originate in the beliefs about what works, a category that overlaps with 
aesthetic norms. These beliefs are only updated when there is evidence that something 
does not work, a process that is sometimes initiated by organizational failure. Justice-
oriented norms tend to be the least negotiable of all. These fundamental values relate to 
conceptions of fairness, justice, and core perspectives on what is worth valuing. Justice 
norms may persist regardless of whether practice shows them to be expedient. 
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Aesthetic Norms 
Aesthetic norms are understood to be idiosyncratic, personal, culturally 
constrained, and distinct to an audience. Aesthetics relate directly to “what people like,” 
and thereby define subjective qualities of work product that may be customized 
depending on the work context. In a newspaper, the most general aesthetic has to do with 
the paper’s “style.” 
Personality. Though not all readers are able to detect the distinctiveness of the 
papers that they read, newspapers have an organization-specific style. This way of 
presenting information is infused into many parts of the layout, photography, and writing. 
One study participant describes the style at the Regional Post: 
Rachel (copy editor at the Regional Post, entrepreneur in one post-failure project, 
then graduate school in education): Well you know, at the Regional Post we sort 
of adopted a certain personality, and I think that if you look at any newspaper, or 
any publication, there is a certain personality, a certain style of writing, a certain 
style of photography, aside from the opinion pages…. [our readers were] blue 
collar, middle class, lower middle class kind of folks. They read the Regional Post 
because they felt like it was their friend. That we were telling stories about their 
neighbors, and we were telling stories about their communities, and things that 
affected their communities… When we went out and took pictures [w]e focused a 
lot on faces, and people in general. What our editor was really interested in was 
digging behind the event and finding out how people felt, and what they were 
going to do now, and how this affected our readers, and why our readers should 
care. We wrote that way, and we edited that way, and we took pictures that way.  
Sarah (copy editor at the Regional Post, entrepreneur in two failed post-failure 
projects, then freelancer): We were definitely the scrappier paper, more the blue-
collar vibe.... We wanted to highlight people, tell the stories of people, while still 
talking about the news of the day. If there was a way to get a personal angle in 
there, then that was ideal. Photos were a big thing with us….We were more 
visual. 
These attributes live on in their post-failure projects and in their strategies. This is an 
aesthetic matter of presentation, and also a strategy for identifying with the failed firm. 
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Journalists know that they lost many readers when they lost their paper, and the 
entrepreneurs among them want to provide something that the previous readers will 
recognize as connecting with what is lost. The aesthetic carries into the post-failure 
projects. For instance, in how the post-failure project evaluated newsworthy content: 
Sarah: I judge it by what's relevant to people's lives. Does it tell a good story? If 
it's a narrative piece, is it well-written? Is it useful? Is it something you wouldn't 
necessarily have thought about but then when you read it you think, ‘Wait a 
second, that does impact my life.’? I never would have thought such-and-such 
legislators’ little battle has any impact on me, but it turns out it snowballs into this 
big thing, and it eventually impacts who runs for office. [At the Regional Post] we 
were there because the community needed us, and we had established a trusting 
relationship between us and community… we were responsible for sharing these 
stories, not just for day-to-day informational value, but also for historical value, 
too. [In the post-failure project] were we able to continue it? To an extent....So, 
yes and no. Yes, we made a good try at trying to continue on in the spirit of the 
Regional Post, and now I think we fell short.  
Resource constraints and other factors got in the way of the full realization of the 
aesthetic that the Regional Post employees could preserve , but the spirit of the writing, 
photography, and design was oriented toward the same model. So far, these post-failure 
projects have failed, but the third such project is underway and time will tell whether it is 
able to preserve the spirit of the Regional Post. 
Irony. Some aesthetics penetrate into the organization’s treatment of news and 
images in a very general way. For instance, reporters and photographers at the National 
noted the paper’s appetite for irony, brevity, and context. 
Brian (reporter at the National, now writing novels): I learned to write a much 
tighter style of lead… not even necessarily an inverted pyramid but sort of a 
snappy lead-I’ve always called it the false irony lead that the National is always 
so fond of, it’s like “Joe Blow may look like an idiot, but guess what, he’s just 
won the Nobel Prize!” … The National likes those kinds of things.  
Ken (National editor, then post-failure project putting together content for another 
paper): We believe in tighter, more emotional images and they [the other local 
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paper] believe in tighter scene setters. They believe in setting a scene for 
everything, and we believe in true visual impact… That has always been the view 
at the National… They're not doing it the way that we would understand our city 
media to do it. It doesn't mean that they're doing a bad job, though in some cases 
we believe that because they don't do what we would do.  
Henry (National photographer, then post-failure project with Ken): So, take a look 
at this. [Henry displays a photograph of a man sitting in a chair, sprawled back in 
a relaxed position] Here is a story about a union that has political clout and that is 
the head of the union, and there is a couple of interesting things about that 
photograph, I think. When compared to my preconception about union clout. One 
is that it is in a high rise, it looks like it has great views and it looks like a very 
successful corporate suite. And that guy looks pretty doggone prosperous. Right? 
So, as you can see when we posted that on our website, that is our lead 
photograph. Right, that is the picture that we liked. OK, so remember that one. 
Now Ken has been talking about photographs that set a scene. So they ran 
something like this. [Henry displays an image where the camera is shot from a 
low angle of a silhouette of the same man sitting up in his chair; this one has little 
context, and the main element is the chair] So to me, I think that is a picture of a 
chair that belongs in a furniture catalogue. It adds ambiance to the environment I 
guess, but I've lost some of the polish of the place and the comfort of the guy. 
Ken and Henry demonstrate their attraction to visual contrast (“false irony”) that parallels 
the leads that Brian describes. More directly, they illustrate the specifics of an aesthetic 
that they are attempting to maintain in a very different organization. Unfortunately for 
them, like many other post-failure transitions, the aesthetic must be merged with other 
sensibilities in the new organizational context. Ken and Henry control which photograph 
goes on the website, so there they use the one that would have been published in the City 
National, but the paper that buys content from their entrepreneurial firm chooses a 
different image, one that violates their aesthetic sensibilities. As Ken said, “It doesn't 
mean that they're doing a bad job, though in some cases we believe that because they 
don't do what we would do.” 
Aesthetic norms seem to fall into a negotiable range of interpersonal conflict. Ken 
and Henry would like to have their way, but the conflict over the photo happens in 
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passing. They don’t change their view about which photo is better, or about what their 
audience wants, but they do come to better understand the aesthetic choices of the people 
with whom they work. 
Fit. The fit between content and audience is a key component of aesthetic norms, 
and one of the reasons why journalists are willing to adapt to new organizations. The 
adaptation is not mere managerial caprice; it is often custom-fit to a particular audience 
and that audience’s preferences. A part of the journalist’s trade expertise is writing 
appropriately for an audience, and most journalists explain aesthetics in terms of a media 
outlet’s audience. 
Mark: Yeah, [the firm that hired me] is very by-the-book. They started out with a 
bunch of young kids that maybe hadn’t done this before. And so, they really 
reduced everything to a formula, and now that they don’t need to do that anymore 
they’ve held onto that formula pretty much, and what it does is that it brings you 
right to the story. Here is what happened. Here is who it happened with. I mean, it 
is just really basic block and tackle, and everything else goes off of there. They 
can take it in different directions down below, but the top of the story needs to be 
really focused… At its best, it is a very straightforward way of approaching the 
story. It is very difficult for a person who is marinated in that to then read the 
New York Times with enjoyment because the stories seem like they’re written 
backwards and sideways. They incorporate an awful lot of information that is not 
really that important, and [they] read sloppy. And you kind of feel like sometimes 
you’re digging through them for important information… with the Times, the 
facts will be there, but they may be wrapped and buried in material that really 
feels extraneous and personal to the writer. There is more poetry there, and that is 
not always a good thing. [Stories at the firm that hired me] really are written for 
their audience…. And that was a huge lesson when I realized that situation.  
Sometimes an aesthetic norm becomes a specialized asset when carried outside of its 
organizational context. Fit continues to be important, but what began as a standard 
approach within an organization becomes a unique approach in another context. 
Rick (photographer at the Dispatch, laid off, then freelance): I started at the 
Dispatch as an unpaid intern for the summer to get college credit. I was a really 
bad photographer. I hadn’t been exposed to everyday conversations and the 
 93 
diversity of knowledge. I learned so much about good photography and good 
photojournalism. There are markets for those skills outside of papers, especially 
in wedding photography. That style of photography, especially when the 
newspaper industry collapsed, happened to be very in at the time [in wedding 
photography]: documentary vs. static and posed stuff. That was sort of a blessing 
for some of us. I do wonder whether that was in style because it was available… I 
do a little bit of posed shooting for the income, but the main thing for me is to 
help people to understand that I am different and that makes me different in the 
way that I’m going to shoot. This is the way that I know how to do it, and it is the 
way that I relay things visually. As long as they understand that, then we get 
along great, but if they’re thinking that it is going to be me saying, ‘Stand up 
straight, chin up, re-enact the ceremony, now kiss her,’ that just isn’t me. I’m not 
a director; I am a react-as-it-happens kind of photographer.  
The example illustrates the complex overlap between norms, skills, and routines. Non-
posed photography was the norm at the Dispatch. Posed photography was the norm for 
wedding photography. The static, posed images of wedding photography weren’t going 
to get into the paper, much less get a job for an intern. Rick learned photojournalism, 
which involves a set of routines for how photographers interact with subjects and 
excludes a set of routines shared by traditional wedding photographers. So, while I 
describe it as an aesthetic norm, it is more than a set of preferences. Rick’s ability to take 
pictures as a photojournalist leads him to take them that way, but his aesthetic preference 
for that kind of photography, for its dynamism, also leads him to value that work more 
highly. Fortunately for Rick, the aesthetic for wedding photography was changing at the 
same time and opening up to the norms and routines that Rick learned through 
photojournalism. The Wedding Photojournalist Association, formed in 2002, is a 
testament to (and force within) this emergent market. As of 2011, the WPJA photography 
contests were receiving more than 20,000 entries. 
Authorship. As much priority as journalists may place on their craft and its 
principles of communication, most are also willing to revise their views if provided with 
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evidence to the contrary. One example of this is the question of whether journalism 
should center on recognized names in journalism and specific authorial credits. Many 
journalists aspire to “have a name,” to gain enough notoriety that their paper would have 
to afford them a modicum of respect. But, they also watch the industry to see how that 
will change, whether the assumption is correct: 
Trent (new media for the Dispatch, then laid off, hired by an international paper in 
Asia, then laid off again, then hired by a top American paper): Look at the 
Economist, which is basically analysis news. They produce news that is about as 
straight as it gets, and they seem to be doing great. They don't even have bylines. 
They say that everything is headed for personality journalism, but I'm not sure 
where the Economist fits into that trajectory. 
Trent demonstrates a critical reflection on one of the basic understandings of the 
American news establishment: that authors matter to readers. Seeing a person’s name on 
the byline is at the heart of the pride and ownership of the news; it is part of the basic 
accountability structure. However, Trent demonstrates his own critical reflection on the 
authorial norm and its meaning. As he considers his own career as a journalist, he aspires 
to a position of expertise, but also wonders if this will provide him with the security that 
he hopes it will. After two layoffs in two years, Trent is motivated to find a less 
precarious position, but his environment provides him with little certainty on how to find 
such a position.  
Aesthetics of news are likely to continue changing, but many of these orientations 
have been standard tropes in news for a very long time. Some papers use a dry, analytic 
tone. Other outlets seek to engage more personably with the news. While it is possible for 
writers to adapt between styles in the news, the switch is not always easy.  
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Not all organizations manage to impose an aesthetic upon individual workers. 
Instead, the organization might merely filter the person’s work product without 
successfully changing the way that they believe the work ought to be done. In this case, 
the individual’s production is likely to spring back after being displaced from work as the 
former employee seeks to reject the firm’s aesthetic and re-establish her own. Two of the 
journalists who I interviewed had been hired with very strong writing credentials into the 
City National, and both faced unpleasant resistance to their writing and story ideas. This 
tension between person and organization was released when the City National laid them 
off, and both found the experience of being laid off to be liberating.  
Pragmatic Norms 
Many aesthetic norms overlap with the second category, pragmatic norms. 
Pragmatic norms are most often identifiable by the tight coupling between the norm and 
the objective of the norm. As such, the value of a pragmatic norm is determined by the 
empirical test of whether the norm accomplishes its goal. 
Meetings. One example of a pragmatic norm is the cadence of meetings. Meetings 
are a necessity of organizational life, but if meetings stretch on, they take away from the 
productive time that people need to accomplish the objectives that they establish. Helen 
describes the cadence of meetings as a challenging part of her transition from a 
newspaper job to a role in nonprofit leadership:  
Helen: At first I couldn’t stand all the meetings and I would come home really 
late and have to do the work that would come out of all these meetings and go to 
another meeting or conference call and then drive to the airport to go to another 
meeting and it was crazy. I demanded to know what time and what part of a 
meeting I had to go to and tried to do that to stay sane. They didn’t appreciate me 
at first, being like that, but I didn’t appreciate them! I was like “ how can you get 
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anything done?” Just in meetings all the time? It was incredible. And I 
remembered hearing about how Colin Powell had 15-minute meetings and I 
thought “if he can do it and run the military, we can do it in less than 2.5 hours.” 
That was culturally very challenging and hard, and setting a schedule was a 
challenge. 
Interviewer: Have you been successful in changing and imposing the norms on 
the way you did meetings on the people you work with? 
Helen: Oh yeah.  
Interviewer: How has it changed?  
Helen: Well it used to be Mondays that everyone knew the whole day was going 
to be full of meetings. It was crazy. I had no idea what was going on for the first 
month. Now they just don’t invite me to them. So now I have almost gone 360 
like, hey occasionally, once a month so I can find out what’s going on! 
Helen describes the nonprofit where she works as an organization that has outgrown its 
routines. It has the close social structure of a very small organization, even though it has 
grown too large to maintain the interpersonal focus in meetings. She says that it has been 
difficult for the organization to move to the next step and that this was part of what she 
was hired to facilitate. The culture of meetings, talking about kids, and gossiping has 
proven to be a major cultural norm. It is clear that she has managed to modify the norm 
enough to make room for herself as an exception. Her position of authority in the 
organization may partially justify this. But she seems to also be changing the norms in the 
meetings, focusing people more on time and productivity. Her inspiration in this goal 
traces back to the role that meetings play in newspapers. 
In newspapers, meetings precede action that is most often governed by a deadline. 
Newspapers inspire a very significant emphasis on time. The emphasis derives from the 
deadlines that define the organization’s production cycle and from the impatience of 
sources who are very often rushed in providing quotes. Other organizations are more 
relaxed, but this does not mean that those organizations can expect to hire people from 
newspapers without dealing with the level of energy and productivity that they are used 
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to maintaining. Instead, the intensity of the news carries through individual careers into 
new jobs where the same strategies are viewed as effective. 
Enterprise journalism. Some pragmatic norms form linkages between individual 
perceptions of what is worthwhile about the work that they do and market strategies. This 
may relate to perceived demand, competition, and relative market position, and 
sometimes make direct reference to the gap left by a failed or failing firm:  
Scott (business reporter at the National, voluntarily left to work on an 
entrepreneurial project): We don’t spend a lot of time covering the mayor’s press 
conferences. Yeah we’ll go, but we’re not going to just transcribe, and we’re not 
going to do spot news. [Reporter] is going to say, “We ought to look into the 
city’s [dumpster permits,]” and as a result of several weeks of work gets a copy of 
the contract to lease the [dumpsters] or board minutes of the [dumpster] company 
and finds out they’re making 80% profit. Notices in the minutes the names of 
some of the board members aren’t recognizable, and finds out that the sovereign 
wealth fund of the UAE is a major owner of the city [dumpsters] right now. 
That’s enterprise reporting…. Nobody knows it’s a story until you figure it out, 
and then everybody knows it’s a story because they read it and go, holy shit. Kind 
of looking at the world in a way that no one has ever done before and bringing 
them stories that really effect their daily lives and inform them about the society 
that they live in. 
The City National laid off some of its most talented and senior staff, an exceptional act in 
a heavily unionized industry that tends to go by “last in, first out.” Shortly after the 
layoffs, Scott left. Scott’s departure from the National was news in itself. He was one of 
the big-name journalists whose organizational status provided him with the clout that 
others sought (he was in the position that Trent longed for). But he decided to leave in 
order to help launch an organization formed almost entirely by people who were laid off 
or bought out by the National. Though the City National survived, its strategy was 
significantly changed. It sought a market oriented, highly localized news emphasis. The 
tone of the news changed as the paper sought to appeal to a younger audience. So, Scott 
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and his colleagues provide a curious case: there is a sense in which they were trying to 
carry on the tradition of the “old” City National, a paper that had since changed so 
drastically that it no longer pursued the news as they thought a paper should. The 
National had once earned a fairly good industry reputation, but the new management had 
a very different vision in mind. First the foreign bureaus were closed, then the national 
bureaus. When Scott describes enterprise journalism, he is describing the best of the 
National, a kind of journalism that the failing, anemic form of a declining paper tends not 
to produce. So, Scott and his colleagues at City News are trying to create an organization 
that can restore the norms of news production that they believe are most worthwhile:  
Scott: I’m okay with being a throwback to quality, substantive journalism. If that 
makes me a dinosaur. I think there’s a need for that, and I think there’s a market 
for that. And I think that the market is big enough that the National can do what 
its doing and we can do what we’re doing, and we can both be very happy and 
successful. 
The dumpster sleuth whom Scott mentioned also left voluntarily to join the 
entrepreneurial venture, choosing to forgo a very promising career at the National for a 
riskier entrepreneurial place that fit more closely with his values and aspirations. The 
pragmatic norms relate, in this case, to producing news that is valuable, and to the 
question of what news will be valued by the market.  
Relationships. Some of the pragmatic norms of journalism relate to the specific 
tasks involved in being a reporter, many of which include relating to people in a way that 
is unusual. Journalists must build trust with people, and then get them to expose sensitive 
facts to the public. Lisa and Carl describe the strategies that they’ve developed to get the 
work done. These strategies are specific to the kind of writing they do. Carl worked with 
athletes and coaches with whom he had to maintain relationships, and so his conduct 
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involved a number of serious considerations of how those relationships should work. 
Lisa’s relationships were more temporary and, like the norms, varied accordingly. 
Lisa (Laid off from the National, wrote for public center agency, rehired by a 
newspaper): As a young reporter, if I asked someone a question, and they kind of 
went off topic, I would feel bad about interrupting them to keep them on point. So 
I kind of let them meander for a little while before I interrupted them. Like, “Oh, 
actually, I need to talk about this.” So you end up wasting a lot of time. And so, 
one of the things I observed from one of the reporters I was - hired by [At City 
National], actually - was just her totally - I always hold my thoughts on this, but - 
really aggressively taking control of the conversation, to a point that I was like, 
“Wow, I would not say that to a source, but okay!” It was very worthwhile, 
because, even though I would never be exactly like she was, the principle of 
keeping someone on point is something I learned. 
Interviewer: As you describe your practice of sports journalism, it’s about 
maintaining relationships… 
Carl: [It is] a little more humanistic. There have been times when I have to 
balance it. I have a job to do and get information out. There have been times when 
I had to make a choice. The information had to get out and but it was going to 
make someone look bad. The person gets upset, but you go for the greater good. If 
this information would save someone else from the same bad situation, you go 
with that.  
Both Lisa and Carl continue to use these norms in their work on an ongoing basis. Lisa 
wrote profiles for the staff of a public agency to show the work that it was doing and the 
histories of the people who worked there. She said that one of her skills was getting to the 
story in a way that her coworkers could not do. Carl’s skill as a writer was matched by 
his ability to maintain relationships, an ability that is highly prized by a university that is 
using its writing staff as a hybrid between news and PR functions.  
Effort. Another norm that seems to be pragmatically decided in the wake of 
organizational failure is the question of how much work to do on a story assignment. 
Some of the classic debates in the sociology of work concern how managers motivate 
workers to maintain production, and how workers create their own interpersonal norms 
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that regulate output, norms that can then be gamed by management (Burawoy 1979). In 
the spirit of pragmatism, many journalists customize their effort according to the outlet. 
Alexis was laid off three years earlier by the Local Blotter. She describes herself as a 
“dead kid in the street reporter.” She has covered wars and disasters before being laid off 
and since. But as a freelancer, she does a lot of mundane writing. She helped write 
someone else’s autobiography (with co-authorial credit), she wrote content for a major 
food corporation (without authorial credit), and she continues to contribute to 
newspapers, including the paper that laid her off. For her, the outlet and the use determine 
the level of effort that will be applied to the task. 
Alexis: When I do stuff for American Journalism Review it takes the longest 
because I have to get so many sources and I know it's being carefully read by 
everyone in my industry. [But when writing for other outlets] I… still try to make 
it good. Even when I'm writing a website about something I don't really 
understand, like a website about machines, I'm like, let me try to make this as 
interesting as possible. I mean, part of it's just to amuse myself, and I'll be happy 
with a weird turn of phrase referring to rivets. And I'll be like, “Oh good! No one 
else in the world will appreciate that, but I'll know.” So writing is a very selfish 
thing for me. I really like doing it, I like playing with words, doing things, so that 
makes me happy. Like writing this guy's book just cracks me up, I'm like, “Wow, 
you sound just like me.” (laughs).  
The routine process of writing, of playing with words, allows Alexis to sometimes lose 
track of the relatively mundane task at hand. This is motivationally important, and 
consistent with the effortless nature of an engaging production process. However, the 
work’s wider social value eventually reminds her of what she has lost, and this is a major 
motivational challenge in the post-failure context 
Alexis: It's still ongoing, it's 3 years later. I used to feel like I was writing things 
that were important in some way, that made a difference, and now I basically just 
write things that are fun or easy. And I wish I could appreciate that more. Other 
people will say “Oh, you got to do this and write about this as a freelancer?” 
[normally freelancers don’t get to do very interesting projects, Alexis is an 
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exception] and I'm like, “Yeah, who cares?” I'm more of the ‘dead kid in the 
street’ reporter, and it's been hard, I mean my husband will tell you he sees a 
pattern, it's like every 3 months I'll get really upset about it, and be like, 'Why am 
I doing this? It's a waste of time.' So I wish I was the type of person who'd be 
happy just working at Target, you know what I mean? Make my shelves. 
Interviewer: Are there things that you wouldn't write... is there an organization 
you wouldn't work for, a job you wouldn't take? 
Alexis: I'm not going to take something that's totally against my political feelings, 
but I can't think of anything else. And you know what it also depends on? My 
name [being] on it. I don't mind writing these websites because my name doesn't 
appear on them. I don't want to be known as the “machinery website writer.” 
So, while the day-to-day practice of Alexis’ work is reasonably satisfying to her, its 
larger consequences and purpose fail to connect with the sense of purpose that she found 
in her work as a journalist within a paper. Effort is thus a pragmatic norm: Alexis 
determines how much effort to put into a project based upon the value that she (and 
others) will derive from additional effort. The calculus is one that she learned as a 
newspaper journalist, and she feels frustrated by the projects where her value contribution 
is exclusively paying her own bills and not helping others.  
Justice-Oriented Norms 
The norms that I have outlined so far are negotiable, and they tend to be revised 
as different situations and contexts alter the rationale behind them. In contrast, justice 
norms like Alexis is struggling with are not easily passed over. Unlike the other norms, 
justice norms seem to be extremely durable in the post-failure experience of journalists.  
The most durable of these goals relate to the objectives that work seeks to 
accomplish. In this section I focus on the justice orientation of journalistic norms, 
orientations that define what work is worth doing and how it ought to be done. Sarah and 
Gertrude explain: 
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Sarah: As journalists we tend to have very lofty goals for what our role in society 
should be, as a watchdog and to further the cause of democracy and those kinds of 
things. That's how we see ourselves in relation to the community. 
Gertrude (Photographer and editor, laid off by the Regional Post and hired by 
another paper locally): For me, photojournalism is not a profession. There’s a lot 
of people who look at it like that, but it’s a calling. A reason. 
Both Sarah and Gertrude find a sense of purpose in journalism. There are many ways to 
describe the interpersonal norms and values that they share. These are professional ethics 
reinforced by schooling, industry standards, codes of conduct, scandals, exit, voice, and 
loyalty. They are also personal systems of value that are reinforced by the lived 
experiences that provide intrinsic motivations to journalists. Much of this is internal to 
the news process, as public journalism can be empowering when it allows a writer to 
serve the interests of others: 
Lisa: I guess the impact of journalism, everyone will say the same two words: 
educate and inform. And so, basically, you want to enlighten people. This is what 
I feel like I'm doing: I'm holding up a mirror to you, society, and I'm telling you, 
“This is what you look like. I'm not making judgments on it. I'm not telling you to 
be better or worse. I'm showing you what you look like. And I'm hoping that you 
take the baton from there, that you make a change based on what I'm showing 
you. And I want to show it accurately and fairly, and a good, vivid picture of 
reality.” I'm not an actor as a journalist. I'm simply an observer. It's up to other 
people to actually do stuff.… Especially when I was on the border, there were 
many instances where I would write something about somebody and things would 
change. I wrote about a family of three or four who lived in a colonia on the 
outskirts of town in a school bus, that they'd pulled the chairs out of, and they 
were living in it. I wrote about the family, and next week, the family's got floor-
to-ceiling, clothes for the kids, that, actually, somebody donated a modular 
home….And that is probably one of a hundred stories I can tell you like that. And 
any good reporter has a hundred stories like that. So I absolutely believe it makes 
the world a better place. 
Lisa’s experience was echoed by almost every journalist with whom I spoke, each of 
whom had some memory of a time when they made a difference in someone’s life. The 
experiences are all of the more powerful because journalists have so little contact from 
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their readers relative to the breadth of distribution of their writing. The production of 
necessary action from news publication serves as proof that news mobilizes people to 
redress injustices. In my interviews I heard stories about holocaust museums that had 
burned, about social issues that were unknown to the public before these individual 
persons made them issues with press. The justice motives drive journalists to be involved. 
As Jeff explains: 
Jeff (wrote for the Regional Post, now he freelances and has published a 
nonfiction book): [After being laid off] I retained my love for journalism and my 
love for photography and telling stories became even greater. I did a lot of soul 
searching when the paper closed. I realized why I wanted to do this in the first 
place and it was reaffirmed in a lot of ways. I retained my deep desire to keep 
doing this. 
Some of the justice norms are also pragmatic. For instance, one journalist moved to a 
small town to run a local paper. The paper’s prior owner had worked for City Hall, and 
had exercised editorial policy that was deferential to one side of the local political debate 
over the other. The new owner, a seasoned journalist, immediately began to demonstrate 
to the community that his paper would be without bias in its presentation of the facts. For 
him, it wasn’t a sense of justice that motivated this particular strategy as much as it was 
“just good business.” Jason, the paper’s owner, can’t imagine writing any other way, but 
no high moral values are necessary to justify the choice of style. 
Internalization 
One question, in this context, is whether norms are internalized or whether they 
continue to be social norms, in the sense that they are embedded within groups of people. 
Both seem to be the case. To some extent, journalists develop as individuals across the 
length of their careers. Gertrude describes the development in political terms: 
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Gertrude: I think that pretty much every journalist I know is extremely liberal 
because of the atrocities that we have witnessed. There's a certain amount of 
evolution that happens when you witness corruption and the unfair practices of 
society. Basically I view my job as being a light shining on dark corners. 
Newspapers often facilitate the imposition of certain key norms in dealings between 
people. Here is one example of a journalist enforcing the norm that only important news 
should be published on the front page: 
Brian: There was one day when [a journalist] came in and saw yet another story 
of some cute animal on page one and he just started ranting—this was pretty 
early, it was at nine in the morning, so most of the staff wasn’t there, but he and I 
get in pretty early, and he starts—”There’s another animal story! No more animal 
stories!” He starts yelling down towards the desk, “No more animal stories on 
page one! We have had it with animal stories!” 
The shared work product and its public nature make the newspaper a characteristically 
social place in which people regulate their shared work activity through informal 
sanctions. Alexis describes visiting an editor of hers after she’d been laid off, and 
complaining about a story that she’d seen in the editor’s section, and witnessed the 
editor’s shame. 
Organizational Norms or Industry Norms? 
One might also wonder to what extent these described norms are endemic to the 
organization rather than the industry. This seems to depend on the newspaper. Many of 
the norms are localized to work groups within a paper, and may be contentious even 
there. According to Carl, some of his colleagues did not approve of his effort to maintain 
long-term relationships with his sources. They fear that these relationships would keep 
him from reporting the news accurately, so Carl had to contend with their norms while 
also asserting the merit of his own.  
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Aesthetic, pragmatic, and justice-oriented norms inspire the survivors of 
organizational failure to reconstruct the normative environments of failing firms in their 
post-failure projects. These norms are not unyielding, but their emergence is consistent 
and predictable. Without some countervailing force, many survivors will default back to 
the preferred norms of prior occupational settings, and some will seek to alter or change a 
new setting to impose the norms of prior work contexts. 
Of the examples provided so far, the personality norm of the Regional Post, the 
taste for irony at the City National, the emphasized audience fit strategy at the news 
organization that hired Mark, Rick’s photojournalism at the Dispatch, the anti-authorial 
norm at the Economist described by Trent, and enterprise journalism at City News are all 
idiosyncratic to a given organization. Obviously, other industries would give different 
examples of idiosyncratic norms, but these norms were chosen for their specificity. Other 
norms provided as examples, such as the justice-orientations of journalists, Helen’s short 
meeting norm, Lisa and Carl’s relationship development norms, and Alexis’ effort norms 
seem to arise within specific organizations, but also seem to be shared widely throughout 
the industry. However, these norms still offer some evidence of continuity because the 
specific transfers demonstrate continuity with organizations outside of the newspaper 
industry. If some norms are shared among newspapers, but the mechanism through which 
they are inculcated is organizational in nature, then transitions outside of papers that 
preserve these norms are demonstrations of their continuity. Transitions within papers 
may also result in continuity, but it is not possible to determine whether this continuity 
derives from the sending organization or not. 
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All three types of norms overlap with organizational routines. Many routines are 
reinforced by social norms. Very often, pragmatic norms perpetuate a given process 
based upon a simple notion of what works; other processes are reinforced by aesthetic 
norms that are unlikely to change without intervention. Justice-oriented norms also have 
corollary routines. One journalist from the City National described a situation at that 
paper where a news story gave positive coverage to a public personality without 
disclosing that the reporter and the personality were both employed by the same parent 
company. This was a major violation of a justice norm that says that editorial policy 
should be disinterested. It is also a failure to follow the routine for such situation, which 
involves a parenthetical note like this: “Full disclosure: the public personality is 
employed by Parentcorp, a firm that also owns the City National.” Full disclosures of this 
sort are routinely utilized to disclose conflicts of interest. The failure to follow the routine 
was a violation of a justice-oriented norm that relates to the fundamental trust between 
journalist and reader, but most news organizations disclose so routinely that there is never 
cause for conflict over a norm. While routines are likely to transfer with the norms that 
reinforce them, the transferability of routines is only partially explained by the 
transferability of norms. The next section seeks to distinguish between routines that are 
easily transferred and those that are not. 
The Persistence of Low-Volatility Routines: Relational Processes 
In computers, there are two types of memory. Random-access memory maintains 
immediate access to active services, applications and data objects. Flash memory 
provides persistent storage for binary data. Random access data is much faster, but in 
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order for it to work it has to be reminded of what it is storing on a regular basis, 
otherwise, its high-volatility storage will “forget.” The volatility distinction provides a 
useful metaphor for distinguishing between routines that are transferable and those that 
are not. High-volatility routines require the organization’s energy to maintain them. As 
soon as they are unplugged from the system, they begin to degrade. Low-volatility 
routines are persistent in the sense that they are durably stored in a way that would allow 
them to be reactivated once called upon. I prefer this metaphor because it focuses 
attention on the energy involved in remembering on an activity basis. The phrase “like 
riding a bike” captures the spirit of a low-volatility routine as an individual skill. Once a 
person learns the sense of balance and feedback involved in riding a bike, the nonuse of 
that sense does not result in its degradation. In contrast, many people find that 
periodically interacting with computer software or programming an electronic device 
requires them to re-learn a process every time. If these acts are done often, they become 
routine, but when carried out sporadically, they are effortful and cognitively taxing every 
time. By extension, high-volatility routines are cognitively and socially taxing to 
redevelop in a new context. It may take a journalist as long to remember her role in a 
rarely-used routine as it did to learn that role in the first place.  
Some volatile routines will survive, and some persistent routines will dissipate, 
but certain features typically make routines more portable and less embedded in an 
organization. Hoetker and Agarwal (2007) observe these properties in their patent-based 
analysis of disk manufacturers. They find that patents which include a diverse group of 
people with differences in expertise are less likely to be cited after a firm fails than those 
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that are more embedded in one individual or one narrow specialization. The same can be 
said for the routines in newspapers. Processes that rely upon multiple departments are 
less likely to persist than processes that are embedded within a single department. For 
instance, the relationship between assigning editors and writers often seems to persist: 
writers keep writing for their same editor, moving together to new papers, or the editor 
keeps sending the reporter work from another paper. However, the serial triggers 
described as a nine-step process above are unlikely to survive intact.  
Many routines are defined by external relationships to the firm, and these routines 
are relatively robust regardless of the firm’s fate. Take Katrina as an example. She was 
laid off by the Local Blotter and hired by another local paper shortly thereafter. In the 
Blotter, she was a court reporter, and she went on to report on courts again for the other 
local paper. She spoke to the same sources, read the same public documents, relied upon 
the same databases, and worked in the same location. Different newspaper, same 
everything else. Her news cycle routine, as defined by that court, was virtually unchanged 
by the layoff that moved her from one organization to another. The chances of her getting 
a job that would permit her to cover the same subject in the same geographic location 
weren’t particularly good, but once she did, everything else was in place. The motives for 
the other paper to use her in a similar task were clear: she could quickly begin to do the 
work without new training or the risk of misfit between her abilities and the requirements 
of the job.  
Others have moved to different organizations in which similar routines are 
undertaken in different ways.  
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Phil (Laid off by the City National, hired by an online news outlet): If you have a 
newspaper and you spend 20 years [there], there is a way of doing things and even 
checking into the building in the morning and you get used to that. With change, 
your entire system gets blown up and you have to reassemble the pieces and if I 
was to offer a metaphor that is meaningful… If you had a beautiful glass window 
and someone threw a rock through it and it was destroyed, you can pick up those 
pieces and create a beautiful work of stained glass and put that up. But not 
everybody thinks that way. For me, the biggest struggle is preparing for the 
changes that come my way, because change is a way of life.  
In Phil’s move from the City National to the online news outlet, many of his routines 
were shattered. At the National he would never have been responsible for laying out his 
own content or creating his own graphics since these tasks had entire departments to 
which they were entrusted, yet Phil also was unable to get an idea past the bureaucratic 
gatekeepers to get it published in the way that he wanted. Phil echoed others in his 
frustration with the unwillingness of the City National to let him see his ideas through. 
Phil learned from these lessons, and as an editor he uses a different strategy of selection, 
allowing people to create things that don’t work so that they can learn what does.  
Phil: One of the differences I am finding out... is that [the online outlet] has as 
serious of a commitment to journalism as any newspaper that I have ever been at. 
The difference is that the paradigm is totally different…. the reason a lot of 
newspapers [are miserly with space], is that print is fixed space, so you have to be 
really careful about what you do and how you do it and how you commit to it. As 
an editor at [an online outlet] I can make the biggest layout I want. Hell, I’m not 
even a graphic artist and I am doing a lot of the graphic design and photo 
illustration for about 70% of the stories I write and edit. If one of my bosses 
doesn’t like it, I can go in and redesign the whole thing in about 10 minutes. I can 
double the length of it. You don’t have to worry about using up all this newsprint, 
or doing something the “correct” way. The amount of flexibility is much greater. 
One of the main challenges that Phil faces is trying to impose the routines from the City 
National and other papers onto his writers so that they have a sense of professional 
integrity. This is not easy, and he spends a lot of time strategizing about how to do it. 
Thus far, he has set out to develop training on journalism ethics, but this raises a question 
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of whether these norms can be deployed out of context among individuals who lack 
training as journalists. However, he says that many other routines of writing, editing, 
developing stories, and assigning reporters are almost intact from the failed firm. 
The most important routines that transfer relate to the collection and presentation 
of information. These routines work through both internal and external channels, and 
cross over the boundaries of the firm. Journalists who learned to defend their story ideas 
to their editors as a means to getting them published may move into roles as public 
relations consultants, pitching story ideas to journalists from the outside. They understand 
the motivations of the media outlets and have years of experience receiving the pitch that 
they are now making. These shifts tend to happen conditionally on the maintenance of 
some basic normative limits in keeping with the spirit of journalism. To provide a sense 
of the hypersensitivity of these individuals to conflicts of interest and the imposition of 
bias through editorial policy, they talk of “feeling dirty,” even though they may work for 
universities, school newspapers, public-sector research centers, or progressive political 
candidates. Some experience no conflict at all because the organization that hired them 
expects them to present things accurately; others self-monitor. 
To give a few other examples of routines that transferred, Gerry, a former copy 
editor from the City National, became a college sociology professor relying upon a 
master’s degree that was decades old. Though he is not particularly well compensated for 
his work by his employer, he does painstakingly edit each of his students’ papers to try to 
make them better writers, a process that he can do much more quickly than a non-editor 
ever could. Helen uses her skills as a reporter to write informative emails to her 
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nonprofit’s stakeholders to update them on their cause. On each of her trips to meet with 
their partners, she schedules visits and writes reports on what she learns by interviewing 
allies that share their cause. Richard, a former foreign correspondent for the City 
National, was laid off and got a job teaching journalism at the college level. He continues 
to write stories on some of the same topics and locations that he covered for the National. 
Lisa had a front-page story in the City National after she was laid off by that paper and 
has since been offered a very good job at a different newspaper.  
Knowing a journalist can be useful. Many of us have stories that we would like to 
see printed, and a journalist has an interest in finding good stories. Interestingly, news 
continues to find its way to journalists even after they stop writing for papers. Lisa’s 
front-page story came as a tip from a friend of a friend that she tracked down. The 
relational process emerges from the latency in the social understanding of what people 
do. Because people’s networks are not entirely updated on a person’s occupational 
circumstances, informal social processes that provide story ideas persist, another strength 
of weak ties.  
What these routines have in common is their low volatility. They do not need a 
constant application of energy in order to maintain them. Weak ties are retained at a very 
low cost, and the reporting relationships that persist are similarly sustainable. Many 
journalists maintain contact with their colleagues, direct reports, and immediate 
superordinates, and many career opportunities seem to flow through these channels. 
Persistent routines are also relatively flexible or somewhat universal in character. Those 
reporters who have been hired as editors for online outlets impose routines that are 
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modified versions of the routines that they themselves were subjected to on the other side 
of the relationship.  
The skills of journalism are transferable, but adapting them can be time-
consuming and frustrating: 
Carl: I will tell you the biggest decision I have had to make is technology-wise. 
When I was at the City National, I had a laptop, I wrote my story, they showed me 
how to transmit it, done for the day. Now, I am here writing the story, posting the 
photos, updating stats, learning how to design pages, create things, all these things 
that I have never had to deal with before have come into play. I guess that’s good 
for me because I am learning stuff about technology. I am 56 years old, though, so 
it takes me a little longer to pick it up. 
Some routines persist through the trivial transfer of specific technological 
implementations that facilitate use. Libraries acquire images from defunct papers, and 
they provide an archive that is similar to the archive found within living newspapers. 
Jason purchased a truck full of newspaper boxes from the Regional Post, and has been 
using them to sell his papers.  
Routines are particularly likely to persist when they overlap with norms. For 
instance, Katrina learned to appreciate the importance of a paper serving as a public 
record for the community while at the Local Blotter. When she moved to the other local 
paper, she continued to attempt to impose this norm by writing more stories than they 
would print for her section with the hope that they would somehow become news. They 
did print more of her material, so the result was a compromise.  
The Cessation of High-Volatility Routines: Technology and Black-Box Procedures 
High-volatility routines are severely weakened by the failure of a firm, and most 
do not survive transfer. The first of these is compensation: 
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Jeff (Laid off by the Regional Post, is now freelancing): I lost a steady paycheck. 
I lost security, in a lot of ways. I lost the camaraderie and the ability to work with 
a staff like that. I lost that feeling that you are really doing something for the 
community that feels important on a day-to-day basis. Sounds a little idealistic but 
I felt that way. But what I gained, I gained freedom and I gained the ability to 
steer my own direction and I gained stress. 
Financial obligations are a classic example of high-volatility routine. Employment 
relationships persist by virtue of the active set of interactions and obligations that trigger 
regular payment and administration of benefits. Beyond payment, an assortment of 
routines becomes less accessible or entirely missing. Some post-failure projects come to 
have awkward sets of routines by virtue of their lopsided uptake among distinct 
occupational groups, at the post-failure project from the Regional Post, this occurred: 
Sarah: The other problem was that we were very heavy on copy editors and not so 
much on reporters, and that was a big problem because the copy-editors that we 
had were not accustomed to having to generate content.  
Interviewer: Why were you so heavy on copy-editors and not reporters?  
Sarah: Because it was harder for the copy-editors to see a path of where to go 
next, so when this opportunity came up they thought, “Ooh, this is something I 
could do.” They'd been pushing us onto the web at the Regional Post for a long 
time, so everybody was learning how to deal with content management. And they 
thought ‘Well, if I can pick that up, and this is the wave of the future’, but it 
doesn't translate, and that's where the disconnect comes. Copy-editing for a 
newspaper and copy-editing/content producing for a website are different, and I 
think our folks had some adjustment problems. 
Interviewer: What was it like for you as a copy-editor? 
Sarah: I was a copy editor, and then at the first project I was running the site for a 
period of time, usually at night 3 or 4 days a week, I'd alternate with another 
person and other folks had it in the morning. We were checking traffic, kind of 
like an Internet news editor, that's not what we called it, but that's what the role 
was. I was working with the copy-editors, working with the reporters to some 
extent, not very much with the reporters, more with the copy-editors, and 
checking to make sure that things were filed when they were supposed to be filed. 
If there was something going on, make sure that it got covered. I'm not a reporter, 
I'm really bad at reporting, I'm very good at editing, not really good at reporting. 
So the prospect of going out and reporting did not appeal to me. 
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The external labor market for former employees from the Regional Post created a 
mismatch between the unemployed and the skills that an entrepreneurial venture needed 
to persist. Add to that the priority of being open to all, and you have a recipe for stress, 
and eventually failure. Many post-failure projects operate in this lifeboat spirit where all 
comers are welcome. But the risks of such a strategy are significant and possibly 
insurmountable. As Sarah explains, the “open to all” strategy is most likely to gather 
those individuals whose labor market opportunities are limited. Thus, if there is any 
change occurring in the industry that makes it easier for some skill sets to find jobs than 
others, then this inequality will burden (and possibly capsize) lifeboat organizations. 
It may or may not be possible for the average editor to teach another person about 
journalism so that she or he can report. It is arguably not possible for an editor to get 
another editor to be a reporter. This was one of the key issues discovered through the 
interview process. 
Interviewer: Did you think about being involved with any of post-failure projects? 
Karen (editor at the Regional Post, laid off, got a one-year position in Africa to 
relaunch a newspaper): No. I just didn’t have any sense of any possibility that 
they could succeed. 
Interviewer: Why not? 
Karen: Well I think that they were trying to do something that we were trying to 
do at the Regional Post and you just simply can’t do it with 25 people. If they had 
been more specific in what they wanted to do, maybe, but they can’t be an all-
around news source for the city with 25 people. You can barely do it with 200 
people. 
Many routines are scale-appropriate. They cannot be transferred into an organization that 
is significantly smaller. For instance, the group that worked together after the Regional 
Post failed attempted to cover many of the same stories in the same way that they would 
have at the Post, but their organization was a tenth the size. Naturally, this scale 
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difference should have changed what news they covered, but a new routine of focused 
news priorities did not immediately coalesce. Instead, they relied upon the established 
routine of attempting to cover every event from multiple angles, in a way that many 
acknowledged led to rapid burnout of thinly spread collaborators. 
Other high-volatility routines include the databases and information structures 
available to the employees through the failed organization, including embedded software, 
which is often proprietary. When organizations fail, employee email addresses are 
deactivated, websites are often taken down, and information resources are no longer 
accessible. After that, many forms of occupational organization must be recreated. 
Employees must replace organizational email addresses with personal accounts, create 
new files on personal computers, and pursue their work independently of organizational 
software. For photographers, this might mean expensive purchases of equipment. It might 
also mean that they are required to edit their own work when others would have done it 
previously. 
In general, it is difficult for employees to transfer processes that they do not 
understand and that are ascribed to individuals who they do not know or technologies that 
are unfamiliar to them. Sometimes, they can find support for these processes outside of 
an organization. Employees may need help within an organization to solve problems with 
email clients and server errors, but comparable services are commercially available, 
sometimes for free. However, more complex services may not be affordably obtained. 
When the Regional Post closed, its employees lost access to a news archive that spanned 
more than a century, covering locations, people, and issues local to them, an archive that 
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also included photography and stylistic guidance. At the same time, there were 
information services to which the Regional Post subscribed that the small post-failure 
entrepreneurial entity could not afford, and these cumulative resources impaired the news 
production that the organization was capable of doing. These technological limitations 
contrast with the more human side of the organization, which was able to transition. For 
example, sports writers were able to obtain press passes to events despite the fact that 
they no longer wrote for printed papers. This is a personal kindness considering that these 
individuals were writing for online-only publications and that the official standard that 
most sports teams use to guide the provision of press passes focuses on printed 
publications in order to exclude bloggers. 
 The study of organizational routines and their transfers is complicated by the 
environmentally sensitive nature of routines as applications of prior routine experience. 
Some routines segue well into others and then morph back into their original form when 
it is possible to do so. As a study in the post-failure transfer of organizational routine, the 
next section takes up the character of job scope as an organizational and occupational 
characteristic. The example illustrates the aspects of self-presentation that influence the 
persistence of some routines, and the relationship between perceived labor market 
demand and the redeployment of routines from failed firms. 
The Division of Labor as Organizational and Occupational Routine 
The division of labor is one of the most basic features of work organization. Its 
post-failure trajectory follows divergent paths depending upon the organizational and 
market incentives that employees perceive. Given the same breadth of purpose at the 
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organizational level, a larger organization should utilize more occupational specialization 
than a smaller organization: bigger newspapers should provide narrower jobs. This is 
facilitated by the existence of specialized sub-organizational units and complex routines 
that pass work products between divisions until they are completed.  
However, interviews in both newspapers and investment banks demonstrate that 
the division of labor arises within a more complicated relationship between the employee 
and the organization than the subdivision of occupational tasks can explain. Many large 
firms provide job mobility and side project flexibility as perks. These perks are intended 
to give employees better training and to help with retention. For instance, the City 
National offered all employees the opportunity to serve as writers in one news section 
after they had established enough tenure to apply. The National would also “throw 
bodies” at a big story, encouraging employees who didn’t usually write stories to cover 
part of a major incident. Global Investment (see Chapter Four) demonstrated similar 
flexibility by giving tech employees time to experiment with new technologies as side 
projects. 
The division of labor may expand or contract as firms fail. Some firms relax their 
restrictions on employees, allowing them to seek more innovative alternatives, this 
occurred at some offices of Open Investment and Walls Investment (Chapter Four), at the 
Afternoon Dispatch, and at the Regional Post. Alternatively, some firms  tighten the 
reigns on employees and try to focus them within their unique competencies. This 
happened at Open Investment offices that were located close to the Open Investment 
headquarters, at Adant, and at City National. 
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When papers relax their restraints on the breadth of work as they near failure, the 
desperate measures of a beleaguered firm permit individuals to experiment with story 
concepts that would not have been permitted when the paper was healthy. Desperate 
measures also drive people to work harder in producing the old and the new 
simultaneously. Some of the changes were mere additions to standard work practices that 
failed to improve core work products: 
Bob (a reporter at the Regional Post, laid off, now freelancing): The role of the 
reporter [stayed the same], yes there was the Twitter, pictures and video with your 
cell phone, but you were pretty much focused on journalism. You weren’t also a 
copy editor…. They changed the cell phones we had and gave us new phones… 
that were enabled to do video, because that was in our new job description.  
Interviewer: Did that work…? 
Bob: It gave me a facility with technology that I probably need to know. But did it 
improve my stories? No, I don’t think so. Did it improve the Regional Post that 
much? I don’t think so. 
Other organizations allowed a broad license that permitted every employee to engage in 
divergent work tasks. Trent created an auxiliary website on behalf of the Dispatch 
without anyone’s permission and showed it to his supervisor for suggestions and 
revisions after launching the site. That logic of production, review, and modification is 
very common in web production but almost unheard of in news journalism, and Trent 
admitted that he would be fired if he were to take the same approach with his current 
employer.  
At the Regional Post and the Afternoon Dispatch, work roles diversified amidst 
failure. People were encouraged to experiment and to try out alternatives. The forced 
organizational change at City National is very much the opposite. In that paper, work 
roles narrowed considerably. The paper had once encouraged editors to do some writing 
and to bring story ideas, but as the paper’s payroll’s dwindled it began to use a more 
 119 
controlled process in which writers wrote and editors edited. One editor says that he 
wrote at least one story per quarter for over twenty years, but didn’t write any in his last 
two years at the City National.  
The complex interaction between failure and the division of labor continues after 
individuals are laid off. First, when it comes to post-failure projects, many post-failure 
entrepreneurs have an unusual amount of access to highly specialized support. Though 
most entrepreneurs would be unable to muster a highly qualified design editor to do 
section layouts, Jason had temporary access to this kind of support because of his 
occupational community.  
As a more standard case, the division of labor requires that generalists act as if 
they are specialists as they apply to specific jobs. Many journalists choose to highlight a 
particular expertise in order to make themselves competitive for expertise-specific 
positions. This sometimes involves selective self- presentation because many reporters 
have covered half a dozen different desks and issues, and simply stumbled into the 
expertise that they now possess on a given topic. The Internet provides journalists with a 
whole new toolkit for developing an expertise narrative. With blogs and online 
magazines, journalists can write things to go into their portfolio and can control which 
stories they use for self-presentation. Personal websites are then used to present these 
narratives within an area of expertise. As journalists search for jobs, they work on 
projects that contribute to their portfolios and show off their expertise. Their efforts have 
the immediate effect of narrowing the breadth of the projects that a journalist will take on 
as a freelancer outside of the bounds of a large firm. 
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Why do they want to become experts? First, entry-level journalism jobs often 
expect an unattainable diversity of skills, asking a new hire to write, interview, report, 
video, research, blog, and code web pages. Such a skill set is unlikely to ever occur in 
any person with any degree of proficiency, and certainly not in a 22-year-old fresh out of 
journalism school. Experienced journalists wish to distinguish themselves as writers and 
thinkers to avoid this kind of position, particularly because many of these positions are 
posted for a third of the pay that experienced journalists have come to expect. Expertise-
seeking journalists believe that once they become an expert their prestige will help them 
to get and then retain a job. There is some precedent for this: at the Local Blotter, for 
instance, last-in first-out layoffs skipped over a few young employees whose expertise 
ostensibly justified retention. Likewise, layoffs at the City National did not include news 
areas where the management valued expertise. The business desk was one example. 
The expertise orientation appears to be a job market strategy rather than an 
occupational redefinition. Once journalists find jobs, tasks again diversify as they seek to 
retain a job within an organization and thus to do what the organization needs them to do. 
Once survivors of failure get positions in papers, the jobs are not so different from the 
ones that they left. There are fewer people in papers, and this means more work to go 
around, but the domain specifications of city desk vs. features have not changed, nor have 
the structures of the stories that these desks require. So, if the organization is healthy, the 
journalist might have a chance to diversify her or his work tasks yet again. 
Unlike the journalists who are hired back into narrow jobs in big papers, the 
journalists who go to work in small papers experience the stress of bricolage. The 
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cobbled together existence of the entrepreneurial firm provides diverse jobs for the 
accidentally available. Some journalists cherish the opportunity. Norm had served as a 
design editor for nearly 30 years laying out the pages of the Regional Post. He was 
thrilled in the post-failure projects to have the opportunity to take pictures for the new 
paper. It was a role that he hadn’t had the opportunity to pursue for years, though he’d 
worked as a commercial photographer early in his career. The stressed entrepreneurial 
firm gave him room to pursue digital photography; his passion became a vocation. Note 
that this directly contradicts the specialization to which Jason had access initially in the 
design of his paper, so the point is that initial specialist access does eventually abate, and 
small-firm employees must deal with small-firm realities in which diverse tasks arrive on 
the desk of each employee. Jason drives across the state to pick up his printed papers and 
does writing, editing, photography, and some business services. So, while he recognizes 
his own limitations and seeks skilled professionals to offset his work, he is certainly 
doing many tasks that he did not have to do at a large paper. At its best, reconfigurations 
like this provide journalists with learning experience, and bond them together with 
interdependencies, what Durkheim called “organic solidarity.” 
Oddly enough, employment security and organizational health seem to relax the 
specialization of labor so that high performance firms will tend to be less specialized than 
firms that experience rapid decline. But the oscillation between specialization and 
occupational flexibility across careers and within firms illustrates the tremendous 
mutability of very basic organizational routines. The lurking variable here is 
organizational slack, which may rise and fall with the health of the firm. 
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This chapter began with an introduction to the newsroom and distinguished 
between norms based upon the rationale behind them and routines based upon the energy 
necessary to maintain them. There are two important topics that remain to be discussed in 
the following section. First, the other factors that bridge or barricade the way for the 
transfer of routines and norms. One major consideration of these factors is whether they 
are positive sources of selection for routines and norms or merely arbitrary.  
Bridges and Barricades: Selection Processes in Post-Failure Transfers 
The process through which norms and routines persist relies upon six 
interdependent factors, none of which is easily isolated. First, persistence depends upon 
the causal attribution of failure. When norms or routines are blamed for a firm’s failure, 
they are much less likely to be retained. Second, positions within hierarchy establish 
opportunities for post failure organizing. If norms were entirely imposed by management 
without buy-in from employees, those norms are unlikely to survive a failure. And if 
employees enter into a position within a new firm where they have little control, they will 
have few opportunities to impose their norms and routines. Insofar as hierarchies persist, 
more routines and norms can also survive. More generally, persistence depends upon the 
opportunity to do similar work in a similar way; hence, the opportunity to find a similar 
job is initially determinative. But that opportunity is also conditional on a set of choices 
that the displaced worker makes. For instance, many displaced workers choose 
entrepreneurial and marginally compensated work rather than career alternatives outside 
journalism. Some who have survived one or even two firm failures nonetheless continue 
to seek work as journalists rather than work that would require a more drastic career 
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change. Willingness to make personal sacrifices defines and expands the opportunity set 
of the displaced worker. But if the journalist is unable to find or make any work at all, as 
is the case for those who stay unemployed, then there is little chance that work routines 
and norms remain occupationally relevant. Individuals have some agency regarding 
occupational opportunity, subject to significant constraints.  
Though journalists are able to choose alternative paths, inertia often carries them 
along internally consistent careers. Skill compatibility makes it easier for a job seeker to 
acquire a job along the same career path than it is to find a position that is inconsistent 
with career history. Social support for a job seeker is also more available along the same 
career path. Displaced workers are more likely to find journalism-related opportunities 
through their peers because their peers are often journalists and because those who are 
not continue to think of the displaced worker as a journalist. 
The final factor, receptiveness, relates to the openness to the routines of failed 
firms on the receiving end. Transfers to very similar work may nonetheless destroy 
routines and norms if the hiring organization is unwilling to grant them refuge. 
Receptiveness also encompasses the status of the hired individual within the hierarchy. 
Due to their status, some people within an organization have the power to impose the 
norms and routines that they choose. 
Causal Attribution 
Many post-failure employees are at least temporarily obsessed with the causal 
attribution of organizational failure: why did the firm collapse? What went wrong? The 
answers to these questions are, for traumatized employees, particularly strong 
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motivations in the search for alternatives. Tim explains Jason’s business model in terms 
that attribute Jason’s choices to avoiding the pitfalls of the Regional Post’s strategy: 
Tim (photographer at the Dispatch, laid off, hired by the Regional Post, laid off 
again, now involved in a post-failure entrepreneurial project): Just say the words 
“business model” and let [Jason] go. At the time that the Regional Post went 
down, they had debts over $100 million because of the news presses that they’d 
put in. Jason will tell you all about being light, and nimble, and unencumbered by 
overhead. 
Jason and Tim both survived the failure of the Regional Post, and both have had time to 
think about why it failed and what its failure means, and one of its key implications is 
that debt makes a business inflexible and therefore fragile. This is one of many lessons 
that journalists learned from the layoff. Every journalist learned that layoffs are possible, 
a non-trivial lesson in a failing industry. Other lessons seem to be sporadically 
discovered. Many journalists learned the importance of political positions, relationships, 
and specialized skills in finding a job and recovering from failure. The process is 
subjective and interpretive: different journalists reach different conclusions in this 
sensemaking process. One journalist says that the future of journalism is in personalities. 
Another provides a counter-example in the news magazine The Economist and expresses 
his own doubts. One journalist says everything needs to go online. Another says that a 
small community newspaper can still make money because it is the only game in town, 
and that everything that newspapers are doing online is losing them money and wasting 
their energy. One says blogging is the future, while another says that the frenzied focus 
upon constant reporting and the 24-hour news cycle is a distraction that dilutes the core 
competency of news: thoughtful analysis and primary coverage. One says that 
newspapers can’t afford to cover small community events, while another says that the 
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only motive people really have for buying the paper is seeing their kids in it which is a 
business model in itself: it gets the reader to feel a sense of ownership and participation in 
the news outlet. The list could go on. Everyone agrees that newspapers expanded too 
aggressively into the suburbs, that news organizations took on too much debt to upgrade 
production equipment, and that they made the mistake of putting content online for free 
which taught readers to read news online without teaching them to pay for it. Beyond 
that, the interpretive lenses provide dozens of different understandings of what went 
wrong and why. Pet theories abound, and norms associated with failure are undermined 
in the process.  
Hierarchies 
Persons in positions of authority impose norms. The Regional Post, for instance, 
is described by most of its survivors as “frantic,” “crazy,” and “feverish,” and former 
Post journalists all say that their occupational pace has slowed since the paper closed. 
Under the Regional Post’s leadership, most employees were being asked to blog, take 
pictures, upload videos, and tweet on Twitter as the news was breaking. Now that the 
Regional Post is gone, few of its former employees maintain these practices; the norms 
were not internalized into the practices of the employees, and once the managerial 
demand dissolved, the practices quickly followed. And what of the management 
hierarchy? Does it survive? 
When new organizations emerge, the structure of the organizations yields a 
diversity of hierarchical relationships. At CityNews.org the editorial hierarchy shrunk but 
remained firmly entrenched. In fact, the project has been criticized for the lack of 
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diversity in its leadership and among its staff, a quality that may be traced in its 
genealogy back to the City National (Phillips 2005). CityNews.org remains heavily 
edited, and the hierarchy persists from the City National, albeit in a smaller 
organizational form.  
Other organizations emerge from failure with less structure. In the place of 
managerial hierarchies, experimental collaborative teams take shape. These minimalist 
organizations are able to try new things and learn new skills in applied ways with 
relatively limited financial risks. The risk-taking is reinforced by unemployment and/or 
severance income that enables organizational experimentation by otherwise risk averse 
individuals. When everyone is sharing in the risk by working for free, sharp hierarchies 
are not justifiable. The egalitarian work model that emerges is very different from the 
newsrooms that it replaces. And while editing and supervision remain in place, the 
demands that editors are able to place on reporters are significantly curtailed.  
The spirit of egalitarianism is slightly exaggerated by the financial reality. As 
firms grow, the reemergence of conflict is likely to occur as soon as there are resources 
available to sustain conflict. With nothing to divide, the person who gets 50% gets as 
much as the person who gets 1%, but these are very different allocations when a firm is 
generating a $100,000 profit. The nascent form of organizational egalitarianism does not 
necessarily provide a sustainable form of workplace equality. 
Some post-failure projects, like the one that emerged from the City National, 
maintain relatively sharp hierarchies that create traditional editing relationships. This can 
be frustrating for reporters whose writing continues to be heavily redacted. However, 
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much of the benefit comes from a sense of purpose and integrity that the City National is 
believed to have lost, which has been reclaimed by CityNews.org: 
Interviewer: So what is that organization like relative to the National? 
Michelle (features writer at the National, laid off, hired by entrepreneurs): It’s like 
night and day. At the National, every idea you came up with had to go through 
seventeen layers of people analyzing it under different auspices, saying yes or no, 
thinking about it, and then there was always this issue, especially in the last 
couple years I was there, a seep through of the wall between advertising and 
editorial, which was really a big problem. I suspect it still is, but I can’t speak to 
that. At the [entrepreneurial project] it’s like, “You want to do this story? Is it a 
good story? All right, go do it!” It’s a different set of parameters; the bar is higher 
and also just different, because we’re trying to cover things that haven’t been 
covered before in a way that they haven’t been covered. You can really psych 
yourself out, I’ve found, because everybody has touched on something at one 
point of another. It’s almost impossible to come up with something that no one 
has ever heard of before. And that’s been a challenge for me too, just coming up 
with [stuff]. It’s been a challenge. It’s been exciting, and occasionally exhausting; 
sometimes I just don’t know who to talk to, I’m learning a new beat. 
Norms survive, and many of the norms that disappear are welcomed departures. This 
shows a constructive process of normative retention. Michelle was learning a new beat, a 
task that many reporters have to do within the paper where they work. What is 
remarkable is that the process is no more jarring than that. One would think that by 
moving from a large organization to a small one by way of a layoff, that Michelle would 
have lost even more. Instead, she retains almost all of the work roles attendant to her 
work activity.  
Opportunity 
Ideally, a profile of labor market conditions would help to establish the 
opportunities that are available to displaced workers, but the market outcomes provide 
only a summary picture. Taken together, the distribution of jobs to which people move 
after job death gives a snapshot for both cause and effect in the transfer of norms and 
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routines. The Dispatch, as the smallest firm studied, provided a unique opportunity to 
observe a relatively complete census of post-failure occupational trajectories. These 
outcomes are reported in Table 4 based upon interview data with former employees.  
Table 4: Frequency of Key Post-Failure Transitions at the Dispatch 
Post Failure Job Count Opportunities to Transfer Routines and Norms 
News 21 Frequent 
Freelance 5 Frequent 
Public Relations 2 Frequent 
Education/Teaching 8 Conditional 
Student 2 Conditional 
Unemployed 1 Rare 
Retired 4 Rare 
Unknown 3 Unknown 
Other 2 Unknown 
 
The table illustrates that journalists tend to continue practicing journalism as employees 
or freelancers, that some move into teaching or public relations, and that a few find other 
occupations. Because Table 4 includes employees who were not directly involved in 
news production, it should be viewed as a conservative estimate of the likelihood that a 
journalist will continue to be a journalist after the collapse of her paper. Some other 
occupational groups within the newspaper industry also make surprisingly consistent 
transitions. For example, the receptionist at the Dispatch became a receptionist for 
another local newspaper. 
The evidence from the Dispatch indicates a strong likelihood of a transition within 
journalism. More than half of the staff of the Dispatch continue to work in a field that is 
closely related to the work that they did as journalists. Many found jobs at newspapers in 
other places, and a few even found employment in the city’s surviving local paper. Some 
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are freelancing, writing copy, or taking pictures for commercial projects in order to 
subsidize the few journalistic projects that they are able to do. Some have taken jobs in 
public relations, most often for public sector or philanthropic entities.  
In the most tightly coupled cases, journalists moved to local papers and continued 
covering the same topics using the same sources and writing for the same audience. 
Nonetheless, even these proximate transitions are not without consequences. For 
instance, some journalists have been rather unsatisfied with the editors and work culture 
at the paper to which they moved. The more standard move in journalism requires 
relocation, often both geographic and topical. The journalist covers a new subject for a 
new audience, and must start fresh in finding sources and learning to write for a new 
audience. Nonetheless, such transfers provide considerable opportunities to approach the 
work with the same norms and routines, and journalists may even choose between jobs 
based upon the norms at the hiring firm. Transfers into public relations involve a subtler 
uptake of routines, but the professional social contacts remain useful, and stories are 
pitched with a similar emphasis. Individuals who move farther afield from journalism are 
managing bars, getting certified to teach, retired, having children, and starting businesses.  
It may be helpful to provide a more specific analysis available directly through 
the qualitative data collected. I met five journalists from the Dispatch two years after 
their firm closed, and for three of them, the career struggles that began with the closure of 
the Dispatch were ongoing. Initially, the occupational fates of this group were rather 
positive. One entrepreneur focused his efforts on a wedding photography business with 
his wife. Three others quickly found jobs at other news organizations. The fifth traveled 
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internationally. Only one (aside from the entrepreneur) was lucky enough to find a local 
job, but jobs were available for those who were mobile. The lack of stable employment 
options in journalism is a major challenge for Dispatchistas8. All three interviewees who 
stayed in journalism were laid off again during the next 18 months. One fell prey to the 
“last in, first out” routine of the hiring firm’s collective bargaining agreement. Another 
worked for a bureau that later closed. A third experienced a nearly identical repeat of the 
failure of the Dispatch while employed at the Regional Post. When these three 
individuals returned to the search for journalism jobs, the search proved much more 
challenging. At the end of two years, only one of the five was making more money than 
he had been at the Dispatch, an increase that counted for little given the cost of living in 
the place where he moved. The entrepreneur was the only person who had not continued 
to practice as a journalist, and his photography business specialized in a photojournalistic 
style of photography.  
There are many challenges faced by journalists, whatever their motivations, in 
order to stay in the field:  
Josh (laid off by the Dispatch, started wedding photography business): I think a 
lot of us started out in this career young and enthusiastic, with no ties, and 
idealistic, and it isn’t that those passions don’t still exist. But family comes in too. 
You’ve got children. My wife’s family is from here. What job am I going to go to 
slave away for less money in a different place when I love it here? Where you live 
and how comfortable you are, and the environment becomes more important. 
When I was a little younger, if somebody said, ‘Oh, there is a job in the middle of 
China’, and it was a good job, I’d be going. If somebody says that now, “No 
thanks! Pass.” 
 
Michelle: Last August I was seriously considering leaving the city, but then I 
                                                
8 The name “Dispatch” is a pseudonym. “Dispatchista” is a rough approximation of what 
Dispatch employees call themselves. Like many sources of identity, firm-based occupational 
groups devise a shared language to talk about their group and its members. 
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thought I don’t know what to do. It’s not a one-horse-town, but if you’re exiled 
from the world of the City National, it’s hard to figure out how you’re going to 
make journalism work as a career here, so I thought I should go to a bigger city.  
 
Patrick: The job market was really bad and there weren’t a lot of options anyway. 
What I knew was that it would be pointless to try to find another job in 
journalism. Layoffs were ongoing. There would be absolutely no way that anyone 
was going to pay me what I was making. I didn’t even try that route. I know 
places like online news and some online publishers are hiring now for different 
online editor and writer jobs, but they’re paying half of what I was making at the 
City National. It’s better than an entry-level salary, but not significantly so. I 
know they’re working their butts off, too. I have zero interest in that.  
 
Ellen (reporter at the National, took a buyout, then the recession forced her back 
to work): I didn’t want to go look for a job. I didn’t think I was competitive 
because I’m 65, and I’ve written too much about age discrimination. I didn’t think 
I was going to get a good job.... I felt that we became like steelworkers. I really 
did. Our industry is going away. There’s no preparation for us and there are no 
safety nets. People in late middle age are really screwed. 
These accounts illustrate the complex set of considerations that motivate career decisions 
for post-failure employees. These are at once regional, organization, and market-oriented. 
It is clear that these transitions have caused a tremendous amount of stress and hardship 
for the survivors of failure, a topic that I revisit in the concluding chapter. But as the next 
section will make clear, journalists are powerfully motivated by factors other than 
occupational and economic opportunity. 
I do not deny that opportunity plays a key role, particularly among those who 
become discouraged in the search for similar work and eventually choose to seek 
alternative employment. However, the importance of opportunity does not dominate other 
factors. Given the state of journalism and news production, one might expect for every 
person who has been laid off from a news organization to immediately invest in 
retraining for a different career. Instead, many go back to school for additional expertise 
in journalism. This counter-intuitive outcome is reinforced by national trends in 
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admissions to undergraduate journalism programs (Streib 2009). Even as the industry 
experiences the tightest job market in decades, enrollments are up and demand is strong 
for an education in journalism. The availability of jobs in journalism, here described as 
“opportunity,” is unable to explain the ongoing human capital investment in the field. 
Students know that they are several years and multiple unpaid internships away from an 
undercompensated job, and that even if they can get a job, that job may be threatened by 
organizational collapse.  
Perhaps these students haven’t been reading the newspaper? On a human capital 
model, nothing could be less rational than for the aggregate investment in particular skills 
to increase, even as the return on the investment of those skills is in a pernicious state of 
decline. Something must be missing from the model. I have no insight into what 
journalism students are thinking, but I do have data on the motivations of journalists to 
stay in journalism amidst career trauma, motivations which may justify the educational 
investments of students. 
Why Journalists Choose Journalism: Choice 
Journalists love journalism because of the experience that they have had (or hope 
to have) within newspapers and the community of people that papers bring together: 
Lisa: Being in a newsroom is like being in a bar with the smartest, funniest people 
you will ever meet. They just use the worst, most horrific language…. People are 
so colorful, and just, they're wonderful to be around. The day just passes like, in 
an instant, when you're around these types of people. [In my new job] my world 
has become a lot smaller and much more myopic. And it's like, I go in my car. I 
come to the [office]. I go in my car. I go home. I don't get a taste or a sense of any 
other type of life outside of this place. And I really don't like that. 
Newspapers provide journalists with a sense of meaning, a purpose, and a community 
that shares these values. Combining these three attributes with an educated, irascible, and 
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often comical workforce makes newsrooms a dynamic and exciting place to work. Lisa’s 
quote illustrates one of the most important features of life within a newsroom: the fact 
that the organization opens out onto the world. Few organizations are as externally 
focused as newspapers. By looking outward, newspapers can often avoid forms of 
stagnation that arise through the narrow pursuit of organizational goals. The organization 
that hired Lisa was much more focused on documenting the goings-on of a very narrow 
place, and unfortunately for Lisa, there just wasn’t that much going on. 
 Journalists are also keenly aware that their skills have been developed within a 
narrow purpose. Some former journalists wish that their peers would realize how general 
their skills actually are, but most believe themselves to have learned a relatively specific 
craft that is not easily converted to other purposes. Journalists choose journalism because 
they love it, and because they identify with the work and do not wish to work anywhere 
else. Because their choices had negative consequences from the start, they are not quickly 
unmade amidst economic adversity. 
Why Journalists Choose Journalism: Inertia 
The collapse of an employer would seem to severely jeopardize one’s career 
inertia, but there are still forces of momentum in continue after one’s employer is 
disbanded, some of which are unique to the failure layoff scenario. Firm closures are 
public events that draw internal and external social support. After failure, interpersonal 
networks present expertise-appropriate opportunities to individuals and prior job market 
experience continues to be the go-to plan for finding the next job. Moreover, managers 
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often take responsibility for helping to place their employees, reaching into their own 
occupational networks to achieve this goal.  
Some editors receive phone calls from those who are hiring asking if any of their 
former employees have yet to find jobs. Many social networks are organized on email 
lists or through online social networking sites like Facebook.com, and these outlets are 
used continually to share information about job opportunities.  
Though the inertia does keep journalists within their careers to facilitate 
opportunities for the transfer of routines and norms, inertia has a more insidious 
implication for survivors of failure. Once an employee has been laid off amidst economic 
hardship, any new job that she or he might find is precarious relative to the current 
employees of the firm. Recent hires are easily discharged without disrupting the rest of 
the organization, and several study participants have been laid off two or more times after 
their first dismissal. Though inertia does keep pulling these journalists back in, they are 
not irrational people, and given enough hardship within journalism, alternative careers 
become increasingly appealing. 
Receptiveness  
The final step in the preservation of routines and norms is the receptiveness of the 
receiving organization. Many of the journalists who have moved outside of their field 
have been surprised at how applicable their skills were and about the receptiveness of 
their colleagues to trying to do things the way that a journalist would. Sometimes, that 
logic provides a lens that organizations lack.  
Lisa: My journalism skills have played a role in me being successful at this job. 
The way I did it was that - they wanted to tell the story of how we’re using 
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money. [Our budget] is a somewhat unpopular program, because people don’t 
think it really resulted in jobs and what-not. So then, “If you want to prove that 
you’re hiring people, why don’t you allow me to do a profile, like I would for the 
National, of every single person that we hire?” And I knew their stories would be 
compelling. So, I reached out to all the new hires. A fifth of them said, “sure.” So 
I ended up doing about 20 - 21 of those, and the first woman was exactly what I 
thought. She was, like, “Yeah, I got laid off more than a year ago. I was five 
months pregnant. It was a total panic in my family. You know, finally, I was able 
to find an art job [here]…. It works on my journalism skills - my “duh,” common 
sense skills - “just profile the people - worked here, in area where they would 
never do that. Because they don't write about people here. They write about 
science, and science is really boring….. That's what I told them when they hired 
me. I was like, “no one gives a shit about your science.” Who are the people 
you're helping? What does your research do? If you're looking up a proton's butt 
for a picture of, you know, whatever. ….It doesn't matter, unless you can use that 
to cure cancer. Connect the dots into a way people will care, because the average 
person doesn't know …. So I've just used [the] journalism idea of writing about 
people and being very practical here, and it has worked. 
Lisa’s enduring pragmatism painted a portrait of a complex organization that was so 
much more personal and accessible than any expert could have done. Her work gained 
national attention, and fostered a real appreciation among her colleagues for her craft. 
Receptiveness may depend upon organizational rank at hiring, on persuasion, and on the 
strength of the existing normative and productive process.  
Opportunity, choice, inertia, and receptiveness are basic features of the post-
failure transition. Based upon the availability of jobs, the motivations of survivors, and 
the receptiveness of receiving organizations, the opportunities for post-failure transfers 
take shape.  
Key Conclusions: Persistence and Selection 
By surveying the diverse processes involved in transferring norms and routines 
from failed firms, we can get a sense of the adaptive process resulting from the 
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evolutionary selection of organizational norms and routines. Here we might distinguish 
two main outcomes: firm-level selection and post-failure selection.  
Where persistence is unlikely, an organizational failure results in firm-level 
selection. For instance, high-volatility routines are selected from an industry by an 
organizational death, and their recovery is unlikely thereafter. If newspapers are finally 
destroyed, some of their important functions like training journalists and imposing norms 
onto news making through tight editorial oversight might be lost forever. Smaller 
organizations may eventually achieve some of this training, but many lack the resources 
to do so at a sufficient scale for it to make a difference. 
When persistence of norms and routines is possible, then secondary selection 
processes become important. First, survivors tend to scrutinize modifications to their 
aesthetic and pragmatic norms. If survivors believe that they know a better way to do 
something and that a norm will improve an organization, they are likely to attempt to 
impose it, providing a positive selection criteria to norms and related routines. Moreover, 
justice norms determine how journalists want to work and where they’re willing to work, 
encouraging individuals to move routines and norms into normatively appropriate 
environments. Similarly, causal attributions of failure constitute critical reflections upon 
organizational performance that stand to improve organizational routines provided that 
the former employee is able to make sense of the failure in a way that relates the right 
routines and norms to organizational underperformance.  
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Are organizational failures selection events in the evolutionary sense? To a 
degree. Yes, but they are incomplete. Post-failure organizing provides a platform for the 
survival of key organizational resources that might otherwise be conceived as “selected.”  
I began by asking whether organizations survive failure, and if so how the entities 
connect, a question that is much larger than the details of norms and routines in 
newspapers. I believe the process of post-failure organizing demonstrates that established 
norms and routines are not obliterated outright by organizational failure and that what 
follows next is more complex and partial than either survival or failure.  
The post-failure entrepreneurial projects have special properties that are unlike 
other new organizations. They have better access to sources, venues, and a capacity to 
scoop other media outlets on major stories. Because these outlets can write in a 
sophisticated way from the start, and they have access to important people, they are fairly 
legitimate from a young age, which is an interesting insight from the perspective of 
population ecology and institutional theory. 
Beyond the post-failure aspects of this chapter, the observational setting revealed 
some interesting features of both norms and routines that may be worthwhile in other 
research contexts. The motivational core of social norms varies, and the distinction 
between aesthetic, pragmatic, and justice-oriented norms is likely to be applicable to a 
much wider setting than newspapers. 
The chapter also contributes a new conception of routines based upon their 
volatility. Routines have already been distinguished based upon whether they are 
transferable or not, but volatility seeks to characterize the essence of what makes routines 
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difficult to transfer: the energy necessary to keep them alive. The more energy required to 
sustain a routine based upon the complexity of the different people and processes that 
must be engaged, the less transferrable that routine will be.  
The next chapter considers related issues in a second industry, investment banks. 
Though the sample is smaller, it provides an interesting counter-example to the 
newspaper setting. While norms bind journalists together, they often push people away 
from investment banks and inspire the emergence of other organizations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
POST-FAILURE CONTINUITY IN INVESTMENT BANKS 
Introduction 
This chapter begins with the question of organizational adaptation. In the previous 
chapter, several of the pathways involved in the preservation of norms and routines 
proved to offer effective selection criteria: they made it likely that the surviving norms 
and routines would be somewhat better than those that had failed at a sub-organizational 
level. This chapter will again document the selection process, but findings follow a very 
different narrative. Here the norms of investment banks meet with wide distaste, and 
many choose not to work in the industry because of its norms, yet the norms do not yield 
to the force of exit. This chapter demonstrates some of the mechanisms through which 
unfavorable norms persist. It also takes up a second topic that the previous chapter left 
unsettled: how exactly do routines and norms survive failure? To this end, specific 
examples of routines and norms demonstrate firm legacies, documenting the process 
through which norms and routines are habituated into employees and teams. 
Method 
The first issue confronted in the study of investment banks relates to the 
specification of the activities and services provided in diversified and complex 
organizations. Rather than seeking to fix a definition of an evolving organizational field, I 
aim to track the career paths of a specific subset of employees within that field. While it 
is challenging to characterize the entirety of large and complex organizations that provide 
diverse services to diverse clientele, it is somewhat easier to take individual employees 
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and their narrow job tasks as instances of larger organizational processes. A 
disaggregation of this sort would be less appropriate within newspapers because of the 
importance of the specific purpose of those firms, but the diversity of investment banks 
makes disaggregation both appropriate and necessary. Given the diversity of roles within 
investment banks, it proved impossible to isolate a single task-group within multiple 
banks. Instead, I sampled from multiple sub-specialties, almost all of which were 
employed at one of two large organizations, Global Investment and Capital Investment. 
Three methodological notes are necessary as preliminaries. 
First, as with newspapers, pseudonyms have been used to de-identify all firms and 
study participants. In such a small industry saturated with journalistic accounts, the goal 
of confidentiality may seem futile, and while I have changed some basic features of the 
account to create ambiguity around which of the several bankrupted entities is subject to 
the analysis, an industry insider is likely to be able to discern the organization’s name 
through some of the defining norms and values of that organization. The conundrum is a 
serious one, for I have set out to convince the reader that some of what is distinctive 
about an organization is carried through the careers of those who inhabit these firms, and 
in order to do so I must explain distinguishing features that would help a reader to 
identify a firm despite the use of a pseudonym. Because the conundrum admits of no 
simple solution, responses are often cited in a way that is intentionally vague about which 
respondent provided a given insight. This is meant to enhance the protection of study 
participants so that any person who could identify someone from his or her organizational 
position and career trajectory could not discern that person’s private perceptions about his 
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or her career, occupational struggles, and organizational frustrations. The study 
participants were informed of these risks before they participated, but it is nonetheless 
incumbent upon the researcher to do what he or she can to protect confidentiality as much 
as is possible. 
The use of pseudonyms becomes increasingly important in the age of searchable 
online information. The simplest protection that a pseudonym provides to a study 
participant is the assurance that an online search will not immediately uncover the 
participant’s private contribution to research. The possibility of such a search constitutes 
a much larger intrusion into the privacy of the participant than the accidental 
identification of a participant by a person whose interest in the subject brought them to 
the text. The use of pseudonyms was a basic expectation of all investment bank 
participants, but the same practice was confusing to many journalists who would prefer to 
have their stories told with the names and facts intact.  
The second methodological note concerns accrual. Contacting investment bankers 
was difficult from the start, and grew more so over time. Thus the sample of bankers is 
smaller than the sample of journalists, and sixteen respondents provide the data for this 
chapter. Certain aspects of the transition, particularly post-failure entrepreneurship, are 
rare enough to be unobservable in a sample of this size. For a study of post-failure 
entrepreneurship, a larger or more focused sample would be necessary. Because of the 
sample limitations, much of the study is focused on a single firm, Global Investment, and 
its various post-failure progeny. While the newspaper sample provided more diversity in 
firm trajectories by focusing on four firms, the examination of careers within Global 
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Investment provides a more in-depth look at the divergent fates of failure where the entity 
itself experiences an incomplete preservation. 
As a third methodological note, the present analysis takes this overall setting as 
exogenous to the actions of its individual participants. It does not judge the role of 
bankers and their banks in the financial collapse and the economic repercussions that 
ensued, nor does it attempt to determine the counter-historical possibilities of how the 
industry would have changed without the intervention. The position is methodological 
rather than political.  
Rather than attempting to evaluate bankers and their conduct from some external 
lens, it is quite interesting to focus on the internal evaluations. These will be 
distinguished between two sets. First, I will focus on the sources of frustration for 
bankers, some of which led study participants to leave the industry. This begins with 
observations of why they leave to demonstrate, in turn, some of the organizing norms 
within banking, and some of what banking lacks. The second section documents three 
routines that persisted after investment banks failed. The third section specifies the 
mechanisms through which this persistence occurs as continuity processes and contrasts 
these processes with continuity processes in newspapers. The final section examines the 
organizational processes for post-failure organizing in investment banks.  
Banks as Structure and Process 
The economic crisis of late 2008 involved an intense spate of organizational 
collapses among some of the largest and most well regarded investment banks. Layoffs 
became common in an industry where human capital is the coin of the realm, and 
 143 
organizations changed shape through acquisitions and failures. The Troubled Asset Relief 
Program averted many outright failures that might otherwise have occurred by sustaining 
insolvent organizations, adding further complexity to the process of post-failure 
organizing. In this section, I document some of the processes involved in banking. All 
information, unless otherwise cited, draws upon detailed descriptions of banking 
provided by study participants in qualitative interviews. 
Investment banks are unlike traditional retail banks. They do not hold deposits or 
maintain accounts. Instead, they perform a pair of sometimes conflicting roles in service 
of capital. As an advisor, investment banks provide clients with information and advice 
on how to approach various financial decisions, including the sale of stock and bonds, the 
processing of international transactions, the coordination of mergers and acquisitions, and 
the process of dissolution or distressed acquisition. Investment banks also serve as 
dealers, buying assets from one client in order to sell them to another. This may include 
stocks, bonds, fixed income, and other financial instruments, most of which were fairly 
mundane until quite recently, when exotic financial instruments like derivatives and 
mortgage-backed securities became important business activities for investment banks. 
Regulatory changes exacerbate the emergent complexity, making it even more difficult to 
characterize what investment banks are and what they do. In fact, some authors have 
proposed a new category: 
Large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs)… [are] financial intermediaries 
engaged in some combination of commercial banking, investment banking, asset 
management, and insurance, whose failure poses a systemic risk or externality to 
the financial system as a whole. (Saunders, Smith, and Walter 2009: 139) 
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The breadth of purpose of these firms has become a very significant issue in making 
sense of the bailout decisions, a topic revisited in the concluding chapter. 
 Though many different activities occur within investment banks and large, 
complex financial institutions, they share a number of characteristics that draw people 
into them and expel them in equal measure. The next section describes the sources of exit 
among investment bankers. Later sections demonstrate some of the reasons why exit does 
not change the norms of practice within the industry. 
Norms at Work: Why Bankers Quit Banking 
The people who leave banking typically leave because of the norms. They leave 
because they do not want to adhere to the intense work ethic that would hold them 
captive in an office late into the night and make any social plans secondary to last-minute 
projects. They leave because banks lack a norm of purpose, like the calling that draws 
journalists, and they want to do something that is more meaningful by pursuing a 
personal project or passion. They leave because banks maintain norms of incivility and 
cutthroat competition that undermine collaboration. These dominant motives are not 
universally felt, but one or more of them applies to every former banker whom I 
interviewed. Nonetheless, the fact that norms motivate exit should not be viewed as an 
indication that former bankers regret their experience. Most prize the experience that 
they’ve had and speak highly of their former colleagues. It would not be difficult to 
extend these departure motives into a broader critique of the industry, but former bankers 
rarely do so. Their narrative describes a mismatch between personal motivations and 
organizational norms. Less often do they judge the industry for its norms.  
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In this section I will describe a few of the main norms that former bankers invoke 
in their descriptions of why they left investment banking. These are work intensity, 
motivation, and incivility. Later, I will note other norms that are salient within the 
industry, but not typically articulated as a reason for departure.  
Too Much Work 
Investment banks are intensive work cultures: the dominance of work over other 
life priorities is a basic feature of these firms. Former bankers note the difference 
between their current work environments and the work that they did at a bank in terms of 
the allocation of time. They are surprised that their colleagues outside the industry go 
home from work on a daily basis before six and rarely work weekends. Here, norms and 
routines overlap once again. Global Investment provided a car service for its staff when 
they worked late. Global also offered a special food service that charged the company 
directly so that employees were well fed as they worked late into the night. These are 
routines that establish the practices around constant work. 
The dominance of the organization within the lives of the employees is therefore 
nearly complete, and while Global Investment does not quite meet Goffman’s definition 
of a “total institution,” it is not unreasonable to compare investment banks with boarding 
schools, army barracks and work camps that subsume nearly every aspect of the person’s 
life into the same entity (Goffman 1961). What is less clear about investment banks as 
total institutions is whether they are sufficiently cut off from outside interaction. Goffman 
allows for this in recognizing that the serving staff of a mansion may be wholly 
institutionalized while the other household members are not. Relative to managing 
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directors and senior staff, employees below the VP level have relatively less external 
interaction through their work. Though many positions are meant to open onto the wider 
financial world or an industry in a way that is not so different from what newspapers are 
meant to do, the intense internal competition, high expectations of work product quality, 
and long hours are not necessarily conducive to a broad external perspective. Very few 
analysts and even fewer traders and bankers have access to a breadth of information that 
would give them experience akin to the newsroom. 
Total institutionalization may not be necessary to impose a work ethic upon 
employees, but it helps. Because employees are expected to be available at all times, and 
because amenities are provided to ensure this end, there are few acceptable excuses for 
not working. Most people put their relationships on hold in service of career objectives.  
Rebecca spent her entire first year working from 7 AM until 11 PM, and 
continued that level of commitment for some time afterwards. Even after she got better at 
managing her time, the work still got in the way of other parts of life:  
Rebecca (quit Global before the bankruptcy): Forget finding a husband. that was 
definitely not going to happen. That was so not part of the equation....I got 
married at 39. I was like an old fart. I was the Last of The Mohicans. [As an 
analyst] I was on the road four days a week. The pace was brutal.... I don't know 
how you can be working 80 or 90 hours a week and have a relationship. At least 
for me, I couldn't do it. I know there are people who do it, not me. I have to say, 
when I left [investment banking] my relationship with my husband improved. It 
wasn't like I was waiting on him hand and foot, but we just had more time for 
each other, and I wasn't exhausted all the time. [While working in banking] I'd be 
cranky. I'd be exhausted. I wanted to sleep. Anyway, my relationship definitely 
improved when I was able to slow down a little bit, [and] smell the roses.” 
For Rebecca and others, time management skills learned as a junior associate made the 
work more manageable, but only as a matter of degree.  Even though all bankers 
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experienced the burdens of an overwhelming workload, a few respondents noted the 
special burden that the banking lifestyle placed upon women.  
Adam (Interned at Global just before the bankruptcy): I guess it was disheartening 
to see the disparate experience between men and women in banking. There’s only 
one managing director I knew of that was a woman. And, she did not have any 
kids, no family, kind of like work is her life, and it was a weird dynamic to think 
that that it was a ceiling. It’s just that women have to decide about having families 
or not, and guys aren’t expected to have to make that choice between family and a 
career.  
It isn’t just life outside of the firm that is disrupted by the work intensity, it is life within 
the firm as well. Socialization is impossible when there isn’t enough slack (Hirschman 
1970) for interpersonal exchange. 
George (a former consultant was laid off by Global): The thing with the trading 
floor… it was awkward at times. Because you would meet someone, let's say, out 
for a drink, and you'd bump into someone that you see on the trading floor, and 
you don't even know his name. And you're looking at this guy's face for three 
hours a day. [laughs]…. You sit at the same place all the time. You have your 
own desk. It's an open plan office, and, from the moment you go 'til the moment 
you leave you just work. You don't stand up and walk around, do lunches, and get 
coffees. So, immediately, that means that you know the people that you work 
with, and, apart from that, it's very hard to meet other people. 
The intensity of work becomes an issue in each of the three key norms identified as 
reasons for leaving the industry. An overwhelming workload is linked with the incentives 
of the organization and with the manifest incivility within the workplace (see below), and 
all three are related to employees leaving the industry. 
Some of those who leave the industry are driven by a moment of catharsis in the 
wake of failure. Being laid off forces some former employees to reevaluate their careers 
and to chart a new course. George had a background in management consulting, but he 
sought an MBA in order to move into finance. After completing an MBA, he got a job at 
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Global at a trading desk, and when Global collapsed he decided to change his industry 
and location in search of a different life:  
George: I decided that I was going to move somewhere - first of all, I was 
thinking about changing industry and going back to consulting. And, also, I 
wanted to move somewhere in a country or a city where people may not earn as 
much, but the work-life balance was much better. So it was more like - in order to 
take perspective on how you're doing in life, you know, you have to take a step 
back and see if things are going well, if things are not going so well, and, actually, 
what's truly important to you, because it was a good opportunity to start from 
scratch. [if I hadn’t been laid off] I think I wouldn't have realized all the negative 
aspects as easily as I did - as clearly as I did - after the collapse of Global. It's the 
same thing as - when you work within a group of people, you tend to lose context 
after a while. So, I think the more I stayed at Global, the more likely it would be 
that I would stay in Global for the long term - or in the industry for the long term. 
So, I decided I would move to [another country], and I would go back to 
consulting or private equity. Because I have more experience there, making it 
easier for me to find a job - and, also, I started to appreciate things in consulting 
that I didn't appreciate before, having worked in another industry. 
The abruptness of the transition from the failed firm serves as inspiration for post-failure 
career changes.  
Though the work in banking requires long hours, the effort is often undertaken on 
a relatively short-term basis. Many junior employees do not intend to stay in investment 
banks beyond a few years of training. They wish to pay their dues and learn the ropes 
before moving to other firms that will value their experience highly, but will have more 
reasonable expectations. 
When asked what they took away from banks, former bankers asserted work ethic 
as a key part of their occupational inheritance. As one former banker explains: 
Rob (laid off by Global, moved to a job in environmental engineering): I’ve 
noticed that I have a willingness to work a little bit harder and stay a little bit 
longer than some of the other people…. In terms of the other lower level people 
that I work with, I guess I definitely see that my work ethic and my willingness to 
help on other projects is definitely a little bit higher. I guess what I like about 
[working in an engineering firm] is that people are more willing to just hang out 
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and talk to you and see how your weekend was and things like that, whereas at 
Global Investment I did that with my friends in my analyst class, but the kind of 
people that I worked with and the people above me, every morning you came in, 
you sat down, you got started working…. We talked a little bit, but not that much, 
which maybe would have come over time, but it really didn't feel like a very nice 
working environment.  
Other respondents echoed Rob’s sentiments, saying that they work harder than their non-
banking peers, and that they feel comfortable doing so because they learned to work even 
harder at a bank.  
Work ethic provides an interesting example of the social and individual process 
through which occupational norms become habituated and internalized. When junior 
associates join banks, they have already been made aware of the level of commitment 
involved, and they make all of their friends and families aware as well. Others may not 
understand, or may even object to how much bankers are made to work, but the 
egocentric network of the banker necessarily adjusts their expectations and comes to 
realize how fickle the banker’s availability will be. A last-minute request from a manager 
can keep a junior associate working past midnight, and the associate’s friends learn to 
expect this. Those friendships that are founded upon an expectation of availability and 
following through on commitments are unlikely to survive, and the remaining friends are 
the ones who accept the terms of that person’s occupational commitments. Thus, when 
we say that a banker has “internalized” a work ethic, the process is not purely 
individualistic. The banker’s work ethic depends upon the patience of his or her peers, 
upon choosing to live close enough to work to be available for a job, and upon the other 
commitments that she may have limited outside of work. It is an ongoing process of 
socialization that is maintained through interactions with others whose expectations must 
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be established and maintained. The process of internalization, as conceived here, is akin 
to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Bourdieu describes habitus as, “systems of durable, 
transposable dispositions… the strategy-generating principle enabling agents to cope with 
unforeseen and ever-changing situations. [Habitus is] determined by the past 
conditions… the actual outcome of identical or interchangeable past practices” (Bourdieu 
1977: 52-53). This project seeks transposable dispositions from failed firms and does so 
through the concepts of norms and routines.  
Work ethic is one such transposable disposition. The organizational context 
sufficiently occupies a person’s time and attention to impose a work-dominated “ethic.” 
This dominance can displace pursuits that would otherwise vie for an employee’s 
attention. Among the former bankers whom I interviewed, banking was replaced by a 
new focused activity rather than a diversity of pursuits. An actor and a musician both 
believed that their single-mindedness distinguished them from their competitors. 
Careerist banking transferred to careerist art through a dispositional intensity. While it 
may not be possible to conclusively reject the alternative explanation that individual 
characteristics determine work ethic that is then selected by banks through hiring 
practices, it is clear that former bankers view their work ethic as portable and a byproduct 
of career experience. Most can imagine an alternative career path that would not have 
taught the lessons of diligence learned in banks. Though these individuals attended 
competitive colleges and have been working hard throughout their lives, banking seems 
to take this to a new level with lasting effects. So, while reasons to leave banking include 
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the time commitment to work, work ethic is also a durable byproduct of banking 
experience, imprinted on the behavior of the former banker. 
Why Bother? Meaning, Money, and Motivation  
Investment bankers tend to be highly compensated for the work that they do, 
though many do not feel highly compensated because their social comparisons are 
focused on other bankers, a point that is sometimes acknowledged: 
Rebecca: They weren't paying me a lot of money, relatively. I mean saying that 
about Wall Street these days, somebody on Main Street is going to come skewer 
me. But they weren't paying me a lot of money.  
The real issue with money isn’t the cash value itself, but the relative status and respect of 
the positions that are associated with making more money. When Rebecca became 
frustrated that Global was not finding her a position that would respect her experience in 
the industry, she added an explicit criterion that unless they found her a position that paid 
more than a certain dollar amount, she would quit, which she eventually did: 
Rebecca: It was really about being stimulated and interested in what I was doing. 
But to explain, the reason I put those criteria out there was not because I wanted 
to make more money, I mean sure, I'll make more money, I'm happy to, no one 
works on Wall Street for their health. It was really to make people say, ‘Oh, okay, 
we can't be thinking about her at this level, we've got to be thinking about her at a 
much higher level.’ But it was not because I need to get paid more. 
So, compensation, status, and job tasks are tightly intertwined. That can make it difficult 
for outsiders like Rebecca to make inroads later in their careers, and Global Investment 
career trajectories are often described as “up or out” where the hierarchy is filled with the 
exceptions, the people who stayed more than a few years.  
 Among junior employees at banks, money is also a criterion, but the symbolic 
meaning of the job remains important.  
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Adam: I can tell that investment banking for [some people] didn’t really juice 
them that much, but they were doing it because there is a pressure at the ivy 
leagues for status. If you’re in investment banking it is like going to an ivy-league 
school. You don’t have to explain yourself. “What do you do? You’re an 
investment banker? Oh, okay.” [From the job] I assume you are a successful 
person, [that] you’re going to have a great life. People get used to that once you 
go [to a] better-rated school…. People don’t know at 22 what they really want to 
do. They do know that consulting and investment banking are very high-paying 
jobs. They are stressful, but you’re given a lot of responsibility quickly, and you 
really got to fight for yourself. It’s competitive.  
In Adam’s explanation we can see the same logic that leads high school graduates to U.S. 
News and World Report seeking the highest status school where they can gain admission. 
The logic is recycled in later career decisions as a “strategy-generating principle” in 
Bourdieu’s words. This is the habitus of an educated elite whose human capital must be 
retested and proven throughout their early careers. 
The norms of compensation, competition, and job mobility are tightly coupled 
and extremely salient within the two banks studied. And some participants found these 
motivational norms to be explicit and destructive to other interests within the firm: 
George: It's very clear. People at Global were trying to make money, and that's 
the goal. There's no other. I don't really see any other. [The goal] was not to 
change the world. It was not Schumpetarian efficiency, or whichever economist it 
was. Anyway, it was not like the view that says that the capitalist allocates capital 
more efficiently in the economy and drives the world forward at all. They were in 
it for the money, and that's it. And, also, you could see that, in terms of loyalty to 
the employer, that was very, very low. And that was something that shocked me, 
when I first started looking into sales and trading. [I] would go to recruiting and 
guys would take [me] on the side and say, “Okay, listen. Dude, I know you're a 
great guy and I like you. So, let me be honest with you: working on the trading 
floor is like working for a sports team. I mean, you just go to whoever pays the 
highest price. And don't think about loyalty because you're gonna get screwed.” I 
mean, these were their exact words. And they came from the mouths of so many 
people, in so many different banks, including Global.  
[In consulting firms] yes, of course, you know, people are very money driven. 
You work late hours, and you do want to get compensated for that. But… people 
[in consulting] want to change the way business is done. And, as idealistic as this 
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may sound, there's still some people out there that do want to change businesses 
and move businesses forward, and make them run better. They do get a kick out 
of it. And seeing people at [my consulting firm] - this is not necessarily the best 
example, because it's known for its strong culture - but I've seen people here that, 
they absolutely adore the company. Something I didn't see at Global. I mean, 
here, there are people who actually love [the firm].  
Part of George’s criticism derives from considerations of organizational culture and 
loyalty, which he finds sorely lacking in the industry. But nested within this complaint is 
a concern about the meaning of the work itself. He explains this further: 
George: [In banking] you're dealing with numbers all the time. There's no tangible 
context. It removes you from the whole process, so, basically, you don't know 
exactly what you're doing. It can't give the sense of purpose that you have in 
consulting - where you go into a company, and you try to change the company. 
[At Global] I was just seeing loads of zeroes in front of me in the computer, and I 
was just trying to make some money. Now, whether this was good or not - 
whether this was for a pension fund, or a hedge fund - didn't really matter to me. 
It didn't really matter to people. It was all about a target. [You] want to hit that 
target, and you just do whatever you can. 
The construal of meaning is a complex social process that is generally underemphasized 
within banks because the income levels generated afford banks the luxury of ignoring 
other considerations. Rather than focusing on some general social value or worth of 
work, banks are often able to define very specific contribution-driven compensation 
schemes. 
Bank compensation tends to be performance driven, and bonuses comprise a 
significant portion of annual incomes. Because of this, bankers time their career 
transitions and job mobility with bonus schedules. Post-bonus departures are one of many 
signals that demonstrate the priorities of investment bankers in how they choose where to 
work (as George’s informants explained, “switching teams.”). Decisions are not without 
tradeoffs, but the level of compensation is a significant factor in mobility decisions.  
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Most occupational settings present a complex motivational structure. Newspapers, 
for instance, reward their journalists with compensation, the industry rewards journalists 
with awards, the readers reward journalists with positive feedback and gratitude, and 
many journalists find intrinsic motivation in the tasks of researching and writing. 
Investment banking motivations are similarly complex. The value proposition for 
working in an investment bank as a junior analyst or in a similarly subordinate position is 
transitional. People are in banks in order to have been in banks. They know that 
employers will value the experience and that two years at an investment bank will open 
doors to many other opportunities within the financial services industry and elsewhere. 
The careerist motives of junior employees provide a very important labor input in larger 
banks, and connections elsewhere in the industry after the junior employees move on. 
These motives also shape the demographics of investment banks, which tend to have a 
disproportionate mass of young and prestigiously educated employees.  
The relatively negative accounts of the culture of investment banks are tempered 
by the accounts of people who have spent significant portions of their careers within the 
industry. Among the five interviewees whose careers spanned more than five years 
within investment banking and analysis, all five of them were relatively positive about 
the industry as a whole. All five raised specific issues with their former employers, with 
varying degrees of frustration.  
There are intrinsic motives for banking: many bankers find their colleagues to be 
smart and find the work to be challenging with real stakes and immediate verifiable 
results. Particularly in trading and analysis, performance can be measured relatively 
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quickly based upon results. Of course, performance cannot, in fact, be quickly measured, 
as will be discussed below. A classic problem in investment is the delayed nature of 
realizing underperformance. The same strategy may appear to make money for years and 
then may lose money in equal or greater measure. It is very difficult to differentiate 
between skillful investment and dumb luck, but investment managers are often in denial 
of the luck involved in their own success (Tyszka and Zielonka 2002). Though chance 
determines many “successes” in finance, the objective nature of the successes make 
extrinsic motivations seem more meaningful and less political.  
The work is important. By finding ways to provide capital to firms, investment 
banks make it possible for companies to grow and to develop over time. Investment 
bankers get to influence these outcomes. However, it is sometimes hard to notice the 
whispers of intrinsic motives amidst the vociferous attention to extrinsic motivation in the 
form of compensation. A substantial body of research in social psychology observes that 
extrinsic motivations tend to drown out intrinsic motivations (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 
1999), and this is almost certainly the case in investment banks. Compensation was an 
important point in every interview I conducted, though the interview questions focused 
upon norms in banking without reference to motivation or compensation.  
Having given some of the strongest explanatory narratives that I can discern for 
why banking is worthwhile, these factors are not sufficient to overcome the social 
understanding of banking. The bankers whom I interviewed had mixed experiences, and 
some raised significant doubts about whether the work that they were doing at the bank 
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was worthwhile or meaningful. For them, one of the best reasons to quit banking is to do 
something else.  
The experience of meaning in work illustrates the deeply subjective nature of 
meaning construction. Objectively, investment banking jobs have nearly all of the criteria 
articulated by normative theorists in defense of meaningful work (1998). Bowie lists six 
characteristics of meaningful work: 
1. Meaningful work is work that is freely entered into. 
2. Meaningful work allows the worker to exercise her autonomy and independence.  
3. Meaningful work enables the worker to develop her rational capacities. 
4. Meaningful work provides a wage sufficient for physical welfare.  
5. Meaningful work supports the moral development of employees. 
6. Meaningful work is not paternalistic in the sense of interfering with the workers’ 
conception of how she wishes to obtain happiness (Bowie, 1998: 1083).  
Of these, the first, third, and fourth criteria are certainly fulfilled through work in 
investment banking. Whether investment banking allows autonomous action, moral 
development, and freedom to conceive of happiness without interference is less clear, but 
any restrictions of these sorts are implicit rather than explicit within the normative 
structure of banking organizations. And if investment banks fail to encourage a critical 
inquiry within the nature of the work itself, they share this characteristic with many other 
organizations.  
What is interesting, however, is that banks do not strongly emphasize the sense of 
meaning that is implicit within the work that banks do. Investment banks have not 
constructed a narrative of meaning for their employees, as providers of “dirty work” have 
been shown to do (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). It seems plausible that the levels of 
compensation and occupational status create a morally stunted sense of worth in the 
investment banking organization and its employees. Emergent stigma associated with 
 157 
banks and their behavior may yet produce more elaborate defensive narratives and 
processes of organizational reflection, but these remain underdeveloped. It might also be 
that transience and wealth generation create surface narratives that are sufficiently salient 
to marginalize deeper questions of worth and value. 
 Some of the construction of meaning can happen post-mortem, after the firm fails. 
And this process is a significant consideration for many survivors of organizational 
failure. George’s catharsis provides an example of one post-mortem sensemaking project 
that ended with a negative evaluation of the larger organization and its objectives.  
What can be most difficult amidst cataclysmic failure is the sudden loss of 
meaning where uncertainty overtakes standard operating procedures. As Weick describes: 
People... act as if events cohere in time and space and that change unfolds in an 
orderly manner. These everyday cosmologies are subject to disruption, and when 
they are severely disrupted... a cosmology episode occurs.... People suddenly and 
deeply feel that the universe is no longer a rational, orderly system. What makes 
such an episode so shattering is that both the sense of what is occurring and the 
means to rebuild that sense collapse together. (Weick 1993: 633) 
This collapse is particularly salient when it occurs amidst sudden trauma and 
overwhelming circumstances, as in Weick’s example of the Mann Gulch fire of 1949. 
However, even a drawn-out process of failure and reconstruction can result in a sense of 
overwhelming disorder. The experience of loss and disorientation seems to differ by 
position within the hierarchy. George summarizes the experiences of junior bankers: 
We had a very close-knit group of people that - we did our internships [as MBA 
students] in summer of 2006, and then we all joined. And, basically, everyone has 
moved on. So no one has stayed in parts of Global that are owned by Walls 
Investment or Open Investment. They've gone to other places. And we have kept 
in touch. And for some people it was actually a traumatic experience, the whole 
downfall. There were people that had serious problems, and they went through 
hard periods of depression. So, it was great to stay in touch with these people and 
try to support each other. And also, you know, just try to think back and have a 
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laugh sometimes at the frivolity of it all - the times we experienced. 
      [Among] junior people in my situation… it's mostly the fact that you lose your 
employment, and your future prospects are not looking very great…. They needed 
people that they were important to, not really for the failure if Global, but how 
they dealt with the aftermath of the failure.  
      Some people made quick moves, so they just grabbed ahold, took it to another 
bank. Some of us didn't. Or some people grabbed it and took it to another awful 
place, like a brokerage house, and they gathered. But I don't think we were 
thinking about, on a big, broad level, why Global collapsed. I think, on the 
associate level, because, you know, [Global was] mostly screwing them out of a 
job. I'm sorry for the language there. You don't have any experience in - most 
people didn't have extensive experience in finance. So, you're basically going out 
there with people with many more years of experience, and you're, like, a junior 
guy, straight out of an MBA - and pretty expensive for people to hire - so, you 
know, the key thing is actually trying to get a job immediately. And, if you're so 
depressed, you blame the people that you worked for directly - not at the level of 
[the CEO].  
      Now, some people had big problems realizing that they were without a job, 
because of how the whole system works. Going to work you're told, on a daily 
basis, how great you are. And then, suddenly, you don't have a job, and that sucks. 
And some people had real issues dealing with that. You could blame [the CEO]. 
You can blame the equity derivative guys. You can blame the fixed income 
derivative guys. But, at the end of the day, you are not getting paid so much 
money just because you're handsome or beautiful. You're getting so much money, 
because there's a certain risk that you're going to lose your job at some point. 
Some people realized that and moved on. Some others didn't…. If I think about it, 
it's not something that is so relevant to me, because it's not something that I did 
wrong. I'm going to learn from their mistakes, [but] I don't think I'm ever going to 
be in the position to run a bank, and then think about [whether to issue] mortgage 
backed securities or not. Certain things I took away, but I didn't think about it that 
much. 
What research that exists on post failure organizing (Walsh and Bartunek In Press) is 
heavily oriented toward the affective processes of coping and sensemaking. Among the 
careerists and pragmatists of investment banks, the community-centered narrative of 
post-failure organizing seems inappropriate. These firms individuate into clusters that are 
held together by bonds formed within the firm, but lack the wherewithal to do more than 
find jobs within the industry. For these junior people, the organizational identity is 
unimportant, and the death of the firm is better understood as the death of a job and a 
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significant career risk. George rationalizes this through one of the basic lessons of 
business school, that people make tradeoffs between risk and reward, and that highly 
compensated people must be taking risks in order to earn their reward. Others have 
different ways to make sense of the system and its logic. But, at the junior level the 
system and larger organizational processes are only evaluated in terms of their impact 
upon the individual person and his or her experience of the larger entity. 
In the case of newspaper failures, that disorder manifests as a career disorientation 
in which individuals are at a loss in the quest for a purposive organizational role. 
However, investment bank roles did not inspire a sense of purpose, particularly among 
junior associates. For them, the purpose of the role was career advancement that they 
sought outside of the organization, so the more salient questions pertained not to the 
broader purpose of the organizations, but the narrow usefulness of time within the 
organization for the individual’s career plans. The cosmology episode (Weick 1993: 633) 
was not the insolvency of banks and their financial misrepresentations, it was the narrow 
uncertainty about whether the personal abuse that they were experiencing would offer the 
rewards that justify the discomfort. 
 In contrast to this, more senior people struggle much more with the entity and its 
meaning. A senior Global Investment employee explains her experience talking to those 
who have survived the Global collapse and continue to work together: 
People lost a great deal of money, they were hurt personally, they lost clients, and 
collective reputation. So, it was real and palpable. To say, it is in your head would 
be ridiculous. I wanted to make sure that people understood that I understood that 
it was real. There was a bit of venting, and I was not offended by that. It is like the 
stages of grief. The first stage is, “I am mad as hell.” Those who suffered personal 
financial repercussions are mad as hell that management allowed it to happen, that 
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government, or that mainstream allowed it to happen. I think that the 
characterization of this as an elite problem serves this country poorly. So for the 
managers, that is a loss of good will that was established by the “integration” of 
Walls Investment with Global Investment. I should say that the broker-dealers 
were never integrated, but the organizations were merged. So the loss of good will 
is a natural consequence of the anger. With two or three more books on this, we'll 
get past the anger and get to the reconciliation phase of grief and loss. I miss my 
team terribly. They were all really able professionals, and I miss working with 
them and the give and take with them. I miss the sense of tenure that I had 
personally. I feel a loss for the equity and hard work that I built over the years… I 
worked 70 or 80 hours per week. All of the senior management did. So from a 
personal level, I miss the ability to use my full bandwidth. I had a job that had a 
lot of components to it. I'm happy to be doing a job that is diminished, but is the 
one that I liked the best. If you're going to be working with less, at least it should 
be the less that you like. I'm sure that many people miss not knowing who does 
what. There is a learning curve. Who do you have to go to get a decision? It is all 
time consuming, and it is all nerve wracking. This is how I used to present the 
issues that would lead one to make a decision, and the new one wants it presented 
a different way.  
      Change is debilitating. We've all internalized that change is renewal, that it is 
liberating, but it can be debilitating because you have to start everything new. 
You used to know who was in the elevator, and how to say hello to them, to ask 
about their children, and their partners, and their parents. It can be debilitating. 
Everyone who has moved away has to embrace this. And many colleagues are 
still having a great deal of trouble getting jobs, and that is disconcerting to people 
who felt responsible for others' careers and their well being. All of it is jarring to 
say the least. It is a sort of tsunami. A whole community was hit by a 300 foot 
wall of water while sun bathing on the beach. I believe that the whole industry is 
going to reinvent itself, and that the big have consolidated to make room for the 
little. There is going to be a whole new generation of, depending on what the 
government does, niche growing to bigger.  
      Over the course of my career people have said to me, “Why don't you go into 
business for yourself” And, I would think to myself, well, the day before 
yesterday we had a problem in the middle of the night, and we had someone who 
solved that problem before everyone else woke up in the morning. When there is 
a powerful and resource filled institution, it is indeed a powerful thing. Why is 
that necessary? Because I believe that the required pace of business fostered by 
technology, is almost spinning out of control, out of the capability of the small, 
unless we hit the pause button. Years ago someone wrote a piece in the NYT 
about “The End of Deliberate Thought.” about the fax machine. The fax machine 
itself says, “Hurry up.” That was 20 years ago. Now think about it. The need to 
have these massive resources is going to keep the small from flourishing. The 
administration says that the engine of our economy is the small businessman, but 
that is delusional. There is no way for them to compete.  
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      The other thing that has not been addressed in any of this post-mortem, is the 
role of government in causing this calamity. The government pushes home 
ownership. The consequence has been the absence of regulation. If you really 
want to go back to the step off the curb, you would say it is the assertion of home 
ownership as an inalienable right. We're all phobic about inflation, but there is 
inflation. This is a diatribe, but not a political one. Also, as a personal prerogative 
and someone who is on her feet and shouldn't be complaining at all, the moral 
imperative of letting some firms fail while others get billions. It is hard to get past 
the anger phase. 40,000. I think that they should have rescued everyone. They 
should have sequestered the toxic assets, and the government should have taken 
responsibility for allowing them to be created. The politics trumpeted rational 
thinking. One would hope that in a country this strong that rational thinking could 
be relied upon.  
This senior-level narrative demonstrates a very different perspective on the organization. 
First, from the senior-level an organization that appears anti-social, overly work-focused, 
and entirely lacking on collegiality from underneath is transformed into a much different 
scene. Temporary ties are replaced with enduring professional relationships, norms of 
stewardship supplant norms of competition, and a very different organization emerges. 
Likewise, the post-failure rationalization is much more developed and demonstrates a 
much more significant sense of the organization itself as a thing of value to be lost. 
Whereas the junior employees lost a job, the senior employees lost an organization.  
 The use of these relatively long quotes illustrates the extended nature of the 
analysis being undertaken by employees in the post-failure perspective. Asking any 
employee to explain what was lost when a firm fails leads down one of these two paths, 
and the path seems to be determined by tenure. The narratives also illustrate the 
contrasting motivations and sense of meaning that employees at different levels find in 
the organization. Senior employees, who find more meaning in the work that they do for 
investment banks, have much more at stake in the organization’s post-failure life. Junior 
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employees are more focused on the precariousness of their place within the organization 
and the industry. 
Incivility at Work 
When asked about the norms of investment banks, many bankers describe a 
counterproductive competitiveness that undermines relationships and collaboration. They 
find little help from their peers and even less from their managers. Spun favorably, the 
environment encourages autonomy and personal responsibility:  
Rob: You have to put in your hours, people expect you to do the work and do it 
right the first time. I guess I learned a little bit about how to work in the real 
working world. Your boss doesn't want to see stupid mistakes. He doesn't care if 
you don't know the methodology at first, especially when you're entry level, but 
they care when you make dumb errors in an Excel formula or something like that. 
That just shows carelessness. I also learned that if you don't now how to do 
something, you don't go ask your boss the first time. You know what the problem 
is, maybe you want to try to come up with a solution yourself, so you go to your 
boss with a problem and solution as opposed to just a problem and he has to try to 
figure it out on the spot. 
Junior employees learn to answer their own questions before asking for help, even if 
someone else could easily answer the question, they learn to figure things out 
independently and to not burden others unless they have to do so. 
However, the unfavorable interpretation of workplace incivility is that it breeds a 
dysfunctional organizational culture that lacks accountability, honesty, and non-
instrumental interpersonal connections. In a cutthroat corporate culture where the norm is 
self-promotion rather than acknowledgement of one’s peers, there is simply less praise to 
go around, resulting in further erosion of the intrinsic motivations involved in 
occupational achievement.  
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Incivility and disrespect were central to respondent explanations of departures 
from investment banks. This is particularly the case with George, Rob, and Victor. 
George and Rob expressed distaste at the experience of working with people at Global, 
and were pushed out of the industry by this distaste, among other factors. Victor’s 
situation was different. He explains: 
Victor: So, one thing I actually should say is that I actually really liked Global and 
I would think that most of the people that worked there would really like it…. I 
think it had a very kind of unique culture and… it was a place that I was just 
proud to work. And, I would actually-I have a lot of good things to say. I was very 
sad like on a personal level when Global failed. Because, for one-yeah, it sucked 
that the Bank failed, but I just had so many friends. And I just knew so many 
good people at Global, it was just like man,… what are these people going do? 
These are quality people and people that I liked. So, that was tough. And… I 
know for a fact that… the folks from Global that went to Adant, and the folks 
who are now at Walls [that] there is definitely like a clash of cultures there. 
 In terms of me specifically, I actually found [my new employer] to be, 
even though I really liked Global, to be refreshing. And, one of the reasons is 
everyone is so nice. It’s not like at Global, people weren’t nice. It’s just like [here] 
they both hire specific people. And, they place an emphasis on their culture-and, 
it’s basically nice people. And, they’re trying to hire other nice people. So, I really 
like that part of it. And I think actually-I think I fit in well, because I think I am 
pretty nice and-you know, I don’t know-I’m-I’m definitely, I’m comfortable with 
that.  
Whereas others were pushed from the organization by its anti-social norms, Victor was 
pulled by more positive norms that existed elsewhere.  He believed that these norms 
originated in selection criteria employed by the firm, which Sutton calls a “no asshole 
rule” (2007).  
 George’s transition went the opposite direction from Victor’s. Whereas Victor 
was refreshed, George was shocked by the culture at Global.  
George: Talking to people from consulting [after being laid off] made me realize 
how more cerebral they are, and how much nicer it is to work with them because 
they tend to be more respectful and more socially savvy than people on the 
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trading floor. [At Global] when you would come in in the morning, there were 
three people I was working very close with. One of them well known to be an 
awful person. I mean, he's the kind of guy that would walk in and you would say, 
“Good morning, how are you?” and [he would say] “Bye.” Or, you know, you 
would talk to him and would be dismissed, he'd just make a face and start looking 
away. Or, another guy would be really aggressive when he talked to clients, and 
he would really tell people off.  
Incivility occurs in many settings, and it should not have surprised George to find that 
people whose job requires them to persuade people to make changes that are difficult to 
make would behave with more social grace than people who stare at trading monitors for 
a living, but there are organizations that seem to encourage a more collegial atmosphere. 
Capital, for instance, is said to have achieved this in many work groups, whereas positive, 
collaborate experiences seem to have been the exception at Global rather than the rule.  
Not surprisingly, those who stayed longer provided more positive accounts of the 
organization and its ethos of interpersonal conduct. Some of these narratives directly 
contradict one another. One person says that Global Investment is an organization that 
cares about its employees; another says that it is not. One says that Global Investment is a 
place where a person can get help when he or she needs it; another says that people hoard 
knowledge and feel put-upon when colleagues ask for help. In any large organization 
there will be variation between and within departments that makes individual experiences 
very different. One manager may treat her subordinates well and another may not. 
However, these experiences are often attributed to the firm itself, and are thus 
motivations for leaving the firm and/or industry rather than transferring internally.  
At the very least, it is clear from many accounts that Global employees were very 
focused on their work. As Rob explains: 
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I guess everyone was just very focused on the job they had to do, you could also 
tell, obviously, people were focused on moving up the hierarchy, and how they 
appeared to their superiors. Obviously, when you're dealing with tens of millions 
of dollars, people get a little pissed off if you make mistakes, things of that nature. 
I never got chewed out or yelled at or anything like that, but I saw it happen, and I 
saw people get angry and slam phones when they made bad trades.... I'm a more 
laid back person than that, so it didn't fit in with my personality.  
Given a salient (if controversial) observation of incivility in the workplace as perceived 
by employees who chose to leave the firm for a “nicer” setting, it seems likely that the 
departure of the employees would reinforce the stable organizational norms. 
Organizational failure, however, can interrupt this process in two key respects. First, 
organizational failure may drive people out of the industry who have a higher tolerance 
for incivility or have not experienced it because of good fortune in their colleagues. 
Second, organizational failure may lead individuals to a moment of pronounced self-
examination that identifies conflicts that would have otherwise been subsumed into the 
daily grind of work responsibilities, like George’s catharsis as described above. 
 This section provided two examples of norms that are carried through careers 
despite organizational transitions: work ethic and a careerist quest for organizational 
status affiliations. These are each described as components of the habitus of investment 
banking. Though motivational norms drive employees away from banking, this form of 
exit provides little or no evidence that the norms of banking are changing. If anything, the 
analysis demonstrates the durability of norms within the industry. It would be interesting 
to know whether former bankers are viewed as abrupt and uncivil in their subsequent 
work contexts. Though one might posit that incivility would be likely to transfer from 
these firms, confirmation would require rather frank interviews with the peers of 
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survivors at the firms that hire them. That information is beyond the scope of the 
available data. 
 This first section gave a sense of the norms within investment banking and how 
they fit into career trajectories. This relationship between norm and career is very much 
opposite the relationship observed in newspapers. Norms hold papers together but drive 
banks apart, at least among junior bankers. The next section considers routines that 
survive organizational failure and the process involved in their preservation.  
Routines That Survived 
Among investment bankers who stay in the industry, and even among those who 
do not, key operational processes persist. There are many obvious ways in which the 
work continues to be similar. Specialists who know about an industry, a financial 
instrument, or a regulatory environment often continue to work within the same domain. 
Thus their information comes from the same sources, many of their contacts continue to 
be viable in pursuit of the same business objectives. This section illustrates continuity in 
three organizational routines: financial modeling, the gloss, and the use of collaborative 
philanthropy to build a CSR movement within a firm. All three of these routines are low-
volatility routines. They do not require much energy to retain process knowledge amidst 
complex interactions. 
Financial Modeling 
The first investment bank example of a persistent routine is the use of financial 
models. I find that models continue to be routinely used before and after transfer, and that 
skepticism about the interpretations of such models is also carried among their users. 
 167 
Quantitative approaches to investment have become an important part of banking. Junior 
associates receive crash courses in the standard program for financial modeling, 
Microsoft Excel. Then they are asked to put together models that indicate what assets are 
worth and to update these models repeatedly in the preparation for presentations to 
clients. Traders likewise use models in different ways depending on the assets that they 
are trading. Models need not be mathematically complex. For instance, one desk at 
Global Investment traded on the gap between the prices for acquiring firm and target firm 
stocks after mergers and acquisitions were announced using very simple models based 
upon the time value of money. Whatever their complexity, quantitative approaches to 
investment created a technical basis for measuring asset prices that traders widely utilize. 
The emergence and acceptance of these models despite their empirical shortcomings has 
become a subject of some fascination to researchers of social finance (MacKenzie 2006), 
particularly because the setting offers an important demonstration of the concept of 
performativity. Like Merton’s notion of the self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton 1936), 
researchers argue that the economy has adjusted its valuations according to academic 
models. 
The entire enterprise has created a strange ritual around the use of quantitative 
data in the financial services industry. On the one hand, modeling is indispensable and it 
contributes one of the few competencies in finance that distinguishes the field from other 
specialized fields that concern themselves with investment. On the other hand, models are 
widely dismissed by those who use them most often, and their results are questioned. The 
contradiction is striking. It is not unusual that a field would utilize an epistemological 
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paradigm for some period of time and then eventually discard it once the field learns that 
the results of the paradigm are not providing truthful propositions as intended. The 
history of science is littered with discarded epistemologies like alchemy, phrenology, and 
the reading of entrails. What is interesting in finance is that despite catastrophic failures 
in quantitative valuation using models that purportedly “measure” risk (Cook and 
Whitmeyer 1992; Taleb 2007), there is little indication that the paradigm has been or will 
soon be overturned. And while there is evidence that stock prices are not entirely random 
(Lo and MacKinlay 1999), it does not follow that the models utilized by junior analysts in 
Excel spreadsheets or the models of more serious “quants” offer sufficient certainty to 
move beyond the randomness critique of investment prediction. 
Yet, insofar as Wall Street values certain models, their value is worthy of note 
within firms. The performativity of modeling may be carried to new extremes within 
firms that wish to take the perceptions of capital seriously. Roger was hired by a tech 
firm to help determine compensation. Their goal, in hiring a former Global employee, 
was to reward employees as the stock market would for innovative activity within the 
firm. Insofar as Roger accounts for basic parameters in their risk/reward benefits like cost 
of capital and growth opportunities, he is shepherding financial models into HR functions 
even further beyond their once domain-specific academic scope. 
The topic of how financial models are sustained despite their frequent 
disappointments is worthy of a general analysis that this project and its sample cannot 
provide. Financial models are taught in business schools at the undergraduate and 
graduate levels, and junior associates are required to learn financial models regardless of 
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their educational backgrounds. At the same time, they learn to doubt the models, and to 
call their results into question. Among survivors of organizational failure, models and 
skepticism about them came up in two ways. First, survivors claim to have been 
inoculated against the influence of models. One respondent said that he distrusts the 
reports produced by banks like the one that used to employ him, and would rather read an 
SEC filing to get a real sense of an asset. Second, models come up as false hopes of a 
rigorous career. Two respondents said that they had come to investment for its 
quantitative aspects and left for the same reason. So, while financial models continue to 
be used by survivors of failed investment banks, the use comes with an increased 
skepticism. The skepticism extends to much of the work that banks do.  
Though modeling and its skepticism proved to be persistent within the 
occupations of bankers who survived failure, these routines are likely to be widely 
distributed in the financial services industry. The more stringent proof of post-failure 
continuity requires a demonstration of continuity in idiosyncratic organizational routines. 
We need to demonstrate that the quirky aspects of a firm persist in the careers of its 
employees after the firm has been destroyed. To this end, I describe two routines of 
Global Investment, account for them as idiosyncratic to Global, and then document their 
transfer. 
The Gloss 
Appearance mattered at Global Investment. Rebecca had worked in equity 
research at another firm for over a decade, and subsequently left the industry. She was 
brought back into the firm through a special HR program at Global that was meant to 
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recruit women who had left Wall Street. On Rebecca’s account, Global Investment had 
very strong norms about keeping up appearances. Rebecca quoted another late-career 
transplant into the firm who said, “It seems like this organization is all about the gloss, all 
about how everything appears to the outside.” I use this term “gloss” in reference to the 
attention to surface details and formality in presentation. Adam paraphrased his manager 
saying, “You can’t always be right, but you can always look like you’re right.” 
Global was a place where a person wears a suit every day, where PowerPoint 
presentations were meticulously and artfully constructed to create an aura of deliberate 
professionalism, and where feedback from superiors was as likely to focus on form as 
substance. Though Rebecca was the only study participant who mentioned Global’s 
emphasis upon the superficial as a component of why she left, every other person who I 
interviewed mentioned the gloss, and most argued that the gloss is part of what they took 
away from the place.  
It is perhaps uncharitable to conceive of investment banks as finishing schools for 
a rising business elite, but Global seems to have served precisely this function. Several 
respondents described the use of formatted presentations from Global in subsequent work 
projects at different banks, how they maintained the font and colors though the content 
and firm affiliation had changed. At Global, most correspondence was standardized into 
some document template that was meant to communicate a certain look and feel. Given 
the care taken in the production of these documents, it is not surprising that former 
employees would wish to continue using them. Victor, who worked at Global and then 
moved to the buy side after completing his MBA, describes making a presentation after 
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Global and having a colleague from his firm identify him as a former investment banker 
based upon the way that he put the presentation together, a signal that he was proud to 
have displayed. 
There is a more involved process through which former employees come to 
recycle the aesthetically pleasing document templates from their failed bank. I conceive 
of this process in four steps. 
First, survivors learned at Global Investment that professionalism matters and that 
a key component of professionalism is appearing to be professional. This point of 
departure provides salience to the presentation routines embedded within the technology 
that is likely to increase its chances of survival. I will say more below about the norms of 
self-presentation at Global investment, and how we observe them. Aesthetics were also 
engrained within a set of workplace routines that became automatic to Global-trained 
employees and were exceedingly foreign to those, like Rebecca, who arrived at Global 
from other firms within the industry.  
Second, employees learned a specific practice of using documents designed by 
someone else to look professional. The practice did not require that the employees learn 
to design documents themselves, or obtain sophisticated aesthetic sensibilities in order to 
evaluate what is professional. The training did not offer any of these skills to the trainee. 
Instead, it required the process of rote reproduction of the same aesthetic frame. In 
Goffman’s terms, every strip of activity was translated and rekeyed in a way that was 
intended to be professional (Goffman 1974).  
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Third, when employees left Global Investment, some left of their own volition, 
many served their term and moved on, and many others moved on after the shaky job 
transition once Global went bankrupt. In order to have use of recycled PowerPoint 
presentations, the employees needed to acquire jobs in which these presentations 
mattered. Most did. 
Though the fourth step is not required, it follows from the first and second. 
Because Global Investment employees are taught that aesthetics and professionalism are 
important, they expect to find these priorities intact at other firms. Shortly after being 
hired, two study participants describe asking their colleagues for a standard slide template 
and being surprised to find that no such template has been defined or that what exists is 
mediocre and rarely used. This revealed weak norms around the priority of using the 
templates that were available. So, the former Global Investment employees located 
presentations that they had written at Global and applied the Global Investment template 
to the presentation for the new organization. 
Norms of self-presentation relate to various aspects of life at Global, and 
presentation document reuse is only one of many examples of ways in which former 
Global employees continue to manage impressions in their subsequent work. Former 
Global employees wear suits to auditions where their competitors wear skinny jeans and 
a t-shirt. They begin meetings by stating the purpose of the meeting. They send emails 
thanking people for their time after each meeting. These are norms of self-presentation 
that are durably drilled into Global employees. 
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The use of PowerPoint is a more-interesting topic than it may first appear. As 
with the routine use of financial models, there are those who are highly critical of 
PowerPoint as a means for the presentation of ideas and analysis. Because PowerPoint 
encourages its users to present ideas in hierarchical and summary fashion, it permits its 
readers to quickly skip over content (Tufte 2006). And in the presentation itself, 
PowerPoint enables the presenter to carefully control the flow of ideas in a way that may 
reduce the opportunity for conversation or critical reflection. However, most of the 
organizations where Global alumni work were already using PowerPoint presentations, 
so there is nothing distinct about the limitations of that technology within the aesthetic 
professionalism of Global templates. 
The most troubling burdens of the gloss relate to the loss of content quality and 
the burden of gender. Rebecca had spent most of her career undertaking and marketing 
Wall Street research, and she understood the priority of appearances. However, she had 
serious misgivings about prioritizing a message’s form above its content, as seemed to be 
common practice at Global. She was most disturbed by a manager of junior analysts at 
Global who pushed the analysts to extend themselves on their statements regarding 
equities. This is her description of the behavior and her response: 
Rebecca: I even saw this in my own peon job, listening to [my boss] with some of 
these analysts and trying to shoe-horn them to a message, “well, you're not going 
to get on the morning call unless you can say 'x' about this stock,” and I was 
listening to him say that, and I'd say, “[boss] for you to tell an analyst what they 
should be saying, you don't know their industry, they know their industry.” And 
that drove him wild. He'd say, “Well, it's not going to sell with the sales force, and 
the sales force won't listen to that.” But it was less about “Hey, what you're saying 
is interesting. How do we make it saleable?” It was all about the polish and the 
image and it's got to be a high-powered message at all times. But sometimes 
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information is not so high-powered, it's not so exciting, but it’s relevant. [At 
Global] it’s the form over the function. 
In this paraphrased conversation, Rebecca illustrates the disagreement over a local 
organizational norm regarding the priority of managing “external” perceptions. This was 
apparently a serious concern of Rebecca’s manager, who offered her little or no 
substantive feedback. Rebecca talked about shallow feedback regarding the 
mispronunciation of a name during their morning research webcast. These webcasts, 
what used to be meetings or calls, were broadcast with live video. Rebecca, who is ten 
years senior to her manager, was also criticized for having a button undone on her blouse 
during one of these webcasts, and for “guzzling” a glass of water.  
The burden of professionalism is borne unevenly in a gendered workplace, but it 
is interesting to note that younger employees, even men, are aware of the inequity: 
Adam: [For] guys, there’s a lot of slobs you work with, but they are wearing a 
dress shirt with a tie, and pants… They’re still slobs, but in a suit… it seems 
pretty uniformed. But women's clothing is so much harder… if you look good, 
you look too good and too sexy. If you’re frumpy looking, that’s not good either. I 
saw that and I said, Oh, my God. Once again, it’s the eightieth time in my life 
where I have been like, I’m just happy that I’m a guy. It’s a lot simpler.  
Clearly, women are exposed to a special burden within a system of professionalism that 
was designed around men and their suits. Rebecca’s experience of having a manager be 
critical of her for the way that she buttoned her shirt despite the fact that she was more 
than ten years older than him illustrates how these scripts of conduct displace other norms 
of decency. Unfortunately for Rebecca, the negative feedback about presentation made 
the work much less interesting, particularly because her manager refused to engage with 
her on substantive issues related to their work: 
Interviewer: Did you get any feedback on content? 
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Rebecca: No. They had a way of circulating research commentary, written 
research commentary, and it had to be formatted a certain way, and it had to be a 
certain font, and it had to be some whole thing. And as a secretary, if that's what 
you did all the time, you did that. And in the first months, when all I was doing 
was answering phones and taking messages and formatting stuff, I would screw 
up the formatting. And the first time I sat down with [my boss], I said “Okay, I 
think I need to learn the processes,” But the next time I said, “I think we're getting 
the processes down, where do we go from here?” His immediate comment to me 
was, “Well you haven't really learned the processes. The email you sent out with 
'x' was improperly formatted and it wasn't left aligned, and the font was wrong, or 
the color was wrong...” and I said to him, “Okay, [boss]. Understood. I didn't do 
the formatting right. Apologies. Can we step back now? Let's just talk about the 
bigger picture.” But he said, “Well, we can't really do that until you learn this.” 
Rebecca eventually left Global, and she is now working in an unrelated industry. The 
only value that she gets out of her old contacts is their willingness to come out and 
support her new career.  
She left Global before the collapse, so her particular trajectory is not within the 
domain of the study. Taken in isolation, Rebecca’s violations in dress, drinking, and 
document formatting may be interpreted as “quasi-normative errors” (Bosk 1979), 
mistakes of conduct that are defined by the locally legitimate authority and are only 
mistakes because that authority deems them so. Yet, looking more closely at her 
description, it is apparent that the complaint regarding her dress did not originate with the 
manager. The critical feedback that Rebecca received actually originated elsewhere in the 
organization. Her manager chose to repeat the feedback rather than buffer it, thereby 
implicating some additional component of the organization. If we believe the manager’s 
report to Rebecca that the criticism originated in the audience, it strengthens the view that 
appearance norms are prevalent within the organization. 
Other interviewees echoed the presentation norm. Art, a trader in London who 
worked for one of the international offices of Global Investments, described the 
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American management of Global as unappreciative of the organization in the UK, and as 
being more concerned with consistency of formatting and the standardization of the brand 
internationally than with the performance of the business. Similarly, Jen, who has worked 
as an analyst at a subsidiary of Global for the past six years, describes the organization as 
being “snobby and uppity” and placing undue influence on the appearance of things. 
Adam also describes the power of the normative culture: 
Adam: I remember one weekend I wanted to change to go from work to see a play 
with a girl I was seeing at the time. I wanted to put on a plaid shirt and I didn’t 
want to change in the bathroom at the theater. So, I changed at work right at the 
end of the workday. I shouldn’t really be stressed out, but… somebody I work 
with might see me in a non-suit! A shirt! Stresses like that I would say weren’t a 
joke. I don’t know if it is self-imposed or not, but people stress out about [it]. 
People stress about look and status and presenting themselves always in a very 
professional way… like, a very strong mask. 
The attention to appearances that Global sustained is an example of a norm that does not 
seem to have fared well in the post-failure transition. While some specific technological 
aspects are sustained, the emphasis upon appearances seems to attenuate among the 
former employees of Global. Jen, for example, currently works at Walls Investments. 
Walls is a private wealth management company comprised of a number of portfolios, 
each of which operates as a semi-distinct business under the control of a portfolio 
manager. Walls was owned by Global until its collapse, and after some months in limbo, 
The Walls portfolio managers negotiated a senior debt obligation with the Global 
creditors in order to take control of the firm. Walls’ equity research group has been hard 
hit by the transition. Approximately 40% of the staff has been laid off. The group has 
been through two research directors in the past year. The first was a transplant from 
Global who maintained many of its norms, but given the overall indeterminacy of the 
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organization, imposed relatively few goals upon the staff. The second, who was recently 
hired at the time of the interview, used to be a portfolio manager in “the Old Walls,” back 
when the firm was a privately held (as it is now). The new (“Old Walls”) director has 
already begun pushing back against the formality that had been the norm within Global. 
Jen describes the change as follows:  
We went from having a daily call in the morning with the portfolio managers, 
which was never well attended, to having bi-weekly calls with portfolio managers 
at 4:15 in the afternoon, 15 minutes after the market closes. We’ve had much 
better attendance from portfolio managers. Beyond these meetings, we are trying 
to do a lot of directed information sharing with the people who are most likely to 
be interested in certain information. We know which managers care about which 
stocks. They may not come to our meetings, and may instead just stop in or call to 
talk to us. We’ve been trying to do more of this. We’re just a floor apart, and we 
just poke our head in to share information. It seems to be working better. 
Jen’s narrative demonstrates some of the work that is being done to counteract an 
established norm, while also providing evidence that there was a norm to be displaced. 
This is an example of an established norm and its eventual diminution through a post-
failure trajectory. The norm survived the failure of Global, but it seems to be receding 
within Walls as more functionally appropriate norms emerge. 
It may be worth distinguishing between the capacity to achieve an aura of 
polished professionalism and the practice of achieving an aura of polished 
professionalism. Global maintained the practice of polished professionalism as a strategic 
part of its routines: 
George: We had to dress up every single day. And this was in contrast to most 
other investment banks. [The leadership] felt that every single day, you're going 
to war, and you have to dress to go to war. Because dressing to go to war reminds 
you every single moment of that day that you're there to work and work hard. 
These little things, this aggressiveness, well, I found it quite appealing. And you 
know it did work up to a point - well, at least until everything collapsed [laughs] - 
it worked well. 
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Some people self-select into that environment; they want to take themselves seriously, 
and Global Investment was a place to do it. However, even for those who eventually 
prefer a more casual atmosphere, Global prepared them to be professional when a 
situation demanded it. Even if Global Investment employees have since moved to 
organizations with more casual norms, the habitus of gloss remains accessible when 
context-appropriate. 
Collaborative Philanthropy 
Hours after filing for bankruptcy, senior executives at Global Investment met with 
the head of corporate philanthropy to see if the foundation could be saved. Global had 
grown a remarkable charity organization that funded projects all over the world, and 
executives viewed the foundation as what might be the last surviving vestige of the firm’s 
good name. As a nonprofit organization, the foundation was partitioned from the rest of 
the business and its resources inaccessible to the firm’s creditors. Though concern for the 
foundation’s fate emerged quickly, the process of reorganization slowed as concern over 
personal liability drove several members off the foundation board. It began with well 
over a dozen members, but by the time that a new home for the foundation had been 
identified, only a third of the board remained. It was clear that the creditors of Global 
Investment had no claim upon the foundation, but it was unclear whether the organization 
should persist, and if so, how it should be organized. Global Investment had employed 
the foundation’s administrative staff and two of them continued to manage the fund on a 
volunteer basis after Global entered bankruptcy. Eventually they would need to be paid 
for their work, but by whom? In my interviews with the former staff of the foundation, 
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the salient feature during this interim period was the precariousness of the situation. The 
foundation had grown up attached to Global, and prided itself on the level of employee 
contribution. This emphasis required a distinctive ethic of participatory governance that 
made the foundation deeply intertwined with Global’s employees and managers: 
Judy (moved from Global Investment with foundation to Walls Investment): 
Global Investment was really a model of collegiality - I'm going to sound like I 
drank the Kool-Aid, but I didn't: I know why we're here [in bankruptcy]- [But] we 
built consensus on almost everything, particularly as it related to the foundation 
because employees were vested in the foundation. So, I was hypersensitive to 
taking people's money and saying, 'See you around.' There had to be a dialogue, 
way beyond how most non-profits engage their supporters. 
The foundation was therefore intertwined with the organization and its employees. It 
would seem to be fragile by the same logic, inseparable from the larger corporate body, 
but its value, and the value of its staff, made it possible for the foundation to be 
transplanted whole into another organization. 
Walls Investment, a former subsidiary of Global, eventually agreed to take 
responsibility for the foundation. The agreement was not easy for Walls, which had 
shouldered significant debt to gain autonomy from Global’s creditors. However, by 
paying half of the salaries of the foundation’s small staff and agreeing to a modest $1 
million annual contribution, the Walls organization was able to rebrand the Global 
Investment foundation as its own. Initially, it was agreed that the foundation would carry 
out its funding commitments to Global grantees:  
Judy: The foundation’s view was that these commitments had been made, and that 
there was a moral imperative: if you were transferring control, you were also 
transferring obligations. And, Walls Investment, to its credit, absolutely embraced 
that. Therefore, we've continued to meet those obligations. Nothing was 
automatic: we still had to do our job which was, wherever we make grants, we 
have a thorough due diligence process to determine things as simple as, ‘Have 
they engaged in any misappropriation or scandal? Is it well run? Is its cost of 
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fundraising and administration proportional to service? Are they sustainable? 
What happens if they don't get this money?’ 
In the process, Walls gained a staff of two who began to immediately reshape the 
foundation to fit with the Walls culture.  
Judy: Walls Investment is run by a partnership committee and a board of 
directors. The partnership committee had vigorous discussions on whether to 
enable the transfer of control and to take on CSR as a business line in light of the 
enormous challenges that Walls Investment faced in rendering itself independent. 
I think that they had themselves come to some, call it, 'collective unilateral 
determination' on what it would be about and how it would operate. Not iron-
fistedly so, but if they were going to take the time to discuss it, they evolved their 
thinking from ‘Yes/No’ to ‘Yes, and here is how.’ So, when I joined I was given a 
download of this body's opinion by the CEO. So, I said, there was nothing 
illogical about it, but I'd like to go around and talk to the partnership committee, 
the operating committee, regional heads, and to introduce myself and to engage in 
further dialog. It was an opportunity for a bit of venting on side track topics, 
but.... we came to some agreement that before we arbitrarily put some definition 
around this, that we would seek to build employee buy-in. 
This is a fairly remarkable example of a core organizational function moving without the 
organizational structure in which it was embedded. CSR ought to be a classically high-
volatility routine. Getting and maintaining consensus among diverse employees requires 
a tremendous amount of energy, but the foundation’s wealth seems to have ensured its 
persistence as a combined entity. A closer look demonstrates that the more subtle aspects 
of Global’s CSR persist because the specialists who run the foundation have stable 
routines and orientations towards their work.  
The post-failure context provides the special opportunity to observe processes 
stripped to their barest essentials and then (sometimes) redeployed within new 
organizations. One might think CSR would be the least likely organizational tradition to 
survive the failure of a firm, particularly insofar as it is embedded deeply within an 
organization and its complex and idiosyncratic workforce. Moreover, the foundation is 
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already linked to specific funding recipients that would seem to also be inflexible. Many 
firms view CSR as the final topping of an organization rather than a core function. The 
Global Investment case calls this assumption into question, and demonstrates some of the 
organic value propositions for corporate philanthropy (Porter and Kramer 2002) emerge 
through organizational practice, and can then be transplanted to other firms through 
special competencies. 
The basic notion of CSR as the collective activity of the people within the firm 
rather than as a top-level business strategy or pet project invokes a set of somewhat fluid 
routines. Foundation staff encourages employees to bring causes to their attention, and 
strive to keep employees involved in the funding process. It is this buy-in that moves the 
foundation into a position of status. Internal ties and competencies are certainly not the 
only function of the foundation’s staff. They develop and sustain relationships with the 
wider nonprofit community in order to make determinations about which organizations 
ought to receive funding.  
Judy: There is a due diligence process for all grant giving because… there is a 
negative spillover to the brand if the recipient does something that is negatively 
newsworthy.  
Due diligence is the basic task of every funding organization, but the task has special 
meaning in an organization that is expected to be savvy with its management of financial 
resources. Investment banks like Global have professionalized their funding bodies and 
focused them on recipient performance measurement as a part of this larger movement. 
Global Investment had a global foundation, but Walls Investment chose to focus 
the foundation regionally. The shift confirms the post-failure adaptation. The Global 
foundation funded many international projects, but the Walls foundation seeks a more 
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local impact in keeping with the scope of Walls employment and customer base. This is 
attributable to the diminished resources as well. Walls is a much smaller firm than Global 
was, so its CSR aspiration had to be scaled accordingly. Also, because Walls had not 
developed a tradition of enterprise CSR, some important ingredients for CSR engagement 
were absent within the firm, and the tradition of employee participation and resource 
allocations had to be redeveloped. 
Judy: The day has its own limitations… There is very little budget at the moment. 
There is a huge preferred obligation to the estate that has to be met first. The 
largest impediment to growth is the corporate commitment… There aren't the 
corporate resources at the moment, except for enormous [internal] good will and 
collegiality. 
Assuming that Walls Investment is able to meet its debt obligation to the Global 
creditors, in time more resources will be available to grow the firm in other directions. 
The early continuity in CSR practice established through the inheritance of the Global 
Investment foundation provides an unusually strong platform for CSR development 
within a firm that has little tradition of corporate philanthropy. However, it remains to be 
seen whether this platform will spread throughout the organization or remain in its 
current form. In either case, some of Global’s legacy persists. 
 This section began with a discussion of financial models and the skepticism that 
investment bankers learn regarding their use. It then sought idiosyncratic routines and 
found two in the case of Global Investment, an emphasis upon the gloss and an 
employee-centered CSR strategy. Both routines transferred to other organizations, with 
losses along the way. In the next section I document some of the differences in continuity 
processes between newspapers and investment banks. Investment banks have much more 
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capacity for organizational and departmental preservation, but the nature of trust in 
financial entities may sometimes undermine that capacity.  
Organizational Continuity Through Group Survival 
Investment bank post-failure continuity processes are very different from the 
related processes in newspapers. This section examines the structural opportunities that 
access to capital provides to the subsidiaries of large failed firms.  
As I have shown above, it is often possible for norms and routines to survive 
when employees move into very different work. However, the odds are grossly increased 
when sub-organizational units persist intact. Many of the stories of continuity in 
Investment Banks involve persistence within a relatively unchanged work group. The 
journalists attempted to make this happen, but investment bankers have done it much 
more successfully. 
Global was a large firm, and its subsidiaries and divisions were fodder for a large 
bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy law provides an important framework for the preservation 
of component businesses within insolvent entities, and the framework provided two key 
possibilities for the persistence of component entities. First, and most common, 
competitors and complementary organizations can buy components of the firm which 
allows the purchaser to gain resources at a significant discount while allowing creditors 
to receive as much up-front value as possible. And second, the employees and managers 
of a division or subsidiary can offer to purchase that division or entity from the creditors. 
In doing so, they are competing against external purchasers, but this may be an act of 
self-preservation for the senior employees, whose position within the entity is uncertain 
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after it is acquired. At Walls Investment this was a particularly appropriate arrangement 
because the organization is heavily subdivided into individual business units organized 
around individual persons: 
Judy: I think that Walls Investment, pre-merger and perhaps post-demise, is really 
more of a consortium of entrepreneurs than a corporately structured hierarchy that 
has a natural upward flow of decision-making. This is a more lateral than 
hierarchical organization, and that doesn't mean that policy here isn't articulated 
and aligned, but at the core of its acculturated mentality, is that “I'm running a 
business,” a portable business. If I leave Walls Investment tomorrow, all my 
clients leave with me. The very foundation of the culture is different than what 
you would find in a more corporate setting. There are a lot of walls here. We're an 
office within an office. Even structurally, the office here is built for siloed 
thinking. 
A would-be purchaser of Walls Investment would have to deal with the very real 
possibility that by upsetting the entrepreneurs within the consortium, they would lose 
components of the business and its value. That uncertainty makes the acquisition by the 
fund managers a particularly appropriate option (Hansmann 1994). 
Where self-acquisition is not possible as it was with Walls, it is often possible for 
individuals within the firm to leave the entity, form a new entity, and then continue to 
operate in the same business, as Judy describes the entrepreneurs doing. This has 
happened often in banks, and even more often in asset management companies. Moves 
like this have been common in financial services, an industry where individuals are only 
as valuable as the relationships that they can carry away from a firm. For the many 
investors who lost money through the failure of these larger entities, the latter course has 
particular appeal because they felt that they could better capture the attention (and 
interest) of the former bank employees if they were no longer working for the larger 
entity. This has been the value proposition of small private wealth management 
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investment firms and family offices that manage investments for small groups of 
investors.  
Post-Failure Organizing in Investment Banks 
Along with the structural differences between the post-failure processes of 
investment banks and the related processes in newspapers, distinctive individual activities 
and relational processes define the post-failure experiences in the two industries. When 
former employees get a severance, or have access to other resources to pad their 
unemployment, it eases the transition between jobs and opens up options that would not 
otherwise be available. As I mentioned above, many job transitions in investment banks 
are timed around end-of-year bonuses. Laid-off employees were unable to time their 
transition in this way, so those who had the opportunity to work for another bank after 
their employer failed were initially happy to do so. However, that job was very often 
transitional for these employees, who used that firm as a stopgap measure while they 
worked to establish other options. There are many advantages to applying for jobs while 
currently employed, particularly because employment signals employability. The point 
about post-failure organizing is that continuous employment may sustain the job slot 
without sustaining the social or routine bonds that hold a firm together. Experiences vary 
widely between former bank employees. Some found the acquiring firms to be open to 
their ideas, in some cases arguing that the acquisition improved their prospects relative to 
working for Global, whereas others found the culture of the acquiring firm to be highly 
problematic.  
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But occupational transitions have become so common within investment banks 
that groups of former employees ally themselves with their organizational affiliation from 
prior employers. Interestingly, these alliances represent banks as they were rather than 
banks as they now are. Many former bankers are carriers of norms that have since fallen 
out of fashion in the forms where they originated. But the incidence of numerous and 
different organizational vantage points permits unique cultural exchange. Here I provide 
a long quote from Earl, who worked at an office of Global that was acquired by Open 
Investment and later quit. He describes his experience at Global below. Note that several 
banks are described here, each with a pseudonym. OMB, Richards, Waverly, and 
Thorndale are nowhere else discussed. For sake of reference, Earl had worked at OMB, 
Open, Richards, and Global during his career.  
Earl [emphasis added]: At Global Investment we used to have within the Global 
culture a sub-OMB culture. So, I came from OMB, my boss was from OMB, my 
boss's boss was from OMB, my main client was from OMB. And two people on 
my team used to work at OMB. We had our own language that we would use that 
was the OMB language for things…. When I was interviewing for this Waverly 
job, it turned out that Waverly had a lot of ex-Richards people in [one] office. 
Three of the people who I interviewed with were ex-Richards so we knew a lot of 
people between us. We knew probably a dozen people between us. So we could 
easily slip into using Richards terms for things and then talk about the differences. 
For instance, at Global Investment we'd say, “At OMB we'd do it this way, but at 
Global Investment we do it this way.” Then we'd try to map out whether it sucks 
or it is better, in our experience and moving forward. There is so much movement 
of senior people now that you get this culture moving around. I always think that I 
carry my culture with me, and it is really a mix. I'd say that I was most influenced 
by Richards in terms of how to get work done, actual work, and most by OMB on 
how to work within the company, the importance of building relationships, what 
seniority is, and how it is achieved. Seniority is not just getting a title, there's 
different elements to it. Is it managing people? Is it limited to business? Is it 
helping your division? There's different elements to it. My old boss at Global 
Investment, an old OMB guy, he's like, “Look, I reject the OMB ideals. I think it 
shouldn't matter how you manage people. I think it shouldn't matter how long 
you've been in the company. What should matter is how much you delivered this 
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year.” That is a very foreign idea for OMB, which used to be on a long-term 
trajectory. People use those kinds of cultural ideas very explicitly. I find it 
interesting. It is actually a very useful tool.  
Interviewer: It is like you are choosing between which routines to use. 
Earl: Exactly, and you know, as you get up in seniority you have a lot of influence 
over institutions and routines. I was sitting on the review boards for some of the 
project management tools Open was developing, and it was all Global Investment 
people. No Open people were on there. But we were all bringing in ideas from 
other companies we'd worked at and trying to get those addressed. Some of us 
were onboard, and now we're part of a Global Investment culture.  
Interviewer: Can you give me an example of one of these OMB vs. Richards 
decisions where you had to work out? 
Earl: I think that probably a good one was a Thorndale vs. OMB situation. OK, 
for example, how we hire people and what kind of interviews we need. At OMB 
the rule was that you needed to have at least three officers interview someone 
before you could hire a new junior person. Global Investment had no such rule, 
but we did it anyway. We thought that was a good [rule]. But we did that rule 
anyway. We still made the three-officer rule inside our group. We were all ex-
OMB people, and we thought that was a good idea.  
[Or another example:] Days off on the weekends. If you work weekends, we had a 
comp day policy at OMB. Under four hours was zero, no additional time off. You 
could work four to eight hours and get half a day, after eight hours you'd get a day 
and you'd have to take it within two weeks. It was a very specific HR rule. There 
was no comp policy at Global Investment, it was like, at discretion of the 
manager. So, you had some groups where the managers were callous and 
immature and giving no credit, and because of that, their people didn't want to 
work on the weekends when they needed to. With other guys, if you answered a 
phone on a Saturday you'd get a free day off. And employees hate that kind of 
crap, so every group that I went into, I agreed with my boss on this, we had a 
group policy for that. I went to HR and asked if it was OK, they said, “We're not 
going to ask, but we won't tell.” These are concrete management things that are 
part of a culture.  
     There are a lot of things like that, about how to onboard clients, how you 
evaluate business opportunities. For example, at Open there was no cost benefit 
analysis of many projects, it was just like, “If a senior guy says, ‘do it,’ then do 
it.” And then the projects lost money, and it was like, “Oh well, I guess I was 
wrong.” But at Thorndale, for some reason they had a really strict cost-benefit 
analysis for all new investments, and it had to make money or they wouldn't do it. 
It had to be something, there had to be some tangible, well-understood benefit so 
that any senior guy could answer why we're doing this. It had to be very clear, and 
some senior guy couldn't just do that by himself, it had to be launched by 
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everybody. Those kinds of things were quite different, but we try to take the best 
practices from the cultures, and in most places you control a lot. 
Given the mobility of labor, it may not make sense to fix routines within the boundaries 
of firms, particularly if enough critical mass from one firm is able to move into another. 
On Earl’s account, the cultural shifts within banking over the past decade have created 
extremely diverse influences from firms that were once quite isolated from one another. 
The combined effect is an explicit choice between options with references made to the 
originating organizations. These are proto-norms and proto-routines, accessible responses 
to situations that can be called upon in making decisions. As with the selection processes 
discussed in Chapter Three, the decision between proto-norms appears to be constructive: 
a rational choice based upon best practices. The diversity of careers permits the 
conversation, and the dynamic nature of routines and norms makes it worthwhile. Insofar 
as bankers stay within the industry, there are often significant opportunities for 
transferred norms and routines. 
Differences Between Continuity in Banks and Newspapers 
Several characteristics of investment banking influence transmission processes. 
The acquisition processes involve much more fragmentation and reconfiguration. When 
employees are able to retain their jobs within the same work group, the transfers of 
routines and norms are extremely likely, and even if the organizations change, employees 
have an added measure of autonomy because they are able to time their own job 
transitions.  
Control over timing reduces the likelihood of ill-fated entrepreneurial projects 
undertaken without planning. Both journalists and bankers eventually spread widely 
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throughout their industries. Many investment bankers trickled out to other organizations 
after they received their bonuses for 2009, and sometimes before. Many journalists 
signed onto entrepreneurial projects, and once they realized the onerous, 
undercompensated work, they gradually disassociated themselves from the effort as they 
pursued other interests.  
Journalists and bankers also differ in their business knowledge. People with 
training in business view organizing a new firm as a deliberate and gradual project that is 
not easily undertaken in a crisis, but journalists may not share this view and the related 
concerns. Business knowledge may undermine some of the optimism necessary to start a 
firm. Organizational life empowers a group of people to believe in themselves, and to 
identify with the organization, but some of that empowerment may exaggerate the 
capabilities that individual persons have to offer.  
For many bankers, large banks continued to be the only viable setting for their 
work. This is because large entities are, as of yet, a necessity for those who wish to be 
involved in issuing financial assets. Given this organizational need, some former bankers 
attempt to pitch their way back into banks with investment ideas for structures that could 
offer new opportunities.  
Another consistency between banks and newspapers is the importance of 
credentialing in the post-failure transition. One former journalist was a well-regarded 
journalist, but had no education beyond an associate’s degree. Colleges asked her to teach 
their classes, only to learn that she had not yet received the degree that they intended to 
issue to their students. Within organizations like newspapers, it has been possible 
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historically for people to advance through their careers without professional credentials 
other than experience, and in a normal economy lateral transitions would also be 
possible. However, when jobs are unavailable, credentials become extremely important. 
At Global, the person who was able to come along with the foundation was the person 
who had an accounting background rather than the more senior manager who had 
supervised that person’s work.  
The presentation of norms and routines and their opportunities for post-failure 
transfer followed a different course than the presentation on newspapers. In this chapter, 
the relationship between norms and retention has been a focal to understanding who stays 
in banking. Investment bank routines were shown to transfer through similar mechanisms 
to newspapers, but unlike papers, investment banks seem to reconfigure with more 
planning and preservation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
WHICH FIRMS SHOULD FAIL? 
Introduction 
Thus far, this dissertation has demonstrated that organizations survive failure 
through the careers of former employees. It showed that routines and norms outlasted 
failing newspapers and investment banks because laid-off employees retained them 
through post-failure projects and new jobs. The positive aspects of individual transitions 
reinforce this organizational narrative. Some laid-off workers describe a sense of 
liberation. They revisit questions of meaning that are drowned out in the din of 
organizational life, and innovate accordingly. But these positive narratives are tempered, 
if not undermined, by the dark side of organizational failure. Former employees struggle 
to find work, experience age discrimination, and suffer through financial hardships for 
which they are ill-prepared. The dark side of failure results in a sense of listlessness, 
powerlessness, and social disintegration. 
The transition to the current chapter and its topic asks the reader to switch from 
sociology to ethics and from descriptive to prescriptive research. The leap is not a small 
one: the operant proof of empirical truth holds little sway here in the question of what 
ought to be, and we must explore different tools in order to decide within a kingdom of 
ends. Before leaving behind the empirical matters and qualitative data, though, I will ease 
the transition with the story of a journalist who serves as a moral exemplar of the post-
failure transition. 
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Roland was employed by the Regional Post as a photojournalist. After he was laid 
off, he was able to buy most of the equipment he needed at a significant discount from 
the Regional Post. Since then his adventures have taken him through a number of 
extremes, including a failed trip down a remote river in Africa, work in an Asian food 
restaurant, and work in forestry services. The year after the failure was a hard one. He 
and his wife were divorced from a 30-year marriage, his house went to sheriff’s sale, his 
son was also laid off, and he continues to struggle financially. But for all of his trials, 
Roland expresses a sense of liberation: 
Roland: It’s been the greatest year of my life. It’s taken me out of the realm of the 
known and pulled me into the unknown. When you’re working you’re always 
kind of like “ugh this is awful, I wish I was out there on one of those construction 
stop and go signs, anything but this…” That’s kind of foolish. You look back on it 
like, oh, I was getting a paycheck, and a big one, too. I’ll never see that kind of 
money again. It’s actually made me sharper and smarter. It’s like going from 
being a dog on a chain to being a wolf. Out there on the hunt. If I hadn’t lost my 
job I would have never gone to Africa. It’s totally opened my brain and my heart. 
It was like, wow, this is amazing! And I want to go back. It’s also strange, 
because I always thought if I lost my job I would just go [hiking] all the time and 
have a great time. Actually, it’s so much pressure. I used to [hike] and do all that 
stuff. Now pretty much every day I am on the hunt. There’s not much time for 
recreation. More “get it figured out.” That’s what I am trying to do. I am trying to 
figure it out. Right now I have to figure it out before I dip too far into my IRA. 
My divorce lawyer recommended to me when I was talking to him about my 
financial troubles these financial people. I went to talk to them…, with the glass 
tables and the mahogany doors, and I went and sat down with these 3 women and 
they looked at all my stuff, and this wonderful woman… told me that they 
generally don’t look at anyone’s portfolio who was under 250 grand. She said that 
a session like I had with them would normally cost like 1200 or 1300 bucks just to 
sit there. They found me so fascinating that they decided to do it for free on the 
condition that when I made money they would make money too. I was like 
“cool!” I was thinking ok I want to go back to school and become a professor. She 
was like “no, you get a job, and then you go to school. School costs money, and 
you don’t have it. Even if you took a loan out, you have to pay it back. Get a job 
first.” Then when I was going to Africa I was thinking – oh they’re going to hate 
this idea. She said it was a gamble and that was great. So they have been working 
with me and helping me. People come out of the woodwork to kind of help you. 
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It’s been an amazing experience and it’s been really fun. I am kind of out of the 
period- I can talk like this. Last winter it was pretty serious. I hadn’t made a dime 
since the weddings quit in October…. I have just been cobbling together a bunch 
of stuff, but I had a very lean winter, it was very scary. Just cold and dark. I had a 
girlfriend and broke up with her on New Year’s Day. It was just like, oh this is 
really bad. You didn’t’ want to pull your head out from under the sheets. Now 
things are starting to turn, now that the economy is starting to open up a little bit, 
and things are starting to happen, you know, for me. I feel very positive about 
everything. I am in a way different space than I was when I worked for the 
Regional Post. I wished I had saved a lot more money. I wish that when they had 
told us [it was going down] I wished I had taken it seriously. I didn’t take it very 
seriously. The paper’s old, no one’s gonna shut this thing down. Somebody’s 
going to step in and save it. That has always happened. I don’t think any of us 
could have envisioned it. It’s like we were on the Titanic and the furniture was 
sliding around and we were going “nah.” Unthinkable. It’s pretty exciting, losing 
the house is pretty huge, that weighed on me a lot during the winter. We lived 
here 20 years and raised our kids here, and I didn’t think it would rock my world, 
but it did and it is probably going to rock it when I actually leave the house. But 
it’s okay. It’s really okay. I kind of dreaded going to the year anniversary get 
together wondering what that was going to be like. That was going to be a 
bummer. Everybody was very happy and positive. Moving in different 
directions…. Nobody was saying it was the most horrible thing that had ever 
happened. People just move on. They get jobs and they go places and they do 
different things. It’s good. I mean I could still be at the Regional Post and still 
doing my job and enjoying it, but this has just opened me to many possibilities. 
Every now and then I still kind of resent it. Geez, I am 58 years old getting kicked 
out on the street. That’s tough. But the world is round, and somebody that’s on 
top today is on the bottom tomorrow. That’s kind of the way it works. I am 
healthy- I have my health. It’s great. So I have a lot of stuff going on. Sometimes 
I look and say, “Well you’re headed for a cardboard box. That’s how this story is 
going to end.” But you can’t look at it that way.  You have to keep doing the best 
you can and honestly if all goes to hell I’ll just find some non- profit and go back 
to Africa. Hand out water bottles and stuff. I don’t know. It’s scary but it’s 
exciting. [After the Regional Post failed] The Regional Tribune swung some vines 
to some people, and I don’t know how happy they are. I feel like I got a chance to 
do something different. I didn’t just jump to another burning ship. I am still kind 
of hanging out. I am still here. When the paper closed I was like “where am I 
going to be in a year? What will that be like?” Well, that’s come and gone. What 
am I going to do in another year? It will be something and it will be interesting. 
Who knows where it’s going to go? I guess that’s the joy of it. I don’t know 
where it’s going to go. At the same time, I am steering the ship. There isn’t 
anybody responsible but me. When you’re working for somebody you can always 
think that they made a bad decision, or if it wasn’t for that person, I could do 
this… Now it’s just ME. When I get up and I have a day when I don’t get much 
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accomplished, that’s my problem. I am responsible. Every morning I get up at 
about 5 and write, kind of get the day squared away and sometimes I go all day 
and some days I poop out about 3, but tomorrow I can say “I’m going to go 
[hiking], and I’m going to [hiking] Wednesday morning too. I set my own goals 
and sometimes I think I don’t work hard enough and sometimes it’s kind of like, 
well, just kind of relax and don’t spin your wheels too much. This is way 
different. I look around and it’s like man I beat up my freelance career and here I 
am trying to restart it. There’s people that have been out there doing it while I was 
working at the paper. And THEY’RE struggling. But it’s something new. And I 
have some advantages over people, because I write, too. I write and photograph, 
and I have been an editor and a manager. I can start a chainsaw, and all this other 
kind of stuff. I have a lot of tools in my belt. Hey, you just got to get up and go 
look for it.  
Roland’s story is up and down. His lows are beneath the low points that his 
organizational life would have permitted, but his highs seem somehow higher. For him, 
the experience gives him total accountability for his own actions and provides him with a 
sense of freedom that he might not have experienced at this stage in his career. Many 
survivors of failure discuss the sense of new challenges and fresh perspective that they 
find. Failure can be devastating, but it is also a process of renewal.  
 Roland may never re-establish a sense of order like he had at the Regional Post. 
He may never have to do so. It may be enough for him to work as a freelancer and to live 
one project to the next. Though Roland’s experience and transition is not unusual, most 
survivors eventually seek order within a new occupational context. They try to establish 
new organizations and new opportunities. It is in their experiences that the iron cage is 
rebuilt. As I argue in the third and fourth chapters, both journalists and investment 
bankers tend to draw upon routines and norms from their failed firms in their 
understanding of the organizational logics of their new places of employment. There are 
contrasts, some of which create conflict, but there are also tacit uniformities that sustain 
or permit the re-establishments of proto-norms from the context of failed firms.  
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 This chapter transitions from an empirical account of failure to a normative 
account of failure, which is further developed in Chapter Six. The final chapter provides 
some analysis of how these aspects of the project fit together, but here it must first be 
recognized that the question of which firms should fail is given vitality by situations like 
the one that Roland has faced. Most people are not able to spin their organizational 
failures as positively as Roland. He is exemplary in his forward-looking willingness to 
embrace the help available to him and to change with the times, to take risks, and to 
continually seek to do things that will be interesting and useful. However, loss is often 
more salient in these accounts than liberation. It is the loss associated with failure that 
initially invokes the question of which firms ought to fail.  
 For the survivors of organizational failure, the question is often “why?” So often, 
the answers are somewhat obvious. Firms fail when they are unable to gather the 
resources necessary to survive, especially when their debts make survival impossible. But 
it is too easy to act as if failure is an exogenous and necessary process. In this chapter I 
will argue that failure is always a choice, as is survival. 
Like it or not, organizational death is a basic feature of a capitalist economy. We 
rely upon failure as a process of renewal to make space for innovative organizations and 
as a motivator for surviving firms (Schumpeter 1950). Given the personal costs of post-
failure reorganization, the stakes are high. So we should make sure that we get failure 
right. This means, firstly, that the right firms should be targeted for failure. It also means 
firms should treat their employees with decency as they disband.  
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Some firms should die and some should survive. One might think that economics 
alone could tell the difference, but I will argue that it takes more than a balance sheet to 
tell which firms ought to persist. Consistent with this view, empirical findings suggest 
that justifications for organizational disbanding rely on more than financial expectations. 
When Sutton (1987: 551) studied the process of organizational death, he found that 
managers called upon key performance criteria relevant to the effectiveness of the failing 
organizations. While financial performance was a consideration in every case, it was not 
exclusive to all other considerations. For example, the lackluster research productivity of 
an academic department was used to justify a decision to disband that department. In 
asserting the complex nature of failure, I also tacitly affirm a view of the corporation as a 
complex entity whose performance must be measured in social, financial, and 
environmental terms. In my view, social performance is more than a idiosyncratic 
objective shared by a few social entrepreneurs: it is a basic component of business 
success. 
This chapter applies some of the leading frameworks of business ethics to the 
question of organizational survival. It finds important insights for survival in 
utilitarianism, human rights, and stakeholder fairness arguments, but nonetheless finds 
that these frameworks are unable to account for the integrative challenge that the research 
requires. The next chapter provides my account as an attempt to integrate these diverse 
considerations into a single approach to the question of which firms should fail. 
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Failure and the Domain of Ethics: Deliberate Failure and Its Consequences 
Is organizational failure an appropriate subject for ethics? There are two 
arguments that may call the normative analysis into question before it begins. These 
arguments relate to the relevance and substance of failure as a subject for ethics. In order 
for an ethical argument regarding failure to be relevant, failure must be subject to rational 
agency. We would not say, for instance, that lightning ought not to strike, that an object 
should not fall with gravity, or that a crankshaft should not turn when a spark plug 
ignites. Ethically normative statements pertain to rational and deliberate choices rather 
than to purely mechanical or natural phenomena. Insofar as failure is a process beyond 
human control, ethics has little to say about it.  
The second necessary condition is one of substance. This is a more contentious 
issue within ethics. There are some who deny any special separation between the subjects 
of ethics and anything else. But a more standard view is that some choices have ethical 
features that others lack. Ethics has little to say about a choice to throw a stone into a 
pond and much to say about a choice to throw a stone into a person’s window. The 
difference is not in the nature of the stone or the material properties of the glass; it is in 
the intrusion of that stone into something of worth. We might therefore ask whether 
organizational failure is more like a stone being thrown into a pond or a window. The 
substantive basis for a normative discussion depends upon organizational failure being of 
consequence to something of value. 
On the subject of failure’s moral relevance, I will argue that failure is a deliberate 
choice. Failure is as much a choice as starting a firm or any other action taken within the 
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scope of a firm. Firms neither come into existence at random nor disappear at random. 
When Sutton’s managers explained the reasons for their firms’ closures, they provided an 
important input for the sensemaking through which organizational actors began to accept 
the impending collapse. But their explanations were not mere rationalizations. The 
possibility of “permanent failure” (Meyer and Zucker 1989) proves that firms can choose 
to survive indefinitely despite persistent financial underperformance, and thus because of 
non-financial considerations. Insofar as some firms can underperform persistently 
without collapse, it lends credence to the view that financial interests alone do not dictate 
the fate of a firm, and that non-financial justifications may stand for more than words of 
comfort. Organizational survival is, and has always been, a choice. Every day when 
employees and managers come to work, they are choosing for their collective enterprise 
to survive. If they chose otherwise, they could exit (Hirschman 1970) or perhaps disband 
the firm by fiat. The same can be said of investors who capitalize, customers who 
purchase, and suppliers who deliver. Sometimes the costs of exit are extraordinary, and 
sometimes the reasons for staying are overwhelming, but in almost any case imaginable, 
the constituencies of a firm decide whether that firm will survive or disband. This again 
reinforces the multi-stakeholder conception of failure outlined in the first chapter.  
The complexity and plurality of an organization’s choice to fail makes it seem 
inevitable once it finally happens. But there are numerous inputs into the process until the 
decision is finalized. Insofar as managers and employees are willing to reduce their pay, 
take furlough, or allow their wages to go into arrears (Spicer, Dunfee, and Bailey 2004), 
failing firms can survive for a long time. With patient shareholders, lax lenders, 
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determined regulators, and public generosity, firms can survive indefinitely. Some firms 
persist through adversity because their stakeholders are willing to make sacrifices to see 
them survive. Others get bailed out and shift liabilities onto taxpayers.  
This view of the corporation as surviving at the pleasure of its stakeholders owes 
its origins to the earliest formations of modern corporations. As merchants and 
speculators first began to charter companies at the pleasure of the crown in the late 
middle ages, the corporation took on the character of an entity that united the interests of 
insiders subject to the authority of the state (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2005). Despite 
the profound diversity of organizations and forms, we can still understand the modern 
firm in similar terms, as an ongoing process of trust relations between individuals and a 
wider social order, a process that places shared resources into the control of some 
individuals for a purpose. If we understand the firm in these terms, organizational death 
occurs when trust is revoked, when individuals cease to work together, and when the 
collective purpose is decomposed into a set of potentially incompatible individual 
interests. Though we call this process death, it is more aptly understood as divorce. Like 
divorce, disbanded organizations decompose formerly-related persons and shared 
resources into individual persons and separate resources; the process of organizational 
failure is one of individuation that forces each person to act in his or her own regard or at 
least to select his or her own motivations going forward. Divorce is a choice and so is 
failure, though the costs of staying in a bad marriage or a defunct organization may speed 
the conclusion.  
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If it is agreed that failure is a choice, the second necessary condition follows in 
course. Organizational death, disbanding, or divorce, whatever its designation, is a vital 
organizational process, and an important site of ethical conflict. It is moral relevant 
because of the high stakes involved. Broadly speaking, firms condition human behavior 
and without them some actions would not occur or would occur differently. It is not 
possible to articulate a normative theory of organizational persistence without first 
accepting that the firm is a predictable cause of human behavior. It need not be accepted 
that the firm is blameworthy, in a moral sense (see May and Hoffman 1991), or even that 
the firm can be punished (Laufer 2006). But organizations must be understood as 
affecting the behavior that occurs within them. Without this premise there would be no 
reason to care about whether firms survive. Insofar as it is believed that individuals 
within a firm are going to continue to do as they did when the firm was operating after it 
is gone, we should not care if the firm survives. Given the current understanding of 
failure in management research, the premise is uncontroversial. However, it suffers from 
an apparent contradiction with the larger empirical argument of this dissertation, which 
might be read as a denial of the importance of organizational survival. To be sure, I do 
find that despite organizational failure, many people are able to sustain their habits, 
norms, and routines.  
Because post-failure reorganization is both constructive and incomplete, the 
contradiction is alleviated. As a constructive process, post-failure organizing puts 
organizational norms and routines through a filtering process as employees try to make 
sense of what went wrong in the failing firm. The process is imperfect, but does have the 
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opportunity to improve upon the dysfunctional norms and routines of failed firms. A 
process of reflection selects among them, quickly discarding those perceived to be 
useless or unjust. As an incomplete process, when firms fail, any loss in productive 
capacity is only partially remedied by the post-failure efforts of former employees. While 
these individuals may continue to do similar work in a similar way, they may do so in a 
different place in service of a different public, leaving the point moot from the 
perspective of a given city or region. Most of the journalists who are laid off by 
newspapers continue to be journalists, but they often do so hundreds of miles away where 
their work product no longer serves the same audience. Because failure is a constructive 
process that either selects norms and routines entirely or chooses the best of them, it may 
sometimes be good for bad firms to fail. And because failure is an incomplete process 
where some productive potential is destroyed, it is sometimes bad for good firms to fail.  
These bases for substantive ethical considerations add to the more obvious 
considerations of shareholders and creditors whose investments and loans depend upon 
the long-term viability of the firm. Thus organizational failures pertain to something of 
value, of value to customers, suppliers, employees, shareholders, and numerous other 
constituencies who depend upon that firm and its services. Provided that the interests of 
these people are morally relevant, so is the destruction of a firm that serves them. 
Though organizational failure is an appropriate subject for ethical analysis, very 
little has been written on the subject. The present chapter fills only a small portion of that 
void. While it provides an argument that some firms should survive, it does not seek to 
explain how they should be made to survive or any specific system in furtherance of this 
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end. And, while it provides an argument that some firms should die, it does not endorse a 
system of corporate capital punishment or any other system as a means to this end. Its 
modest objective is to demonstrate that business ethics has something to say about which 
firms should fail and how they ought to behave while they do so.  
As a prelude to the sections below, the argument proceeds as follows. To start, 
organizations are justified by the benefit that individuals derive from them. Were a 
utilitarian to apply her most basic calculus to organizational survival, she might reach the 
following conclusion: firms that do more harm than good should die, and firms that do 
more good than harm should survive. The first section develops this utilitarian account. 
However, there are important limitations to this perspective, which are discussed in the 
second section. In particular, it is not clear whether any economic organization can justify 
harming one party for the benefit of another. The third section attempts to address these 
criticisms with a rights-based approach. This account suggests an even more restrictive 
scheme: firms should do no harm at all (Donaldson 1989; Freeman and Phillips 2002), 
and those that do harm ought not to exist. The latter argument is guided by an account of 
organizational legitimacy that originates in organizational theory. Unfortunately, the 
rights-based account also suffers from an important deficit: it is unable to distinguish 
between failings that justify an organization being disbanded and failings that are less 
severe in nature. The rights-based approach also lacks any constructive guidance on 
underperforming firms that serve important social needs. These issues are addressed by 
the property-based approach articulated in the next chapter. The next chapter outlines this 
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alternative, and tests it against the utilitarian and rights-based approaches through the 
newspaper and investment bank examples. 
Long Live the Useful: A Utilitarian Account 
Utilitarianism is an ethical system that directly seeks human well-being as its end. 
It is a normative view conceived in the writings of Henry Sidgwick (1981) and John 
Stuart Mill (1998), developing on the work of Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and David 
Hume. Though these thinkers were some of the leading philosophers of their time, the 
utilitarian view has since fallen out of favor among many academic philosophers. Modern 
philosophical treatments of utilitarianism are rife with exceptions that strike a decidedly 
deontological tone (see Williams 1973a: 78). One reason for this trend is the ascendance 
of the field of economics as the arbiter of public policy, legal analysis (Posner 2007), and 
many less established normative projects (Levitt and Dubner 2005). Economics takes a 
version of utilitarianism as its guiding compass, and philosophy has responded by noting 
some of the limitations of this view (Anderson 1993).  
Though economists may be viewed as utilitarians, their perspective differs 
markedly from the philosophical systems upon which it is based. For example, Sidgwick 
rejects efficiency as the practical end of utilitarianism (Bernstein 1995: 477; Sidgwick 
1981) and affirms the importance of the distribution of happiness (416). These 
considerations are largely unaddressed within economic orthodoxy9, particularly with 
respect to the economics of profit seeking organizations. As such, it should not be 
                                                
9 To be fair, economists have applied considerable effort to the study of inequality, providing us 
with concepts like the Gini coefficient and other measures of aggregate wealth dispersal. 
However, these efforts are often ignored in the quest for efficiency, a quest based upon a calculus 
of mathematical maximization that is common to many economic analyses.  
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surprising that a utilitarian account of organizational survival would demonstrate 
incongruence with the economic account of the same subject. Whatever utilitarian 
welfare considerations were carried into economics by the Cambridge school (Medema 
2007), the discipline has yet to apply them to firm production functions. For firms, the 
economic model continues to be survival of the fittest. 
The application of utilitarianism to the problem of organizational disbanding 
begins with the economic concept of market failure. A market failure occurs when the 
market does not internalize the full costs or benefits of a good or service into its price. 
One version of that problem is aptly described through the concept of positive and 
negative externalities. When a transaction results in positive externalities, third parties 
benefit without paying. When a transaction results in negative externalities, third parties 
incur uncompensated costs. Positive and negative externalities justify taxes for public 
goods and regulation for private bads (Braithwaite 2005), and they also justify a more 
nuanced account of when organizations ought to survive. 
Economists generally assert that profitable firms should survive and unprofitable 
firms should fail, a view that becomes politically contentious amidst economic crisis 
(Romney 2008). The specific economic view relates to the anticipated positive cash 
flows, a firm’s capacity to pay its debt, and the other expectations of financial 
performance. The core assertion of the economic view is that a firm should be judged on 
net by the entirety of its transactions. Unfortunately, it can be extremely difficult to 
determine the totality of a firm’s transactions, and actual performance is much more 
difficult to measure than the proxies we rely upon, such as share price. Though I will not 
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get into the problems of performance management, which I discuss in the next chapter, 
the reader should be cautioned against the view that economics provides a simple or even 
coherent approach to measureable performance. In this area, the gaps between theory and 
practice are expansive (Meyer 2002). 
Whatever its limitations, the financial conception of survival provides a starting 
point for the utilitarian account of organizational survival. The utilitarian criterion can be 
stated as follows: 
Firms that do more harm than good should fail and firms that do more good than 
harm should survive. 
As with the financial account, the organization’s productivity is considered in aggregate. 
However, unlike the standard economic analysis, the utilitarian must consider all benefits 
and harms derived from the organization, not just those that result in direct economic 
costs and benefits. The contrast between a utilitarian system of ethics and a financial 
logic derives from the failure of the market to internalize all costs and benefits from 
positive and negative externalities. Insofar as there are costs incurred by third parties that 
go uncompensated, a firm’s financial performance may be overstated, as with the case for 
its survival. Similarly, insofar as there are benefits from a firm’s activities that go 
uncompensated, then its revenues may be understated, as with the case for its survival.  
There is some novelty in applying the utilitarian logic in judgment of a firm. 
Utilitarianism is normally applied in one of three standard ways. First, act utilitarianism 
seeks in every action the maximization of the total benefit achieved by that act. Second, 
rule utilitarianism seeks to define rules that will most often achieve the most beneficial 
result. And third, a variant of rule utilitarianism is applied to public policy arrangements 
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in an effort to determine which policy provides the greatest net social benefit. There is a 
well-established tradition of applying utilitarian concepts to legal analysis in contract, 
tort, regulatory oversight, governance, and market control. The application of 
utilitarianism to the question of whether a firm should survive is akin to the policy 
analysis process, but the maximization of utility occurs through the selection of firms 
rather than the selection of policies.  
The implicit orientation in the standard economic thesis regarding organizational 
survival is that organizations should produce a net benefit in the form of profit. There are 
classes of organizations, like nonprofits, where the benefits are otherwise distributed, but 
“for profit” firms are aptly named for their orientation. If we contrast the aggregate 
ethical (consequentialist) and economic outcomes of the firm, we find four possibilities: 
Table 5: Ethics, Economics, and Organizations 
   Ethics 
    Net Harm Net Benefit 
Economics Profitable  Perverse Profiteer Ethical Enterprise Unprofitable Wanton Washout Costly Crusader 
 
To develop the relevant contrast, I highlight some features of these different categories. 
Ethical enterprise. Most businesses fall into this category. Organizations that 
provide valuable services for their customers, jobs for their employees, and tax revenue 
for their surrounding communities without additional harm incurred by third parties are 
often both profitable and beneficial. Whether the business is a day care, a factory, a gas 
station, or a restaurant, most businesses do more good than harm, and they survive 
through the value that they provide. 
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Costly crusader. There are many firms that lose money despite their public 
benefit. This is arguably the case for all nonprofit organizations, which are most often 
dependent on public subsidy and private donations by design, and it can be the case with 
for-profit firms and social entrepreneurial ventures as well. Dees explains the contrasting 
logics of standard and social entrepreneurship, and the problems in trying to evaluate 
them based upon the same criteria: 
An entrepreneur's ability to attract resources (capital, labor, equipment, etc.) in a 
competitive marketplace is a reasonably good indication that the venture 
represents a more productive use of these resources than the alternatives it is 
competing against. The logic is simple. Entrepreneurs who can pay the most for 
resources are typically the ones who can put the resources to higher valued uses, 
as determined in the marketplace. Value is created in business when customers 
are willing to pay more than it costs to produce the good or service being sold. 
The profit (revenue minus costs) that a venture generates is a reasonably good 
indicator of the value it has created. If an entrepreneur cannot convince a 
sufficient number of customers to pay an adequate price to generate a profit, this 
is a strong indication that insufficient value is being created to justify this use of 
resources…. Markets do not do a good job of valuing social improvements, public 
goods and harms, and benefits for people who cannot afford to pay. These 
elements are often essential to social entrepreneurship. That is what makes it 
social entrepreneurship. As a result, it is much harder [than with regard to a 
standard entrepreneur] to determine whether a social entrepreneur is creating 
sufficient social value to justify the resources used in creating that value. The 
survival or growth of a social enterprise is not proof of its efficiency or 
effectiveness in improving social conditions. It is only a weak indicator, at best. 
(Dees 2001: 3) 
The contrast between social and financial performance is appropriately explained. The 
question is whether Dees is correct to suggest that different performance criteria should 
be applied to different organizational types. I argue that both social and financial criteria 
are relevant to all firms. On my account, social performance is more than a quirky 
objective shared by a few entrepreneurs who are doing something different. 
Organizations gain additional resources through economic and social benefit, regardless 
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of the munificent intentions of benevolent entrepreneurs, but if the people who they serve 
do not have enough money to pay or if the benefit of their productions are not fully 
contained among those who purchase, the profit measure of social performance may 
underestimate the firm’s social value. In Chapter Seven, I will introduce the argument 
that newspapers are examples of costly crusaders, an argument that explains some of the 
frustrations of news organization. 
Perverse profiteer. Freeman (cited in Freeman 1994: 421n) has argued against 
what he calls the “business sucks” story. He claims that a morally pessimistic view of 
business is a major problem for business ethics, and that business can be responsible 
without becoming something other than business. Freeman rejects the separation of 
economic and ethical motivations within business, and argues that they must be 
considered together (Freeman 1994). While I accept the claim that ethical and business 
motivations are inextricably connected, it seems incontrovertible that sometimes business 
really does suck. Such is the case with the perverse profiteer. This business causes harm 
to such a degree that if you took all of the surplus benefit that it provides, it would still be 
insufficient to compensate for its transgressions.  
Few firms survive perennially in this status, but I submit tobacco firms as an 
example. It is difficult to quantify the pleasure that people receive from smoking or the 
social functions provided by cigarettes, but the health effects are now widely understood. 
Tobacco use impacts smokers directly and harms third parties through secondhand 
smoke. Given harm to third parties, it is possible that all of the uncompensated harm 
exceeds the value derived from smoking by all of the willing participants in the tobacco 
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economy. Supposing this to be the case, a utilitarian might argue that tobacco firms 
should not exist. Such an argument raises a variety of questions. For instance, should a 
product not be available because some of its purchasers choose to use it in a way that is 
harmful to third parties? Would it be enough to add third-party considerations to the 
warning labels already applied to packaging? The contentious debate regarding the 
regulation of potentially dangerous products is broadly dispersed and intensely 
politicized, but the buyer’s responsibility objection is particularly hollow in the case of 
tobacco. The tobacco industry has actively obstructed health science and public health 
regulation for nearly a century (Brandt 2007). The obstructed regulations, particularly 
regarding the use of tobacco in public places, were most often intended to regulate 
consumption rather than its distribution, thus rendering the paternalism critique moot. If 
tobacco brands cannot thrive without public consumption and public consumption will 
impose uncompensated costs onto third parties that exceed the pleasures derived by 
primary users, then a utilitarian view suggests that tobacco ought not thrive. As a case of 
perverse profiteering, tobacco is a paradigmatic example of how regulatory gaming can 
delay failure and sustain economic performance, promoting the disconnect between 
ethics and economics. 
Other industries provide even clearer examples. IG Farben used enslaved 
prisoners from Nazi work camps to operate its factories (Hayes 1987), Union Carbide’s 
subsidiary in India released methyl isocyanate gas from its Bhopal facility and killed 
thousands (Trotter, Day, and Love 1989), and BP lost control of one of its drilling 
operations in the Gulf of Mexico at an incalculable environmental cost (Goldenberg 
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2010). In each of these cases, the social and environmental harm tested the firm’s very 
foundations, whether or not it was profitable. Massive industrial disasters are very 
different from the ongoing harms of tobacco, but for a utilitarian whose promethean 
perspective is supposed to anticipate the risks involved in building a dangerous chemical 
plant near a large population center and drilling far into a deep sea gas reserve near a 
biologically sensitive estuary, the accidental nature of these incidents does not authorize 
the logic that brought them to fruition. 
Just as the question of profit ignores past successes in the consideration of current 
and expected income, so too does the moral calculus deny the importance of past 
beneficial actions given current or anticipated wrongdoing. A variety of black market 
businesses also fit into this category, generating profits without positive social benefits.  
The regulatory environment is a significant factor in determining which firms fall in this 
category, and which lose money and become wanton washouts. In principle, the 
irresponsible acts that make firms perverse profiteers offer some basis for regulatory 
intervention, though such interventions may be slow, bitterly fought, and eventually 
ineffectual. As will be discussed in detail below, general legal frameworks, like limited 
liability, play an important role in defining these categories. Hansmann and Kraakman 
explain the problem:  
Some small corporations that are viable under limited liability would cease to be 
so under unlimited liability, since they could not buy adequate insurance and their 
shareholders would be unwilling to expose personal assets to the risks of a tort 
judgment. But there is no reason to assume that such small firms should exist—
that is, that they have positive net social value. In fact, an important advantage of 
unlimited liability is precisely that it would force such firms—which are 
effectively being subsidized by their tort victims—out of business. (Hansmann 
and Kraakman 1991: 1879, emphasis in original) 
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Here, the authors illustrate the complex relationship between regulation and bankruptcy. 
It is possible that some regulatory changes will cause firms to fail, but if this does occur, 
it is important to ask whether the firms ought to have existed in the first place. 
Wanton washout. The final category includes those businesses that are neither 
beneficial nor profitable. These businesses, we might presume, are unlikely to survive. 
Interestingly, this category provides some of the most famous cases in business ethics: 
asbestos; Hooker Chemicals dumping hazardous waste at Love Canal; A.H. Robins 
releasing the Dalkon Shield IUD, which caused severe pelvic infections, spontaneous 
abortions, and deaths; and numerous other projects in which temporary profit centers 
became long-term cost sources that eventually destroyed many of the firms involved. It is 
often very expensive to do the wrong thing, and the rewards can be disappointing. 
History is strewn with accountability successes where the real costs of a harmful product 
are forced back onto a company, and these incidents often result in a collapse of business 
viability. Lacking the intrinsic motivations of worthwhile business objectives, it would be 
surprising if unprofitable and morally corrupt firms persisted.  
Many illegal and black market businesses also belong in this category. Criminal 
businesses often do get caught, and the costs of criminal business often outweigh the 
benefits. The widely publicized findings that street-level drug dealers earn approximately 
minimum wage (Levitt and Venkatesh 2000), much less than media portrayals imply 
(MacCoun and Reuter 1992), provides another example of a business activity that is 
neither profitable nor beneficial.  
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The four categories emerge from a conflict between ethics and economics. When 
incentives are aligned the utilitarian account has nothing to add to the economic analysis. 
The entire universe of business can be described as either wanton washouts, which 
neither make nor ought to make profit, and ethical enterprises, which are both profitable 
and socially productive. The two other categories result from incongruence. On the basis 
of total utility, the survival of costly crusaders enhances utility, yet the economics alone 
suggests that these firms should fail. The disbanding of perverse profiteers enhances 
utility, yet the economic case suggests that these firms should survive.  
Problems with the Utilitarian Account 
This initial calculus is an oversimplification in at least two respects. First, the 
utilitarian would wish to account for the costs of transitioning from an ongoing business 
into the post-failure arrangement. It would not be enough to identify the net-harm 
produced by the organization; it would also be necessary to demonstrate that the 
destruction of that organization would be net beneficial. Further, the simplified calculus 
ignores the likely eventuality of unanticipated consequences (Merton 1936) within and 
beyond the firm. Any intervention into the system of control that determines the fate of 
firms is likely to result in a mixed set of outcomes; such is the nature of economic 
regulation. For example, one unintended consequence of regulating smoking in bars has 
been an increase in drunk driving, as the obstinate smoker-drinker drives further to 
jurisdictions where bars continue to allow smoking (Adams and Cotti 2008). One of the 
unintended consequences of destroying harmful firms is the likelihood that the same 
deviant behavior that fostered them will foster new firms in their stead. Responsible 
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business exit from irresponsible business may also require regulatory and governance 
intervention. 
Of course, all applications of utilitarianism and social policy more generally result 
in uncertainty and new risks. Though many use this uncertainty as an argument against 
all interventions, J.S. Mill suggests caution rather than inaction: “The question [of] to 
what objects governmental intervention in the affairs of society may or should extend 
[does not] admit of any universal solution” (Mill and Ashley 1920: 941-942). If the 
universal case for or against regulatory intervention does indeed fail, then we are left with 
a complex set of considerations that must be weighed before any intervention can be 
justified. This is particularly the case in rescuing companies or driving them to disband.  
If the consideration of utility is aggregated to the organizational level, one 
intuitive implication is that net harmful organizations should be destroyed and net 
beneficial organizations should be preserved. But as we move beyond the simple contrast 
and attempt to implement a system of moral selection within a population of 
organizations, a number of issues emerge that the utilitarian account is ill equipped to 
address. I will summarize four such issues: the problem of aggregating consequences to 
the firm level, the problem of accounting for consequences, the problem of regulation and 
incentives, and the problem of trading off between harms to one party and benefits to 
another.  
Aggregation. At what level should we calculate utilitarian choices? We have 
already established the distinction between act and rule utilitarianism. Rule utilitarians 
suggest that choices should be aggregated into rules to reduce the cognitive task of 
 214 
choosing. In contrast, the reason to aggregate utilitarian outcomes to the firm level are 
quite different. In the case of organizational aggregation, there are three primary 
considerations: failure is already a choice, organizations are a coherent scope for the 
aggregation of activity, and aggregation is consistent with the legal system of corporate 
personhood.  
Utilitarianism is about choices, and if failure is a choice, as I have argued, then 
the moral choice of failure invites an analysis that is aggregated to the firm level. Such an 
aggregation does not excuse or exclude other levels of analysis. This is unlike a utilitarian 
analysis of a public policy that focuses singularly on the citizens of a single nation state 
and abandons any analysis of consequences for resident aliens or citizens of other nations 
(Singer 2002). Instead, aggregation accepts a global theory of responsibility for the 
outcomes of actions causally linked to the firm, and seeks to sum the benefits and 
burdens of these acts. 
Clearly, the behaviors that are ascribed to the firm should focus on those actions 
that are caused by the existence of the firm, but this is already an underlying assumption 
of every organization-level claim. When we say that Microsoft developed Windows, that 
Google indexed a web page, or that Southwest flies to Chicago, we are saying in each 
case that the employees of these firms undertook these activities, or developed the 
technologies that did so. Thus, just as we ascribe actions to a firm, we can question its 
survival by asking questions about the totality of these ascribed actions.  
In fact, we aggregate many actions to the level of the firm, and this process is 
facilitated by the legal theory of corporate personhood. Firms write checks, incur fines, 
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make contracts, own property, and are subject to laws. Insofar as we can conceive of 
reasons why individual persons can be put to death, either as a means to deter other 
criminals or as retributions for wrongs done, we should be so much more ready to 
develop a similar line of reasoning at the organizational level.  
These are good reasons to aggregate consequences to the firm level, but they 
provide little help in determining whether the firm must fail. Clearly, it should be 
preferable that the firm should change rather than close.  But sometimes firms should fail. 
Organizations are path-dependent. Most of the time they are likely to keep doing what 
they have done before, despite good reasons for doing otherwise. The cases of tobacco 
and asbestos provide direct evidence that firms are not easily swayed from their path to 
profit, despite an understanding that such a path results in unjustifiable harms. How can a 
manager determine which firms have the fortitude to change their ways? It would seem 
preferable that the firm should be reformed through changes that would allow its 
beneficial activities to prevail over its harmful activities. There is no reason, as a matter 
of morality, why we should prefer that perverse profiteers disband rather than improve 
their practices. If anything, the reverse should be preferable. There are many 
interdependencies that exist within a modern firm, and failure can be a personally 
devastating process, the costs of which must be accounted for in the utilitarian case for 
organizational selection. Imagine that a utilitarian manager realized that his business was 
doing more harm than good. Ray Anderson, former CEO of Interface, a $1 billion 
company that specializes in carpet tile faced just this situation and was able to explain it 
in stark terms: 
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“The market, in its pricing of exchange value without regard to cost or use value, 
is, at the very least, opportunistic and permissive, if not dishonest. It will allow 
the externalization of any cost that an unwary, uncaring, or gullible public will 
permit to be externalized—caveat emptor in a perverse kind of way. My God! Am 
I a thief, too? Yes!... I am a plunderer of the earth and a thief—today, a legal 
thief. The perverse tax laws, by failing to correct the errant market to internalize 
those externalities such as the costs of global warming and pollution, are my 
accomplices in crime. I am part of the endemic process that is going on at a 
frightening, accelerating rate worldwide to rob our children and their children, 
and theirs, and theirs, of their futures.” (Anderson 1998: 6-7) 
Anderson recognized the crisis of conscience in the corporation that he had started. He 
described himself as a “plunderer,” but the next logical step was not for his firm to close: 
it was for the firm to refocus its efforts on the sustainability of its practices. Such 
reformation is much more obvious as an avenue for change than the complete destruction 
of the firm. Yet, Anderson acknowledges that firms that fail to behave responsibly should 
die. He is particularly perturbed by the environmental posturing of disingenuous firms:  
“We must be genuine. Our actions must speak louder than our words. Greenwash 
(pseudo-green) is, and should be, business suicide. Our customers should and will 
see right through it” (Anderson 1998: 72).  
Anderson’s argument is pragmatic. It assumes the overlapping of ethics and economics 
and denies the possibility of perverse profiteers. Yet, cases like tobacco and asbestos 
challenge this assumption. It is possible that scrutiny will eventually lead to 
accountability, but it may take a very long time for this to occur.  
And what if carpet production, like tobacco sales, cannot be conducted 
responsibly? What if it became clear that the product life cycle for carpet was 
unjustifiably harmful and that a change in business models would be costly beyond the 
financial capacity of the firm? A manager faced with such a situation might find that too 
much fixed capital had already been invested in a harmful production process, and that 
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too many callous managers had already acquiesced to that business model. Given such a 
situation, as a matter of morality it would be incumbent upon the manager to convince the 
board, and through them the shareholders, that the business should be closed. And even 
that might not be enough. Utilitarianism may also require that this manager salt the earth, 
to ensure that no other businesses be permitted to operate in this harmful way. This is 
arguably what tobacco companies ought to have done 100 years ago when the first health 
effects of their products came to light.  
The problem of aggregation is therefore addressed through a two-step process. In 
the first step, the morally underperforming firm seeks improvement by increasing social 
benefit and decreasing social harm. If this is successful, the firm becomes net-beneficial 
and the process is complete. However, if a good faith effort fails to create a net-beneficial 
organization, then the organization is left with no other option and utilitarianism would 
require that the organization disband. 
Accounting. How are we to know the net benefit of the organization? The 
advantage of accounting for money is that there is an objective standard. Granted, there is 
considerable wiggle room within this objective standard. Nonetheless, in economic 
accounting, an established process calculates and tracks the realization of revenue and 
costs according to a set of professional standards. Utilitarianism, however, concerns itself 
with measuring the aggregate happiness realized from different possible states of the 
world. That problem admits of no easy solution (Posner 1981). 
 There are important movements attempting to measure the non-economic costs of 
business, notably triple-bottom-line accounting (Elkington 1998; Zhao and Kuh 2004), 
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and these attempts should be applauded. But two problems present themselves as entities 
endeavor to measure their own impact. First, they struggle with measuring and comparing 
against a common standard given the diversity of valued ends. And second, they struggle 
with third party effects that are not easily measured or anticipated.  
There are many consequences of business that are not easily reduced to economic 
measures. If a business pollutes a stream in a way that makes the water undrinkable for 
the foreseeable future, there is an economic cost to this loss for those communities that 
depended on that stream. The value of that loss is calculable, but the ancillary biological 
costs of the pollution are difficult to measure. Worse still are the human costs that cannot 
be reduced to economic measures. What is the cost of losing a nice place to sit and read a 
book? What is the cost of a disfiguring injury or an intellectual impairment? The 
settlements for cases involving these personal costs provide a measure of how they are 
valued within a legal system, but for many people the value of money and the value of 
health and well-being are incommensurable (Anderson 1993). Incommensurable goods 
are not reducible to a single measure with which the fate of a firm can be determined. 
This includes fundamental aspects of a firm like the community of employees and the 
position that the firm fills within the wider economy.  
If placing a price tag on community is difficult, measuring the broader market 
implications of a failure is nearly impossible. Large entities have primary connections to 
many other firms and secondary connections to a sizeable portion of the economy. When 
large firms fail, the shock is felt first by their employees, investors, creditors, customers, 
and suppliers, but the shock may also reach the employees of their suppliers, the 
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customers of their customers, and so on. Interdependencies were a primary justification 
provided in the 2008 bailouts, and a source of significant contention (Walsh 2009). 
Though these are plausible justifications, the justifications are not quantitatively derived. 
The real costs of allowing AIG, GM, or other firms to fail are unknown and perhaps 
inestimable.  
Regulation. Should the state make socially valuable firms profit when the market 
fails to do so? Should the state regulate harmful business activities to reduce negative 
externalities of business? One could imagine that a benevolent regulator of the market 
would wish to achieve just such an end, but not know where to begin. Problems of value 
measurement are central to the convoluted evaluation of the United States’ Troubled 
Asset Relief Program. Moral hazards are one of the first critiques. Critics argue that 
government subsidy reinforces bad behavior and encourages imprudent risk taking. Yet 
even hard-nosed economists can justify subsidies and regulations where true market 
failures are involved. Examples include the adoption of new technologies with network 
externalities (Katz and Shapiro 1985), the creation of public spaces, and the regulation of 
pollution (Cornes and Sandler 1986). There are different ways of dealing with these 
externalities, but there is little doubt that they must be dealt with somehow. For example 
much of the debate on carbon emissions concerns the choice between hard limits and 
tradable limits. Should pollution be restricted or should a market for pollution be created? 
The choice will affect whether organizations are viable and for how long. Hard limits 
might immediately destroy the least efficient firms whereas tradable credits might allow 
some of these firms to be sustained. The fact that regulation can cause firms to fail is 
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either an indictment of the policy or of the firms, but trying to preserve firms can create 
odd motivations as well. Some businesses might choose to appear burdened by regulation 
in order to justify subsidy. 
Tradeoffs. Does benefit for one party justify harm for another? On utilitarian 
grounds, it would seem that it does. Imagine a misanthropic but law-abiding firm that 
causes a variety of harms. The firm mistreats employees, distributes unnecessarily 
harmful products, and neglects shareholders by overcompensating unremarkable 
executives. Suppose that the harms to these parties outweigh the benefit received by 
others. If the firm identified children with leukemia as a dire social cause, and managed 
to materially improve their welfare, could the increased welfare among the children 
justify the firm’s survival? Can the firm’s philanthropy offset its misanthropy? There are 
many reasons to think that such a tradeoff would be unfair, even if it resulted in a better 
social situation for the children. It may be argued that the employees, shareholders, and 
customers have rights that cannot be disregarded or overridden by a virtuous act directed 
elsewhere.  
Yet, the tradeoff critique may overstate the case against utilitarianism. The 
greatest good may be served by excellence in the corporation, and excellence may be 
characterized by respect for employees, concern for customers, consideration of 
shareholders, and appropriate uses of the firm’s resources for targeted social 
improvement. The problem of tradeoffs is very real, but if these problems are 
overemphasized they may dominate cognitive models for how problems are solved. 
Concerned with this, business ethics educators and practitioners might do well to focus 
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on identifying ways that firms can increase the production frontier and thereby benefit all 
stakeholders. As Freeman argues: 
“Redescribing corporations means redescribing ourselves and our communities. 
We cannot divorce the idea of a moral community or of a moral discourse from 
the ideas of the value-creation activity of business. To do so, entails the 
acceptance of a principle, the Separation Thesis, which has for too long been used 
to close off discussion and to silence conversation.” (Freeman 1994: 419) 
And so, it is at least worthy of note that an overemphasis upon tradeoff constitutes a shift 
from the value creation activity that is at the heart of business ethics. The conflicts are 
undeniable and unavoidable, but many businesses manage to operate as ethical 
enterprises without sacrificing the interests of one party for another. 
The problems of aggregation, accounting, regulation and tradeoffs present special 
problems for the utilitarian who would apply her logic to the question of organizational 
survival. Yet, even taken together, these issues are not sufficient to cast doubt upon the 
larger project. The intuition stands that the most beneficial firms should survive and that 
the least should cease operation. What seems to be missing from the utilitarian account is 
a theory of organizational legitimacy that is sensitive to the deontic constraints of 
economic life. The next section provides the basic features of such a theory.  
The Legitimate Should Survive: Rights and Fairness 
The utilitarian account emerges as a close parallel to the standard economic logic 
of organizational failure, and it is useful as a baseline to demonstrate that the profit 
imperative is not a comprehensive criterion for the survival of business. However, the 
extension of this view offers little insight into the relative priorities of business. The 
notion of business as a beneficial entity is exceedingly vague, and other than eking out a 
modicum of social and environmental betterment, the theory provides almost no content 
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in terms of how a firm ought to behave. Yet, in cases that call a firm’s survival into 
question there are numerous factors and distinct social values that are involved in the 
larger calculus. For the deontologist, the question is not whether the firm is beneficial, 
but whether it is legitimate. 
Theories of legitimacy in organizational analysis were conceived in starkly 
survivalist terms. Unlike the literatures that they have fostered, many earlier treatments of 
legitimacy focus on the existence of a firm. For instance, “Legitimation is the process 
whereby an organization justifies to a peer or superordinate system its right to exist.” 
(Maurer 1971: 361). Similarly, “Organizational legitimacy refers to… the extent to which 
the array of established cultural accounts provide explanations for [a firm's] existence” 
(Meyer and Scott 1983: 201). More recent conceptions of legitimacy are somewhat less 
concerned with the existential questions than with a more continuous friction between an 
organization and its environment. Suchman, for example, offers the following definition, 
“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions” (1995: 574). Suchman’s definition is more general, but it 
also dilutes the sense of power that the perspective has over the entity’s fate. To ask 
whether a firm is desirable, proper, or appropriate is very different than asking whether 
that firm ought to exist.  
But the stark question of legitimacy and survival continues to be raised in some 
settings. Private military companies are one extreme example of entities that are 
beleaguered with a crisis of legitimacy. Elms and Phillips (2009) argue that the pragmatic 
 223 
legitimacy of these firms derives from the value that they provide directly to their 
stakeholders, particularly those that pay for their services. On the other hand, their moral 
legitimacy involves the interplay of reciprocity in their relationships to various external 
constituencies, including the communities where they are permitted to operate. Unlike the 
utilitarian, who is relatively willing to trade-off between benefits for some parties and 
harms for others, Elms and Phillips suggest that profits for security contractors and safety 
for their customers are not sufficient to provide these firms with moral legitimacy, it is 
the wider lens upon which such legitimacy depends.  
The distinction between pragmatic and moral legitimacy is an important part of 
this argument, but when Suchman developed that distinction (Suchman 1995), he did so 
in utilitarian terms, arguing that moral legitimacy concerns “judgments about whether the 
activity ‘is the right thing to do.’ These judgments, in turn, usually reflect beliefs about 
whether the activity effectively promotes social welfare” (579). Whose welfare must a 
corporation promote in order to justify its survival? What is “social welfare” in this 
context? 
John Rawls is one of the most influential critics of tradeoffs in human welfare. 
Rawls argued for basic institutions that maximize the welfare of the worst off (Rawls 
1999). For him, the question was not merely, “What makes the largest cake?” but also, 
“Who gets to eat it?” In Rawls’ view, deviations from equality are justifiable insofar as 
they improve the welfare of the worst off. The Rawlsian view differs from the utilitarian 
view in two key respects. First, it places deontic constraints on acceptable means for the 
promotion of social welfare: “Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully 
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adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same 
scheme of liberties for all” (Rawls and Kelly 2001: 42). And second, wealth is to be 
distributed through positions that are open to all through equal opportunity and “are to be 
to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society” (Rawls and Kelly 
2001: 43). So, while Rawls shares the logic of maximization with utilitarians, his 
argument precludes the tyranny of the majority or the supremacy of the minority and thus 
it is an egalitarian argument. However, Rawls explicitly limits his argument from being 
applied to individual morality, arguing that the agreement upon basic institutions did not 
require a comprehensive doctrine that would force every individual to redefine her own 
definition of the good. Others have argued that egalitarian views do require personal 
forbearance in the interest of fairness (Cohen 2000). 
In business ethics Rawls is applied directly to considerations of meaningful work, 
workplace democracy (Hsieh 2008), equality of opportunity, and executive compensation 
(Harris 2009). Freeman suggests another application that requires a much looser 
interpretation of a Rawlsian approach: 
One way to understand fairness in this context is to claim a la Rawls that a 
contract is fair if parties to the contract would agree to it in ignorance of their 
actual stakes. Thus, a contract is like a fair bet, if each party is willing to turn the 
tables and accept the other side. What would a fair contract among corporate 
stakeholders look like? If we can articulate this ideal, a sort of corporate 
constitution, we could then ask whether actual corporations measure up to this 
standard, and we also begin to design corporate structures which are consistent 
with this Doctrine of Fair Contracts.” (Freeman 1994: 416) 
Freeman goes on to propose that under such an arrangement, any modifications to the 
contract should be unanimously consensual and all externalities should require a 
renegotiation of the contract that would include those who were unwittingly involved in 
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the agreement. Phillips has a similar idea in mind when he suggests a principle of 
stakeholder fairness as a basis for evaluations of organizational legitimacy (Phillips 
1997). He suggests a principle of fairness to govern stakeholder relations:  
Whenever persons or groups of persons voluntarily accept the benefits of a 
mutually beneficial scheme of co-operation requiring sacrifice or contribution on 
the parts of the participants and there exists the possibility of free-riding, 
obligations of fairness are created among the participants in the co-operative 
scheme in proportion to the benefits accepted. (Phillips 2003b: 92) 
This principle creates obligations between cooperating parties relative to their 
contributions and their benefits. Phillips uses the principle to develop a conception of 
stakeholder legitimacy, arguing for which stakeholders have rights within the firm 
(Phillips 2003a). But the principle is extensible to the entity level.  
While Phillips (2003a) remains primarily focused on deriving the moral 
legitimacy of stakeholders, his emphasis on the reciprocity of relationships 
between firms and stakeholders suggests a similar logic for the moral legitimacy 
of firms. Firms derive moral legitimacy from recognizing their responsibilities to 
morally legitimate stakeholders (Elms and Phillips 2009: 407) 
We might extend the principle to suggest a fairness-based principle of organizational 
survival:  
Firms that fail to recognize their responsibilities to morally legitimate 
stakeholders ought not exist. 
 
A fairness-based approach to developing a positive theory of organizational legitimacy 
provides the first deontological perspective, and Phillips and Elms have come closer to 
applying this theory directly to the question of which firms should survive than anyone 
else. The implications of their view are important for organizational analysis and business 
ethics in general, and the findings will overlap considerably with the utilitarian 
perspective on organizational survival. Wanton washouts and perverse profiteers are 
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illegitimate because they fail to respect the reciprocity upon which the principle of 
stakeholder fairness is based. However, unlike the utilitarian, fair play cannot justify the 
preservation of social enterprise or other entities that the market mechanism is unable to 
support. Costly crusaders, the darlings of the utilitarian view, have no ground to stand 
upon in the principle of stakeholder fairness. In those terms, it was fair that they fail. 
The second possible application derives from a conception of human rights. 
Whereas the Elms and Phillips approach seeks to theorize legitimacy through a 
conception of the firm, Donaldson (1997) expresses the obligations of corporations that 
are similar to the obligations of individual persons. He begins with the obligations that all 
persons share for protecting all other persons and their basic rights, as defended by Henry 
Shue (1996). Firms, as collections of people, may be said to inherit many of the 
obligations of individual persons. This sort of argument has a very long history. Plato, for 
instance, attempted to explain the virtuous city with a reference to the virtuous man 
(Plato 1992 [380 B.C.E.]). Part of the novelty of Rawls was the assertion of a sharply 
delineated domain for social justice at a level of abstraction that differs from individual 
morality. Yet, corporations are arguably much more like persons than basic institutions. 
Assuming freedom of entry and exit, firms are comprised consensually and therefore 
situations in which individual persons act according to their own choices. So, why would 
these freely choosing people not be subject to the same obligations as corporate actors to 
which they are subjected as individuals? Donaldson revises Shue’s argument to define a 
list of rights and correlative duties that are limited according to the specific nature of the 
corporation and its purpose. In his view, there are responsibilities that belong to persons 
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and nation-states, but are not entirely relevant to corporations. For instance, firms have an 
obligation to avoid depriving a person’s freedom of physical movement, but not to help 
to defend this right. Non-discriminatory treatment, however, requires that firms avoid 
depriving it and help protect from its deprivation. Donaldson’s argument is one of many 
that define what corporations ought not to do and what they must do in the language of 
rights and duties. Some aspects of his argument are incontrovertible. For instance, most 
would agree that a corporation ought not limit a person’s freedom of physical movement. 
The question is whether these deontic constraints are sufficiently substantial to be linked 
directly to a corporation’s right to exist. 
The extension of corporate obligations to respect human rights to the question of 
organizational survival moves beyond the established literature. Should firms survive if 
they violate basic rights? We might presume that chronic offenders of any one of these 
principles may be appropriately described as illegitimate and their survival called into 
question. The principle is similar to a firm’s failure to treat stakeholders fairly: 
Firms that violate basic rights ought not exist. 
The view provides an even more narrowly defined set of organizational obligations than 
the reciprocity argument originating in stakeholder fairness. There are, however, some 
issues highlighted here that are not so easily conceptualized within the other views. For 
instance, a corporation’s duty to help protect freedom of speech and association, which 
Donaldson asserts may be easily overlooked by the utilitarian and fairness views. 
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Limitations of the Rights and Fairness Accounts 
The rights and fairness approaches each have their own strengths, and they do 
avoid some of the limitations of the utilitarian view. For instance, neither is prone to 
unjustifiable tradeoffs that would harm one party to benefit another. However, they lack 
key criteria as well. They offer little or no insight into what firms are morally worthy and 
worth protection from bankruptcy, they offer no theory of proportionality based upon an 
internal logic for when excessive wrongdoing justifies closure, and they offer little 
insight into the problem of aggregation that plagued the utilitarian account as well. 
Costly crusaders. Can the fairness approach or the rights-based approach say 
anything about which failing firms ought to survive on moral grounds? Though these 
firms provide some aspirations for firms to be fair and respect rights, these aspirations are 
not sufficiently specific to distinguish between a costly crusader and a useless (but 
harmless) organization.  
It may be desirable that we separate the positive and negative calculus. There is a 
tradition within management theory that suggests that positive and negative assertions of 
viability should rely upon different justifications. Drucker expresses the contrast: 
The first test of any business is not the maximization of profit but the achievement 
of sufficient profit to cover the risks of economic activity and thus to avoid loss. 
The root of the confusion is the mistaken belief that the motive of a person—the 
so-called profit motive of the businessman—is an explanation of his behavior or 
his guide to right action. [The profit motive] is irrelevant for an understanding of 
business behavior, profit, and profitability whether there is a profit motive or not. 
That Jim Smith is in business to make a profit concerns only him and the 
Recording Angel. It does not tell us what Jim Smith does and how he performs…. 
In fact, the concept is worse than irrelevant: it does harm.…. It is in large part 
responsible for the prevailing belief that there is an inherent contradiction 
between profit and a company’s ability to make a social contribution. Actually, a 
company can make a social contribution only if it is highly profitable. To put it 
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crudely, a bankrupt company is not likely to be a good company to work for, or 
likely to be a good neighbor and a desirable member of the community—no 
matter what some sociologists of today seem to believe to the contrary. (Drucker 
1974:60-61)  
Nested within Drucker’s critique of the “profit motive” is a subtle distinction between 
failure and success. In Drucker’s view, organizations that cannot generate profit cannot 
be sustained, and thus are not socially beneficial. There is no room within this argument 
for the rescue of the costly crusader, but there is room for the objection to the profits of 
the perverse profiteer, as there might also be on fairness, and human rights grounds, 
depending on the nature of the social harms that make the firm morally bankrupt. 
 The rights based views are clearly incomplete in this particular area. This is not 
merely a matter of “moral free space” (Dunfee and Donaldson 1999: 38). Though we do 
wish to allow room for organizations to pursue whatever values are beneficial to their 
members and others, it is nonetheless important that a conception of organizational 
survival account for the contributions of the firm, even those that are not contributing to 
financial performance. 
Proportionality. One of the admirable qualities of the fairness approach is that it 
gives organizations something to strive for rather than merely something to avoid. The 
problem with both the fairness-based approach and the rights-based theory is the question 
of magnitude. The utilitarian scheme provided a hard-line distinction between net benefit 
and net harm, and that distinction originated within the logic of the argument itself. But 
what about an unfair firm implies that once things have become abjectly unfair, that firm 
ought not exist? Friends cheating at a game may lead a person to quit playing, but that 
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implies organizational exit for individuals. At what point should a person destroy the 
game so that they can never cheat again? The rights logic offers few additional answers.  
Aggregation. If one person in an organization with 10,000 employees is 
responsible for severe misconduct, say, the murder of an activist in a place where the 
company does business, should the firm not exist? The crime is severe, and the individual 
who is involved should be punished, but what good is served in destroying the company? 
The crime is a capital offense for a person in many jurisdictions, but should it be a capital 
offense for a firm? Any argument that can be made to this end must necessarily come 
from outside of the basic rights logic, because these constraints offer no clear path for 
evaluating the firm as a whole. As faulty as the utilitarian’s aggregation seemed to be, 
and as troubling as the tradeoffs permitted by it were, it did provide a discrete answer to 
the question of which firms should survive. The prevailing rights-based accounts only 
offer more questions. 
Conclusion 
Utility, rights, and fairness offer helpful insights on which firms should fail, but the 
insights are inconclusive and incomparable. Utilitarianism provides a coherent theory 
with little practical value. It is difficult enough to know the consequences of a single act; 
it is nearly impossible to sum up the benefits of a complex corporation. And worse, 
without additional constraints, utilitarianism would allow a firm to harm one party as a 
means to benefitting another, a tradeoff that violates the basic nature of consensual and 
mutually advantageous participation in the market. 
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Deontology remedies the defects of utilitarianism while introducing its own 
inconclusiveness. It would not allow a party to benefit at the expense of another and 
would prohibit violations of human rights, yet it offers little insight into when these 
violations warrant organizational failure, presumably as a form of punishment. 
Retributivism, a deontological theory of punishment, suggests that the punishment should 
fit the crime, but the theory is criticized for offering an underdetermined schedule of 
punishments (Pincoffs 1977). If it is difficult for retribution to be meted out on person-to-
person crimes where the concepts of harm are at least comparable at the same scale, the 
difficulty is worsened in choosing a punishment for an entity. To forcibly disband a firm 
as punishment for its rights-violating acts seems reasonable if serious injustices occur, 
but whether the line should be drawn to include only genocide and crimes against 
humanity or a broader set of crimes is an interpretive matter. 
Stakeholder fairness prohibits tradeoffs that unfairly disadvantage a collaborator 
or burden third parties. It suggests that mutual benefit through collaboration is the end of 
business, which gives some indication of what a malformed business would look like, 
and how disbanding might be justified. Yet, like deontology, the theory provides no 
bright line that might distinguish firms that should disband from those that should not.  
The next chapter provides a property-based account of which firms should 
survive. In so doing, it develops an alternative conception of the purpose of the 
corporation. The argument shares characteristics with all three approaches presented in 
this chapter. It takes the conception of positive and negative externalities from 
utilitarianism and economics, reciprocity and mutual benefit from stakeholder fairness, 
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and cross culturally universal “moral minimums” from the rights-based approach. 
However, in the end, it stands on its own as a theory of property and profit in failing 
firms. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
LEGITIMACY, PROPERTY, AND SURVIVAL 
Introduction 
A fully adequate normative approach to corporate failure must deal with the 
divergent views outlined in the last chapter and play to each of their strengths. It must 
acknowledge that firms should provide net benefit, but that firms cannot do so by 
harming third parties. It must affirm the importance of fairness within the firm and 
require that firms are respectful of the rights of shareholders. A theory of failure should 
provide a means for dealing with these different perspectives on economic life and 
integrating them into a more comprehensive view. It might even exceed them, and 
recognize the interdependence of failure where supply chains create distance between 
firms and the consequences of their policies.  
In this chapter, a property-based account of organizational failure provides such a 
framework, an approach upon which these competing considerations can be addressed in 
parallel. The account may be quickly described in the following way. Firms ought to 
survive when they provide morally substantive entitlements to profit, and they should fail 
when they are unable to do so. In unpacking the notion of profit entitlement, we are able 
to integrate the concepts of social benefit, deontic constraints, and fairness. 
There are five key advantages of this approach relative to the accounts explored in 
the preceding chapter. First, it integrates the considerations of other parties into the fabric 
of the firm itself, providing a basis for a pluralistic theory of value that considers fairness, 
rights, and utility within the same calculus. Second, it recognizes the importance of 
 234 
imposing the burden of failure on the appropriate parties. By targeting the parties who 
ought to incur the costs of organizational acts, the approach opens the way for reformed 
firms to survive and for firms that ought to fail to be quickly inspired to do so. Third, the 
approach is dynamic. It avoids a global calculus of benefit and harm, replacing these 
notions with a more immediate question of revenue and costs. It follows ordinary 
business logic even more closely than the utilitarian account in the previous chapter. 
Fourth, the property-based approach allows for a positive theory of organizational 
survival. Many firms lose money, but some losses are more regrettable than others. 
Regrettable losses constitute a special category that raises (but does not answer) the 
question of public subsidy and individual career sacrifice to sustain underperforming 
firms. And fifth, the property approach reconnects organizational survival with the larger 
industrial context. The property-based approach requires that all costs be internalized 
upstream within a supply chain in order to justify profits further downstream, 
acknowledging that a firm’s right to exist cannot be determined in isolation of other firms 
and their responsibilities. 
This entitlement basis for a theory of property requires that we differentiate 
between legitimate and illegitimate profit, a difference that can be difficult to identify. As 
Balzac wrote, “At the bottom of every great fortune without apparent source, there's 
always some crime—a crime overlooked because it's been carried out 
respectably”(Balzac 2004: 118). When it comes to wealth derived from respectable 
crimes, there are few sources that are better sanitized than profit. The origins of profit are 
easily forgotten: once distributed to employees and shareholders, no trace remains of 
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corruption, illegality, or environmental harm. The same can be said for profit derived 
from corporate torts and contractual breaches. The respectable origins of irresponsibly-
derived profit are reinforced by the governance structure of the firm. Those who have 
benefited from crimes may transfer their obligations to non-beneficiaries before the costs 
are incurred. If employees and shareholders who benefit from corporate misdeeds do not 
bear the costs, the result is divergent moral and economic motivations. 
To explore the problem of corporate crime and unjust enrichment, I consider a 
specific case of corruption at Siemens AG. In December of 2008, Siemens pled guilty to 
a globally systemic bribery strategy. The New York Times headline read, “At Siemens, 
Bribery Was Just a Line Item” (Schubert and Miller 2008). The $1.6 billion settlement 
was the largest in history. The scandal implicated senior Siemens executives and 
accountants, along with public officials from more than a dozen countries. The SEC 
complaint covers a period from 2001 to 2007 and documents Siemens’ $1.1 billion in 
profits from 312 projects associated with proven offenses. Siemens AG employees bribed 
public officials on the firm’s behalf from 2002 to 2007. The firm, and its stakeholders, 
profited from their crimes. By the time Siemens had negotiated its fine in late 2008, the 
human substance of the firm had changed. In the end, it was the shareholders and 
employees who would pay, but not the same subset who had first benefited from the 
crime. In answering the question of “who should pay?” we also begin to theorize the 
nature of moral entitlements to profit.  
The plan for this chapter is as follows. The first section proposes responsible 
business as the means through which moral entitlements to profit are generated. A 
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comparison between the profit-from-responsibility view and the historical conception of 
property entitlements reveals a sharp contrast. Profit claims must be justified in a 
forward-looking way based upon the to-be-discovered accuracy of statements of revenue 
and cost. As long as irresponsibility is latent (unobserved and excluded from costs), then 
profits are morally indeterminate.  
The second section argues that the status quo arrangements of limited liability and 
corporate personhood do not address this latency. In fact, it is these arrangements that 
create special problems. As a result, there are more failures than are necessary because 
wayward agents have incentives to hide improprieties so that discoveries are sudden and 
devastating to firm value. These arguments are demonstrated in the third section through 
the case of corruption at Siemens AG.  
The third section provides four key arguments for specific duties between 
beneficiaries of organizational harm and the victim of these harms. Though it is 
acknowledged that some limits should be placed on these duties where parties were able 
to anticipate risk and negotiate ex ante, the argument is shown to hold at least for tort 
violations and crimes, an argument that follows a defense of unlimited liability found in 
legal analysis. 
The fourth section takes the example of corruption at Siemens AG as a means to 
identify the relative strength of stakeholder claims over profits at different times during 
the Siemens corruption scandal. Broadly speaking, employees who actively perpetrated 
corruption are found to have the weakest claims, employees who were not directly 
involved but should have noticed the normative laxity have slightly stronger claims, and 
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shareholders who are unaware of any likelihood of transgressive behavior have stronger 
claims still, but none of these parties has claims to Siemens profit that exceed the claims 
of the citizens who overpaid for Siemens services through their taxes because of 
Siemens’ corrupt payments to their officials. 
The fifth and sixth sections concern an alternative scheme of stakeholder 
responsibility, and apply this scheme to the problem of organizational failure. By 
redesigning the system of governance so that mistreated stakeholders can reclaim profits, 
the corporation can be made to provide morally justified income to its shareholders and 
managers, and these parties can thus be motivated to destroy firms that produce more 
harm than benefit. This section focuses on the special problem of measuring and inspiring 
organizational social and economic performance. 
The Entitlement to Profit: Ethics, Economics, and Property 
Without the misalignment of economic and ethical motivations, there would be no 
need for the field of business ethics and no cases worth discussing. No arguments would 
be necessary to demand respect for employees, information for investors, or safety for 
customers; the market would provide. The business ethics faculty would be similarly 
superfluous. Who needs professors if the market teaches the lessons of ethics? 
Organizational failure would proceed whether a firm failed morally or ethically, and the 
worthiest firms would attract the most capital. 
Sometimes ethics and economics seem to be fully aligned. Sometimes ethics pays 
and impropriety is costly. But to focus only on these congruent cases is to deny the darker 
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alternatives of costly moral acts and irresponsible profit. The incongruent cases set up the 
central tension in the field of business ethics, the struggle between ethics and economics.  
Table 6: Ethics, Economics and Entitlements 
   Ethics 
    Wrong Right 
Economics Profit 
Unjust Enrichment 
(Perverse Profiteer) 
Substantive Entitlement 
(Ethical Enterprise) 
Loss 
Justified Loss 
(Wanton Washout) 
Unjust Impoverishment 
(Costly Crusader) 
In Table 6 the upper right and lower left quadrants represent congruent cases where the 
incentives are aligned: righteous acts yield profit and reprehensible acts cause losses. The 
upper left and lower right quadrants represent a normative conflict between egoistic 
motives and ethical ones. In these cases, profits result from doing the wrong thing, and 
losses from doing it right. The table develops the same contrast as the utilitarian theory in 
the last chapter, but it focuses at the level of activity10 rather than the larger entity and it 
is focused on the entitlement to profit that such an activity generates. 
The possibility of profiting from immoral activities has important implications for 
a system of property. Profit from ethical activities yields a substantive entitlement. When 
morally sound activities lead to profit, those parties who lay claim to the profit have a 
strong ownership claim. However, irresponsible activities provide no such property 
claim: instead, irresponsible profits are often owed to others. What is justifiable for 
irresponsible business? Probably losses: it seems that irresponsible actors whose 
businesses flounder may be said to deserve their losses. 
                                                
10 I take the term “activity” from the performance management literature where activity-based costing is an 
attempt to ascribe costs to specific activities. As Meyer (2002) argues, if firms can also relate revenues to 
these same activities, then it is possible to evaluate them based on their contributions to firm performance, 
at least until clever individuals learn to game the metrics and drive all of the variance out of the measures. 
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The economic justice of losing out by doing the right thing is an open and 
interesting question. It is unlikely that anyone has a “right” to profit such that a loss 
caused by moral action would justify claims against others. But a more limited claim is 
defensible: insofar as others are profiting in the same industry from irresponsible 
behavior it is unjust, or at least unfair, that the responsible actor be punished for ethical 
acts. Also, consistent with the market failure argument for positive externalities, if a 
needed service is not being adequately valued because the market fails to measure 
benefits derived from that service, then there may be a case for public subsidy or private 
philanthropy in the promotion of the service, regardless of profitability. 
The consequences of an irresponsible act resulting in profit are not merely the 
negative outcomes of the activity itself. The misdistribution of resources that results is 
also objectionable as a matter of property, and a similar market failure argument applies. 
If the market fails to capture negative externalities and to incorporate them into costs, 
then resources are likely to be misallocated to the harmful activity. The concern for 
property theory is that property allocated as profit to undeserving parties could motivate 
impropriety, forcing economics and ethics into tension.  
This scheme is an oversimplification because is not always possible for an 
organization to meet all of the expectations of its stakeholders. Whenever people 
cooperate to achieve a common end, their interests remain distinct. Yet their efforts and 
resources become commingled. It is almost inevitable that the fruits of their labor will fail 
to serve some of their interests, and that a subset of the group will be disappointed. While 
this outcome may be unavoidable, it is nonetheless to be regretted by all members of the 
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cooperating group that all cannot benefit equally, or in measure with their efforts and 
contributions, a view established by Phillips’ principle of stakeholder fairness. So, while 
the initial typology implies a sharp distinction between substantive entitlement and unjust 
enrichment, there is sometimes a “moral remainder” (Williams 1973b) that is beyond the 
means of the firm, but nonetheless within its responsibilities. Boundary cases are possible 
where individuals are substantively entitled to their benefits despite the existence of 
disappointments among their fellow stakeholders.  
 The property claims typology can be consistently applied to most ethics cases. For 
example, consider the case of corruption at Siemens AG. After an international 
investigation, Siemens pled guilty for bribery in late 2008. The SEC complaint identified 
312 projects associated with proven offenses. The projects resulted in more than a billion 
dollars of profit for Siemens. According to the initial typology, insofar as bribery is 
wrong, the case belongs in the left column, and because the bribes resulted in more than a 
billion dollars of profit, the case should be in the top row. Siemens’ bribery initially 
resulted in unjust enrichment, the upper left quadrant. Many people benefited from 
Siemens’ performance in the course of this bribe-induced profitability, including 
managers, shareholders, investors, and creditors. The eventual revelation of the Siemens 
transgression resulted in the largest fine in history, and some of these parties were 
subsequently made responsible for paying restitution through the Siemens fine. But this 
fine does not change the problem of prior distributions of resources that are no longer 
justified. Siemens had already distributed ill-begotten gains, and recovery of these funds 
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is precluded by the limited liability structure of the firm.  I will argue that such resources 
could be rightfully reclaimed (or “clawed back”) from those who are not entitled to them. 
Though the conflict between individual motivations and moral duties is a 
universal tension in the human experience, modern business life strains the conflict far 
beyond its normal bounds. Limited liability allows individuals who have benefited from 
irresponsible acts to avoid paying restitution, provided that they’ve already sold their 
shares. More generally, the social organization of economic life moves individual persons 
through firms, careers, locations, and communities so that individuals often avoid the 
costs of their own misdeeds.  
Many irresponsible acts are either never recognized or recognized long after the 
harm is done. If and when irresponsibility is discovered, its costs are often borne by 
innocent parties who arrived after the transgression occurred. I refer to this problem as 
latent irresponsibility. One of the property implications of latent irresponsibility is the 
unjust distribution of profit to managers and shareholders when other parties have more 
substantive claims. Just allocations of corporate profits require individual persons who 
have benefited from collective or corporate crimes to pay remedy to victims, the same 
may be said for civil liabilities as well.  
Unjust enrichment warrants special concern for business ethics, because it pits 
pecuniary motivations against moral motivations11. Maitland (1997) describes the market 
as a “school of the virtues,” and some markets seem to work towards this optimistic end. 
                                                
11 I use the legal terminology of “unjust enrichment” because, as I will argue below, the 
intentional participation of the enriched person is irrelevant to the justice of desert. It is not 
important that the person intended the harm, only that the harm occurred and thus undermines her 
claim on the property that she gained. 
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But when markets teach their lessons to the successors of irresponsible actors without 
cost to the original offenders, then the wrong people are being schooled.  
Property. At a basic level, unjust enrichment is a problem of chronological 
perspective in a theory of property. Whether intellectual, physical, or real, most property 
claims are based upon historical justifications. As Nozick writes, “Justice in holdings is 
historical. It depends on what actually has happened” (Nozick 1974: 152). Intellectual 
property originates in authorship and assignment of creator rights. Physical property is 
either claimed or transferred so that the history of the object can justify a person’s claim 
upon it. Even redistributions of property through taxes are backward looking. Though a 
more elaborate account of property has substantial implications for business ethics 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995; Munzer 1990), this chapter relies on a basic feature of 
property as historically determined.  
It is not difficult to make concrete statements regarding the nature of property. In 
most aspects of interpersonal life, people have relatively clear understandings of who 
owns what. Norms of ownership and transfer exist within all human communities, and 
while these norms differ, they are nonetheless coherent such that people know or can 
determine who, if anyone, has a special claim to a given resource. I call this coherence 
property determinacy. 
Unlike the norms of ownership and transfer, the notion of organizational profit is 
eternally incomplete and temporally uncertain. Whereas a determination can be made 
regarding a stolen bicycle as to who has a justified ownership claim based upon the 
history of that object, a mere historical analysis of the hands through which a stock has 
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passed is not sufficient to justify the relative merit of a claim upon an organization’s 
resources. Given uncertain costs, consequence, and finality, corporate profits are morally 
indeterminate. The costs and consequences of business are often not known until after 
business activity is completed, sometimes long after. More basically, it is not possible for 
all of the consequences of an act to be recognized prior to or during the act itself. It is not 
even possible to know how long one must wait for such recognition. And without 
certainty of the costs of doing business at any point in time, the moral justification of 
claims to the residual of those costs remains unproven. Costs are hidden by accident, 
ignorance, willful ignorance, and malice (Mulford and Comiskey 2002), but lacking an 
omniscient accountant, it is simply not possible for a balance sheet to state all costs in the 
present tense.  
Must we be Prophets to Measure Profit? 
If we cannot anticipate all costs, then we cannot immediately determine a firm’s 
profitability. Without prophetic powers, rewards will sometimes be distributed to the 
undeserving. This may seem to be a somewhat obscure problem of entitlement theory, 
but it arises from a much more general problem of organizational performance 
measurement. In this section I retrace Meyer’s (2002) argument regarding the problems 
of performance management. I extend his argument to the problem of social performance, 
and later relate my approach to Meyer’s work.  
The disappointments of organizational performance measurement are widely 
publicized, if not well understood. We know, for instance, that key measures of 
organizational performance are uncorrelated, indicating that the construct of 
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“performance” lacks clarity, if not validity (Meyer, 2002: 4). We also know that 
seemingly healthy organizations sometimes collapse without warning, demonstrating that 
basic questions of organizational viability and solvency are not measureable with 
established indicators of organizational health.  
Unfortunately, the measures of social and environmental performance are no 
better. Firms watch indicators closely, gaming external perceptions by manipulating the 
few measureable proxies observable to market participants. Outsiders are therefore 
unaware of the actual intentions and consequences that are associated with a firm’s social 
and environmental performance. Surprises occur in social performance as often as they 
do in financial performance: well-regarded firms are revealed to be far less responsible 
than their reputations suggest. Enron, Nike, BP, and many other firms have disappointed 
high expectations and undermined business ethics rankings when background practices 
came to light. 
We can locate the problem of performance management among three different 
audiences, each of which is frustrated by the challenge of measuring organizational 
performance. Responsible investors struggle to discern the real moral life of the firm.  
Returns-oriented investors struggle to determine the firm’s actual financial prospects. 
And managers labor to distinguish the activities that contribute to profitability from those 
that do not. Though investors of all types might blame managers (sometimes rightfully) 
for a lack of transparency, managers struggle with some of the same problems. It is often 
impossible to associate a given revenue stream with the person or persons whose 
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activities made it happen. And so, a lack of actionable information hinders managers as it 
does investors.  
Why is organizational performance measurement so challenging? There are three 
practical problems and three normative problems, which I will describe here. The first 
practical problem is that organizational performance, unlike musical performance or 
mechanical performance, is not immediately and directly observable. The efficiency of an 
engine and the tonality of a musical expression are immediately experienced so that it is 
possible to observe the performance of the system with very little delay. In both cases, 
the immediacy of performance measurement allows for optimization that would 
otherwise be impossible. The modern engine has numerous sensors checking heat, 
oxygen levels, and fuel consumption in order to make slight adjustments to improve 
current performance based upon feedback from the most recent adjustments made to the 
overall system. This allows engines to dynamically react to changes in temperature and 
altitude without expecting the environment to provide stability. Similarly, the skill of a 
musician depends upon his or her ability to quickly adjust the sound that her instrument 
makes and the time at which it is made as immediate responses to the sound that she 
hears it making and the sounds of the ensemble in which she performs. Organizational 
feedback generally lacks this immediacy. In organizations, particularly large ones, there 
is often a considerable delay between the activity and the measureable performance of 
that activity. The few measures that are immediately available may not be directly 
actionable because they aggregate the work of multiple individuals, or they are subject to 
subtle manipulations.  
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The second key practical challenge relates to the decomposability of 
organizational performance into the multiple performances of individuals and groups. 
Organizations merge multiple performances of different individuals and activities so that 
it is difficult to determine which activities are productive and which are counter-
productive. Attempts to measure the performance of multiple activities, and “roll them 
up” to the top of the organization may blur distinctions between differentiated sub-units 
that are not actually comparable. Attempts to drill down from top-level performance 
measures like profitability or return on assets may fail to properly attribute revenues to 
the activities that generated them. Activity-based costing provides one of numerous 
attempts to solve this problem, but as Meyer (2002) notes, it is much easier to attribute 
costs to activities than it is to associate revenues with activities, and the costs themselves 
are only a problem if they are unsupported by revenue.  
The third key practical challenge concerns the human side of performance 
measurement. Performance measures tend to lose variance over time (Meyer 2002: 53): 
performance becomes more similar as actors develop similar strategies and as they learn 
to manipulate the system in order to show performance on key measurements while 
shirking unmeasured aspects of performance. When performance measures are entirely 
consistent with desired performance outcomes, then the result is a narrowing of the field 
as multiple performances converge on the performance frontier. If, however, the 
performance measure is only one of several factors in performance, then emphasizing the 
measure may detract from performance, a problem that has been the subject of 
considerable research (Kerr 1975).  
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Given the challenges, the whole project of performance management might be 
given up were its objective less important. But the practical benefits of deriving specific 
goals from measureable performance outcomes, and then using these goals to motivate 
behavior warrants ongoing efforts even if performance measures are second best. 
Remember the functional cases of the engine and the musical expression, each of which 
improved drastically when guided by immediate feedback and adjustment. 
The normative questions of performance are equally complex. Empiricists tend to 
assume profit and shareholder wealth creation as the obvious end of business activity, 
which simplifies the end sought by organizational activities. Many of us in business 
ethics affirm these objectives, but we add a number of caveats and qualifications. At the 
very least, we assert that firms should follow just laws and keep their commitments. 
These are aspects of performance that most business ethics faculty would suggest that 
firms pursue regardless of the immediate financial implications. Many of us would add 
some other protections, fair treatment of stakeholders, responsible stewardship of the 
environment, and adherence to local norms are among a much longer list of performance 
criteria discussed in the preceding chapter that business ethics faculty put up for 
consideration in the classroom and articulate in our research. The resultant performance 
criterion is so riddled with qualifications and exceptions that it sometimes seems like we 
are re-tasking the firm, and ascribing to it a much more general social mission. Dunfee 
(2006) did this explicitly when he argued for a duty of rescue, and his work is not alone 
in asking more of firms than the mere pursuit of profit.  
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In business ethics we face three somewhat different challenges with respect to 
organizational performance. The first is widely recognized and discussed; it is the 
question of what basic purpose should motivate a corporation and its employees. From 
the dominant perspective of performance management, profitability is a key performance 
criterion, but it lacks some of the key characteristics to would make it useful as a goal-
generating strategy, an argument that I traced back to Drucker (1974) at the end of the 
last chapter. The second normative challenge is also widely recognized. Like empiricists, 
we have reason to fear that our understanding of performance will be manipulated by 
shrewd managers who are more concerned with perception than reality. We are all aware 
of the perversities of reputation management, green washing, and vanity ethics 
campaigns that do little to address underlying issues.  
The third normative issue, which is also similar to the problem of timing in 
performance measurement, has received relatively little attention within business ethics. 
Empiricists realize that the lag in performance measurement is at the heart of the 
organizational challenge faced by managers. Between financial performance measures, 
which are backward looking, decisions, which are current, and share price, which is 
prospective, managers may focus on the wrong criteria expressed in the wrong tense, they 
may look to the now rather than the future. In fact, the entire exercise of performance 
management is based upon the prospective inferences of past linkages between 
organizational activities and desired outcomes. Activities that yielded results in the past 
are rewarded in the present with the hope that they will yield results in the future, and 
new activities are tried out in the present to determine what should be rewarded in the 
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future. The system works well when managers seek long-term performance, but that is 
not always the time horizon on which managers operate. Consider, for instance, 
managerial decisions to re-allocate costs and to use aggressive earnings management 
strategies to shape performance perceptions; present-tense actions that undermine future 
performance in the service of flawed performance measures. As an example of this, 
Harrison and Fiet (1999) observe that CEOs reduce funding for research and 
development to make it look as if they have improved performance immediately after 
being hired, a strategy that inevitably reduces organizational functioning as well. Notice 
that the manager, accepting the performance measure of profitability chose to game the 
system by reducing costs immediately after being hired, many of which were actually 
contributing to shareholder value. Because the performance measure was unable to 
measure actual performance, the manager increased compensation in a way that 
decreased organizational performance. 
I focus on this third issue, on the latency in the observation of performance. It is 
characterized by two related problems: (1) an inability to observe—and immediately 
reward or punish—the outcomes of an organizational activity and (2) an inability to 
decompose—and reward or punish—the individual persons whose combined actions 
resulted in some organizational outcome. Latency has a variety of implications for 
business ethics, many of which are also expressed in the law. Latency is the reason why 
Hansmann and Kraakman (1991) propose a system of unlimited liability for corporate 
torts. It is the reason why Enron, WorldCom, the Ponzi scheme of Bernard Madoff, and 
many other financial debacles reached such epic proportions. Latency is also a problem 
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that enjoys a number of incomplete solutions. Clawbacks, proportionate fault in class 
action lawsuits, Superfund cleanups, and vicarious liability are all focused on the problem 
of latency. Note, however, that such “solutions” create a new injustice as they remedy the 
old one, burdening actors who were not responsible for an action with the costs of the 
action’s remedy. The latency problem is significant. The Promethean omniscience 
necessary to decide whether a shareholder is entitled to the wealth that her shares produce 
leads me to propose a radically different conception of organizational performance, one 
that replaces foresight with afterthought. 
In ethics, it is widely observed that managers are short-sighted. We recognize that 
many of the benefits of moral acts accrue slowly, and we hope to convince our students 
to think in the long-term.  Unfortunately, it is unlikely that our students will be able to 
buck the system so completely, even if they are armed with our very best arguments. 
Public equities markets and private investment that aims to serve such markets have 
powerful mechanisms in place driving short-termism. Ignoring these mechanisms is at 
least a bad career move, and maybe a bad organizational strategy as well. If we want 
individuals to think and act on long-term motives, we should provide them with such 
motives, and give them permission to operate in these terms. This means firstly that a 
system of long-term incentives needs to be provided, and secondly that such a system 
needs to encourage individual actors to hold each other accountable. This is what I mean 
by “giving them permission.” I will return to the issue of performance measurement, both 
economic and social, later in this chapter when I consider the implications of an economy 
of traceable currency for performance measurement. 
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Latency presents a special challenge in the development of a moral theory of 
organizational failure. Morally bankrupt firms can be expected to hide the fact that they 
ought to fail for a long period of time, and the economic incentives encourage the delayed 
recognition of justice. The example of tobacco presented above illustrates this risk. A 
comprehensive solution to the problem of organizational survival must first address the 
problem of latent costs and the moral indeterminacy of profit. 
The Status Quo of Profit Legitimation 
The recognition of costs can take years. Novel processes, products, and services 
are particularly likely to result in human and environmental costs that are not 
immediately known. Even something as mundane as the installation of a roof results in a 
long delay between the generation of revenue and the full realization of the roof’s 
expected longevity. It can take years to demonstrate the impact of a chemical on an 
ecosystem or to understand the consequences of allowing a business to operate in a 
community. It can also take years for an organizational transgression to be exposed; some 
never are. Any assertion regarding profit must necessarily be provisional for some period 
of time, if not indefinitely12.  
If an economic system were meant to achieve certainty regarding the legitimacy 
of property claims over profits, profits would have to be sequestered an indeterminate 
amount of time, until they could be distributed with near-certain legitimacy. Under a 
delayed system, investors would have no incentive to invest. Delays in the distribution of 
profit would render the system untenable. 
                                                
12 Revenue recognition can also be delayed. Individual actions may contribute to successes long after they 
have been compensated, and some of these outcomes exceed expectations. I set up unrecognized liabilities 
as a special problem. Latent revenues are also possible, but the topic is not pursued here. 
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The implications of the moral uncertainty of profit are profound because profit is 
central to the workings of the economic system as a whole. Profit is often defined as the 
motivating goal of business and business persons (Jensen 2002). Even if Drucker is 
correct that other goals, like creating customers, are more appropriate ends for the 
achievement of organizational performance (Drucker 1974: 61), the minimization of 
costs and the maximization of revenues are at the heart of the business logic. But if this 
culminating achievement of profit is merely an incomplete snapshot of a broader 
normative justification, then many distributions of profit will result in unjustified 
ownership. For instance, when newly hired CEOs cut research and development, capital 
expenditures, and pension contributions to falsely inflate their own performance 
(Harrison and Fiet 1999), the result is a weaker organization, but increased CEO 
compensation. Is the CEO is entitled to this increased compensation? Contractually, yes. 
But a broader normative justification of the CEO’s action would be sorely lacking. 
Instead, we say that CEOs should be paid for performance, an aspiration that speaks to 
efficiency and meritocracy, but also to a CEO’s moral entitlement to the profit that she or 
he receives. As a matter of fairness, it would seem unjustifiable for a leader’s 
compensation to increase as a result of actions that decrease the organization’s health. 
The CEO’s action should not justify such an entitlement because her initial claim to the 
organization’s resources derived from her contribution to the organization. 
There are entire classes of market participants for whom the profit motive does 
appropriately characterize how they conceive of their own goals. Capitalists contribute 
their investment, often through the purchase of securities like corporate stock, and they 
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hope to recover their contribution through dividends or increases in share value. If profits 
are morally indeterminate, so are proceeds from dividends and earnings from share price 
increases. The problem is that these distributions and gains only go in one direction. Once 
a limited liability corporation has distributed profit or once shareholders have sold their 
shares, those resources and individuals are no longer connected to the firm. And so, if the 
firm fails, its beneficiaries are no longer responsible to its victims. 
Yet our system of governance and regulation acts as if profit is like every other 
form of property. This is done by treating the organization as morally substantial through 
the legal personhood of the firm. Let us say that a large roofing corporation is paid to 
install a roof, and that the roof comes with a twenty-year warranty. Some roofers may 
provide such warranties through third parties as a form of insurance, but this particular 
company is large enough that its customers accept the credibility of its warranty claims. 
If the roof should leak, the customers would expect to contact the company, not the 
individual persons who shingled the roof or the manufacturer of the materials used in the 
project. If the roofing firm were sold, the seller would be responsible for disclosing the 
outstanding liabilities, including the number of warranties and the historical failure rate 
of installed roofs. As far as the roof purchaser is concerned, the ownership transfer of the 
roofing firm is irrelevant so long as the entity with which she deals continues to ensure 
the long-term integrity of her purchase. This is the sort of arrangement that the 
corporation was designed to handle, and so long as the organization survives, there is 
nothing wrong, in principle, with the handoff between investor groups.  
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There are many areas of contract law that do not permit such a handoff. I cannot, 
for instance, select another person to live in my apartment and hand over my lease to 
them without my landlord’s consent. It is a peculiar feature of the corporation that once a 
corporation mediates a transaction, the identities of other parties transacting with the firm 
no longer matter. Clearly, there are costs that are predictable and thus insurable. The 
roofing example illustrates one of these. As long as the roofing company has the money, 
its customers do not care whether the original investors or new investors cover warranty 
claims. Insofar as these claims are predictable, they are factored into the purchase price 
paid by the new investors for the firm. The predicted claims are applied as a discount 
against the future earnings anticipated through investment in the firm, which implies that 
the original investors incur the cost in either case. 
The corporate form and its structure of limited liability provides that shareholders 
risk no more than the amount that they have invested in the firm for the duration of their 
investment. The ownership regime is based upon transferable shares that allow investors 
to consign their opportunity to profit and their (limited) liability to another person 
through the sale of company stock. It is the buyer’s responsibility to understand the 
benefits and risks of ownership and to decide accordingly, provided that no false claims 
are made in the course of the sale.  
However, when the processes are less regular than the insurance of installed roofs, 
it becomes more difficult to justify the system of limited liability. In many cases, the 
buyer’s assumption of risk may be objectionable to the other parties who have specific 
and legitimate claims upon an earlier owner. The victims of corporate malfeasance may 
 255 
have legitimate claims that are not easily met by the current or future owners of a firm. It 
may be the past owners and managers who owe them a debt13. 
Four Arguments for Personal Duties of Restitution 
Duties of restitution between stakeholders ought to be specific, temporal, and 
personal. In the same way that a person cannot send another to serve on her behalf for 
jury duty, to vote on her behalf in an election, to complete her prison sentence, or to 
fulfill her military service obligation, a person ought not be allowed to conscript another 
into covering the ill-begotten gains of her corporate ownership. The claim rests upon four 
key arguments. First, if corporate ownership results in constituencies receiving property 
when others have more substantive claims, then that system of ownership fails to uphold 
the basic premise of justice in holdings. Second, on efficiency grounds, it is preferable 
that those individuals who benefit from wrongdoing should pay for restitution so that 
there will not be perverse incentives motivating misdeeds. Third, there are often person-
specific duties between beneficiaries and victims of harm, duties that cannot be fully 
settled by another party. And finally, organizational death can result in victims losing the 
opportunity for any restitution whatsoever, an injustice that is only resolved if person-
specific duties are durable beyond the failure of the firm. 
                                                
13 In a sense, the nature of profit-related obligations affirms the stakeholder approach to corporate 
responsibility. Phillips (2003b) places the voluntary acceptance of benefits of a cooperative 
scheme as a paramount concern in his theory. For Phillips, this voluntary participation is the 
origin of an obligation, “A moral requirement generated by the performance of some voluntary 
act (or omission)” (2003b: 94). Whether the property claims of stakeholders over the profits are 
generated by acts and omissions, or by the mere fact of a property relation is of no great import 
for this account. In either case, obligations properly met generate legitimate claims to the profits 
of a firm, and unmet obligations do not.  
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Justice in holdings. If individuals are allowed to transfer their risks in a given 
period of economic activity while protecting their benefits from that period, the gap 
results in morally ambiguous windfalls. The question, from property, is whether this good 
fortune offers any moral justification for the recipient of wealth. The justification cannot 
rely upon the stochastic process of merely being in the right place at the right time; it 
must somehow justify why those who profited have more substantive claims than other 
parties. The aspiration of a property regime is that all resources be controlled by those 
individuals whose claims upon them are most substantive. If a person were to say, “I 
exercised my stock options before I knew about the crime,” her statement would indicate 
her innocence from a charge of insider trading, but it would not affect the moral 
justification of her profit. The merit of such a justification can only be considered with 
specific reference to the relative strength of such claims. I examine this particular 
argument in the following section with reference to corruption at Siemens AG. The 
analysis is driven by a comparison of shareholder, employee, and victim property claims. 
Clearly, as a matter of law, a person who sold a share of a stock at the right time without 
insider knowledge is merely lucky, and I would not argue otherwise. I will, however, 
argue that the timing of an announcement does not coincide with the distribution of 
benefits from harmful activities. In the case of Siemens, the announcement of the 
investigation occurred after years of profits derived from illegal bribes had already been 
distributed. I claim that these profits and the share prices that they sustained were not 
morally justified, and that the victims of the bribery, local citizens who paid too much for 
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products and services, have a stronger claim upon the Siemens resources for this period 
than the shareholders who happened to sell at the right time. 
Person-specific duty: Prior distributions of profit should not be insurable risks if 
there exists a specific obligation between the beneficiaries and victims of a given act. In 
the case of organizational crimes, many beneficiaries were not intentionally involved in 
the criminal act. Nonetheless, the benefit they receive may be sufficient to establish their 
collective duty to victims. As far as responsibilities go, the fact of an individual’s role as 
a beneficiary of an irresponsible act is only superseded by a direct causal role through act 
or omission. This sort of claim is often developed within discussions of reparations for 
slavery. Suppose that we could agree that the decedents of slaves had a right to more 
wealth than they currently possess, that just as their forebears should have received the 
promised 40 acres and a mule, so should their descendants receive some compensation to 
remedy historical injustices. If we could agree on this, the next question would be: who 
should pay? From the perspective of many critical race scholars, white people who live in 
the United States have special responsibilities because they continue to enjoy special 
“white privileges” (McIntosh 2004) and continue to earn the “wages of whiteness” 
(Roediger 2007). Here the responsibility originates in having benefited from an injustice 
rather than in any causal participation. I likewise suggest that the beneficiaries of harmful 
corporate acts owe restitution regardless of the harm. The argument may depend upon the 
specific nature of the benefit and harm, and it may be justified on either fairness or justice 
grounds.  
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Imagine, for instance, that a firm specialized in the sale of gift cards, a profitable 
business given the relatively high likelihood that the cards would be lost and not used. If 
the business experienced a sudden spike in the utilization rate of its cards, it might 
experience serious cash flow problems that might eventually result in the firm’s 
bankruptcy. Is it fair that resources that should have gone to pay for the contractual 
obligations to the cardholders have instead been distributed to shareholders as profit? No, 
that distribution runs against the basic nature of profit as a residual, and the unfairness 
may be said to create a specific obligation between the beneficiary-shareholders and the 
cardholders. Though the argument is largely couched in efficiency grounds, justice 
considerations also animate Hansmann and Kraakman’s (1991) argument for unlimited 
liability for shareholders in the case of corporate torts, an argument upon which this case 
is based. 
The second argument for person-specific duties originates in the role-based duties 
of stakeholders. The obligations of managers to shareholders are widely established, but 
another set of obligations may be said to run in the opposite direction. As the shareholder 
responsibility movement moves from the backwater into the mainstream (Dunfee 2003), 
many shareholders have begun to frame their investment decisions through an ethical lens 
(Glac 2009). Their strategy may only be effective if they achieve a critical mass of 
investment, which they are unlikely to do (Hudson 2005), yet it also seems that they have 
no other choice if they want to take the long view (Sethi 2005). Shareholders put their 
capital at risk when they choose to invest in stocks. One way of understanding this risk is 
as a role-based responsibility that shareholders assume in order to stake a claim on the 
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organization’s profits. Responsibilities are thus reciprocal between the investor and her 
firm, and through the firm to other parties who have established claims to the 
organization’s resources (Phillips 1997). 
If an investor in a petroleum company benefits from the lax safety and 
environmental protections that the company utilizes, the investor profits because costs are 
reduced. And if one of that oil company’s deep-sea wells begins releasing massive 
amounts of oil into an ecologically sensitive bay, that investor would be partly 
responsible. The investor’s responsibility is not merely an artifact of the legal 
arrangement that describes her liability; it also derives from the benefit that she obtained 
through the irresponsibility.  
The collective responsibility of investors may also derive from their role in 
inspiring the harm. If the investors established a culture that privileges short-term 
performance over other goals, they may also be remote causal agents in the harm. When 
investors collectively push for cost reductions that result in corners being cut, each 
investor has some causal responsibility for the harm that was collectively inspired. 
Efficiency: The alignment of incentives within an economic organization requires 
that responsibilities and consequences be personally and temporally located among the 
agents who make decisions. Motivational efficiency has been a central theme for 
economists for the past half-century (Leibenstein 1966), as a problem of inducing effort 
(Hart and Holmstrom 1987) and appropriate decision making (Diamond 1998). In the 
standard case, the objective is to encourage an individual person (“agent”) to pursue the 
interests of another (“principal”) by measuring and rewarding the performance of the 
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agent. The model is most often applied to the relationship between managers and 
investors, but it is extensible to the relationships between workers and managers, 
suppliers and purchasers, and other transactions where monitoring is costly.  
Private property regimes are one established strategy that aligns individual 
incentives with a regime of use-oriented property stewardship. The key rationale for a 
system of private property is that by allowing individual persons to have exclusive rights 
to resources, these individuals will be motivated to care for the resources and to make 
them as useful as possible (de Soto 2000). If individual persons internalize the costs and 
benefits of discrete property management decisions, better decisions will be made 
regarding these resources.  
The same aspiration holds within a property theory of the firm, but the separation 
of ownership and control (Berle 1933) makes the aspiration seemingly unobtainable. 
Attempts to align managerial incentives (Jensen and Murphy 1990) under the auspices of 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) have backfired to provide unjustifiable 
increases in executive compensation that are only marginally associated with firm 
performance (Bebchuk and Fried 2004). And while the long-term incentives of agency 
theory have yet to be realized in corporate governance or regulation (Bhagat and Romano 
2009), even the most creative compensation agreements cannot adjust for the skewed 
reality of latent costs. It is deeply problematic on efficiency grounds that individuals are 
motivated to act on short-term considerations because others will bear the costs, and this 
problem is only partially addressed by long-term compensation schemes. Specific duties 
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between beneficiaries of organizational harms and victims of organizational harms are 
necessary for the alignment of incentives. 
Organizational death: The longevity of the firm is not guaranteed. Firms close for 
various reasons, and numerous stakeholders are left without a nexus for their contracts. 
Larger stakeholders may have an incentive to become involved in the bankruptcy 
proceedings and to claim available resources. But some parties are likely to be left with 
substantive rights that no longer pertain to any person’s or entity’s related duty. An 
unscrupulous entrepreneur could legally close her business, and reopen under a new 
name, discarding the liabilities of the old firm. These so-called “phoenix firms” allow 
entrepreneurs to recurrently escape debt and customer liabilities, and have been the 
subject of some debate in the UK (Miller 2006). It is not at all clear why duties should be 
abrogated when organizations fail, and the pool of resources distributed through a 
bankruptcy is often a small portion of what the organization owes. Organizational death 
gives a clear reason why responsibilities cannot be ultimately located in the organization. 
There is no good rationale for the simultaneous collapse of the rights and duties that 
occurred under the umbrella of the firm. The special issue of organizational death 
motivated my initial theorizing on entitlements to profit. It also motivated Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s argument on tort liability in which they propose shareholder liabilities for 
torts that a firm’s estate fails to settle (Hansmann and Kraakman 1991:1896), affirming 
the importance of personal liability as a stopgap for failures in corporate liability.  
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Contractual Limits on Restutitive Duties 
These four arguments affirm the view that organizational duties must be 
personally and temporally located. This does not require a drastic redefinition of the 
nature of business ethics within a firm. It requires no more than the basic notions of 
decency, respect, fairness, rights, and human flourishing would require of a moral 
manager. Nor does the argument require a drastic extension of the nature of tort liability 
within the law itself; the argument redirects responsibilities rather than creating them.  
Along these lines, the basis of contract still warrants respect. Some parties agree 
to bear costs ex-ante, and they have limited cause for claiming restitution from the firm. 
As a rule, parties who contract with a firm have an opportunity to negotiate terms as they 
choose and should not be able to claim resources that exceed the negotiated terms 
(Hansmann and Kraakman 1991). But the rule has exceptions; for instance, the doctrines 
of unconscionability, duress, and misrepresentation call the contract into question, and 
the values of fairness and protections of human rights cannot be discarded for the 
imagined realism of optimal contracting.  
Even externalities are sometimes known and consensual. If a host community 
unanimously approved zoning for a new factory after being informed of the various 
nuisances of the facility, these nuisances would not impugn shareholder entitlements to 
factory profit. It would be a different matter if the factory’s emissions caused 
unanticipated respiratory problems. If the laws were just to begin with, entitlement to 
profit does not requires a radical redefinition of contractual, criminal, and civil liabilities. 
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However, some adjustment may be necessary in the targets and timing of these 
established legal duties.  
Thus far, I have argued that profit is characteristically different from other forms 
of acquisition and exchange and that an immediate normative assessment of the 
legitimacy of profit is not possible because profits are conditional on the revelation of to-
be-discovered costs. What is fundamental to this treatment of profit indeterminacy is that 
profit, as we understand it, should result from the revenue in excess of all costs. Included 
are any costs associated with crimes committed by the organization and any externalities 
that the firm has foisted onto surrounding communities or the environment. 
Illegitimate Allocations and the Modern Firm 
Many of the corporate acts that justify disbanding a firm are criminal. The 
criminal law establishes society’s expectations for individuals and corporations, and 
insofar as these agents and entities fail to meet expectations, the profits that are generated 
may be illegitimate. In this section I will argue that certain cohorts of employees and 
shareholders should have financial liabilities for the firm’s nonconforming behavior. The 
argument is easily extended to torts as well. 
Most business ethics frameworks would reach the same conclusion about Siemens 
AG, and its global strategy of corruption implemented from 2001 to 2007. Many would 
describe the $1.6 billion settlement as a comeuppance. Dunfee and Donaldson’s 
Integrative Social Contracts Theory (Dunfee and Donaldson 1999) would find an 
abundance of violated norms, including the authentic norms of communities in which 
Siemens operates. Though there are marginal cases like guanxi, the exchange of favors to 
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build networks, where it is sometimes culturally necessary to participate in gift giving 
exchanges that would seem like bribes in other cultural contexts (Dunfee and Warren 
2001), bribing public officials to win contracts violates most international codes of 
conduct and runs against a concerted effort among businesses to curb corruption from the 
supply side. Kantians who value truth-telling (Bowie 1999), would find the inconsistency 
of Siemens’ actions to be particularly troublesome. Siemens was a member of 
Transparency International, an organization whose stated purpose is to curb corruption. 
Thus, Siemens’ actions were dishonest to the point of hypocrisy. Not surprisingly, 
Transparency International asked Siemens to withdraw in December of 2007. A 
stakeholder analysis, one based upon fairness, would note the unfair advantage that 
Siemens enjoyed over its competitors, and also the unfair prices paid by stakeholders: 
public sector customers and their taxpayers. The illegality of Siemens’ actions are blatant 
enough that even Milton Friedman, who rejects the notion of corporate social 
responsibility, would find Siemens’ law-breaking to be reprehensible (Friedman 1962; 
Friedman 1970).  
Despite the near-consensus view that Siemens was in the wrong, business ethics 
and criminology literatures suggest widely divergent post-hoc regulatory responses. The 
largest controversy concerns the question of entity vs. individual fault, and the related 
question of whether it is appropriate to punish Siemens AG as an entity or only to punish 
the agents within Siemens who were knowingly engaged in acts of bribery. These are 
open debates in business ethics, and the perennial scandals of corporate malfeasance are 
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likely to sustain them for years to come. Yet these debates take us far afield from the 
commercial nature of the crime itself, and from the corporate structure that perpetrated it.  
I suggest that we return to the commercial understanding of the crime-benefit 
process, and to the property rights that have been misallocated as a byproduct of the 
crime. In so doing, we set aside the question of punishment, and focus on the question of 
responsibility for restitution. If it is agreed that a system of property should allocate 
holdings to those individuals whose claims are most substantive, then a productive 
exercise may begin with an analysis of the relative property claims of the key parties in 
the Siemens briberies.  
Siemens’ illegal acts resulted in some people earning more than they should 
through unjust enrichment and some paying more than they should through unjust 
impoverishment. Two questions emerge: who should pay, and what should be done with 
an entity that allowed a crime like this to occur? Clearly, the perpetrators of the crime 
may have some direct liability for their illegal actions, but what about the investors and 
employees who unknowingly profited from the wrongdoing? In some ways, the claims of 
these investors and employees may be akin to the purchaser of a stolen bicycle. If the 
person bought the bike from a thief, that person has a relatively substantial claim over 
that bike relative to the thief and a relatively unsubstantial claim relative to the bike’s 
original owner. The strength of these claims is only comprehensible when they are 
weighed against each other.  
To weigh the claims of Siemens’ shareholders and managers, we must first 
identify the parties with substantive claims. To do so, we can consider a counter-
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historical narrative: what would be different if Siemens had not chosen to bribe public 
officials? Two economic effects of bribery are an increase in the price paid for goods sold 
and the sale of inferior goods at a price that is unjustified by their quality. In either case, 
an open and competitive procurement process would have reduced the price paid for 
goods procured. This implies reduced revenues for Siemens and reduced costs for the 
procuring governments and their taxpayers. Insofar as the bribes ought not to have 
occurred, Siemens’ profits are overstated. A portion of Siemens’ profit should actually be 
understood as being owed to the taxpayers of the procuring government. Siemens 
absconded with revenue that it should not have received, and thereafter, Siemens’ 
shareholders and employees benefited from the revenue. Siemens’ claim to its profits is 
weaker than the claim of the citizens who were forced to pay an unfair price due to an 
illegal act. These citizens are victimized twice over because the bribed officials, thanks to 
their newfound wealth, become even more difficult for the citizens to monitor or 
depose14. Siemens’ competitors are also victims who may have lost the opportunity to do 
business because they were unwilling (or less willing) to bribe.  
Let us focus on the citizens as victims, and on the legitimacy of their claim to 
Siemens’ 2002 to 2007 profits. In this account, it is important to locate a stakeholder 
group in time. Modern corporations are disconnected from individual persons. Employees 
come and go from firms that persist over time. Delay in the recognition of irresponsible 
acts results in a different subset of individuals incurring the costs of a transgression from 
those who derived benefits from that transgression. Thus, responsibilities might be 
                                                
14 In this spirit, Colin Leys translates Dumont’s protest against Africa’s “Bourgeoisie of a new 
type, which Karl Marx could scarcely have foreseen, a bourgeoisie of the public service.” (Leys 
1965). 
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localized to “cohorts” of specific stakeholder groups. My account will focus on the 
responsibilities of the 2002-2007 cohorts of shareholders and employees.  
Investors.  
What are the special obligations of shareholders? In a standard analysis, 
shareholders have no special responsibilities to each other or to the firm as a whole. Their 
choice to invest obliges others within the firm to act in their best interests, but the 
responsibilities are not reciprocal. Whereas it would be inappropriate for managers to 
privilege one shareholder over another, courts have affirmed the rights of shareholders to 
charge a price premium without sharing that premium with other investors15.  
The non-standard analysis finds that shareholders are responsible for the 
incentives that they provide within the market. The responsible investment movement has 
amassed a substantial pool of capital under the auspices of this claim, and many investors 
feel intuitively uneasy with the prospect of benefiting from the most malignant firms. 
Others seek to provide additional capital to the most responsible companies, hoping that 
they will outgrow their peers. My argument does not require a strong shareholder 
responsibility interpretation because it works on the basic premise that a shareholder’s 
entitlement is limited to the residual profit of a firm. 
Most of the Siemens investors were unaware of the firm’s illegal and corrupt 
behavior. Nonetheless, these investors profited from the firm’s illegal provision of 
business through public corruption. Without corruption, Siemens profits would have been 
substantially reduced. The question is whether it is appropriate for a somewhat different 
                                                
15 E.g. Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 684, 397 N.E2d 387, 421 N.Y.S 2d 877 
(1979). 
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group of shareholders to incur the cost of the corruption fine in a later period, and if it is 
sufficient for this cost to be incurred indirectly through the centralized control of 
Siemens. In other words: which of the investors should pay and how should the costs be 
distributed?  
The limited liability company, coupled with the regulatory framework that 
governs the sale of public securities, would suggest that the company itself should pay. 
Presumably, the company’s incurred cost is passed onto the investors. Specifically, the 
investors who own the firm while it is under investigation and after it has settled the case. 
The cost is realized in two different time periods: first, during the investigation when the 
market responds to the uncertain liability and again after the negotiated settlement has 
been publically disclosed. The cost is not incurred by shareholders who exited the firm 
prior to the discovery of corruption. In contrast, Hansmann and Kraakman suggest an 
information-based rule that focuses liability among shareholders at the earliest of three 
moments: when the information of a likely tort filing became known to management, 
when a tort was actually filed, or when the firm “dissolved without leaving a contractual 
successor” (Hansmann and Kraakman 1991:1897). Though this approach improves upon 
the delayed burden of a judgment, it does not address the specific problem of profit 
legitimation because it continues to allow parties to profit from criminal or harmful 
corporate action until its discovery. Under these dominant institutions, the maximum cost 
that can be incurred by the shareholders is the price that they paid for their shares. Should 
the firm be bankrupted and control shifted to creditors, those creditors would have no 
claim to make upon the shareholders beyond the capital that they had already contributed 
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to the firm through the shares that they owned. Their lost investment would be as much 
as they could loose.  
In legal scholarship the standard alternative to limited liability is so-called 
“unlimited liability.” This would result in the shareholders being fully liable for Siemens 
irresponsible acts, not just through investment, but also through personal wealth. Limited 
liability protections have been the subject of significant legal debate because of the 
tendency to promote risk-taking. Hansmann and Kraakman’s rejection of limited liability 
for corporate torts responds to this concern: 
There may be no persuasive reasons to prefer limited liability over a regime of 
unlimited pro rata shareholder liability for corporate torts…Changes in 
technology, knowledge, liability rules, and procedures for mass tort litigation 
have for the first time raised the prospect of tort claims that exceed the net worth 
of even very large corporations. Environmental harms, such as oil spills or the 
release of toxic materials, are one potential source of massive liability; hazardous 
products and carcinogens in the workplace are others. At the same time, the 
mergers and acquisitions movement of the past decade has converted many large 
corporations that were formerly publicly-traded into highly leveraged closely-held 
firms; these firms, which have proportionately small net assets and are under great 
pressure to maximize cash flow, have an unusually strong incentive to engage in 
excessively risky behavior. Already, strong empirical evidence indicates that 
increasing exposure to tort liability has led to the widespread reorganization of 
business firms to exploit limited liability to evade damage claims. The method of 
evasion differs by industry. For example, placing hazardous activities in separate 
subsidiaries seems to be the dominant mode of insulating assets in the tobacco 
and hazardous waste industries. In contrast, disaggregating or downsizing firms 
seems to be the primary strategy for avoiding liability in the chemical industry 
and, more recently, in the oil transport industry. Indeed, one study finds that, over 
the past twenty-five years, a very large proportion of small firms entering all 
hazardous industries in the United States are motivated primarily by a desire to 
avoid liability for consumer, employee, and environmental harms.' (1991: 1879-
1880) 
Limited liability promotes a legal game of risk shifting that minimizes the pool of 
resources available to plaintiffs with legitimate claims. Risk-shifting strategies differ, but 
the intent has little basis in morality or law.  
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Liability could be distributed pro-rata, in proportion to one’s investment, or 
through a scheme of joint and several liability where every individual party would be 
responsible up to the entire liability. There are several important efficiency arguments 
against a system of joint and several liability. One problem is the divergence in risk 
incurred by different parties who invest in the same firm depending on personal wealth 
(see Halpern, Trebilcock, and Turnbull 1980). Though there are enduring critiques of 
diversified ownership as a source of weak governance (Roe 1994), it is nonetheless the 
case that the diversified ownership paradigm that dominates investment practice is 
incompatible with a regime of joint and several unlimited liability. Proponents of pro-rata 
liability for corporate torts argue that liability insurance is available to monitor and 
equalize the risks thereby alleviating the stress placed upon share price by shareholder 
inequality (Hansmann and Kraakman 1991: 1879). However, this is only a partial 
remedy, as different shareholders would wish for different qualities of coverage, affecting 
the same result as a difference in prices. I will deal with the distributional implications in 
detail below. Unlimited liability seems to have its own perversity. The idea that any 
person, irrespective of the extent of their involvement in a firm, should be liable to the 
point of personal bankruptcy seems to lack any standard of proportionality. And yet, the 
dominant standard of proportionality results in costs incurred by the successors of those 
who benefited from inappropriate behavior. I suggest an alternative approach that 
aggregates the benefit received by individuals from the firm’s profits during the time 
when the irresponsible acts were falsely contributing to entity profitability, and 
distributes duties of restitution in proportion to benefits received. 
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As I have argued above, there is a sense in which the shareholder’s responsibility 
should not be insurable because of the specific duty between beneficiaries of harm and 
those who have been harmed. The strongest critiques of nonspecific fault concern 
efficiency and victims’ rights. When the wrong investors are charged for the impropriety 
of a company it provides perverse incentives for investors and managers who can gain 
from the organization’s misdeeds without incurring the costs. Such incentives are 
inefficient; too much capital is pushed into bad firms and too little into good ones, and 
insiders are relatively uninspired to play the governance roles that are required of them.  
The victims’ rights argument arises from direct responsibilities owed to victims 
by beneficiaries, as described above. These interpersonal obligations are unmet by 
random or anonymous restitution. Were I to hit a pedestrian while riding my bicycle and 
to injure her arm, my obligation for restitution to her would not be met if I volunteered at 
a hospital and helped others. This is the case whether the harm done to the pedestrian was 
intentional and therefore criminal, or accidental and therefore subject to civil liability.  
Unlike the bicycle accident, corporate crimes and torts make it difficult to identify 
a blameworthy causal agent. Even if a causal agent can be identified, they often lack the 
resources to remedy the harm that they caused. Yet the non-specific and non-causal role 
that shareholders and employees play in crimes and torts does not preclude them from 
playing a role in the restitution for those crimes and torts. Duties of restitution may derive 
from social roles, like “manager” or “shareholder,” duties may emerge from a contractual 
obligation taken consensually as a part of filling one of these roles, or duties may also 
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derive from the benefits received. It is preferable that those who gained from a crime pay, 
and that those who lost be paid16. 
 In this sense it does not matter whether the liability is criminal or civil. We need 
not equate the shareholder with the perpetrator of a crime or harm. Rather, we should 
reduce our understanding of restitution to something that is a basic part of ensuring the 
legitimacy of corporate resources that have been distributed. The civil liability standard is 
the most appropriate basis for restitution in the wake of organizational misdeeds. Most 
criminal laws require that the perpetrator be of a “guilty mind” (mens rea) in order to 
prove fault. In civil liability, the standard does not require an intentional act. Even an 
accident where there was negligence is sufficient cause for a legal remedy. Let us assume 
that none of the Siemens shareholders were aware of the bribery. To intend bribery 
requires some forethought, which the shareholders lacked in the case of Siemens. Even 
without intention, according to the civil liability standard, the shareholders may still be 
responsible for restitution. This is consistent with what actually happens under the current 
system. Shareholders are already on the hook for the firm’s liabilities through their 
interest in the price of the firm’s stock and its dividends. In the current paradigm, the 
firm’s civil and criminal fines depress the share price of the firm and distribute costs 
among shareholders in proportion to their ownership stakes.  
The firm’s liability is already being delivered to shareholders. The trouble is that 
it is delivered too late and therefore to the wrong shareholders. A prior investor cohort 
should incur the criminal fine. A system that charges those shareholders who benefited 
                                                
16 For a history of the role of victims in American criminology and a critical take, see Dubber 
(1999) and other articles published in that volume through a related symposium. 
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from the illegal behavior seems intuitively more defensible than a system that imposes 
the costs on investors who neither knew about nor benefited from the crime. Given that 
costs related to corporate wrongdoing should be incurred by the right individuals to avoid 
perverse incentives and to facilitate direct restitution between those who benefited and 
those who were harmed, I suggest that the shareholders who owned the company during 
the years when it was actively bribing public officials be fined, and I suggest that they be 
fined in proportion to their profit from the firm17. In selecting the time period, investors 
should be identified based upon the duration through which the firm benefited financially 
from the impropriety. Investors who held Siemens stock during a period between 2002, 
after the first profits from proven bribes were realized, through late 2008, when the stock 
price bottomed out partially in response to the scandal and the related settlement are 
candidates.  
The property-based case is not punitive, and I see no reason why parties who 
unknowingly participated in a legal transaction should be punished symbolically. 
However, parties who have more substantive claims than these investors are well within 
their rights to expect restitution from the unjustly enriched investors. In the case of 
bribery that results in more profit than would otherwise have been possible, the stronger 
property claim originates with the taxpayers whose governments overpaid for goods and 
services.  
 Having located one stakeholder cohort who should be held liable for Siemens 
impropriety, the extent of this liability is at issue. What is the amount of liability that each 
                                                
17 The actual amount of the settlement may derive from the harm or externalized costs (Polinsky 
and Shavell 1994), but the distribution of settlement should be proportioned based upon 
individual profits from the firm over the relevant period. 
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historical investor might be said to owe? I have already argued against a joint and several, 
“unlimited liability” approach, which I believe fails to acknowledge the different 
intensities of contact that different investors have with the focal firm and its ill-begotten 
profits. I have also argued that the amount should be restitutive rather than punitive. But 
there are substantial obligations that can be limited by the depth of the person’s financial 
engagement with the firm. In my view, the maximum liability per share should be no 
greater than the sum of all dividends distributed during the period of corruption and the 
share price at the time that the stock was sold or if the share is still held, the price when 
the liability is calculated. 
Such a system would allow the victims of corporate wrongdoing to receive 
restitution from those who profited from the wrongdoing to the amount of profit that they 
earned. It also includes their liability at the time of sale. Siemens distributed $7.61 in 
dividends per share from January 2002 through January 2007. With 870 million shares 
outstanding, these dividends alone would be sufficient to pay the firm’s fine several 
times. But I do not suggest that the burden be distributed exclusively among shareholders 
to those who earned dividends. Under an investment paradigm in which some funds hold 
for very short periods of time, the relevant question should focus on the overall profit or 
loss from the ownership, not the length of time during which the share was held.  
Consider two hypothetical investors. The first held the stock from March 9, 2007 
to December 28, 2007, buying at $105 per share and selling at $157.10 per share. The 
second held the stock from June 10, 2005 until March 6, 2009, buying at $76 per share 
and selling at $49 per share. The first earned 50% profit, and the second had her value cut 
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in half. The second investor held the company for longer, received more dividends, and 
seems to have a more substantial relationship to the firm. But should her liability be 
greater than the first investor’s? In the current system, the duration of ownership is the 
most important source of exposure to liability for entity-level improprieties, and shorter-
term investors are less likely to bear these costs. This is the reason why we focus on 
profits from malfeasant entities, thereby obliging the investors who profit (irrespective of 
duration) for the losses incurred. In fact, the second investor has already paid through the 
devaluation of her shares, and the substantial loss in the value of the stock is probably 
sufficiently punitive. 
Though we need not resort to a welfare argument, two welfare considerations may 
be worth attention. First, it is often wealthier investors who are included in actively 
traded hedge funds and other shorter-term investment strategies. Whereas so-called 
“retail” investors and mutual funds “own the market” and can only exit companies slowly 
at substantial expense, this implies that in the current system retirement funds, pensions, 
and middle class savings are more exposed to corporate crime than elite wealth. An even 
more basic welfare claim derives from the fact that within this one company, one investor 
already lost, and the other gained. We do not say that the losses were “ill-gotten,” we say 
that these losses were deserved. But we do say that the profits were “ill-gotten” and we 
have good reason to expect that they be subject to reclamation. 
The restitution obligations of shareholders shifts firm liability away from the last 
responsible holder. The shift has very important implications for organizational failure. 
Imagine that Siemens’ bribery had continued for fifty years instead of five and that its 
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overall criminal obligations were $16 billion. Such a judgment could easily bankrupt a 
very large firm that may not have resources available to pay the fine. The firm would be 
bankrupted, the shareholders would get nothing, the creditors would take control, and 
many of the firm’s assets would be spun off to recover debt. The resultant process would 
be far more disruptive to the firm and the economy than to recover the wealth from all of 
those parties who had benefited from that firm along the way. A recovery that drew from 
50 years of shareholders would be widely dispersed, and would have a deep reputational 
effect on the firm, but insofar as the firm remains capable of producing profit in a worthy 
manner, the settlement would not threaten the future of the firm. The firm’s legacy would 
suffer the most violent blow. 
 I have argued that shareholders who benefited from crimes have a weaker claim 
to Siemens’ profits than the victims of the crimes. While I do believe that it would be 
appropriate for this cohort of individuals to pay the remedy, there is another group whose 
claim on Siemens’ profits is even weaker. 
Management and Employees  
Many of Siemens’ employees were not involved in the bribery, and were unaware 
that it was taking place. The only difference between these individuals and the investors 
is that they have a special perspective on the firm’s internal normative environment, and 
are especially well situated to anticipate its weaknesses. While the deviant behavior may 
not have been directly observable, employees have access to better information than the 
average investor, and if the corporate culture lacks the self-regulatory wherewithal to 
control deviant agents, employees are well positioned to be aware of this laxity. 
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Employees may not be able to observe the crime itself, but they can observe the culture 
that allowed it to happen.  
In other respects, the situation of employees is akin to that of shareholders. 
Employees have a claim upon the resources of the firm, both through compensation and 
through profit sharing incentives, and that claim is justifiable insofar as the individual has 
a more substantial claim than other parties. Like shareholders, the profit claims of these 
employees are weaker than the competing claims of governments that overpaid in 
Siemens’ contracts, because the profit was miscalculated when it was distributed, and so, 
like shareholders, employees from the relevant period have some outstanding obligations. 
The question of how to distribute and limit employee obligations is even less established 
and more controversial than unlimited shareholder liability.  
On the narrowest interpretation of the nexus of contracts view of the firm, all 
employee compensation is contractually defined and should supersede the residual claims 
to profit made by shareholders. The shareholder primacy debate specifies this sort of 
ordering, and it is often argued that shareholders enjoy their primacy because everyone 
else comes before them in the way that corporate obligations are met. However, this 
interpretation is problematic because employee compensation is often determined 
through contributions to firm performance based upon a share of firm profit. If firm 
performance has been unjustly determined, then employee compensation has been 
unjustly exaggerated. As such, any increased incentives at Siemens during the relevant 
period from 2002 to 2007 are suspect, as are performance-related incentives like bonuses 
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that were “miscalculated” for that period18. Profit-related earnings of Siemens’ 
employees provide weaker moral claims to wealth than the claims of the victims of 
Siemens’ crimes. In general, liabilities should be scaled according to the benefit that 
individuals received from the firm, and capped before the costs borne by the person result 
in unjust impoverishment. 
Though most of the employees and managers were unaware of the bribes, some 
were aware or actively engaged in the corruption. Managers are able to exercise 
considerable control over the firm. The governance structure of the publically traded 
corporation affords substantial leeway to managers in their conduct and the decisions that 
they make on behalf of the firm. Courts generally avoid second-guessing managers in 
matters of “business judgment” and thus sustain the separation between ownership and 
control (Berle 1933; Easterbrook 1991). Because investors are largely separated from the 
control function of the firm, it makes sense to look elsewhere in understanding the 
decision-making apparatus (and perhaps mens rea) of the firm. For this, we must look to 
managers. 
                                                
18 It may be unfair for employees whose work tends to be compensated through profit-related 
bonuses to be fined when other salaried employees are not. The structure of compensation 
schemes is often determined by the kind of work that someone does and this structure is not 
entirely consistent with the extent to which that person has benefited from an organizational 
transgression. I have no argument for the innocence of salaried employees or for the substance of 
their property claims relative to the external stakeholders. However, no simple calculus will 
determine how much they should pay. One might begin with the premium paid to that employee 
relative to similarly trained employees in other firms. Robert Frank has noted the price that 
socially minded lawyers pay in order to take the “moral high ground” (Frank 1996), a price which 
can also be conceived as a premium paid to individuals in order to get them to do morally 
reprehensible work. Ideally, an employee’s objectionable pay premium would share in the cost of 
an organizational transgression. 
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I will say more below about entity-level fault and the ways in which managerial 
decisions come to make a firm liable for their actions, but here I will focus on the 
managers as individuals and their personal obligations in the wake of a crime. My 
objective is not to provide a new justification for criminal law regarding economic 
crimes. Such justifications have already been written (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). 
There is little controversy in the view that individuals are responsible for their actions, 
even when those actions occur within an organizational hierarchy. This is particularly the 
case with respect to bribery. For example, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, one of the 
United States’ relevant legal provisions on bribery, specifically informs managers that 
they will be personally liable for fines for the bribes that they pay, and that this personal 
liability cannot be insured by an employer.  
Unlike the property argument up to this point, which has relied upon the special 
nature of profit as a residual claim, criminal acts may directly alter the rights that an 
individual has to any compensation whatsoever. Other than the sorts of personal affects 
that might be brought into a prison, a community can take property away from an 
individual in the name of deterrence as a form of punishment. If the goal is restitution, 
then other limits may be in order. For example, it might be reasonable to expect an 
employee or manager to return or eventually repay all compensation received during the 
period of criminality, or only that in excess of the median income of the person’s home 
country. The regulation of criminally liable individuals does not require a property 
justification because their crimes are already regulated by law. However, there is 
something to be said for bringing all of those who benefited under the same corporate 
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liability, making restitution through fines to all of them, and then levying punitive 
damages and sentences on the cabal of individuals who actually bribed, funded bribery, 
or hid funds to make them available for the payment of bribes.  
Once again, employee liability for organizational transgressions has significant 
implications for organizational failure. Like the shareholders, when past employees share 
in the cost of a transgression, current employees are able to move beyond the misdeed 
without the abrupt transition that would otherwise be necessary. The firm’s reputation 
suffers, as do the savings accounts of some of its longer-standing employees, but in the 
standard case there is little threat to the firm’s future. The cases in which the firm’s future 
is under threat present a profound indictment of the firm’s productive system and its 
legitimacy as a source of profit. 
Faulting the firm 
Unlike approaches to corporate wrongdoing that assign blame only to individuals 
(Fisse and Braithwaite 1986), thereby reducing the entity to the properties of its 
individual parts (see Quinton 1975), I take the organizational structure as substantial. 
However, I do not think that it is sufficient to distribute fault to the entity-level, and aim 
the regulatory force at the firm (Laufer 2006). While these two approaches to corporate 
and individual level fault dominate legal and business ethics conceptions of corporate 
crime and collective responsibility (May and Hoffman 1991), I propose a hybrid position 
that seeks restitution from individuals and entities that benefited from corporate 
criminality as it occurred, thereby shifting the emphasis to locate responsibilities among 
stakeholder groups who were responsible at key intervals in time. This beneficiary-
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oriented model sidesteps the issues of blameworthiness that animate justifications for 
organization-level punitive action, and instead focuses on the legitimacy of ownership 
within an economic system. If other parties have a more substantive claim upon resources 
than a given stakeholder, I argue that they have a right to reclaim the resources that they 
deserve. I argue for reclamation on efficiency and justice grounds, and consider the legal 
and financial institutions that reclamation requires.  
Organizations differ in how decisions are made and in the distribution of 
knowledge. Some organizations are top-down so that most individual behavior is the 
product of a top-level strategic decision or general organizational policy. Other 
organizations permit substantial individual or departmental autonomy. The dominant 
legal standard of organizational fault, vicarious liability, assumes a tightly controlled 
organization. Under this doctrine, the firm is liable for whatever its agents do on its 
behalf. But as William Laufer notes in his book, Corporate Bodies, Guilty Minds (2006), 
courts have been uncomfortable with this standard since its adoption. Laufer seeks to 
develop a fault standard that captures the essence of “what makes a corporate crime an 
organizational crime rather than a crime committed in an organization by an agent” 
(2006: 70). His proposal, constructive corporate fault, looks to a firm’s policies and 
procedures to evince the fault of the entity.  
Siemens provides a challenging application of the theory of constructive corporate 
fault. Laufer maps organizations onto the four mental states defined in the model penal 
code: purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent19. Siemens is a difficult case for 
                                                
19 Model Penal Code § 2.02 comment at 230 (1985) 
 282 
Laufer’s approach because of the divergent positions of individuals within a large firm 
like Siemens AG. Laufer acknowledges this problem when he speculates that most of the 
firms that are criminally liable for “purposeful criminal acts” are small firms existing 
solely for the purpose of committing a fraud. This acknowledgement seems incongruous 
with the construction of criminal fault. Insofar as a corporate criminal fault has been 
“constructed” it should not require that all agents within a firm be faulted for a crime as 
individuals, yet this is one of the aspects noted in the case of A.R. Baron & Co., where, 
“Convictions were obtained across the entire corporate hierarchy” (2006 : 79). It is clear 
that within Siemens, funds were allocated for bribes within those departments where the 
bribes could do the most good. By my reckoning, this implies a purposeful strategy of 
bribery. If we understand purposeful corporate acts as Laufer does,  
“Purpose reflects motives, aims and objectives that accompany intention. A 
purpose is a reason for doing something or an explanation of one’s action or 
intention. The corporation did X to accomplish this purpose…. Action is 
purposive, and most culpable, when it is one’s conscious object (desire) to engage 
in an act or cause a particular result.” (2006 : 78). 
The fact that slush funds were created for bribery gives a strong indication of foresight, 
and the fact that they were targeted for key projects resulting in $1.1 Billion in profit 
would seem to square them with profit motive, and even to demonstrate that they were 
allocated with some eye to efficiency.  
Nonetheless, Siemens is a very large company, and only a few of its employees 
were directly involved in the bribery. From what we know about criminality within 
organizations (Baker and Faulkner 1993), clandestine activity is only disclosed to a very 
small group of people. It would seem that this was the case at Siemens as well. Can we 
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ascribe an intentional state to an organization when it was a secretive cabal that led the 
organization astray? Laufer proposes that we can, and I agree in a qualified sense.  
Let us say that we have two choices: (1) only the agents who can be proven to 
have actively participated in criminal acts of bribery at Siemens can be punished or 
expected to pay restitution (2) criminally liable individuals will share fault with Siemens, 
the entity and the company’s liability will be paid through a very large fine, in addition to 
restitution. If this is the choice that we face, then I stand with Laufer in supporting the 
latter option. As I have argued above, many employees are aware of the regulatory laxity 
of the organization, and the investors do not change so much over five years that the fines 
are totally misplaced when applied to them. Moreover, that is one of the risks that they 
take by investing in a corporation under the current system of governance. Yet, given a 
third option (3) that would result in non-criminal restitution being repaid by beneficiaries, 
such direct reclamation would be a substantial improvement over the other two 
alternatives.  
The comparison of these three options is a bit of a red herring because it shifts us 
from the realm of criminal punishment to the realm of civil or criminal remedy without 
acknowledging that in this shift the controversy went away. The critique pertained to 
punishing corporations; forcing them to pay what they owe to others was never up for 
debate. But the arguments are more related than one might think. If it were the case that 
(a) punishing corporations provided deterrence from individually criminal acts and that 
(b) such deterrence could not be effectively provided in any other way because 
organizations and the distribution of profit provide many beneficiaries of organizational 
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misdeeds with an escape route, then we might agree to punish firms on efficiency 
grounds. This may result in certain injustices, such as people incurring fines who do not 
deserve them, but this may be a regrettable moral remainder from the best arrangement 
available to deter organizational misdeeds. It is only after we introduce the option of a 
more reliable system of personal accountability that that the deterrence justification for 
corporate punishment becomes untenable. Once we learn to seek restitution from the 
right people, we might not need to punish collectives that include the innocent20. 
So far, my argument is outlined between the entity and the individual at the 
stakeholder-cohort level of analysis, but this level identifies individuals more often than 
entities. There are four key arguments for identifying individuals. First, direct 
reclamation maintains the legitimacy of the financial system. Many business ethicists 
have asserted the harm principle as the first rule of economic life: “Do no harm.” And 
one way in which they reinforce this rule is to suggest that firms should start by trying to 
obey the law21. If the economic system is to affirm this rule in the most meaningful sense, 
                                                
20 By punishing the innocent, I mean levying fines against an organization that burden parties 
who should not be financially liable for the organization’s misdeeds because they were neither 
beneficiaries to nor participants in the crimes. Some common forms of punishment could never 
be justifiably applied to such innocents. For example, it would never be appropriate for a non-
participant in the crime to be incarcerated or subjected to corporal punishment for the misdeeds of 
her peers. I take fines to be different, and I take the corporation to be a punishable entity until a 
proper system of individual-level restitution can be imposed to ensure that the right agents incur 
costs at the appropriate level. 
21 The harm principle, a concept borrowed from philosophy and tort law, is arguably one of the 
moral minimums of business practice. Donaldson suggests that the corporate corollary duties to 
individual rights require that multinational corporations avoid depriving individuals of their 
freedom of physical movement, freedom of speech, physical security, right to not be 
discriminated against, right to subsistence, and other basic rights. For some of these Donaldson 
also suggests that firms should go beyond to “help protect from deprivation” (Donaldson 1989: 
86). Arguably, the harm principle is slightly overstated. Many business dilemmas result in harm 
irrespective of the path taken, so harm would seem to be rather unavoidable. It is perhaps 
somewhat clearer to suggest that business should, “leave no harm un-remedied.” Firms should, on 
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then people must not be allowed to profit without paying for any harms that occur in the 
profit-making activity, irrespective of whether they had the prescience to realize that 
criminal scrutiny was drawing near. Second, direct reclamation sends a message that is 
distinct from the humdrum of investment life. Those who profited from the Siemens 
corruption between 2002 and 2007 would be made to consider a portion of their wealth as 
illegitimate upon receipt of a bill for the settlement. Such a message would give pause to 
a number of agents, who would then have an opportunity to consider their own 
complicity and be inspired to motivate more responsible organizational acts in the future. 
Third, finding the right individuals changes the structure of incentives within the broader 
economy, so that individuals do not benefit for misdeeds that are done on their behalf and 
with their pecuniary interests in mind. And fourth, the reclamation of profits from those 
who benefited encourages the current members of Siemens to fully disclose the extent of 
wrongdoing revealed in their own internal investigations to purge the organization of its 
misdeeds and to push as much of that cost upon those who are outside of the firm. The 
human substance of organizations changes over time, but the need for individual agents 
to protect the firm’s good name does not. One way to get an organization to fully 
acknowledge the misdeeds that occurred within it is to bring in new individuals whose 
incentives are not determined by prior misconduct.  
Entity-level fault and punishment relates to failure in two specific ways. First, if a 
large enough fine or settlement burdens a firm that firm will be forced into liquidation. 
Thus, entity punishment can become a kind of corporate capital punishment. The capital 
                                                                                                                                            
this account, internalize all costs and seek consent in all business transactions. This is, however, 
more expansive than the norms that Donaldson proposes for business based upon the rights that 
businesses should avoid depriving. 
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punishment of corporations does not raise the same moral issues as the capital 
punishment of individuals, but it does raise a set of important considerations that are 
unique to it. Partial capital punishment of persons is not possible, but it is possible to 
strike down an aspect or division of a business without destroying the larger whole. 
Corporations also tend to have mixed groups of individuals, some of whom are clearly 
innocent. The innocent parties constitute the most central challenge to the prospect of 
corporate capital punishment. Lacking a theory of which firms ought to survive, it is 
difficult to establish a definitive judgment on corporate capital punishment. Hopefully the 
account below will help to provide a more complete account of the determination of a 
firm’s worthiness for survival. 
Entity responsibility has been the best available option for some time, and is 
likely to continue to occupy this position until something is done to alter the regulatory 
fabric and to take more seriously the process through which corporations distribute profit. 
The next section suggests some ways in which these problems can be addressed. 
Towards Reclamation Governance 
Upon examination, latency in the realization of responsibilities causes many 
problems of organizational governance. Classically, managers are hoping that fraud and 
other improprieties won’t be found out on their watch, lest they personally suffer the 
embarrassment and costs. What is worse, many financial crimes and organizational 
misdeeds are intentionally buried in the organizational hierarchy in order to avoid 
liability among senior executives and to protect stock options and other performance-
based compensation. This willful ignorance places resources in the hands of unscrupulous 
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individuals who are not in the control of the investors or the managers of the firm, a 
doubly problematic scenario. If we want firms to internalize the costs of their misdeeds, 
we must force them to bear these costs as if they had been imposed at the time of the 
misdeed, not years or decades later. The internalization of costs also improves the social 
and environmental incentives for organizational survival and failure. A system that can 
force agents to internalize the long-term costs of their actions has the potential to 
rationalize the decision to fail. 
But how should we organize an economy in order to facilitate the reclamation of 
resources from those who have profited unjustly? The ideal solution should be imposed 
without adding undue regulatory complexity to the ownership and management of 
firms22. Though efficiency claims have received significant attention in this analysis, 
little has been said regarding the cost of tracking down investors and employees and 
forcing them to pay, sometimes in paltry sums. It is certainly much easier to write a check 
from a corporate treasury than it is to locate a disaggregated mass of investors, many of 
whom own shares through other entities, sometimes several entities deep. Here I will 
briefly outline two options, the second being a relatively radical shift from the dominant 
governance paradigm and structure of currency.  
Beneficiary tracking. Some basic reporting already takes place with the SEC 
regarding the purchase of stock, especially when an ownership stake is sufficiently large. 
Were profit reclamation identified as a desirable regulatory alternative to firm-level fines, 
                                                
22 Not so long ago, investment occurred in relatively simple social structures, and before that 
primitive societies existed where property rights and responsibilities were known for nearly every 
object within the spatial and social domain of a human group. Though most commentators note 
the complexity of modern property relations and laws, it is also interesting to note that this 
complexity is often simpler than the order that preceded it (Scott 1999). 
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the first step would be to record the identities and amounts of all profits distributed to 
individuals or entities from each firm, and the profit gained through sale of shares. The 
structure necessary to track this activity would not be trivial, but it is not that much 
greater than the structure necessary to track securities trade, administer shareholder votes, 
pay dividends, track employee compensation, and monitor the system of taxation. Given 
the identities and amounts of individual liabilities, a bill could be sent to every investor 
and employee for their debt in the larger remedy in proportion to their benefit from the 
firm’s profit during the relevant period. This would satisfy a case like Siemens by forcing 
the right group of employees and shareholders to repay a portion of what they received 
from the firm.  
The beneficiary tracking approach has three limitations. First, the system becomes 
less stable as latency increases. If a corporate impropriety lay dormant for twenty years, 
many who had benefited would be dead by the time their obligations were determined. 
Their debts would have to be passed to their estates through an increasingly complicated 
process of recollection. And worse, if a beneficiary were bankrupted before the revelation 
of impropriety, no resources would remain to pay restitution. The beneficiary tracking 
system is not capable of operating in the long run, but this is precisely what theory 
required to ensure substantive entitlements to profit. The second limitation is the 
organizational scope of the system: the approach ignores important extra-organizational 
features of corporate responsibility. If a firms’ subcontractor enslaved its workers, the 
beneficiary model would protect the purchaser from any non-contractual obligations to 
the enslaved workers. So, if one wished to maximize profits and minimize risks, one 
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could house riskier business activities within separate organizations, an established 
practice in many industries and a major problem for the concept of limited liability 
(Hansmann and Kraakman 1991:1896). Because organizational boundaries hinder the 
recognition of externalities within the firm, the process is insufficient to fully establish 
entitlement to profit. And third, the beneficiary system does little to leverage reputation 
effects that might motivate caretaking among economic actors. In traditional societies, 
one who steals property from a neighbor incurs the cost twice, first through the 
reclamation of the property, and second through the altered conduct of the community 
that now views him as a thief. This secondary mechanism is fundamental to the genesis 
and maintenance of the property norm against theft. However, in the beneficiary system 
the burden of having benefited from impropriety is basically anonymous; it does not call 
the beneficiary into question in any larger sense. For all of these reasons, the beneficiary 
tracking regime is insufficient to protect a system of property rights to profit. Under this 
system, profit remains morally indeterminate. 
ETHO$ economy. If our goal is to make a system in which wealth by entitlement 
is distinguishable from wealth by theft, it will take more than a system of tracked 
beneficiaries to meet the objective. Instead, the paths of all currency must be tracked. 
Imagine an economy in which each person is responsible for the places from which her 
money comes. In keeping with this responsibility, there is a real risk that money can be 
reclaimed if its title was not clear when it was acquired. Rather than structuring the 
regulatory function of the economy through a series of managerial hierarchies, each 
person would be made responsible for ethics upstream. Responsible investors and fair 
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trade consumers already view themselves in such a role: they use their economic 
decisions to address non-economic considerations within the economy and thereby take 
responsibility for upstream conduct. 
To fix the idea, imagine an economy of “ETHO$,” indivisible and traceable units 
of virtual currency. The tracking system records the currency’s pedigree through every 
transaction in the economy. In the ETHO$ economy, stolen currency is rarely 
worthwhile. How could one steal a currency that is easily reclaimed by a victim? As the 
owner of a stolen bicycle reclaims it from a thief, so can a person reclaim an ETHO$ that 
was unjustly taken.  
Many economic crimes look like theft in the ETHO$ economy, and the system 
has the capacity to regulate most of them. I have already claimed that Siemens stole 
wealth from purchasing governments through corruption. A similar argument of 
comparative entitlements might lead to the view that insider traders have weaker 
entitlements than the parties to whom they sold their overvalued shares, that drug dealers 
have weaker entitlements than addicts, and that those who profit from the mistreatment of 
employees have, in a sense, stolen from them. In the ETHO$ economy, the question 
arises at every stage in the transactional chain: does the payer have the strongest 
entitlement to his or her wealth or has it been stolen from others? As the entitlements 
grow weaker, the likelihood of reclamation increases and the currency’s value 
depreciates. 
Of course, it is often difficult to know whether the sources of wealth are 
legitimate. It would make no sense for the butcher, the baker, and the grocer to scrutinize 
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the transactions of each of their customers to determine the worth of their currency. 
Instead, an insurance scheme could guarantee the value of each unit, and the company 
would take an interest in the activities of the individuals that the company serves.  
The valuation of ETHO$ follows an interesting logic. A virgin ETHO$, received 
directly from the government, maintains its full value. But it depreciates slightly with 
every transaction as the risk of reclamation increases23. Theoretically, an ETHO$ 
received as a justified entitlement would maintain its full value, while ETHO$ from 
known fraudsters would depreciate drastically because these would be much more likely 
to be reclaimed than income from responsible business people. Insurance could be 
provided, in such a system, to guarantee the full value of a given ETHO$, and it would 
come with monitoring that sought to justify the sources of income claimed by the 
individual, and to make sure that these accord with appropriate business practice. 
For those who think that the original position (Rawls 1999) is the right frame for 
considerations of business responsibility, I suggest that an economy of ETHO$ offers a 
much more helpful groundwork for thinking about the nature and flow of economic 
responsibility. The virtuous person’s ETHO$ are worth their full value because she 
                                                
23 This view of supply chain responsibility is not amenable to the holder in due course (HDC) 
doctrine as imposed by the uniform commercial code (§3-302). HDC insulates the final purchaser 
of a debt obligation from any fraud, bad faith, or non-performance that occurred between the 
parties of a transaction in an attempt to grant the fungibility of currency to negotiable instruments. 
Insofar as my argument works against every dollar being treated the same, irrespective of its 
origins, I would make a similar claim regarding a promissory notes and other negotiable 
instruments. As a matter of statutory law, the value of such instruments is not determined by the 
conduct through which they originated. However, as a matter of justice and a moral theory of 
property, such an arrangement is no more defensible than a system that acts as if all profits are 
responsibly produced as soon as they have been distributed.  
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embraces the real costs of her business activity and does not claim more revenue than she 
deserves. The swindler’s ETHO$ depreciate as soon as they reach his hands.  
I have shown critically that the current system of governance sometimes allocates 
property to individuals who do not deserve to profit. A system of ETHO$ places a moral 
taint on ill-begotten gains that provides motivation for individuals to concern themselves 
with the origins of their wealth. The inquiry demands a fluid system of responsibilities, a 
system in which a person could be assured that the wealth that she possesses is her own24. 
The ETHO$ economy provides this. 
The system results immediately in a governance function between individuals. I 
become interested in the sources of the monies with which I am paid. Of course, it is not 
possible for me to monitor all people, so instead we rely on a system of private insurance 
that attests to the value of the currency being handed off. A responsible businessperson 
who always distributes property in a just order, meeting prior obligations before later 
ones, will have an inexpensive insurance premium. However, an unscrupulous person 
whose business transactions have a history of reclamation will experience a pronounced 
devaluation of his currency, and significantly increased monitoring. The same will hold 
                                                
24 I count myself as a property pluralist. Though I do not claim that all systems of property are 
equally good, I argue against the view that a modern understanding of property is the apex of an 
evolution that has finally achieved a desirable end. Philosophers should be wary of guessing at 
exactly where they stand within a larger trajectory, because everyone, apologists and critics alike, 
lacks perspective on the larger historical arc. It is clear that property relations in modern society 
lack substantive content that can be found in more “primitive” societies. Community-scale 
property relations allow for the tools, land, and possessions of individuals to be actively 
acknowledged by that person’s peers. In a small community everyone knows who owns what. In 
such a community, is not worthwhile to steal a tool; the risks are too great. Property 
acknowledgement, and accountability, depends upon cohesive communities with fewer 
possessions and these characteristics are not common in developed economies. The argument 
developed here applies local property governance to the system of currency.  
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for organizations, which will be motivated to serve all stakeholder interests prior to 
distributing funds. There are three key changes inspired by the ETHO$ economy: 
First, the ETHO$ economy is a reformulation of the activist consumer’s 
perspective on corporate governance. It traces responsibility and liability through 
transactional chains rather than merely corporate hierarchies. This does not dispense with 
the hierarchies, but it does expand and reinforce the interest groups who place their trust 
in them.  
Second, the ETHO$ economy provides an unprecedented opportunity for 
performance measurement within the firm. Individual employees will wish to ensure that 
the revenues that they receive are actually connected with their own work products, 
because these work products are within the sphere of their control and thus governable by 
them. This induces a connection between revenues and activities that is otherwise quite 
unusual in a complex organization, and as Meyer (2002) notes when he suggests that 
such a connection be forged, it is difficult for organizations to inspire and maintain the 
practice. The economy might inspire some conflict over how revenues from different 
sources are distributed, and this conflict would relate to the larger normative questions of 
what revenue sources are being properly cared for, a question that employees have been 
known to leave to senior managers. But imagining that every employee had to wonder 
about the long-term value of the payments that she received, such an inquiry would focus 
an employee on the question of where the money originated, and whether the other 
obligations were met before the employee had been paid, questions that most employees 
are unlikely to ever ask under the present regime. 
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And third, the ETHO$ economy provides an alternative, network approach to 
organizational persistence, a benefit that I will discuss in detail below. My objective in 
this project has been to envision a system in which individuals have long-term 
motivations, in which governance motivations are distributed among those who are most 
likely to have information that would help them to govern, and in which the organizations 
that fail are the ones that ought to fail. The ETHO$ economy does this, and it provides an 
alternative specification for thinking about ethics. Many business decisions can be 
conceived through the following thought experiment: If I make money this way, is there 
anyone who ought to have a right to take a portion of the money back? In other words, if 
I make money in this way, will it be mine? I take this to be the spirit of justice that 
uniquely arises from a property-based conception of business ethics, but that encapsulates 
many other theories of the subject. 
Earlier in this chapter, I presented three problems of performance measurement in 
empiricism and three problems in normative inquiry.  
Practical problems 
1. Performance observations are delayed; not immediately observable. In the ETHO$ 
economy, the delay is not a problem because costs continue to be associated with 
individual persons. If you take a bonus that is too large, it may be taken back. 
2. Multiple individual performances overlap, and are not separable. In the ETHO$ 
economy individuals are interested in the revenues associated with their own 
activities because these revenues are known to be entitlement-generating. 
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3. Specific measures are proxies, and therefor distorting and game-able. In the ETHO$ 
economy, employees have to take a more holistic view because reclamation may risk 
their income later. 
Normative problems 
1. What goal should businesses pursue? The ETHO$ economy does not provide 
business with a goal. This arises from practice, but it provides business with 
boundaries around practice that will be useful in attaining the goal.  
2. Social and environmental performance proxies are green washable. But ETHO$ are 
not. In fact, deceptions and disappointments are likely to haunt irresponsible firms 
and their employees. 
3. Capital markets and career structures promote short-termism that undermines the case 
for ethics. Most importantly, the ETHO$ economy gives employees a long-term 
incentive to steward their organization and its conduct regardless of their career 
aspirations and connections to a given firm. 
These advantages of the ETHO$ economy are directly applicable to the problems 
of performance management outlined above. One way to understand the strategy to the 
normative problem of organizational failure in utilizing the ETHO$ economy is as a 
general treatment for aligning ethical and economic incentives. Organizations that can 
survive such an alignment are much more worthy of survival than those that cannot. One 
of the special properties of the ETHO$ approach is that it can do this within supply 
chains with complex causal roles. Consider a relatively simple supply chain of 
international scope involved in the production and distribution of athletic shoes: 
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Figure 1: Shoe Corp Supply Chain Responsibilities 
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The diagram depicts a supply chain in which sweatshop conditions resulted in 
undercompensation for the employees of a supplier and the employees of a supplier’s 
supplier. Suppose that a shoe manufacturer, Factory Corp, has been under-compensating, 
abusing, and defrauding its suppliers and employees. And that by virtue of Factory 
Corp’s actions, Shoe Corp, has been distributing unjustified profits to shareholders and 
employees. The logic here is that Shoe Corp ought to have paid more for the shoes that 
Factory Corp supplied and that Shoe Corp’s profits are therefore exaggerated relative to 
those to which clear entitlements are available. According to the entitlement logic, Shoe 
Corp employees, Shoe Corp investors, and Factory Corp shareholders all owe restutitive 
duties to the suppliers and employees whose undercompensated efforts resulted in 
overstated profits. 
In the ETHO$ economy, the duties of restitution would first restore the ETHO$ to 
their rightful owners. Supposing that a Shoe Corp shareholder had taken an ETHO$ from 
Shoe Corp profits and spent it at a restaurant, the ETHO$ would be taken back from the 
restaurant. The restaurant would be repaid by a combination of Shoe Corp’s insurance, 
the investor’s insurance, and the investor’s personal wealth. The insurance premiums 
would have been established during the period when the transaction originally took place, 
and these would be sunk costs for the investor and for the firm, so the system forces the 
firm and the shareholder to fully internalize the externality of irresponsible business 
practices. Were Shoe Corp a responsible company that cared about ethics throughout its 
supply chain, its insurance rate would be quite reasonable and every ETHO$ of profit it 
distributed would be worth its stated value. However, once the impropriety has been 
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discovered, all of the misdistributed ETHO$ are taken back and returned to those who are 
entitled to them, and the obligations are pushed upstream to the most immediate available 
person who benefited from the transaction. 
The example illustrates the key reason why one might prefer the system of 
ETHO$ over the system of beneficiary tracking. In this example, the beneficiary tracking 
system would not identify the responsibilities of Shoe Corp’s shareholders regarding 
Factory Corp’s employees because they occupy separate legal entities. Many 
shareholders and consumers view apparel manufacturers as responsible for the workplace 
conditions in the factories that supply them, a view that is consistent with the entitlement 
theory developed above. But they have yet to establish a system of governance that takes 
their view of responsibility seriously. The ETHO$ economy provides such a system. 
If an organization has unfulfilled duties in the ETHO$ economy those duties are 
to be fulfilled through profit before any other party bears the costs. Profit is a residual; it 
comes last. The flow of currency from consumers into Shoe Corp should create equitable 
distributions throughout the supply chain before profits can be distributed. Most 
importantly, if these flows have not been routed as they should, they are subject to 
reclamation from wherever they have gone. This means that Shoe Corp employees, 
shareholders, subcontractors, and sponsored athletes all have reason to concern 
themselves with responsibility within the Shoe Corp supply chain, because all are 
recipients of funds that may be reclaimed if restitution is required upstream.  
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When the Tap Runs Dry: Entitlement and Failure 
When Factory Corp’s employees sue for restitution, their lawsuit pulls profit from 
investors and employees upstream. It does so because Shoe Corp shareholders and 
employees were not entitled to a portion of the profit distributed to them. This is the case 
whether the ETHO$ have passed through one person’s hands or many. Supposing that the 
ETHO$ are insured at every step in the chain, then it is finally the former shareholders 
and employees of Shoe Corp who will bear the costs for past transgressions. The current 
shareholders and employees of Shoe Corp are burdened with two costs. First, they will 
incur the cost of fairly compensating the supply chain going forward, which may reduce 
the firm’s profitability. And second, they incur the cost of increased doubt about the 
responsibility of their business practices, a cost imposed directly through the insurance 
premium for Shoe Corp profits.  
Once externalities are incurred as costs and once the consequences of leading 
investors and insurers to doubt the strength of the entitlements that Shoe Corp is able to 
provide, the firm is finally stripped to its essential core and is viability is for the first time 
calculable. This is the property basis for organizational survival. Each organization is 
duty-bound to its stakeholders and the stakeholders in the wider network. The viability of 
Shoe Corp depends upon its ability to redistribute ETHO$ upstream to cover duties of 
restitution while continuing to provide surplus ETHO$ to downstream shareholders. If 
there are still positive cash flows after restitution has been paid, then the business can be 
said to generate a social surplus. Otherwise, it should not exist. 
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The ETHO$ system provides inter-temporal motivations for organizational 
failure. Unlike the utilitarian justification for failure, which required that the net social 
benefit of all acts be calculated, the system of reclamation permits the direct and marginal 
estimation of these effects without having to aggregate immeasurable costs. The system 
suggests that actors will lose interest in enterprises that are not socially beneficial and be 
drawn to other activities where internalized costs do not undermine organizational 
profitability, achieving the economist’s ideal. The proposition for a property-based view 
of organizational failure is as follows: 
Insofar as an organization is able to generate morally substantive entitlements to 
profit, that organization should survive.  
There is also a positive claim to be made regarding firms that lose money, but behave 
admirably in their conduct: 
Insofar as a firm cannot generate profit, but generates excessive entitlements 
despite economic losses, that firm is worth preserving.  
Together, these two propositions provide the basis for a property-based approach to 
organizational survival.  
I have argued that the prevailing system of governance allows parties to benefit 
from injustices, and that this threatens the entitlements that the system generates for those 
who derive wealth from profit. In the dominant system, firms will sometimes 
unpredictably collapse under the weight of past transgressions. Unfortunately, misdeeds 
are allowed to accumulate and the total liability is eventually realized as a simultaneous 
shock. Enron provides a useful example. Enron’s bookkeeping practices created 
misperceptions of financial performance. Then, all at once, the whistle was blown and the 
firm quickly collapsed under the weight of its own accounting restatements. The course 
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of Enron’s destruction is typical of many scandals in which exaggerated financial 
performance justifies overcapitalization, allowing a firm to continue growing when it 
should be shrinking. The resulting crash is more destructive than is necessary. 
An ETHO$ system operates under different rules. Earnings would not be 
“restated;” ETHO$ would be reclaimed. This means that the costs of Enron’s deception 
would be spread among its employees and its shareholders, concentrating among those 
who had gained most from the firm amidst the deception. Enron’s deception would serve 
no purpose under reclamation governance: why bother to understate debt and overstate 
profit when the overstatements would eventually be personally reclaimed? And even if 
the crimes follow their historical course of boom-and-bust, under reclamation governance 
the burden would be widely disbursed among current and former beneficiaries. This 
might increase the chances for the entity to survive because the costs are not merely 
borne by the corporate treasury. The scenario also alters the motives: if the managers at 
Enron ever wanted to have their money be trusted again, they would have reason to worry 
about their integrity from the start. 
Most societies find an arbitrary system of ownership to be undesirable, and many 
have quite complicated and well-orchestrated understandings of ownership that are meant 
to achieve pluralistic social ends. The structure of corporate ownership through the firm 
is meant to be one such arrangement, but that system has a moral perversity that 
manifests itself recurrently in the modern economy. The perversity results in unjust 
enrichment of well-positioned individuals who benefit from harms without paying for 
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their costs. This is an injustice for the firm and for the property system that relies upon 
the firm. It also demonstrates the incongruence of economic and ethical motivations. 
The system of ownership that allows each individual to pass the property that they 
own with only ephemeral duties of stewardship and liability has provided a rapid 
expansion of capital availability in the course of its utilization. But something has been 
lost to a social order that makes ownership morally empty, impersonal, anonymous, and 
secret. One thing that is lost is accountability. I have tried to outline some of the ways in 
which property is held accountable and made responsible, and some of the reasons why 
capital has not been similarly engaged.  
The minute details are extremely important in understanding how the system 
works and should work. These details suggest an increased emphasis upon bottom-up 
approaches to the field of business ethics. There are limitations to the grand abstraction of 
ethics. One limitation is the specificity with which we can address interactions between 
individuals to define responsible business practice. Rawls does not make these 
interactions the subject of his theory of justice (Rawls 1999), but we should make them 
the subject of ours. Given the resources that businesses command, the role that they play 
in established and emerging economies, and the extent to which businesses define the 
lives of individual persons, by consequence alone business must be taken seriously as a 
subject of justice. Business ethics ought to be more than a footnote in a theory of justice 
because business practice is more than a footnote in the incidence of injustice. 
To this end, businesses must be judged on their ability to create morally 
substantial entitlements to property and profit. This should be the goal even if no system 
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exists to internalize the externalities that third parties are forced to pay. The failure of the 
law to require a person to do the right thing does not justify doing something that is 
wrong. The perspective is most immediately grounded in Phillips’ stakeholder fairness 
and Freeman’s stakeholder theory, which specifies the importance of mutually beneficial 
business activity. These views are systematized through the property entitlement 
arguments developed above. But the argument is open to other issues such as those 
realized in rights-based and utilitarian approaches. Just as the norms of fairness and 
reciprocity spread into a firm’s supplier network, so should the protections against 
violations of human rights and the concern for the generation of net-positive social value. 
Any of these factors can threaten an entitlement to profit, and so all must be addressed by 
a fully adequate scheme of business ethics that guarantees morally substantial claims to 
distributed profits. 
 304 
CHAPTER SEVEN: 
SHOULD BANKS AND PAPERS SURVIVE? 
Introduction 
The normative exercise of chapters five and six is unlike the empirical analysis 
that preceded it, and some might argue that these are separate projects that contribute 
nothing to one another. The argument may come from both sides, as ethicists wonder 
about the value of empirical observation and sociologists wonder about the value of 
normative considerations. The competing logics of normative and empirical research, and 
the possibility for successful integration has been subject to much debate within business 
ethics (Donaldson 1994; Jones and Wicks 1999; Trevino and Weaver 1994; Velasquez 
1996; Werhane 1994). And the issue is of special importance here, as the reader 
justifiably asks two related questions. How does the empirical observation of the post-
failure processes improve the normative analysis of failure? And, how does the normative 
analysis of failure improve the empirical analysis of post-failure processes?  
In this final chapter I speak to the question of compatibility between normative 
and empirical research. First, I examine the larger narrative that I have pursued in this 
project. I consider this narrative as a method for knowing about ethics and for knowing 
about organizational processes and seek to describe the ways in which these two 
components of the research have contributed to each other, and how I have sought to 
partition them as distinct exercises. Second, I apply the normative analysis to the 
empirical settings of this dissertation, to newspapers and investment banks. In so doing, I 
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demonstrate the final stage of my normative method and the importance of its ongoing 
empirical application. 
There is an important question of compatibility within the competing logics of 
normative business ethics and empirical sociology. To be sure, most sociological projects 
would do well to avoid moralizing, and this one is no exception. How empty would be 
the empirical claims if they were concocted from vapor to support a normative view? 
Ethics and empiricism can work at cross-purposes because each has the potential to 
corrupt the other. Sociology, which aims at describing objective and subjective social 
realities as they are experienced, is carried no further by asking “What ought we to see?” 
If anything, a researcher who is too focused on wishing for a given outcome may dismiss 
disconfirming evidence, and this would be a clear violation of an empirical researcher’s 
professional responsibility. For example, if a sociologist who believed strongly in the 
nuclear family were to find that children raised by divorced parents instead fared better 
than children from intact families, that sociologist would be duty-bound to report her 
results regardless of personal convictions that contrary results were more likely or more 
consistent with her cause. Research is not value neutral, but this does not mean that one 
should promote false statements to further political or moral ends.  
Just as prescription can undermine a descriptive project, the corruption can run in 
the other direction as well. For example, it is not enough to say that “People think 
inequality is acceptable:” ethics requires that we demonstrate that people are right to 
think as they do, and further, that we understand what it means to be “right.” One need 
look no further than slavery and gender inequality to find enduring cases of broad social 
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agreement on unjustifiable views. As Hume observed long ago (1978), the normative 
project is not effectively undertaken with empirical evidence alone. Donaldson pursues 
this claim further:  
“The temptation to integrate the normative and the empirical at the level of 
fundamental theory must be firmly resisted. We cannot both understand empirical 
causes and evaluate normative behavior using the same set of integrated axioms” 
(1994: 167). 
This argument has a face validity that appeals to the most basic field-based expertise of 
both social science and humanistic disciplines. There is a danger that by focusing on what 
“is” we might fail to apprehend what “ought to be.” 
Clearly, there is a gulf dividing the methodologies and logics of social science and 
humanistic reasoning (1959). But the expanse between the approaches is greatly 
exaggerated. First, many settings provide examples where the facts and the words about 
them are unambiguous indications of what “ought” to be done. Searle shows the 
absurdity of the is/ought distinction in ordinary life by imagining himself as a baseball 
player who has just been tagged out and called out by an umpire: 
“I however, being a positivist, hold my ground…. I point out to [the umpire] that 
you can't derive an “ought” from an “is.” No set of descriptive statements 
describing matters of fact, I say, will entail any evaluative statements to the effect 
that I should or ought to leave the field…. I think everyone feels my claims here 
to be preposterous… By undertaking to play baseball I have committed myself to 
the observation of certain constitutive rules” (1969: 185). 
The philosopher-player who seeks compelling normative reasons to play by the rules has 
apparently misapprehended the nature of the game. There is, in fact, no reason why the 
player cannot simultaneously observe the validity of the umpire’s call as a normatively 
binding statement and also observe the empirical presence of the norms of rule-following 
and role-based authority within the game setting.  
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 Second, there is a critical question about where emergent norms actually 
originate, and it is fair to say that social progress is rarely won through philosophy. 
Returning to slavery and gender inequality, for instance, it was clearly changes in 
practice that led to changes in thinking rather than the reverse. Women and minorities 
gained equality slowly through struggle, not through the rational considerations of 
philosophers. Most philosophers have lagged considerably behind the concerned citizens 
and subjugated minorities who brought these issues to the fore. Reason has a role in 
articulating and reconsidering ethical perspectives, but the importance of intuition, 
compassion, and observation is equal if not greater. 
 And third, social science is not as objective as its adherents may claim. Some 
fields embrace their normative orientations. Economists, for instance, use efficiency, 
rationality, and optimality as evaluative standards. Many empirical projects are almost an 
afterthought in economic analysis, a check to see if practice follows the course that 
theory suggests it should. When it does not, the economist is more likely to stand in 
judgment of the practice than the theory. Sociology and psychology bury their evaluative 
concepts within the subjects of study, and these are never arbitrary. Positive 
psychologists study subjective well-being because they believe that positive human 
experience is important, and while this belief is neither confirmed nor disconfirmed 
within their analysis, many of the associations that they seek are meant to demonstrate 
the importance of “happiness” in human health and other subjectively important ends. 
Similarly, sociologists study network position and interpersonal connection because they 
believe that relationships are important. They seek to demonstrate the ways that 
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relationships foster other valued ends. Their positivism requires an ethos of how facts are 
known, but it does not require them to discard their own intuitions and sensibilities about 
what is ultimately of value. 
Normative and empirical analyses are (and ought to be) interdependent. Ethics is 
rife with empirical suppositions, and ethicists would do well to understand how people 
who face a given dilemma interpret that dilemma, how they bracket what matters in a 
given situation, and how they understand the rules regarding their conduct. This is useful 
information even if the ethicist eventually concludes that the standard interpretation of a 
situation is morally perverse and wrong. Just as empiricism enriches ethics, so too can 
ethics enrich empiricism. Ethics focuses on some extremely compelling issues, and these 
issues present worthy subjects for empirical inquiry. Philosophy also provides a useful 
language for distinguishing between moral motivations. In the next section I document 
how these disciplines have informed each other within this dissertation. 
Failure: Empirical and Normative Perspectives 
This dissertation provides one example of how normative and empirical 
undertakings can be pursed within the same project, if not the same chapter. The 
dissertation begins with an introduction to a set of empirical considerations, and then 
explores these empirical questions through interviews with people whose experience 
bears directly on the topic. The empirical component consists of four chapters: an 
introductory chapter on theory, a chapter on methods, and two chapters to collect and 
categorize empirical observations. The empirical analysis makes no attempt to justify 
normative claims. Instead, it focuses on “ways of knowing” about human behavior, the 
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existence of social norms, and the dynamics of social and economic life in the wake of 
organizational failure. I find in the third and fourth chapters that many organizational 
norms and routines survive failure, and described some of the processes through which 
this occurs. Even clearly normative concepts like the justice-oriented norms of chapter 
three are treated as social objects and subjected to a sociological analysis that aims to 
understand rather than to judge. I distinguish the justice orientation of a norm based upon 
the way that individuals describe it and the sacrifices that they are willing to make to 
maintain it rather than by my own beliefs about justice. The title “justice-oriented” might 
well be replaced with “serious,” or “deeply guiding,” because the overlap between these 
norms and the philosophical accounts of justice is merely incidental. However, it is not so 
surprising that the intuitions of journalists and investment bankers about matters of 
personal feeling are directly connected with what philosophers would also believe to be 
important. This is, of course, because both philosophers and professionals are guided by 
some of the same basic value commitments, but the empirical project offers no proof of 
this because philosophers are not included in the sample. 
The normative analysis consists of two additional chapters. These chapters 
consider a more general topic and do not focus on the specific individuals or the study 
context. Until this point, the presentation has been largely split from the empirical 
analysis that preceded it. Instead, the normative Chapters Five and Six consider the more 
general question of which firms should survive. Participants in my research have wrestled 
with this question in the post-failure career crisis, but business ethics has little to say of 
their struggle. I hope that those who participated in the empirical portion of this study 
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could find something of interest in the normative analysis, but it does not originate in the 
way that they frame their choices, nor is it extrapolated from their experiences. 
In two normative chapters I discuss four distinctive perspectives on organizational 
failure, perspectives based upon utility, rights, fairness, and property. The normative 
claims are justified based on the strength of the argument for them. These arguments 
mainly operate by means of comparison between theories. For example, if business 
activity ought to aim at mutual advantage for all collaborators then utilitarianism accepts 
tradeoffs that are inconsistent with the stakeholder principle of fairness, a conclusion that 
follows from the nature of the utilitarian logic applied at the firm level. This demonstrates 
that utilitarianism reaches a result that is inconsistent with the standard, cooperative view 
of the corporation. 
Normative analysis considers prescriptive claims for what one ought to do. Like 
empirical analysis, normative analysis depends upon foundational concepts, but the 
foundational concepts of ethics—the rights of a person, the importance of human 
wellbeing, the priority of human community, the intrinsic value of the natural 
environment, the priority of honoring one’s commitments—are not demonstrable using 
empirical tools. While proxies for these values can be measured, and their correlates 
tested, their worth is not an empirical matter. 
There are numerous strategies for answering the basic questions of ethics: why be 
moral? What is ultimately of value? And I have said very little about these basic issues in 
either section of the dissertation. The contribution that I have made to normative theory is 
one of application. If I have developed something new in my account of the ETHO$ 
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economy, that line of inquiry will require much more development before it can be 
established on its own grounds. So far, the justification for the ETHO$ economy is based 
upon gaps in other lines of inquiry and approaches to accountability. The basic precepts 
are only briefly articulated. The only additional clarification that may benefit the 
interpretation of the normative argument is my stated loyalty to value pluralism. Value 
pluralists believe that there are multiple systems of value that compete for attention in 
any normative analysis. Business ethics fosters value pluralism because the diversity of 
organizations and cultural contexts in which businesses operate provide numerous 
reasons for us to respect the agreements within firms and the local regulatory systems in 
which firms operate (Dunfee and Donaldson 1999). Given the opportunity to exit, 
employment agreements most often arise from consent and therefore create a diversity of 
binding organizational norms. This diversity is greater than what one would expect to 
find in a universalistic context, like the state. It is the voluntary nature of economic 
associations that gives them their special character as forms of community into which 
members self-select (Hartman 1996). 
Over the course of three chapters including this one, a normative analysis of 
failure follows three steps. First, it uses established normative theories within business 
ethics to consider an unexplored topic: the ethics of failure. Second, it addresses the 
inadequacies of these theories by extending a property-based approach to the subject of 
organizational failure. The property approach unites important values found within other 
theories of business ethics through integration rather than asserting the relative priority of 
one value over another. The third and final step returns to the empirical focus of the study 
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and applies the normative argument within it, using the empirical observation to sharpen 
the normative claims. Empirical observations cannot prove normative theory. They 
cannot determine what ought to be valued. But they can demonstrate a theory’s vitality 
and relevance within the normative conflicts of the applied research setting. 
The section below considers the question of whether newspapers and investment 
banks ought to survive. It does so with reference to the critical reflections on the positive 
and negative externalities of these industries. A positive test of the normative framework 
would find the claims regarding these industries to be categorically consistent with the 
proposed framework. A negative test would reveal important normative issues that are 
not compatible within the proposed framework, each of which might suggest revisions to 
the approach. John Rawls proposed something similar in his work. He argued that by 
moving between normative theory and intuitions in practice, a philosopher can eventually 
reach a “reflective equilibrium,” a point at which a theory stabilizes into a form that is 
consistent with intuitions and intuitions have stabilized to be consistent with the theory 
(Rawls 1999). The full process is not realized here. It would require that the theory be 
applied directly to practice and that the consequences of that application be observed and 
addressed by altering the theory, a cycle that would continue until an equilibrium was 
reached. The application of a theory of organizational failure would require experience 
that does not exist to determine its practical implications. Instead, the application that we 
are able to consider is whether the reasons for firms to survive and for firms to fail are 
generally comprehensible within the terms of the proposed theory.  
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Newspapers and Banks: Two Questions of Survival 
Suppose that we can agree that organizations ought to create morally substantial 
entitlements for their shareholders and employees, and otherwise they ought not exist. 
Where would this view lead us in the observational settings of newspapers and 
investment banks? This dissertation has documented some of the critical reflections of 
employees from both of these industries, and some glowing praise for organizations that 
have collapsed and disbanded. There is nothing objective about the perspective of former 
employees, but neither is there a good alternative perspective that provides a purely 
objective lens.  
This chapter presents the public goods argument for the survival of newspaper 
journalism and the excessive risk argument for the failure of investment banks. I hope 
that these summary judgments are taken in the spirit of inquiry rather than 
conclusiveness. Each is intended as a means of elucidating the argument rather than 
deciding the outcome. In taking up these arguments, I shift my attention from a case-by-
case analysis of firm failure to an industry analysis based upon a set of generalities. In 
practice, of course, the question would not be whether banks should fail, but whether a 
specific bank should fail under specific circumstances. I do discuss some of these issues 
with reference to Global Investment and the City National, two central organizations in 
my dissertation.  
Since early 2008, both newspapers and investment banks failed for economic 
reasons. In newspapers, the economic collapse occurred due to persistent cash flow 
problems and an insurmountable debt burden. New advertising outlets, many of which  
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were online, diluted the value of newspaper advertising inventories. Meanwhile, websites 
like Craigslist.org and eBay.com crushed the local market for classified advertisements. 
At the same time, the content itself began to be distributed through numerous alternative 
outlets, many of which avoid the cost of collecting news and merely aggregate the news 
collected by others. Declining readership, reduced advertising revenue, and an inability to 
capture the local need for information has resulted in a rapid and drastic downturn in the 
economic performance of newspapers. In investment banks, significant exposure to home 
mortgage markets coupled with organizational interdependencies through derivatives 
contracts very nearly toppled the financial system.  
In this setting, it is no wonder that the question of survival for these two industries 
has entered the public arena for debate. It is also no wonder that countless essays, 
analyses, and arguments have been written on all sides of the issue. I will not attempt to 
document all of the influential accounts involved in this debate. The next two sections 
document critical and supportive perspectives on newspapers and investment banks. I 
conclude by revisiting the initial theorizing of Chapter One and summarizing the 
contribution of the larger report. 
Should Newspapers Survive? 
In an age of bailouts, many newspapers are sinking, yet thus far new public 
subsidies have not been mobilized to support their rescue. The qualitative account of 
chapter three reveals three reasons for subsidizing the news: the socially beneficial 
product of a well-functioning news media, protecting a training ground for journalism, 
and the direct costs of unemployment. The account also reveals that not all papers are 
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equally deserving of subsidy. In particular, the City National stands out as a paper that 
has failed its employees and public, but continues to survive. In this section I will argue 
for the protection of the news media through public subsidy as suggested by media 
scholar C. Edwin Baker (2009). I note the limitations of preferences for and against 
organizations revealed through qualitative research, and argue for the protection of norms 
of professionalism among well-intentioned employees. 
My defense does not concern the medium through which news is distributed: it 
focuses on the organization and structure that generates and curates the news. Whether 
people find their news online, on monitors in public spaces, on their cell phones, in print, 
or on their computers, there are certain basic components of a news organization, which I 
have identified as norms and routines of news production and which may be worth 
preserving regardless of the reader’s choice of news medium. I focus here on the 
preservations of the essential aspects of news collection organizations rather than the 
technical apparatus of newspaper production. 
The Costs of Collapse: Positive Externalities, Training, and Unemployment 
Positive externalities. News media are an important force of accountability and 
public motivation for social, economic, and political stability. In economic terms, 
newspapers produce significant positive (and negative) externalities:  
Media products often produce extraordinarily significant positive and negative 
externalities. People care whether their reputation is ruined or advanced, whether 
people they meet are boring or cultured, and whether they are murdered or aided 
by the person they pass on the street – and these are among the phenomena whose 
occurrence can be significantly influenced by other people’s media consumption. 
Likewise, many people value a well-functioning democracy. They are affected by 
whether the country goes to war, establishes parks, or provides for retirement and 
medical care – and hence can be greatly benefited by other people’s consumption 
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of quality media or harmed by others’ ignorance or apathy produced by 
inadequate consumption or consumption of misleading, distortive, and 
demobilizing media. Furthermore, the political or corporate corruption that the 
threat of media exposure deters is a benefit that the press cannot effectively 
capture – there is no story – to sell to consumers. (Baker 2002: 10-11)  
Baker outlines the key rationale for many public interventions meant to protect media 
producers. From discounted postage to property rights, American public policy includes a 
variety of provisions that attempt to ensure the survival of the media.  
What would they preserve? The foremost concern is for the preservation of the 
news product, the words and images that portray an accurate representation of events to 
inform a wider public, and while the specific form of these words and images remains 
contentious, their necessity is not. An uninformed public cannot make good decisions 
about how to vote, what to buy, and how to understand changes in their society and 
culture. A professional media is one of the pillars of an informed society, and its nature as 
a public good explains one of the key reasons for subsidy. Newspapers are costly 
crusaders, and without subsidy they may not have the resources to keep doing the work 
that they do. 
Can the media be trusted with the responsibility of informing the public? Not 
entirely. Readers must filter information in order to determine its trustworthiness, but it 
would be wrong to place the entire burden on the reader. Fortunately, in my interviews 
there was not a single mention of a “buyer beware” ethic among journalists. Newspaper 
journalists espouse a deep sense of professional responsibility for the news that they 
report, and this sense of responsibility is at the heart of what we should wish to preserve. 
Training. How does one preserve responsibility? It isn’t the sort of thing that can 
be bought and sold, or even paid for. Most readers are entirely unaware of the process of 
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contestation involved in producing the report that they read. In fact, many journalists are 
even sheltered from the economic pressures that mire the paper as a whole, though this 
separation has been destroyed in many papers, and this is a major loss. But the greater 
loss is the destruction of the news organization and the news collection and curation 
relationships that evolve within these firms. The transition moves the editor from a role 
as mentor, collaborator, and critic to one of purchaser.  
To get a sense of how the changing organization of news threatens the learning 
that happens in papers, consider this interview excerpt from Tim, an experienced 
photojournalist who took a position as a photo editor at the Afternoon Dispatch. Note that 
Tim learned from the organization beneath him because the organization had a tradition 
of story telling with pictures. Though this quote concerns the relation between a photo 
editor and a photojournalist, an equivalent case could be made for assigning editors and 
writers. Note also that this was a second interview with Tim as a follow-up on his 
trajectory, so the questions are less exploratory than in the first interview. 
Interviewer: You mentioned that all of your experience, including being an editor, 
has improved your photojournalism. This is a leading question: Did being an 
editor focus you more on the story? At what point did you focus on getting the 
story into the picture? 
Tim: Well, in keeping with the contrast between the Afternoon Dispatch and the 
Dispatch Journal, there was never at the Dispatch Journal, an expectation for 
photographers to be anything other than photographers. The term 
“photojournalist” wasn't used, and there was no expectation that you were going 
to do anything other than provide decoration for the presentation of the story. It 
wasn't about message, about narrative, and that sort of thing. And when I was a 
photo editor at the Afternoon Dispatch I became more in tune to that. It wasn't 
just my own realization; I didn't invent that. It was a disposition that was in play 
at the Afternoon Dispatch for a long time. So, it was something that I learned at 
the Dispatch, or at least learned to put into play and make use of. It was fun. It 
made the photography richer and, we felt, more useful to the readers. It felt like a 
more rewarding journalistic experience. I might have strayed from your question. 
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Interviewer: Not at all, that seems like the experience that you had as an editor. 
Do you think that your photography would have improved in the same way had 
you taken a job there as a staff photographer? 
Tim: I actually had that opportunity. It was put in front of me that I could choose 
[laughs]. At the time that they hired me they needed both, and I could be 
whichever I wanted to be, and I chose the editor job. … For me, having changed 
hats like that, and having that experience of coming to the photography from a 
different position and looking at it more critically, collaborating with the 
photographers, had the effect for me of teaching me about the story telling aspect 
of photography in ways that just by shooting, I don't think that I would have 
picked up on.  
Interviewer: How does that happen? Is it in having to talk to someone else about 
why you choose a picture? 
Tim: Yes. In fact, there is one conversation in particular that will always stand out 
with me, with Josh actually. Ironically, it didn't have to do with Dispatch pictures, 
but with a woman who had sent some pictures asking for critique about some 
stories she was working on. I had been at a photojournalism conference not long 
before that, and she'd missed the opportunity to talk to me and wanted to get some 
feedback. So she sent me this work, and we printed it out and spread it all out, and 
were talking about that very thing. And we found ourselves trying to articulate 
different qualities in pictures that make them stand out. That make them why 
you're attracted to this picture over that picture. The articulation became this very 
important thing: the words that we were choosing to use to describe the picture 
and the strengths of the picture became what I came to describe as my editing 
words list. You know, it is a list of about twenty or thirty words. They include 
light, moment, color, expression, things that any given photo is going to have 
some combination of these things as features of that photo, and when you are 
critically trying to decide what makes this picture stronger you have a sense about 
that, that language of photojournalism is at work, but to actually force yourself to 
articulate what that quality is that is making you decide what is making this great 
picture became this list. It isn't as if we then used that list to sit there and distill 
the quality of photos, but it was an important exercise in learning the language of 
photography, and I've always felt that if people who didn't come from visuals, 
who we fondly refer to as “word people,” came to have some of the same 
language, this articulation tool, at their disposal, maybe they could be able to look 
at pictures with a little more sophistication. 
Interviewer: And the million-dollar question that follows from that is, what 
happens if photo editors are no longer interacting with photographers, if they're 
just deciding what to use. How does that learning happen? 
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Tim: I think it suffers. It definitely suffers. I work with the local university 
photographers and their daily newspaper staff, and those guys are hungry for that 
feedback and that interaction, and others who are just out there on some level, 
trying to produce, trying to freelance, trying to keep active, to keep in the game. 
Especially younger people, I am finding are always seeking that out. But, as a 
freelancer… actually as a former photo editor, I know that there isn't a lot of 
feedback that goes on when you are sending in photos remotely. Usually what you 
get is, “Don't you have any of this? Could you send some more photos?” It isn't 
critical feedback that helps, you see, helps you shoot, helps you learn. 
The news crisis is already under way, but some of its most severe effects may not 
materialize for years because the industry currently relies upon an inventory of 
unemployed but well-trained journalists. Once these journalists leave the industry, papers 
may find a much weaker labor pool that does not share the normative and aesthetic 
culture of current employees and freelancers. News production centered on freelancers 
does not offer the feedback and support necessary to inculcate the norms of journalistic 
practice. 
Unemployment. The social and economic function of news affirms the reason why 
the industry matters to outsiders. The reduction of learning opportunities within 
journalism may be a significant factor in its eventual decline. But the most immediate 
cost of failing newspapers is borne directly by laid off employees. The circumstances of 
these individuals are perhaps the most severe indictment of their industry. Journalists 
tend not to be compensated well enough to self-insure against job loss, and the use of 
strategic layoffs among senior staff to reduce payroll cost results in an extremely 
challenging economic circumstance for individuals who are exposed to age 
discrimination in the job market. Journalists are far from helpless in this struggle, and the 
acceptance of these decisions by unions implicates an even wider part of the news 
organizations that allow senior journalists to be dismissed.  
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Given the possibility of post-failure entrepreneurship and the social costs of 
unemployment, it seems that one public policy innovation suggested by this context is the 
subsidization of entrepreneurial projects among victims of mass layoffs. If former 
employees of news organizations did not have to personally cover all of the risk of their 
entrepreneurial endeavors, it seems likely that more would participate in these projects 
and work to find alternative organizational forms. And better yet, their former employer 
would have to deal with the very real likelihood that layoffs would yield new 
competitors, a fact that is often forgotten by desperate managers. 
Should All Papers Survive? 
The City National stands out as one of the most severe cases of the collapse of 
journalism. The transition occurred through the intervention of the business side of the 
paper into the news organization, and though the paper still employs some very good 
journalists, it has been a difficult place to work for some time.  
The City National, like many papers, has been desperately chasing readers and 
aiming their content at specific audiences. Unfortunately, this marketing approach is 
disconnected with the social value justification of the trade, and may undermine the end 
that it seeks25. It certainly creates serious tensions within the newsroom.  
The City National distinguishes itself by the abrupt transition it made from being 
a paper where people were proud to work into a paper where, as one former reporter 
                                                
25 That some things are best pursued indirectly is an important observation in philosophy and the 
thesis of the pleasure paradox. Kierkegaard wrote in Either/Or, “Most men pursue pleasure with 
such breathless haste that they hurry past it.” The same may be said of newspapers that may be 
discarding the elements that make their news worth reading in the search for readers. 
 
 321 
remarked after an interview, “It was an honor to be fired by a paper like that.” As a rule, 
papers are weakened by financial stress, but journalists describe being motivated by the 
desperate times. At the City National however, this is not observed:  
Patrick (laid off by the City National, continues to work as a writer on 
technology): Journalism is not an industry that thrives under cost cutting and 
pricing pressure. It doesn’t get better for it. Whereas efficiency clearly makes 
some industries better, efficiencies are not making journalism as we know it 
better.  
Perverse incentives in the communications market lead firms to spend more on news 
presentation than they do news collection, to treat political realities as political games, 
and to fabricate controversy out of agreement (Fallows 1996). None of this is responsible 
to readers or even good for the bottom line of an information organization in the long run, 
but the only way to protect a profit margin amidst decreasing revenue is to cut costs 
drastically, and with costs go news creation resources that justify the entire system. One 
participant describes this in personal terms: 
I miss the banter of the newsroom, the busyness and a little of the cynicism. I miss 
the “we're all in it together “, but I don't miss my particular newspaper because 
the paper I worked for is no longer the paper it was. I wish it well, I want it to 
survive and to figure it out. I wish I could have been a part of that solution, but I 
spent [many] years learning very, very specific things about [certain news] and it's 
not valued at the City National as it once was. My greatest capability and 
knowledge base is not there.  What they needed me for, they don't need me for. 
That is the reality. 
As the news fails, some newspaper journalists and managers fail each other. They fail to 
protect each other and to value things that ought to be valued. They fail to ensure that 
their own employment is not coming at the expense of someone else’s employment. 
Amidst failure, some of the positive and protective social norms of collaborative and 
supportive industries collapse under the strain of personal risk. As such, though the City 
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National has failed many of its employees, this is not a sufficient reason to say that the 
paper ought not survive.  
Saving Journalism 
 As an empirical matter, this dissertation has made a strong case for subsidizing 
work rather than organizations. Though work occurs within organizations, there are many 
ways in which subsidies can be diverted to third parties whose activities are not 
connected with the efforts that a policy means to preserve. In describing the firm as a 
system that generates legitimate entitlements to profit, we must acknowledge the diverse 
interests that bring people together within the firm. Insofar as the public wishes to join 
these interests, it should apply its will with some specificity, not just to the organization, 
but to some of the work products associated to the organization. Otherwise, public 
resources will be diverted whichever way the organization could wish, and this may not 
be at all good for the public. Meyer’s (2002) argument for measuring revenues at the 
activity level, where goals are most powerfully motivational, might be extended to 
suggest that subsidies should be focused on specific activities as well. 
 In newspapers, we are concerned with news production and curation. We are not 
concerned with those who made bad bets on news markets in a gambit to take city papers 
into suburbs, nor are we much concerned with the capital investments in print production 
that these people made. At least, no more concerned than we might be for any other 
productive capacity that we should wish to encourage. But from the public subsidy 
perspective, it is the journalism that matters, and any subsidies should be focused on the 
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work activity of news production. Baker testified to this end before a congressional 
subcommittee: 
If the government gave these media entities a tax credit for half of the journalists’ 
salary… the public interest would be served. These tax credits would reverse the 
incentive for newspapers to lay off journalists, and in turn would increase the 
quality of newspaper journalism and cause circulation to rebound. For the roughly 
48,000 journalists now employed by the nation’s newspapers, who are paid on 
average slightly less than $50,000 a year, this tax credit would cost about 1.25 
billion dollars, a fraction of the amount in today’s dollars per person that the 
country provided in the form of a postal subsidy a hundred years ago. This 
targeted subsidy would duplicate the financial commitment of the founders to the 
news media of their time (2009). 
Many disappointments of American political life can be blamed on a beleaguered 
media establishment, and the market incentives can be blamed in turn. Targeted subsidies 
might correct these market incentives and provide for a more responsible media 
establishment.  
In property theory terms, news organizations probably generate excess 
entitlements to profit, but the ETHO$ economy has no special technique for identifying 
these entitlements. Unfortunately, the intellectual property mechanism has not (and may 
never) capture this aggregate product. Though I have said little about the intellectual 
property issues that undermine the revenue model of news organizations, these challenges 
make the context a difficult place to implement the ETHO$ economy. Those who escape 
with value from news organizations have not stolen money: they have taken words, facts, 
and ideas into their vocabularies, onto their websites, newscasts, and blogs. The 
influential reuse of ideas that originate in papers is at once a triumph of the journalist’s 
work product and a detractor from the revenue opportunities for the firm.  
 324 
The destinations of ideas are difficult to trace, and so the aggregate value of the 
ideas is fundamentally uncertain. Whatever value is attributable to papers must be 
determined by other means. Note that this is precisely the sort of revelation provided by 
the interaction between normative theory and empirical practice. The fact that the 
normative theory is incomplete indicates that it is in need of further development. In 
particular, there is an open question of what duties a firm’s beneficiaries owe the firm 
regardless of their contractual relationships. As the newspaper case demonstrates, 
identifying such relationships may be complex, but the question of responsibilities for 
third parties who benefit from positive externalities is as compelling as the question 
pursued in the preceding chapter, which examined the rights of third parties who are 
harmed by a firm’s negative externalities. These are potentially fruitful avenues for future 
research. 
Other normative theories also substantiate the claim that newspaper journalism 
should survive. From a utilitarian perspective, most newspapers provide enough social 
value to justify their survival and to make failure lamentable, but the utilitarian criterion 
is weak. It only required the paper to offer some positive social value to outweigh its 
social cost. There is more substance in the rights-based view. Though Donaldson’s 
criteria offer little insight, Bowie’s notion of meaningful work (1998) suggests a 
newspaper in which individual journalists are permitted some autonomy as workers. Add 
to this Phillips’ argument for stakeholder fairness, and we can begin to imagine the news 
organization as journalists would choose for it to be, which, according to interviews, is 
focused on news that matters, telling stories well, individual initiative, and social 
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responsibility. This is the newspaper that journalists have been struggling to save, the 
newspaper that many of them have come to love and cherish. And I admit that I have 
accepted the spirit of their cause. Though the case for the City National is weaker than 
most, the positive social benefits of most newspapers exceed their capacity to generate 
revenue, and our society’s health may be directly linked to the health of its news media. 
Should Banks Fail? 
The most striking contrast between newspaper journalists and investment bankers 
is the difference in the prevalence of justice norms. With very little prodding, reporters 
explain a complex set of duties that they recognize in light of the public service of their 
trade. Journalism is not a profession in the sense that it has no governing professional 
bodies and no means to restrict labor supply, but there is certainly a professional ethic in 
place among reporters. Unfortunately, as I describe in Chapter Four, I found very little 
evidence of justice norms in investment banks. There were two mentions of guarding 
against insider trading, both by people who had chosen to leave the industry. Several 
bankers mentioned compliance and oversight, and this research protocol was even 
reviewed by the compliance department at one firm before the banker agreed to 
participate, but the normative orientation that explains why all of those rules matter was 
almost non-existent. Whether these norms were displaced by extrinsic compensation as 
Chapter Four suggests, or undermined by a pattern of unenforced rules (Burg 2010), their 
absence is palpable. Without the guiding force of a global sense of duty, investment 
bankers have only the measure of money to determine which risks to take, and there is 
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much less attention to stewardship and systemic risk than is warranted by the nature of 
the business. 
With enough faith in the market, a person may become convinced that justice 
norms are unnecessary. She may believe that the invisible hand will motivate appropriate 
behavior and that no other interventions are needed to protect the system as a whole. The 
promulgation of this view is partially the fault of business schools that have certainly 
fostered the mythology of self-regulating markets (Khurana 2007). However, the view 
seems to have become less common given the prevalence of strong evidence to the 
contrary. It now requires a rather callous disregard of events that are readily observable to 
every person within or outside of the financial services industry. Of the numerous 
financial scandals involving market failures, it seems quite clear that the market alone 
was unable to regulate behavior at Enron, WorldCom, and Bernard L. Madoff Investment 
Securities. Any coherent social and political perspective in the financial world has had to 
make room for these disappointments.  
In Chapter Four (p. 152), George critiques the lack of organizational culture in 
banking. Before he was even hired by a bank, he was being counseled on switching firms 
to avoid being exploited, on loyalty to self before loyalty to firm. These norms are salient 
in compensation, mobility, career structure, and the collapse of organizational legacies. 
When Earl notes the selection process involved in explicitly recombining routines (p. 
186) he also cites his manager’s rejection of the old way of banking. He quotes his boss 
as saying, “Look, I reject the [prior employer] ideals. I think it shouldn't matter how you 
manage people. I think it shouldn't matter how long you've been in the company. What 
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should matter is how much you delivered this year.” Unfortunately for banking, most 
firms have left the long-term interests of the firm behind and accepted Earl’s manager’s 
view. They accept that recent performance is all that matters.  
The 2008 crisis led to a critical reconsideration of this perspective. Many firms 
have begun to institute “clawbacks” that allow the firm to reclaim employee 
compensation if apparently profitable transactions prove to be unprofitable after the fact. 
The movement meets with obvious distaste from employees, but also surprising pushback 
from institutional investors on the buy-side. For instance, Hye-Won Choi, the head of 
corporate governance at TIAA-CREF is quoted in a Time news story arguing against 
clawbacks, “Rather than relying on clawbacks, companies should make sure they get 
their compensation decisions right in the first place” (Gandel 2010).  
The debate reveals the industry’s ongoing inability to comprehend the 
epistemological limits of financial knowledge. I argue in Chapter Six that the actual 
performance of a transaction cannot be immediately known. As such, getting 
compensation decisions “right in the first place” misplaces faith in the established 
financial measurement and risk management systems, something that financial services 
employees are learning not to do (see p. 169). These epistemological limits make the 
rapid firm switching of financial service careers the riskiest possible configuration. 
Employees can take their money and run long before the actual performance of their 
strategies is known or knowable. 
Note that journalists also switch teams regularly, moving through careers that are 
linked to numerous other people. However, their transitions often seek to affirm the 
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priorities of the work that they do. Though new jobs may result in slight compensation 
increases, it is more common for journalists to leave based upon disagreements with 
editors or to get their work in front of a larger audience, factors that do not undermine the 
performance of their employers. Bankers may actually downgrade the status of their 
employer in order to upgrade the terms of their compensation, a process that makes it 
difficult for any firm to develop an organizational culture of stewardship. 
Unless financial services firms can learn to appropriately regulate the level of risk 
that each firm fosters within the economy, it is not clear that they should survive. There 
are other ways to provide capital and liquidity to firms. The chief development is the 
emergence of much more developed organizations on the buy side. Institutional investors, 
private equity firms, mutual funds, and hedge funds are large and diverse enough that it is 
no longer clear that banks are necessary to provide some of their traditional roles.  
Banks are abusive and subordinating organizations that draw a huge supply of 
human capital to carefully scrutinize deals that firms conduct on a massive scale. Because 
many people wish to have the experience of working on these deals and because banks 
need to justify their extraordinary fees, an unusual supply of junior labor is deployed to 
do an excessive amount of busy work, updating numbers multiple times before reports 
are produced and meticulously perfecting reports and presentations. As such, the cost of 
banks is also the opportunity cost of all of the more useful things that these associates 
could be doing if their talents were directed elsewhere. 
This is not to say that investment banks are incapable of contributing to social 
value. Global Investment has remarkably sophisticated philanthropy programs, 
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foundations, and active employee volunteer programs. Moreover, the employee spirit of 
public service through work is not the only estimation of value. Whether baseball players 
are in it for the money or in it for the love of the game, their fans are still glad that they 
play to win. The customers of banks apparently receive enough value from the banks to 
justify paying very significant fees.  
I sit on the fence regarding the fates of investment banks. Interestingly, I find it 
much easier to call for the survival of papers than I do the destruction of banks. Others 
are not so reserved. Michael Lewis, for instance, writes, “The problem wasn’t that 
Lehman Brothers had been allowed to fail. The problem was that Lehman Brothers had 
been allowed to succeed” (Lewis 2010: 262).  
Let us try to make sense of this view of bank failures using the four different 
propositions of failure laid out in Chapters Five and Six. First, consider the utilitarian 
lens. On the utilitarian account, we might interpret Lewis’s quote in the following way: 
the problem with failing banks was not that they served a higher purpose, but that up until 
failure they had persisted in a way that actually caused harm. Lehman Brothers deserved 
death, because Lehman was a perverse profiteer, a firm that had positive economic value, 
but negative social value. The utilitarian view seems to provide a relatively consistent 
interpretation of Lewis’s claim. Lewis argues that the banks were incompetent in their 
oversight and understanding of their own businesses, and that this incompetence created 
risk for the entire economy. 
The second and third lenses are less useful, not just in interpreting Lewis, but in 
making sense of the bank failures. The second lens concerns the violations of rights, and 
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the importance of duties. But the major problem in the banks was not a violation of 
human rights. In most cases it doesn’t even seem to have been a serious breach of 
fiduciary responsibility. Rather, it was hubris, weak regulation, and a failure to apprehend 
the risks associated with novel structured “vehicles.”  
The fairness perspective is likewise less than helpful in making sense of the 
situation with the banks. Clearly, these entities were legitimate. Their credit was the gold 
standard. Their jobs were highly sought-after. They were the authorities on the value of 
not just firms, but on creations of derivative relation to everything else, artifacts of 
financial engineering that were value constructs of the highest order. These firms were 
legitimate enough to create derivatives, and then to convince others that they could 
determine (“calculate”) the value of that which they had created. Perhaps there was a 
failure in cooperation. Perhaps flatter organizational hierarchies, more open dialogue, and 
more self-critical organizational cultures might have led to reflection and constraint. But 
this seems doubtful. Stakeholder fairness provides no more interpretive power in the case 
of banks than human rights or the harm principle. These approaches cannot explain 
whether Lehman Brothers should have been allowed to fail, nor can they interpret the 
meaning of Lehman’s success.  
The entitlement perspective offers the most substantive interpretation of Lewis’s 
claim. It is not merely that Lehman’s success was harmful. It is that Lehman did not 
deserve success; that their success was in some sense disingenuous, imagined, or unreal. 
And this is precisely the perspective that the entitlement theory holds. The banks 
generated profit and tremendous wealth until the moment when the bottom fell out. On 
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Lewis’s account, it was not merely an arbitrary eventuality or regrettable circumstance. It 
was a predictable oversight made by an entity that had not deserved the wealth that it 
generated. What is most interesting about the property-based approach is that it allows for 
the contradiction that Lehman had not, for some time, been generating morally 
substantive entitlements to profit and that Lehman should survive. This is a result that 
differs markedly from the utilitarian perspective.  
Drawing upon a history of Lehman’s distributed profits could easily have 
reclaimed the cash necessary to cover the losses in mortgage-backed securities. The 
question is, on what basis could such a reclamation be undertaken? Where is the crime? 
What is the tort? Where is the contractual breach? The answer relates to the system-wide 
effects of Lehman’s failure. When one firm comes to occupy a central position within an 
economy, its shareholders and employees benefit from that status: they profit from the 
firm’s centrality and from the transactions that it underwrites. These benefits may be said 
to create special obligations that relate to the risk involved in having a firm be so central. 
That firm should be more cautious rather than less cautious, and insofar as the employees 
and shareholders benefit from the firm’s lack of restraint, they owe restitution to the other 
entities whose debts went unpaid by the firm’s collapse. On this view, it is not the 
American public that should have bailed out Lehman, or AIG, but the thousands of 
employees, current and former, and millions of shareholders, current and former, who 
derived wealth from the firms that were apparently not being managed with appropriate 
care. If anyone is responsible for the consequences when Lehman failed, it is those who 
benefited when it succeeded. 
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The reclamation approach provides an expansive vision for some of the parties 
who should not have profited, some of them work for banks and packaged mortgages in 
tranches that were destined to lose money. Others coordinated fraudulent loans for people 
who did not have the credit to justify the mortgage. Others wrote derivatives contracts 
that created quantities of systemic risk that were ignored for short-term gains. At this 
point, the effort involved in attempting to blame these parties seems tiresome and 
counterproductive. These strategies have already given way to the next vulnerability in 
the financial system, and the next spate of scandals will prove that solutions from the last 
were insufficient. 
But there is a remarkable simplicity in the ETHO$ response to these problems. 
Each of these individuals would have received revenue associated with these troubled 
assets. Their revenues would be the first to be reclaimed, and this personal risk might 
have seriously altered individual actions, not just for this incident, but for many possible 
future schemes as well.  
 In the end, the question of whether the banks should survive is a political one, as 
are all of the analyses of the crisis. There are enough moving parts of an economy that 
one can point fingers at the regulatory structure of choice. Posner explains the process: 
People are pointing fingers of blame in all directions. Many of these are people 
who are eager to deflect blame from themselves or who see some other career 
advantage in pointing the finger in the direction they do. The left is blaming the 
stupid, greedy, reckless, and overpaid bankers (as it deems all bankers to be), and 
is being joined by Congress and many in the media, who sense political and 
commercial advantage, respectively, in a simplistic populist explanation for 
economic failures. Some on the left are also blaming financial deregulation and 
lax enforcement (during the Bush Administration) of the remaining regulation and 
conservative macroeconomists and conservative finance theorists for arguing that 
depressions were a thing of the past and asset-price bubbles an illusion. The right 
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is blaming the government for encouraging mortgage lending to people with poor 
credit. Investors are blaming credit-rating agencies… behavioral economists are 
blaming everyone in sight, including bankers and borrowers, for exhibiting 
irrational exuberance during the boom that preceded the bust. The chairman and 
members of the Federal Reserve are blaming the fragmented structure of financial 
regulation, the limitations of the Fed’s legal authority and economic power, the 
global “savings glut,” and mistaken assessments of bankers of the risks created by 
novel financial instruments. There is little disinterested analysis of the causes of 
the depression; most of it seems motivated by political and career concerns. 
(Posner 2010: 250). 
Posner’s longing for an impartial analysis is understandable, but as he realizes, no 
analysis of a single cataclysmic historical event will provide a pure demonstration of 
causation through which blame can be conclusively established. He is arguing for caution 
in the development of economic policy aimed in a knee-jerk fashion, and this seems 
reasonable.  
 I have argued for a system of financial regulation that takes seriously the origins 
of income and the fairness and justice of those origins. For some of the causes that Posner 
lists, a system such as that would offer little help. It will not undo the problems of 
irrational exuberance or bad monetary policy. However, it might lead to a more careful 
analysis of the long-term effects of an act. This alone may be enough to keep important 
organizations socially and financially viable. When it comes to Global Investment, Walls 
Investment, and Open Investment, interviews convinced me that these organizations were 
actually better than their peers. I therefore affirm the profit reclamation perspective and 
argue, against Lewis, that failure was not the best way to teach the lessons of financial 
stewardship, but I agree with Lewis that none of these firms should have been allowed to 
succeed. 
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Conclusion: Rebuilding the Iron Cage 
How do institutions change? According to Weber, capitalism provides an iron 
cage of rationality, a burden of inescapable normative control that leaves little room for a 
course correction: 
The capitalist economy of the present day is an immense cosmos into which the 
individual is born, and which presents itself to him, at least as an individual, as an 
unalterable order of things in which he must live.  It forces the individual, in so 
far as he is involved in the system of market relationships, to conform to capitalist 
rules of action (1958: 51). 
It is this inescapable cosmos that conditions the behavior of individual persons and the 
organizations that they inhabit. Weber concludes that this system of rules is also 
necessarily linked to the preeminence of external goods: 
The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so.  For when 
asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to 
dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of 
the modern economic order.  This order is now bound to the technical and 
economic conditions of the machine production which to-day determine the lives 
of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly 
concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force.  Perhaps it will so 
determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt.  In Baxter's view, the 
care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the 'saint like a light 
cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment.' But fate decreed that the cloak 
should become an iron cage.  Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world 
and to work out its ideals in the world, material goods have gained an increasing 
and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in 
history (181). 
The argument lays the foundation for the conception of organizations as institutionalized 
within rules of action that make organizations behave similarly, “isomorphically” 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In one of the essays that founded the field of population 
ecology, Hannan and Freeman ask “why are there so many kinds of organizations?” 
(1977: 936) but the fields of population ecology and neo-institutionalism have instead 
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explained why there are so few. Post-failure continuity is an important innovation 
mechanism through which new organizational forms are created and recombined. Its role 
in the diversification of organizational forms is a matter of the first importance to 
industries that face cataclysmic failure. Organizational failure sounds an alarm of 
irrationality, calling the established logics into question and opening the way for 
“institutional entrepreneurs” (Eisenstadt 1980). But the new structures are less radical 
than this model implies, because the agents who hear the call most clearly are those who 
are best positions to re-use the material that they learned in their careers at failed firms. 
Fully or partially rationalized organizations are motivated by their own logics, and 
these logics constrain organizations and individuals alike. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
develop this argument using Weber’s metaphor of bureaucratic authority, the iron cage, 
to capture this sense of control within organizational fields. One cost of the forced 
isomorphism of organizational life is a reduction of diversity in organizational strategies 
and structures, and diversity is one of the chief sources of stability for a population in 
stress. As we know from biology, less diverse populations are more vulnerable to 
cataclysmic events. In biological terms, the phenotypical variation of a diverse population 
increases the likelihood that some subset of the larger population will possess the 
characteristics that facilitate survival as environmental conditions change (e.g. Fischer 
and Matthies 1998).  
Organizational isomorphism can result in simultaneous or serial failures, and as 
failure occurs, the iron cage of bureaucratic rationality may be broken. Individuals are 
torn from their organizational settings and forced to make radical choices that can 
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redefine their careers and their industries. The organizational stresses that tear firms 
asunder also destabilize the assumed norms of business practice, and the change that 
ensues may be far more radical than what incumbent firms can achieve on their own. But 
radical or not, the odds are that most work practices will need an organizational context 
to call home. So, while the iron cage may be dismantled in the process of corporate 
failure, the savvy among its survivors may be the quickest to rebuild a new structure. 
Individual occupational histories yield proto-norms and proto-routines that could be re-
established in new and alternative organizational settings. For freelancing journalists and 
entrepreneurs, proto-norms form a strong foundation for their subsequent pursuits. Those 
who embark upon more radical training and job switches find less substance to recycle  
Key Findings 
Though many of the observations in this dissertation have been specific to a larger 
argument about the nature of organizations and the careers of their employees, this 
section provides a summary of findings regarding mediating factors in the transfer of 
norms and routines, distinguishing between individual, network, and organizational levels 
of analysis.   
Individual 
It is the survivors of organizational failure who choose the organization’s fate. 
They make the choice through their career ambitions and strategic decisions. A variety of 
individual-level factors influence the opportunities for persistence, including the 
following: 
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• Mobility. Survivors who will move to work face very different post-failure 
prospects than people who will not. Post-failure entrepreneurship is sometimes an 
occupational strategy necessitated by a desire to avoid a costly move. Mobile 
people can more easily join established firms by relocating to jobs in other cities. 
• Motivation. Individual occupational goals are at least delayed, if not undermined, 
by the failure of an employer. People whose motivations were unfulfilled within 
the failing firm may take a fresh look at what matters, and a new set of priorities 
is sometimes the result. At the other end of the spectrum, people are powerfully 
motivated to continue their work regardless of the firm’s fate if they view their 
occupation as a calling to which they are morally obliged. 
• Credentials. Some of the people who are displaced from work by firm failures 
lack the credentials to find similar work in other organizations. Younger people 
may find it worthwhile to invest in more education to improve their occupational 
opportunities, but this may not be an option for more experienced individuals 
whose occupational achievements have surpassed their level of education. 
Credentials also channel survivors onto unexpected occupational pathways. Long-
forgotten degrees are suddenly central to a new narrative of individual capacities. 
• Unemployment. Failure causes unemployment, and unemployment presents a 
number of challenges for post-failure organizing. These can be emotional and 
psychological challenges, like depression. Yet, unemployment also presents 
opportunities. Unemployment benefits and severance reduce the strain of 
subsistence concerns, and allow survivors to experiment with entrepreneurial 
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projects or to develop new skills. The specific unemployment situation is 
therefore influential in post-failure trajectories. The more protected the economic 
situation, the more diversity of experimentation and pursuits. 
This list provides some individual-level factors that have been observed to affect the 
transfer of routines and norms from failed firms into new and established firms.  
Networks 
Interpersonal networks are both a part of the firm and separate from it. The 
reporting relationships that define occupational networks for new hires may generate 
bonds that are strong enough to survive organizational failure, and even if the 
relationships were purely occupational, failure may strengthen them as individuals pull 
together to find information and support in the wake of failure. Some network processes 
that impact post-failure transfers include: 
• Social support. Occupational networks provide social support to the survivors of 
failure. Though some people want to get away from the failed organization and 
the bittersweet feelings of remembering it, most remain tied into their social 
networks. Social support tends to affirm the group feeling necessary to impose 
shared norms and values. 
• Information. Interpersonal networks provide the survivors of failure with useful 
information. Journalists find story ideas, freelancing gigs, and full time jobs 
through their connections. Investment bankers also find jobs, as well as 
information on the economic and social health of potential employers. The 
information tends to lead journalists and bankers into work that is similar to what 
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they did in their failed firm, because information is provided through channels 
that have an established understanding of an individual’s capabilities and because 
network-wide information is spread within occupational groups. 
• Bricolage. Post-failure entrepreneurs call upon the networks of their former peers 
to help cobble together necessary resources. Survivors are remarkably willing to 
help out with early stage projects and to utilize their special competencies. One 
might expect for network centrality to be positively associated with access to 
resources, and this is probably the case in investment banks. But in newspapers, it 
seems to eventually go in the opposite direction. Individuals who are central have 
many friends who claim to be interested in helping out with a project but are 
eventually concerned with their own pursuits. The strong expectations between 
friends are sometimes disappointed with organizational needs of post-failure 
projects exceed the motivation driving performance. In contrast to these friends 
who find disappointment, post-failure projects that emerge among people who do 
not know each other as well, but may be associated with the same failed entity, 
seem to form more durable collaborations. Parties who were less connected within 
the network of the failed firm (say, friends in common rather than close friends) 
have access to the same people, but they must concern themselves with making it 
worthwhile for any contributor to help, a more sustainable practice for any 
organizer.  
• Process. Many processes, whether routines or norms, are embedded within 
interpersonal networks. In papers and banks, the physical assembly line may not 
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exist, but the interpersonal analogue is a productive routine that involves multiple 
individual actions chained together between people who have limited upstream 
and downstream interaction. A freelancing journalist may get to know a source 
without ever meeting that source’s peers. Similarly, she may know her editor but 
rarely interact with the editor’s colleagues or the managing editor to whom her 
assigning editor reports. Process relationships survive intact when individuals 
continue to serve economic roles that make them useful, like when freelancers get 
work writing for their former editors who now serve in different positions. 
• External ties. The occupational networks established within failing firms 
characterize one important set of interpersonal ties in the post-failure 
environment, but pre-existing or external ties are also important factors in the 
persistence of norms and routines. Because organizational failures are public, 
people reach out to their former colleagues who moved to failing firms and are 
known to be victims of the firm’s demise. This outreach may carry information 
about jobs and opportunities that are then delivered into the firm. It is common for 
managers to use their own personal networks to help their subordinates to find 
jobs, thus increasing the likelihood of transferred routines and norms. 
Networks, and their component relationships, are crucial to most survivors of 
organizational failure. Though the methodological framework utilized in this dissertation 
does not permit the analysis of social structure, it is clear that relationships are an 
important pathway through which norms and routines survive organizational failure. 
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Organizations 
Organizational characteristics play a role in both sending and receiving proto-
routines and proto-norms. Formal organizations provide jobs, revenue, legitimacy, 
direction, hierarchy, established process, and community. Though organizations do 
emerge from failed firms, most survivors find jobs within incumbent firms that can use 
the survivor’s human and social capital. Some of the key organizational factors 
influencing the transfer of norms and routines include: 
• Performance. Localized dysfunction can undermine a larger organization despite 
high performance elsewhere in the firm. Because economic actors understand this, 
a career association with a failed firm is often discarded as an individual 
performance indicator. Instead, hiring firms look to individual and work group 
performance to determine the capacity of the individual. Local organizational 
performance is therefore a factor in the jobs that people get, but the influence of 
organizational performance does not end with the transition to the next firm. 
Insofar as former employees are understood to have come from higher-
performance organizations, the routines and norms that they share with their new 
colleagues are likely to find a more receptive audience than if the employee is 
perceived to have come from a backward, underperforming division of a failed 
firm. Survivors might also rely upon the perceived performance of the failed firm 
in determining what routines and norms ought to be transferred. Assuming that 
individual employees are able to assess the relative performance of their prior 
routines and norms as compared with the routines and norms of the receiving 
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firm, it is expected that high-performance organizations would be more likely to 
transmit routines than underperforming organizations. While it is often difficult to 
assess the global performance of a given process, the incremental comparison is 
quite workable. 
• Hierarchy. Reporting relationships sometimes survive failure, either when work 
groups remain intact or when management-level hires bring on former employees. 
The relative authority of the survivor within a firm that she joins (or founds) 
determines her ability to transfer norms and routines. Positions of authority enable 
the adoption of proto-norms and proto-routines that could not easily be proposed 
up the chain of command by subordinates, regardless of the business case. 
• Redundancy. New positions within incumbent firms range from completely 
redundant and similar to existing positions to novel and alternative. More novel 
positions afford more direct transfer of norms and routines because the process 
has not yet been determined or established.  
• Receptiveness. Some organizations are more interested in learning from their new 
hires than others, and receptiveness can also be uneven within a given 
organization. Receptive organizations that effectively receive feedback and 
respond to criticism are more likely to permit the transfer of routines and norms. 
These are only a few of the organizational factors that influence the transfer of norms and 
routines into established firms.  
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Limitations 
This dissertation explores the post-failure career trajectories of employees after 
they lose their jobs. Its limitations are as follows: 
This study cannot document rates of post-failure entrepreneurship in the overall 
economy. The external validity of the study is limited by its sample and its method. 
Given the short time period during which this study was conducted, it is unlikely 
that the turmoil of the newspaper industry has come to an end. Moreover, the investment 
bank appears to have reached a state of partial equilibrium where, subsequent to a few 
major failures and near misses, the industry has managed to garner enough public support 
to avoid further casualties. Nothing is certain, but the dynamics of banks seem to be in 
the hands of a few dominant players who are unlikely to be overturned in the near future.  
The accrual strategies for the study also present a limitation. The primary 
investment bank contacts have been identified through the alumni database of a single 
large university. These respondents do not represent the entire population of the failed 
firms, and no data on employee demographics were accessed to compare with the 
participant pool. Relatedly, the post-failure narrative developed here in both industries 
describes a highly valued employee with specialized skills and knowledge. This research 
is not generalizable to many undifferentiated and temporary positions occupied by 
working class and working poor individuals.  
The study focuses on two industries. Insofar as the career experiences of 
individuals within these industries are similar to other industries, the research has broader 
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implications, but in an ideographic sense, this is a localized study of career outcomes. It 
will not be possible to generalize to all failing firms, or even to firms of all sizes.  
Because this research is almost entirely based on self-report responses, the 
research is subjective and vulnerable to a number of inherent biases. Though the strategy 
of retrospective sampling permits some basic analysis of career history for causal 
inference, there are some reasons for concern given the single source of data and the 
single survey administration. It might be preferable to do as Harris and Sutton (1986) did, 
interacting directly with employees of failing firms as they fail, but this strategy was 
unfeasible for the current project because it would not be possible to identify which 
individuals would eventually transition to firms of interest or start their own. 
Nonetheless, despite these limitations, I believe that this study contributes 
significantly to the literatures of business ethics, organizational theory, and 
entrepreneurship. Globally, the International Labor Organization predicted that 50 
million jobs would be lost in 2009 (Pickard 2009). A better understanding of the 
organizational destruction and re-creation that occurs through job displacement and inter-
organizational continuity may help to explain the social and economic costs and 
opportunities of these job losses.  
Suggestions for Future Research 
This project touches upon a number of topics that warrant further examination. I 
will highlight a few that I view as most important and feasible. 
• As Chapter Five makes clear, the field of business ethics has yet to make sense of 
organizational failure and the question of which firms should fail, but the lacuna is 
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larger than that. In fact, business ethics has done little to account for the changes in 
organizations that occur across the organizational lifecycle. Do young firms have 
special leeway to learn? What is a responsible rate of growth? Do the implicit 
understandings of employment agreements differ depending upon the age of a firm? 
How does a firm fail with grace? These are a few of a great many questions that have 
received less attention than they should, given the dynamics of organizational growth 
and decline. 
• Newspapers and investment banks are two industries where professional, highly 
educated people are able to adapt their skills to new contexts. What of other industries 
where firm-specific human capital investments are much greater? Failures are 
frequent enough that there is room for an experimental study that provides 
entrepreneurial guidance for failure survivors and compares outcomes to control 
subjects who receive no such support. 
• This qualitative study would greatly benefit from a quantitative follow-up. Beyond 
the basic question of how often key routines are believed to transfer, mediating 
factors such as whether the firm disbanded, whether the failure was civil or 
conflicted, the geographic opportunity structure, and the nature of the work could all 
significantly influence the process described herein. 
• Occupational networks come from careers, but the opposite process has received far 
more attention (Granovetter 1973). More realistically, networks and careers co-evolve 
in a process that involves sorting, skills development, trust formation, and 
availability. Organizational failure provides a mostly-exogenous shock to these 
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networks, and it would be interesting to study the way that network ties respond to 
these shocks. Many respondents noted incoming ties based upon a public 
understanding of a failure event. Editors received calls that allowed them to help 
place their subordinates and journalists heard from old colleagues who were thinking 
of them and wanting to see if there was anything that they could do. Though 
organizations might benefit from failing quietly, employee interests might be better 
served by a public incident. 
• Chapter Six proposes a radical redefinition of economic responsibility for a firm’s 
transgression. Clearly, much more work needs to be done before this redefinition 
could serve for more than a thought experiment. As a first step, one might seek to 
establish the precedent for historical property-based accountability in pre-capitalist 
societies, and the governance properties associated with such accountability. Chapter 
Six calls the top-down governance paradigm into question, but the system of 
network-based interpersonal accountability that would replace remains a rough 
outline of a drastically different constellation of social relations. 
Research and Practice 
The main empirical topics of this dissertation, organizational failure, post-failure 
organizing, and the survival of norms and routines, are matters of moment. For the 
survivors of failure, the post-failure transition is a difficult, uncertain, and sometimes 
defeating process. The salience of this experience makes it important as a subject of 
research. Insofar as management science is to be a science of compassion that recognizes 
the human costs of organizational outcomes (McGregor 1960), then failure must be 
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understood in these terms, and public policy must focus upon reducing the costs of 
industrial transitions such as these. 
More focused, if not more compelling, are specific concerns for the fates of two 
vital industries: newspapers and investment banks. Both provide an indispensible service. 
One does so at a cost and risk that is far too great for the public to bear. The other does so 
at a benefit that is not nearly covered by the actual costs incurred. For those who would 
reform these two industries, I suggest that they look no further than the careers of those 
journalists and bankers make their living within them. Insofar as the career of a journalist 
aspires to a greater purpose and seeks to fulfill the promise of public journalism, public 
policy should seek to protect the fair compensation of this work. As Baker argues (Baker 
2002; Baker 2009), this is already done through provisions of copyright law and postal 
subsidy, and these provisions should be updated for an era where copyright protections 
and postal distribution are no longer sufficient to ensure fair compensation for journalistic 
labor. And insofar as the career of an investment banker aspires to nothing more than the 
generation of wealth and the accumulation of status, the system of investments is likely to 
remain vulnerable to the excesses that go along with perverse incentives and unjustifiable 
risk. 
 To be clear, I do not think that bankers lack character, or that they cannot find a 
sense of purpose in the work that they do. I have shown, however, that such purpose is 
obfuscated by the intensive and active maximization of income encouraged by careers 
within banking. Many of those who sought a sense of purpose after their banks failed, 
looked elsewhere within the industry or to other industries entirely. Though the 
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preservation of the American and global financial system through public subsidies was 
almost certainly stabilizing to the larger economic order, one must wonder about the path 
not taken, and the lessons that would have been learned on that course. It seems likely 
that the few financial analysts and bankers who chose to ply their trade after a financial 
apocalypse would do so with a sense of stewardship beyond the maximization of wealth, 
and this, I fear, we still cannot say of the financial services industry as a whole.  
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APPENDIX A: ORGANIZATIONS 
Adant: Acquired several business units from the Global Investment Estate, merging some units 
(with massive layoffs) and acquiring others to expand to businesses that the firm had not 
been involved in before the acquisition. 
Afternoon Dispatch: This high-functioning afternoon daily experienced ongoing organizational 
decline in resources, but nonetheless managed to maintain a solid news legacy in its 
region. Surviving most afternoon dailies, the paper closed amidst declining subscriptions 
and declining advertisements. Controversially, the Dispatch's parent company is 
reportedly able to make more money from the joint operating agreement with another 
paper in the city than it was while the Dispatch was operating, a fact that runs against the 
anti-monopoly intentions of the policy that first authorized these agreements.  
Capital Investment: Large investment bank that nearly collapsed but was instead acquired 
through a distressed acquisition. 
City National: A large metropolitan daily, the City National has gone through a bankruptcy, an 
ill-advised acquisition, and several rounds of layoffs. The organization began its cost 
reduction strategies with buyouts and then continued by laying off relatively senior 
employees, many of whom were very well regarded. Sampling for this study focused in a 
round of layoffs that seemed so tenure-inspired that the layoff packet included a list of all 
employees who had been laid off and their ages to ward against an age discrimination 
lawsuit. Unlike the Regional Post and Local Blotter, the City National has experienced 
very significant decline.  
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CityNews.org: Formed by senior editors and well-regarded journalists from the City National, 
this organization provides web-based news, in-depth coverage of city politics, and a local 
insert for a regional edition of a national paper. The organization hired some well-
regarded journalists from the City National and hired others who had been laid off by the 
paper. 
Dispatch Journal: Peer paper to the Afternoon Dispatch that hired several employees when the 
Afternoon Dispatch failed and then laid most of them off one year later. 
Enclave Investment: Large financial services firm that acquired Capital. 
Global Investment: Large investment bank that entered bankruptcy and was broken into pieces. 
The bank is the main subject of the investment banking portion of this study. 
Highway Herald: Purchased by a former employee of the Regional Post, the Herald provides 
news in a small town that lacks any other news source. The Herald distributes its papers 
in newspaper boxes that were purchased from the Regional Post, and the paper’s design 
was created by friends of the purchaser from the Regional Post. 
In Region Times: The first post-failure project in the wake of the Regional Post's closure. The 
project received a lot of coverage and interest, but subscriptions were lower than 
organizers had anticipated and funders provided much less support than the founders 
anticipated. As the relationship between the organizers and the investors degraded, more 
than 20 former employees from the Regional Post quit the project, so that only one 
former Post employee remained. 
Independent Regional Post: The second post-failure project in the wake of the Regional Post. 
Like the In Region Times that preceded it, the Independent was meant to rely upon a 
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hybrid online-only subscription model. The paper would provide pay content along with 
free content for any site visitors. The project failed when subscriptions did not materialize 
and founders received less support than the project required to be sustained. 
Lichenson: Entity that merged with Global Investment for several years in the 1990s then 
separated several years later. 
Local News: Sister paper of the Local Blotter serving the same region. Included here as a paper 
that has hired several people who were laid off by the Blotter, sometimes onto nearly 
identical beats. The Local News is a slightly lower status paper than the Blotter. 
Local Blotter: Large metropolitan daily that went through significant suburban expansion in 
early 2000s, and then experienced significant reduction in revenue a few years later. The 
firm entered bankruptcy and subsequently conducted a round of layoffs that were mostly 
last-in, first-out, with a number of exceptions made for employees whom the 
management wished to protect. 
Open Investment: International financial services firm that purchased several offices from 
Global Investment. 
Regional Post: Well-known paper with a long legacy owned by the same company as the 
Afternoon Dispatch. The publisher sought a new owner, and when that failed, the paper 
was closed. Though it experienced a slight decline, its coverage was award-winning to 
the very end and its very loyal subscription base showed some interest in a series of post-
failure projects, but these transfers have not materialized as entrepreneurs had hoped. 
Regional Tribune: Competitor of the Regional Post, shared publication and distribution services 
through a joint operating agreement until the Regional Post was shuttered.  
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Tech Inc.: A technology company based in California. 
Walls Investment: Walls Investment was privately owned into the late 1990s and then went 
public for a short period of time before merging into Global Investment in the mid-2000s. 
The firm serves institutional investors and provides private wealth management services 
as well. The fund managers of Walls acquired the firm from the Global estate along with 
a significant debt obligation. 
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APPENDIX B: STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
Adam: Worked for Global as a summer intern, and turned down an offer just after the firm’s 
bankruptcy was announced. Adam is now pursuing a career in the arts as a first-year 
student in a highly competitive master’s program. He says that the professionalism, work 
ethic, and focused interview process that he learned about through Global Investment 
probably got him into graduate school. 
Alexis: Worked at Local Blotter and was laid off as a relatively junior hire. After being laid off, 
Alexis spent months doing disaster relief, and then settled into two years of freelancing 
and self-publishing children’s books. Just over two years after being laid off, Alexis was 
hired back into journalism by Local News, the sister paper of the Blotter. Alexis loves to 
write and could always focus on that part of the work, even when writing for a corporate 
website. She transferred her newsgathering process and understanding of the news 
organization, but lost the opportunity to do work that she valued. Now she’s back writing 
about major social issues, albeit for a somewhat lower-status paper. 
Andrew: Left the City National after almost 20 years in journalism in order to join a public 
relations firm. Andrew broke some important stories for the National, but recognized the 
economic slide that the organization was taking (other respondents describe his 
foresight), and decided to switch careers shortly before a massive layoff of senior 
reporters. Andrew uses his understanding of the news process to advise firms and 
individuals on how to manage news exposure. He continues to rely upon his contacts 
from the National, serving as a mediator between clients who don’t know what is 
newsworthy and reporters who don’t care about information that is not newsworthy. He 
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says that others might feel dirty doing the work that he does, but he knows how the game 
is played. 
Anna: Moving from another large bank, Anna joined Global Investment one year before its 
closure. Though she was not the most senior person in the group, her background in 
accounting provided a credential that kept her tied to the foundation, and she was able to 
move to Walls Investment. Though Walls Investment has fewer resources for the 
foundation and a slightly different mission, almost all of the work and the strategy that 
she learned at Global applies directly to the Walls context. 
Art: Officially laid off by Global and then rehired by Open Investment, Art transitioned from a 
role of customizing financial instruments for different regulatory contexts to a very 
similar role at Open Investment. He was away from Global on personal leave during the 
bankruptcy, but he was laid off by Global and rehired by Open along with the other 
employees. Art found that the Global collapse liberated his division from Global’s 
control and that Open has been much more flexible with their office. Most other routines 
have transferred, though he notes that the lost business caused by the period of 
uncertainty when his division had no clear organizational home and the need to rebuild 
credibility thereafter. 
Ben: Worked as a copy editor at City National for almost twenty years and then was laid off after 
a series of buyouts. During his time at the National, Ben served numerous different roles, 
many of which allowed him to continue writing stories on a regular basis, though editing 
was his main job task. Towards the end of this time there, his work tasks became less 
diverse as the size of the paper shrunk and the news organization began to reinforce a 
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more sharp distinction between writers and editors. Since the layoff Ben has been able to 
return to the diversity of work, and to the writing that he had missed in his last years at 
the National. He thought that being laid off would put an end to his career as a journalist, 
but he’s been surprised to find opportunities as a freelancer to write stories and do 
interviews. He met the editor of a college alumni magazine while taking his son to 
orientation, and has since been writing for them along with editing for a small publisher. 
Bob: Worked for the Regional Post part time and did part-time freelance work for several years. 
During this time he published a book on one of the major stories that he’d covered, which 
was released shortly after the Regional Post disbanded. Though freelancing was much 
more a part of his experience than others from the Regional Post, Bob finds that the 
freelancing work has dried up. Because budgets have decreased and sections are 
shrinking, it is more difficult to find work, and the work pays less. Bob is working on his 
second book, which is long-form journalism and uses many of the same techniques that 
he would use to write a feature story. 
Brian: A writer by avocation, he came to the City National by way of a strong publishing record 
as a freelancer in Eastern Europe. He was laid off by the National and has since been 
trying to publish a novel. For him, the layoff was liberating. It got him started on his 
dream of writing a novel and released him from a dysfunctional organizational culture in 
which he found it very difficult to get a story published, much more difficult than it had 
been as a freelancing outsider for other papers. Brian continues to use his journalistic 
research techniques in his fiction writing. 
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Carl: Covered high school, college, and professional sports for the City National. After being 
laid off, Carl used his connections to local sports to find a position writing stories for the 
sports department website of a local private university. He continues to rely upon the 
same norms of fairness and relational trust to cover athletes that he learned to follow as a 
newspaper journalist. 
David: Worked as web sports editor for the Regional Post until it closed, and then has been 
involved in a number of post-failure projects. He was a major force in the In Region Post 
and when that project disbanded because funding fell through, he was one of the three 
lead editors in the Independent Regional Post. Beyond these significant experiments in 
online subscription models, David also helped a number of his colleagues to develop their 
own personal websites to cover the news (especially sports) outside of the bounds of a 
paper. Through the post-failure projects, David worked with a communications firm that 
now uses his services to design and update websites. Most of his freelance work comes 
from designing websites, and writing and editing copy for websites. 
Earl: Employed as a regional expert for Global Investment in Asia, Earl’s division was acquired 
by Open Investment. Unlike the European experience with Open, those whose offices 
were closer to the home office of Open experienced a much more aggressive imposition 
of culture and organizational norms. Earl stayed with Open for over a year, but eventually 
resigned with plans to find work in the U.S. Throughout the transition into Open and 
since, Earl has continued to play a very similar role in the work that he does. 
Edward: Went to Global Investment to develop skills in finance having already started his own 
company and worked for a private equity firm. As an analyst, Edward covered a very 
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vibrant industry in a domestic outpost office. He chose not to renew his contract with 
Global, and instead took a job with a hedge fund. A few months later Global was laying 
people off from his division. Edward has since taken a position in an Internet startup. 
Ellen: One of several long-tenured employees who took a buyout from City National, Ellen 
thought that her retirement was set until her portfolio lost more than 30% of its value. In 
order to supplement her retirement savings, she continues to cobble together freelance 
opportunities, mostly identified through her contacts from the paper. These opportunities 
include writing for smaller publications and writing copy for other purposes. She notes 
the very significant challenges that older people face finding work and has entirely given 
up on the possibility of finding a full-time position.  
George: Worked as a management consultant before going back to business school for his MBA. 
After receiving his MBA, he started at a Global Investment trading desk. He was 
assigned to trade an asset class that was rather inactive at the time, and he found the 
Global experience to be a major disappointment relative to his experience in management 
consulting. George was laid off by Global Investment and after that, he changed a 
number of things in his life. He chose to move to a city where he believed that the quality 
of life was better. He chose to find work in consulting because he liked the people and the 
norms of collaboration. Though he left investment banking behind, he says that the focus 
in banking on making a clear decision and being able to explain why you do it has 
improved the way that he does consulting. 
Gerry: After over 30 years as a copy editor and graphics editor at City National, Gerry was laid 
off. Since then he has experienced endless frustrations in his job search. Of the hundreds 
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of resumes that he sent out, only one received a response, and that opportunity failed to 
materialize into an interview. Gerry’s wife was laid off almost simultaneously. Her job 
search has followed a different course. She has had dozens of interviews, but no offers. 
They attribute the difference to the fact that her recent master’s degree makes her seem 
younger on paper. Both believe themselves to be victims of age discrimination. The work 
that Gerry has found arose from an almost-forgotten master’s degree in sociology that 
qualifies him to teach in a for-profit online university and a local city college. He receives 
$1500 to teach multiple sessions per week of a five-week intensive class. If the pay were 
enough to make ends meet, he wouldn’t mind the work, and he likes using his editing 
skills to work with his students on improving their writing. But because of the pay, his 
job search continues. 
Gretchen: An experienced photographer, the Regional Post hired Gretchen to work with some of 
its photographers and to help them to improve their work. When the Regional Post 
collapsed, she was hired by the Regional Tribune, the Regional Post’s sister paper, to 
serve the same purpose. 
Greg: Worked for the City National for over 30 years. His career there progressed from serving 
as a general assignment writer, to writing features, to writing in a news magazine, and 
then to a role as an editor later in his career. For the last five years of his time at the 
National, Greg was the editor for a section of the paper. At the same time, he began 
teaching journalism classes at a local college. He took a buyout because he feared that the 
City National would lay him off or transfer him to an onerous position like midnight copy 
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editing. Fortunately, his work at the college allowed him to transition into a full-time 
position teaching and advising the student paper.  
Helen: An eminent journalist at the City National, Helen left the paper to pursue an opportunity 
as the leader of a nonprofit. Her transition ended up being extremely well timed, as many 
of her friends and peers were laid off shortly after she left. Helen continues to approach 
her work as a journalist. On every trip that she takes, she sets up site visits and documents 
the organization’s work and its purpose through her leadership position. She believes that 
journalists underestimate the power of their skills when applied to other job tasks. 
Henry: After 40 years in journalism filling various roles at City National, writing, editing, and 
selecting visuals for publication, Henry took a buyout and began working as an editor for 
CityNews.org. There he continues serving as an editor and working on visuals. 
Jack: After a distinguished career at the City National, Jack was laid off when the section that he 
edited was consolidated and its coverage drastically reduced. He took his experience in 
political reporting and used it to move into a position in government relations for a local 
college. Jack’s job is a combination of PR, political lobbying, journalism, and teaching, 
and while it continues to involve the content knowledge, skills, and connections that he 
developed though journalism, he does miss some aspects of the newsroom experience, 
though perhaps not as much as he had expected. He describes himself as being in a 12-
step program to recover from his addiction to journalism. 
Ruth: Worked her way up through the ranks in photography at the Regional Post. Ruth was laid 
off when the paper collapsed, and hired by another paper almost one year later. That 
paper laid her off with its entire photography department after three months. Six months 
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after that, Ruth found a job in photography at a third paper. Ruth has had a difficult time 
finding an organization that would provide her with the opportunity to use her training 
and talent. 
Jason: While serving as a national correspondent for the Regional Post, Jason became interested 
in small, local papers. He used his travel as an opportunity to learn more about these 
papers and when the Regional Post closed, Jason found a paper to buy. Owning nothing 
but a car, he poured his savings into the Highway Herald, his first major investment. 
Jason gathered numerous resources from the Regional Post and also from his background 
in journalism. The Herald has no online resources, and it is flourishing. 
Jeff: Was a general assignment photographer for the Regional Post. He launched a career as a 
freelance photographer after the paper closed. Jeff arrived at the Regional Post with solid 
photography skills, but he says that he learned to be a journalist through the mentorship 
and intensive feedback that he received at the paper.  
Jen: As a junior analyst at Walls Investment, Jen remained employed through the Global 
Investment collapse. Though more senior analysts were fired to reduce payroll burden, 
Jen kept her position. Walls brought one of its former fund managers to serve as head of 
research and under his leadership the relationship between research and investment 
advising improved. Jen’s job remained relatively consistent throughout the transition. 
Josh: A photographer at the Afternoon Dispatch, Josh and his wife have been able to develop a 
wedding photography business that seems reasonably successful. They have even been 
able to hire some of their former colleagues to shoot some of their weddings. The 
emergence of a photojournalistic aesthetic in the wedding photography business has 
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helped Josh to make immediate use of his style of photography and the routines with 
which he relates to his subjects. 
Judy: Worked for the Global Investment foundation, and was one of the few employees who 
moved from Global to Walls when the foundation was relocated to that organization. 
Judy has been able to keep up with the commitments of the foundation and to begin to 
develop relationships with Walls Investment employees that are akin to the relationships 
that connected Walls employees with their foundation, a sense of ownership that is a very 
important part of her approach to corporate social responsibility. 
Karen: Worked on presentation side of Regional Post. After the paper closed, she served as a 
caretaker in her family for a period of time, and has most recently taken an international 
position as an editor for a national media organization. 
Katrina: Wrote for the general assignment desk at the Local Blotter until being laid off by that 
paper. She was able to find a job at Local News, and was quickly transferred to cover the 
same beat that she’d covered at the Blotter. 
Keith: Left Capital Investment two years before the firm’s distressed acquisition. He took a 
sabbatical at that time before moving to a small firm. Keith’s interview demonstrates the 
similarity between the transitions within the industry during failure and under less 
economic stress. The financial services industry is characterized by numerous 
occupational transitions. Note: Keith does not fit into the sample because he left the firm 
so long before its distressed acquisition.  
Ken: Served as a photographer for City National and won numerous awards. Took a job at 
CityNews.org, and continues to shoot with the same aesthetic. 
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Kevin: Worked as a junior analyst at Capital Investment. Decided not to stay on beyond his two-
year commitment, and left just before Capital’s demise. His manager at Capital helped 
him to find a job with former colleagues at a hedge fund. His group was eventually split 
into an independent fund to which his employer contributed. He was transferred to 
another project, then hired by the split-off fund, and eventually laid off. Kevin described 
the lessons he learned at Capital as exceedingly narrow, but nonetheless useful. He found 
the investments of the hedge fund and its subsidiary to be reckless, and wasn’t surprised 
to see the fund collapse. He is now working to develop a similar investment product 
outside of a bank and then to broker it into a job.  
Lisa: A promising young reporter at City National, Lisa was laid off along with many long-
tenured employees. She found a job working for a nonprofit science organization where 
she applied her skills as a journalist to explain the organization’s purpose and to tell the 
stories of its employees. At the same time she continued to write stories as a freelance 
journalist, one of which was published on the front page of the City National. She 
continued to network with journalists and to participate in some national organizations, 
and after over a year at the science organization, Lisa received an offer to return to 
journalism. 
Maria: As a science writer for the Afternoon Dispatch, Maria distinguished herself by making 
some of the technical stories clear to the paper’s audience. One of the few people from 
the Afternoon Dispatch to be hired by the Dispatch Journal, Maria was laid off shortly 
thereafter. She decided to relocate without a job. She writes a blog and describes herself 
as a “recovering journalist.” 
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Mark: Mark covered business for the Local Blotter, including the Blotter’s bankruptcy. He 
chose to leave the paper to get a job elsewhere in order to protect another employee from 
a layoff. Two years later he was rehired by the Blotter, and continues to write for them.  
Mary: A fairly serious writer, Mary came to newspapers by way of literary and travel 
magazines. She won awards for her writing at City National, but she was laid by the 
paper in a spate of dismissals. Mary has since spent her time as a caretaker and writing 
for an online project. The transition has been difficult and she is unsure when she will be 
ready to search for another job. 
Michelle: After being laid off from writing features for City National, Michelle was hired to 
work for CityNews.org. She continues to maintain relationships with a number of her 
former colleagues from the City National, many of whom were laid off at the same time 
that she was.  
Nathan: When Global Investment went bankrupt and was acquired by Adant, Nathan had 
already survived two mergers at other banks starting in the late nineties. Nathan’s project 
at Adant became high profile within the firm, but conflict within the organization made 
him accept an offer at another firm. He found his latest job through a former manager 
from Global, and was able to make a transition from working on the tech side to 
managing the technological support structure that was already in place.  
Norm: Worked in layout and design for the Regional Post for almost twenty years. Has been 
involved in post-failure projects like the Independent Regional Post and the In Region 
Times. Norm is closer to retirement than some of the other entrepreneurs, so for him 
these projects provided an opportunity to practice digital photography. For years he had 
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been selecting and positioning photographs, and now he was able to shoot them. He 
continues to be involved in some web projects in his spare time. 
Olivia: Beginning as a copy editor, Olivia worked at several small papers before she landed her 
first position at the City National. She eventually became an assigning “middle 
management” editor there. Later, Olivia edited features and made the unusual transition 
to serving as a staff writer. She wrote on a single topic for almost a decade until she was 
laid off. Since she has been trying to work with nonprofits related to her area of expertise, 
to help them with their communications. She has been very successful at doing this on a 
volunteer basis, but has had trouble getting the organizations to pay for it.  
Patrick: After twenty years in journalism, Patrick spent his last five years at the City National 
writing for a business section on technology. Then he was laid off. He has since been 
working for tech blogs, ghost blogging for companies, and helping with communication 
strategy.  
Paul: Freelancer worked with CityNews.org as it began its development. Has since taken a job 
with a foundation serving as a communications and web strategy person.  
Peter: An experienced sports writer, Peter worked at nine different papers and eventually took a 
buyout from City National. Since then he has been writing for CityNews.org, and has 
been appointed as the president of the Catholic High School that he attended many years 
before. 
Phil: With a bachelor’s degree in English, Phil says that he got his first newspaper job in order to 
keep his “80s rock band hair”. Twenty years later, he was covering layoffs and the 
downed economy when he was laid off himself. He ended up finding a job as a news 
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editor for a national online publication that focuses on local news and information about 
destinations. Phil struggles with the challenge of instilling the values and norms of 
journalism into a diffuse organization. 
Rachel: A page designer for the Regional Post, Rachel was very involved in the initial phase of 
the In Region Times, but when that project failed the new business model had less need 
for a page designer. Rachel couldn't find a journalism job locally, and her husband’s 
journalism job was worth keeping, so she decided to go back to school to get a master’s 
degree in education.  
Rebecca: After working as an analysis for over a decade in a medium size financial services 
organization, Rebecca decided to focus on classical music. She returned to Global 
Investment for a short time, but found her role in that organization to be unappealing and 
now continues to focus on her music. She also serves on the board of a local nonprofit 
music organization. 
Richard: After twenty years with City National, most spent as an international correspondent, 
the City National laid Richard off. Fortunately, he anticipated the layoff and had a job 
lined up teaching journalism at a university outside of the US. Richard continues to write 
and to teach the norms of journalism to his students.  
Rick: A photographer for the Afternoon Dispatch, Rick was laid off with the closure of the 
paper. He took time to travel internationally and to volunteer. Rick continues to freelance 
and has been working to start social venture that would subsidize photojournalism 
equipment and classes for underprivileged children in developing countries using revenue 
from wealthier photographers who want to learn to shoot. 
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Robert: Worked at Global Investment right out of college for just over a year before it collapsed. 
The collapse led him to reconsider his career. Robert has since focused on environmental 
engineering, a part of his undergraduate training that felt more substantial and meaningful 
than his background in finance. 
Roger: Roger went to work for Global Investment straight out of college. After four years he left 
for an MBA, and then returned to Global for a few more years. When Global collapsed, 
Roger’s division was acquired by Adant. The day after receiving his bonus, Roger 
resigned and went to work for Tech Inc..  
Roland: A talented photographer for the Regional Post, Roland’s post-failure transition was 
particularly difficult, including a divorce, a number of sometimes-dangerous temporary 
jobs, and a failed odyssey to capture the last images of communities that would be 
destroyed by a massive river dam. Roland says that the year after the failure was one of 
the best in his life. 
Sarah: Laid off from editing for the Regional Post, Sarah was heavily involved in post-failure 
organizing, both in the In Region Times and the Independent Regional Post. After these 
two projects failed, Sarah began developing her own freelance portfolio as a freelance 
editor. 
Scott: A well-regarded business journalist, Scott left City National of his own accord in order to 
join CityNews.org. Scott’s role is slightly different at CityNews: he is doing more to 
define the news that small organization produces and working to develop a partnership 
with a local public news organization through a different medium. 
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Steven: Worked at Capital until shortly after it was acquired by Enclave Investments. Moved to 
a multi-family office to manage a fund of hedge funds. When that office relocated, 
Steven went to work at starting his own firm. He believes that many investors wish to 
work with people who are independent of larger entities like banks, and that these 
relationships permit more trust. 
Tim: As a photographer at the Afternoon Dispatch, Tim expected for the paper to eventually 
close. When it happened it was a great loss, but not much of a surprise. The job that he 
found at the Regional Post seemed like a much more secure position until shortly after he 
arrived, when rumblings of the parent company’s search for a buyer began to be heard. 
When the firm collapsed, Tim returned to live with his family near where the Afternoon 
Dispatch had been. He continues to work as a photographer, doing some freelance and 
shooting for the Highway Herald, a part time arrangement that he found through common 
colleagues at the Regional Post. 
Trent: A multimedia producer for the Afternoon Dispatch, Trent found another job relatively 
quickly at an international paper. He was laid off from that job as well, and then rehired 
by the parent company of the firm to work in the US.  
Victor: After working in compliance at Global Investment, Victor departed from the firm at 
exactly the right time, narrowly avoiding the firm’s bankruptcy. After finishing his MBA 
Victor found a job on the buy-side of the business working for a firm where he had 
interned during his MBA.  
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